这可能是泡沫,否则投资何处
这很可能是个泡沫——2025 年第四季度信函,但还有大量其他投资机会。一个不可知论投资者的投资策略。作者:本·英克 | 资产配置执行摘要。在我们看来,人工智能看起来是一个典型的投资泡沫,估值极高,且存在大量投机迹象。但我们认识到,尽管许多投资者担心人工智能可能是个泡沫,他们对此远非确信,并且倾向于默认市场定价合理,将其作为一个相当强的先验假设。在诸多泡沫中,这种情况会使构建一个稳健的投资组合近乎不可能,因为如果你相信泡沫存在,你持有的组合在正常时期将是疯狂之举。例如,2007-2008 年的“万物泡沫”和 2021 年的“持续期泡沫”,都是这样的泡沫:如果你相信泡沫存在,正确的组合恰恰是在市场定价合理时预期回报低得令人无法接受的组合。但 2025 年的人工智能泡沫与这两者都大不相同,反而更像 2000 年的互联网泡沫。在那个泡沫中,对泡沫不持立场的投资者,无论身处泡沫还是正常市况,都可以持有一个风险回报权衡合理的投资组合。如今,非美国股票、深度价值股和流动性另类资产提供的回报,无论人工智能是否存在泡沫,看起来都合理甚至更好。根据罗伯特·席勒的总回报周期调整市盈率,标普 500 指数目前交易水平高于其 1929 年和 2021 年的峰值,并且比 2000 年峰值低约 13%。如果我们将投资组合从人工智能股票转向这些资产,即便金融市场在某种程度上仍与 2000 年峰值水平相当,也可能在泡沫被证实时为投资者避免大量痛苦。按标准周期调整市盈率计算,我们更接近 2000 年峰值;按市销率和市净率计算,目前处于历史最高位,但仍处于合理定价区间。
IT’S PROBABLY A BUBBLE, QUARTERLY LETTER 4Q 2025 BUT THERE IS PLENTY ELSE TO INVEST IN An Agnostic Investor’s Playbook Ben Inker | Asset Allocation Executive Summary AI looks like a classic investment bubble to us, with very high valuations and signs of rampant speculation. But we recognize that while many investors harbor fears that AI might be a bubble, they are far from sure of that fact and tend to assume the market is appropriately priced as a fairly strong prior. In many bubbles, such a scenario would make building a strong portfolio close to impossible since the portfolio you’d hold if you believe in the bubble is a portfolio that would be crazy to hold if times were normal. The 2007-8 Everything Bubble and the 2021 Duration Bubble, for instance, were both bubbles in which the right portfolio to own if you believed there was a bubble was a portfolio that would have an unacceptably low expected return if markets were fairly priced. But the 2025 AI Bubble looks little like either of those two and much more like the 2000 Internet Bubble, in which a bubble-agnostic investor could have owned a portfolio with a reasonable risk/reward trade-off in either a bubble or a business-as-usual scenario. Today, non-U.S. equities, deep value stocks, and liquid 1 alternatives offer returns that look reasonable or better, regardless of whether AI is in a bubble. Tilting On Robert Shiller’s Total Return CAPE, the S&P 500 is trading above its 1929 and 2021 peaks and is about 13% a portfolio away from AI names and toward those assets may save investors a lot of pain if it turns out lower than the 2000 peak. On standard CAPE, it is closer we are in a bubble without meaningfully reducing expected returns if financial markets are somehow still to the 2000 peak. On price/sales and price/book, it is still fairly priced today. at an all-time high.
Thinking Machines 今年早些时候以 100 亿美元估值融资 20 亿美元,显然没有告诉投资者——“当一个人的收入取决于他对某事的无知时,要让他理解这件事就很难。”——厄普顿·辛克莱他们当时的计划是什么。诚然,他们似乎后来想出了一个计划,而投资者一定认为这是个好计划,因为大约三个月后他们就以 500 亿美元估值在融资了。这计划一定相当厉害。
Thinking Machines raised $2 billion earlier this year at a $10 billion valuation, apparently without telling investors “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary what their plan was. Admittedly, they seem to have come depends upon his not understanding it.” —Upton Sinclair up with one since then, and investors must think it’s a good one, given they’re raising capital at a $50 billion valuation about three months later. Must be one hell of a plan.
3 引言 AMD 宣布合作当天股价飙升 24%——我认为大多数人都承认,如今人工智能及相关股票很可能存在泡沫。我不会对 OpenAI 的情况多费口舌,但甲骨文在宣布其合作后股价大涨 36%。我不想花太多时间讨论证据,但可指出的迹象比比皆是。标普 500 指数目前的估值水平仅在互联网泡沫时期出现过,在某些指标上甚至比当时还要昂贵。而 Palantir 的市销率高达 120 倍,几乎可以肯定比历史上任何其他超大盘公司都要高。在投机狂热的其他迹象中,狂热的风险投资者正将数十亿美元砸向人工智能初创公司,估值动辄数十亿,却连对方的计划都没听过。股票投资者仅因与 OpenAI 的投资交易,就将大型公司的市值推高数千亿美元——这家公司的收入要增长一百倍才能兑现其承诺。投资者如此急于押注下一件大事,以至于过去一年里将量子计算股票的价格推高了 1200% 甚至更多,估值水平之高让 Palantir 看起来都像一只价值股。这在我们看来显然是个泡沫,尽管我不认为能说服那些信奉“这次真的不一样”的人工智能信徒相信这一事实。但本封信并非为信徒而写,而是为“不可知论投资者”而写的。这样的投资者承认有大量证据表明我们身处泡沫之中,但同时也相信,尽管有这些证据,一个合理的出发点仍是:所有资产在任何时候都被定价为提供正常回报。泡沫通常是不可知论投资者的问题,但有些泡沫比其他泡沫更棘手。今天这个泡沫的好消息是,它允许不可知论投资者构建一个投资组合,如果泡沫最终破裂,这个组合能大幅跑赢市场;如果所有资产都提供正常回报,这个组合也能表现不错。这很可能是个泡沫,但还有大量其他可投资标的 | 第 2 页
3 Introduction AMD rose 24% the day it announced their arrangement I think most people can admit that there may well be a bubble in AI and related stocks today. I won’t with OpenAI, and Oracle leapt 36% upon the announcement of theirs. spend a lot of time discussing the evidence, but there is plenty to point to. The S&P 500 is trading at 4 valuation levels only seen during the Internet Bubble, and on some measures, is even more expensive While Palantir trades at 120 times sales, almost certainly now than it was then.1 Among other signs of rampant speculation, frantic venture capitalists are higher than any other megacap company in history, Rigetti Computing and D-Wave Quantum trade at 1007 and 318 throwing money at AI startups at multi-billion-dollar valuations without even being told their plans.2 times sales, respectively. As those two companies are Equity investors are bidding up the value of giant companies by hundreds of billions of dollars due to directly competing with Microsoft, Alphabet, IBM, and other extremely deep-pocketed companies in the nascent investment deals with OpenAI, a company whose revenues would have to rise a hundredfold to make quantum computing space, it shows almost touching faith good on its promises.3 Investors are so desperate to get in early on the next big thing that they’ve bid by investors to assume they will somehow wind up the winners if quantum computing ever amounts to anything. up the prices of quantum computing stocks 1200% or more over the past year, and at valuations that 5 make Palantir look like a value stock.4 It certainly looks like a bubble to us, although I don’t believe I’ll The degree of “this time is different” is truly next-level convince any true believers in the AI version of “this time it really is different” of that fact.5 This letter this time around. The inimitable Matt Levine pointed out in his October 15 column "OpenAI Has a Business Plan" is not written for the true believer, however. It is written instead for the “agnostic investor.” Such an that Sam Altman effectively said in an interview that their investor is one who recognizes that there is plenty of evidence indicating we are in a bubble, but also business plan was, “We will create God and then ask it for money.” Mark Zuckerberg also recently said on the ACCESS harbors a belief that, despite that evidence, a decent starting assumption is that all assets are priced podcast that they’d rather risk misspending a couple to deliver a normal return at all times. Bubbles are usually a problem for the agnostic investor, but hundred billion dollars than risk missing out on being first to superintelligence. some bubbles are more of a problem than others. The good news about today’s bubble is that it's one It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p2 that allows an agnostic investor to build a portfolio that can strongly outperform if there is a bubble that ultimately bursts, and can also do just fine if all assets deliver normal returns.
泡沫分类学
21 世纪金融市场的一个好处是,它们在大多数投资者记忆犹新的时间里,制造了种类繁多的有趣泡沫。20 世纪 90 年代末,当我们论证互联网泡沫时,可参照的案例只有 1929 年的美国、19 世纪 60 年代的英国铁路热潮,以及 17 世纪 30 年代的郁金香狂热。6 除了 20 世纪 80 年代的日本(当时已被视为与任何“正常”国家无关而摒弃),绝大多数投资者一生中从未见过真正有意义的投资泡沫。7 但过去 25 年,发达国家给了我们三大泡沫:2000 年的互联网泡沫、2007-2008 年的万物泡沫,以及 2021 年的久期泡沫。这些泡沫所涉及的资产类别差异巨大,投资者保护自身投资组合所需的应对方式也截然不同。在所有这些泡沫中,当前的事件看起来最像 2000 年的互联网泡沫,这对不可知论投资者来说应该是一种安慰。尽管动态的、基于估值的资产配置在这三个泡沫中都为许多投资者减轻了大量痛苦,但只有在 2000 年的那次泡沫中,你才有可能避免巨额损失,而不必持有一个在正常情况下看起来很疯狂的组合。
A Taxonomy of Bubbles One nice thing about 21st-century financial markets is that they’ve generated an interesting variety of bubbles well within the memory of most investors. When we made our case for the Internet Bubble in the late 1990s, our options were limited to the U.S. in 1929, the British Railway boom of the 1860s, and the Tulip Mania of the 1630s.6 Outside of 1980s Japan, which had already been shrugged off as irrelevant to any “normal” country, the vast majority of investors hadn’t seen a meaningful investment bubble in their lifetimes.7 But the last 25 years have given us three major bubbles in the developed world: the 2000 Internet Bubble, the 2007-8 Everything Bubble, and the 2021 Duration Bubble. Each of these bubbles varied significantly in terms of the assets involved and required investors to respond quite differently to protect their portfolios. Of them all, the current event looks most like the Internet Bubble of 2000, which should be a relief to the agnostic investor. While dynamic, valuation-driven asset allocation saved many investors considerable pain in all three bubbles, only in the 2000 event was it possible to spare yourself large losses without having to own a portfolio that would have been crazy to hold in any normal situation.
2000 年的互联网泡沫
互联网泡沫的故事对多数人来说已足够熟悉,无需过多复述。互联网和当时(相对)现代的手机网络所体现的通信与计算领域的真正突破,引发了一场投资狂潮:投资者高估了通信流量的增长速度,也高估了参与这场繁荣的公司的投资回报。投资者在新兴经济体中鉴别最终赢家时,表现得既差劲又毫无甄别力。标普 500 指数攀升至前所未有的估值水平,领涨的是科技和电信公司,它们的估值高得不可持续,有些甚至商业模式本身也难以为继。供应商提供的卖方融资(vendor financing)以及互联网公司之间的循环交易,制造了比实际更大的活跃度和终端用户需求假象。结果,标普 500 指数从 2000 年夏季到 2003 年春季实际下跌了 45%,而科技股密集的纳斯达克综合指数则暴跌 79%。这是一个巨大的泡沫,给许多投资者带来了重大痛苦,但这种痛苦在很大程度上是可以避免的,即便是对那些没有非凡预见力的人也是如此。要理解原因,不妨从估值角度审视泡沫的顶峰。图 1 展示了 2000 年 6 月的风险/回报散点图,使用的是我们当时发布的资产类别预测。8
图 1:2000 年 6 月的风险/回报权衡
关于泡沫的一本好书,我们推荐此前同事爱德华·钱塞勒(Edward Chancellor)所著的《恶魔噬人:谁跑得慢谁遭殃》(Devil Take the Hindmost)。他与人合著、将于明年 1 月出版的新书《永久熊市的诞生》(The Making of a Permabear)同样值得一读!
The Internet Bubble of 2000 The story of the Internet Bubble is familiar enough to most not to require a lot of retelling. The genuine breakthroughs in communications and computing that embodied the internet and (relatively) modern cell phone networks of the time sparked an investment frenzy where investors overestimated the rate of growth in communications traffic as well as the returns on investment for companies participating in the boom. Investors also did a poor and indiscriminate job of picking the eventual winners in the new economy that was being created. The S&P 500 rose to never-before-seen valuation levels, led by technology and telecommunications firms trading at unsustainably high valuations, sometimes with unsustainable business models as well. Vendor financing by suppliers and circular deals among internet firms created the illusion of greater activity and end-user demand than there actually was, and the S&P 500 ultimately fell by 45% in real terms from the summer of 2000 to the spring of 2003, while the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite fell by 79%. It was a massive bubble that led to major pain for many investors, but that pain was largely avoidable, even for those without heroic prescience. To see why, it’s helpful to look at the height of the bubble through a valuation lens. Exhibit 1 shows a risk/reward scatterplot from June 2000 using the asset class forecasts we had published at the time.8 EXHIBIT 1: RISK/REWARD TRADE-OFF IN JUNE 2000 For an excellent book on bubbles, we recommend “Devil 10% Expected Annualized 10-Year Real Return Take the Hindmost” by our former colleague, Edward Emerging Equities Chancellor. His new book, co-written with Jeremy REITS Grantham and coming out this January, “The Making of a 8% Permabear,” is well worth a read too!
6% 新兴市场债券 7 等权重风险投资组合
6% Emerging Bonds 7 Equal-Wtd Risk Port.
20 世纪 70 年代初的“漂亮 50”时代无疑是一个泡沫,但整体来看,美国股市在 1972 年“漂亮 50”估值顶峰时的价格,远比 60 年代中期便宜得多,而 60 年代的估值顶峰又远低于 1929 年的水平。自 1994 年我们开始发布资产类别预测以来,其背后的基本思路一直保持一致,但一些细节随时间发生了变化。值得注意的是,2000 年时,我们假设资产需要 10 年才能回归公允价值;从 2003 年起,我们将这一假设改为 7 年;从 2010 年代中期开始,我们还开始考虑均衡利率的多种情景。既然美国大盘股的估值正处于历史最高位,其预期实际回报显著为负。但对于一个愿意放眼别处的投资者来说,可做的事情还有很多。其他几种风险资产相对于历史而言价格低廉,提供了高于正常水平的预期回报。尽管存在泡沫,投资者总体上承担风险实际上获得了不错的回报。通过预测数据绘制一条风险/回报回归线可以说明这一点:该线的斜率 +0.4 距离均衡斜率 +0.6 并不遥远。超越市值加权组合进行多元化的好处巨大;我们预测的风险资产等权重组合预期实际回报为 +4.1%,远高于 MSCI 世界指数的 -1.2%。
The “Nifty 50” era of the early 1970s was certainly a bubble U.S. Gov’t. Slope = +0.4 in large cap growth stocks relative to small cap value 4% TIPS Bonds Int'l. Small Caps stocks, but the overall U.S. stock market was substantially 2% U.S. Small Cap cheaper at the peak of the Nifty 50 in 1972 than it had been Intl. Gov't. Bonds in the mid-1960s, and the valuation peak of the 1960s was Cash Int'l. Large Caps substantially lower than what had been reached in 1929. 0% 8 MSCI World While the basic idea behind our asset class forecasts -2% U.S. Large Caps has been consistent since we started publishing them in 1994, some details have changed with time. It’s worth -4% noting that in 2000, we assumed assets would take 10 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% years to revert to fair value. Starting in 2003, we changed this assumption to 7 years. Beginning in the mid-2010s, Expected Annualized 10-Year Volatility we also began contemplating multiple scenarios of equilibrium interest rates. As of 6/30/2000 | Source: GMO It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p3 With U.S. large cap stocks trading at their highest valuations ever, their expected return was significantly negative in real terms. But for an investor prepared to look elsewhere, there was plenty to do. Several other risk assets were trading cheaply relative to history and offered better-than-normal expected returns. Despite the bubble, investors were actually getting paid nicely for taking risk overall. Drawing a risk/reward regression line through the forecasts illustrates this: the line’s slope of +0.4 is not far off an equilibrium slope of +0.6. The benefit to diversifying beyond a cap-weighted portfolio was huge; an equal-weighted portfolio of the risk assets we forecasted had an expected return of +4.1% real, far higher than the MSCI World’s -1.2%.
值得强调的是,这些预测并非基于任何关于泡沫何时破裂的假设——它们仅仅假设资产价格将在 10 年内平稳回归公允价值。你无需相信自己知道泡沫何时会破裂,也能理解持有其他资产是更明智的选择。而且,你也无需整体减少股票或风险资产的持仓。在通胀保值债券(TIPS)提供 4% 实际收益率的背景下,将资金转向低风险资产绝非疯狂之举,我们的投资组合也确实持有高于正常水平的债券配置,但构建一个价格极具吸引力的多元化风险资产组合,实际上相当容易。你只需要愿意接受相对于传统市值加权股票组合而言,出现一定程度的跟踪误差。如果那位不可知论投资者相信,所有资产有 50% 的概率是公允定价的,另有 50% 的概率估值最终会均值回归(正如我们的预测所假设的那样),答案就非常明显了。一个包含国际小盘股、房地产投资信托基金(REITs)、新兴市场股票、新兴市场债券,以及发达市场政府债券的组合,才是值得持有的。9 如果最终所有资产都被证明定价公允,该组合的风险和预期回报将与“正常”平衡型组合非常相似。但与正常组合不同的是,如果怀疑中的泡沫最终成真,这个组合仍然能够提供强劲的预期回报。
It is worth noting that these forecasts were not driven by any assumption about the timing of the bubble bursting—they merely assumed asset prices would smoothly revert to fair value over 10 years. You didn’t need to believe you knew when the bubble would burst to understand that you were better off owning other assets. And you didn’t need to reduce your overall holdings of equities or risk assets in general. With TIPS offering 4% real yields, moving money into lower-risk assets certainly wasn’t a crazy idea, and we did have higher-than-normal exposures to bonds in our portfolios, but it was actually pretty easy to build a diversified portfolio of risk assets trading at very attractive prices. It only required a willingness to accept a fair bit of tracking error relative to a traditional cap-weighted equity portfolio. If our agnostic investor believed there was a 50% chance that all assets were fairly priced and a 50% chance that valuations would eventually mean-revert (as our forecasts assumed), the answer was pretty obvious. A portfolio of international small caps, REITs, emerging equity, and emerging debt, alongside developed market government bonds, was the one to own.9 If everything had turned out to be priced fairly, the portfolio’s risk and return expectations would have been very similar to those of a “normal” balanced portfolio. But unlike the normal portfolio, this portfolio would still have a strong expected return if the suspected bubble turned out to be real.
在 GMO,我们当时毫不怀疑 2000 年的泡沫就是货真价实的泡沫。我们在客户允许的范围内,果断地将资产配置组合从美国大盘股转向更为便宜的资产。(具体各泡沫高峰期的组合持仓见附录。)因此,从 2000 年到 2003 年,我们的全球资产配置策略 10 每年跑赢 65% 全球股票/35% 美国综合债券 11 基准超过 10 个百分点,在标普 500 指数的熊市期间实现了实际正收益,而 65/35 基准经通胀调整后下跌超过 27%。等到传统的 65/35 组合在 2005 年底于实际价值上重新回到 2000 年高点时,我们的策略已经上涨了超过 50%,实现了 7.3% 的年度实际净回报率。
At GMO, we had no doubts in our minds that the 2000 bubble was indeed a bubble. We moved our asset allocation portfolios aggressively away from U.S. large caps and toward the cheaper assets accordingly, within the bounds our clients allowed. (See Appendix for our portfolio holdings at each bubble’s peak.) Our Global Asset Allocation Strategy10 was therefore able to outperform the 65% Global Equities/35% U.S. Aggregate Bond11 benchmark by over 10% per year from 2000 to 2003, making money in real terms during the S&P 500’s bear market, while the 65/35 benchmark fell by over 27% after inflation. By the time the traditional 65/35 portfolio regained its 2000 peak in real terms at the end of 2005, our strategy was up more than 50%, an annualized net return of 7.3% real.
2007-2008 年的“万物泡沫” 然而,2005 年的市场并未完全恢复正常。事实上,一场全球房地产泡沫已接近顶峰,助长房地产投机的宽松货币政策也鼓励投资者推高了各类风险资产的价格。到 2007 年,这已演变成杰里米·格兰瑟姆所称的“万物泡沫”,各类风险资产同时变得估值过高。这为投资者带来了截然不同的挑战,如图表 2 所示,该图是我们截至 2007 年 6 月的资产类别预测的风险/收益散点图。如果你将投资组合偏向价值股那一半,表现本可以更好,因为当时价值股相对于市场的折价幅度达到了有史以来之最。
The Everything Bubble of 2007-8 But markets were not entirely back to normal in 2005. In fact, a global housing bubble was already nearing its peak, and the loose monetary policy that enabled speculation in real estate had encouraged investors to bid up risk assets of all kinds. By 2007, this had turned into what Jeremy Grantham dubbed the “Everything Bubble,” where risk assets of all kinds had become overpriced 9 simultaneously.12 This provided a very different challenge for investors, as shown in Exhibit 2, a You could have done even better by biasing your portfolio risk/reward scatterplot of our asset class forecasts as of June 2007. toward the value half of those groups, given value stocks were trading at their widest-ever discounts to the market.
虽然我们在 1999 年秋天就开始跟客户探讨无基准投资的方式,但直到 2001 年秋天才迎来该策略的第一个客户。我们推荐股票的模拟组合,表现比当时实际操作的全球资产配置策略还要好。
While we had started talking to clients about investing in a benchmark-free manner in the fall of 1999, we didn’t get our first client in the strategy until the fall of 2001. The paper portfolio of our recommendations would have done even better than the Global Asset Allocation Strategy we were running at the time.
具体基准构成是:48.75% 标普 500 指数 / 16.25% MSCI 全球除美国指数 / 35% 彭博美国综合债券指数。
The specific benchmark was 48.75% S&P 500/16.25% MSCI ACWI ex-U.S./35% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond.
当时,我们几乎所有的客户在股票投资组合中都明显偏向本国市场。
Almost all our clients at the time had a significant home bias to their equity portfolios.
它无处不在,渗透万物:第一个真正的全球性泡沫(Grantham,2007 年)。
It’s Everywhere, in Everything: The First Truly Global Bubble (Grantham 2007).
这可能是个泡沫,但还有很多其他东西可以投资 | 第 4 页 图 2:2007 年 6 月的风险/回报权衡
4%
预期年化 7 年实际回报 3%
TIPS
国际政府债券
2%
美国国债
现金
新兴市场债券
1%
0%
-1%
REITs
新兴市场股票
等权风险组合
国际大盘股
-2%
MSCI 世界指数
美国大盘股
国际小盘股
斜率 = -0.5
-3%
美国小盘股
-4%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12%
预期年化 7 年波动率
截至 2007 年 6 月 30 日 | 来源:GMO
尽管此时美国大盘股再次被大幅高估,但它们还不是最严重的,全球范围内的小盘股被高估得更厉害。但从宏观层面看,这个泡沫与 2000 年的互联网泡沫有两点极其显著的差异。第一,风险/回报线的斜率在 2000 年是建设性的 +0.4,到这时已经变成令人震惊的负值 -0.5。投资者第一次似乎在为承担风险而付钱。理解这一点,并不需要解读金融体系的过度杠杆化程度,也不需要预知即将到来的全球金融危机的时机。我们的预测只是假设各个资产类别需要 7 年时间回归公允价值。而且即使回归需要那么长时间,每一个高风险资产 13 的预期回报都低于每一个低风险资产 14。与 2000 年不同,这次不论你是持有市值加权还是等权版本的风险资产,结果都差不多,因为等权风险资产组合的预期回报几乎和 MSCI 世界指数一样糟糕。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p4 EXHIBIT 2: RISK/REWARD TRADE-OFF IN JUNE 2007 4% Expected Annualized 7-Year Real Return 3% TIPS Intl. Gov't. Bonds 2% U.S. Gov't. Bonds Cash Emerging Bonds 1% 0% -1% REITs Emerging Equities Equal-Wtd Risk Port. Int'l. Large Caps -2% MSCI World U.S. Large Caps Int'l. Small Caps Slope = -0.5 -3% U.S. Small Cap -4% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Expected Annualized 7-Year Volatility As of 6/30/2007 | Source: GMO While U.S. large cap stocks were again substantially overvalued by this point, they weren’t the worst offenders, with small cap stocks around the world substantially more overvalued. But at a high level, there were two extremely striking differences between this bubble and the 2000 Internet Bubble. First, the slope of the risk/reward line, which had been a constructive +0.4 in 2000, had by this point become a shockingly negative -0.5. For the first time ever, investors appeared to be paying for the privilege of taking risk. Understanding this did not require deciphering how overleveraged the financial system had become, nor the ability to divine the timing of the forthcoming Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Our forecasts simply assumed that asset classes would take seven years to revert to fair value. And even if reversion had taken that long to occur, every single risky asset13 had a lower expected return than every single low-risk asset.14 Unlike in 2000, this time it didn’t much matter whether you owned a cap-weighted or equal-weighted version of the risk assets, as the expected return of the equal-weighted portfolio of risk assets was almost as bad as the MSCI World.
这种情况让不可知论投资者陷入了非常棘手的境地。如果你相信估值信号所传递的信息,你应该持有的理性投资组合,与资产价格全部公平时你会持有的组合截然不同。在风险资产内部进行分散化投资,无法带来任何有意义的帮助。你必须降低投资组合的风险,而对于不可知论投资者来说,降低风险本身就是一件风险极高的事情。如果估值给了你错误的信号,而资产实际上定价合理,那么降低风险会让你进入一个预期回报率低得多的投资组合——这个组合绝不可能产生投资者长期所依赖的实际回报水平。由于大多数终端客户和投资委员会充其量只能算作不可知论者,这让他们的顾问和首席投资官(即便他们坚信泡沫确实存在)陷入了极为尴尬的境地。要证明降低风险是正确的决策,他们并不需要相信崩盘会马上发生,但在被解雇——或至少被迫重新买入风险资产之前,他们并没有太多时间来证明自己的判断。投资者一旦怀疑自己错过了上涨的市场,很快就会变得焦躁不安。
This situation put the agnostic investor in a very difficult position. The rational portfolio to own if you believed what valuations were telling you was drastically different from the portfolio you would own if everything was priced fairly. Diversifying within risky assets couldn’t help in any meaningful way. You had to de-risk the portfolio, and de-risking is an extremely risky thing for an agnostic investor to do. If valuation is giving you the wrong signal and assets are fairly priced, de-risking puts you in a much lower expected return portfolio—one that could not possibly deliver the level of real returns investors count on in the long term. Since most end clients and investment committees were, at best, in the agnostic camp, this left their advisors and CIOs—even if they believed wholeheartedly in the existence of a bubble—in a very tough spot. While they didn’t need to believe the bust was imminent for de-risking to be the right call, they didn’t have much time to be proven right before getting fired, or at least before being forced to buy back into risk assets. Investors can get antsy quickly when they suspect they’re missing out on rising markets.
我们选择遵从估值信号,大幅降低了投资组合的风险。在 GMO 基准无约束策略(该策略赋予我们最大的灵活性)中,到 2008 年夏季,我们将股票敞口削减至 25%。这 25% 全部投向 GMO 的质量策略,因为我们相信,若经济衰退演变为大萧条,高品质公司最有可能存活下来。实际发生的全球金融危机(GFC)甚至比 2000 年的下跌更为猛烈:一个由 60% MSCI 全球全市场指数与 40% 彭博美国综合债券构成的组合,从 2007 年秋季到 2009 年冬季,实际价值下跌了 37%。而在基准无约束策略中,我们将回撤幅度控制在了 20%,到 2009 年底实际价值便创下新高;相比之下,那个 60/40 组合直到 2013 年才收复 2007 年的实际峰值。
We chose to follow the valuations and aggressively de-risked our portfolios. In the GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy (where we had the most flexibility), we reduced our equity exposure to 25% by the summer of 2008. We invested all 25% in GMO’s Quality Strategy, driven by our belief that high-quality companies would be the most likely survivors should a downturn turn into a depression. The actual GFC downturn was even sharper than that of the 2000 event, with a 60% MSCI ACWI/40% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate bond portfolio falling 37% in real terms from the 13 fall of 2007 to the winter of 2009. In Benchmark-Free, we cut that drawdown to 20% and reached a Equities, REITs, and emerging debt. new high in real terms by the end of 2009, whereas the 60/40 portfolio took until 2013 to surpass its Cash, TIPS, and U.S. and international government bonds. 2007 peak in real terms.
这可能是个泡沫,但可投资的标的还有很多 | 第 5 页 2021 年期限泡沫¹⁵ 接下来形成的泡沫,对我们这位不可知论投资者来说,可能更难应对。到 2021 年底,自 2008 年以来基本沉寂的通胀卷土重来,截至 11 月的一年里上涨了 6.8%。然而市场似乎并不在意。短期国债收益率仍为零,10 年期国债仅提供 1.5% 的微薄收益率。这并非因为投资者假设消费价格会迅速回落到正常水平。当时,10 年期通胀保值国债(TIPS)收益率为 -1.04%,意味着任何借钱给美国政府十年的人,实际都将遭受重大损失。问题并不限于政府债券。标普 500 指数的周期性调整市盈率(CAPE)达到除 2000 年互联网泡沫巅峰前后几个月外的历史最高水平,而全球几乎所有其他资产也加入了这场狂欢,如图表 3 所示。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p5 The 2021 Duration Bubble15 The next bubble to form was arguably even trickier for our agnostic investor to handle. By the end of 2021, the inflation that had been largely quiescent since 2008 had come back with a vengeance, rising 6.8% in the year to November. And yet markets didn’t seem to care. T-Bills still yielded zero, while the 10-year note offered a meager 1.5%. This was not because investors assumed that consumer prices would quickly fall back to normal levels. At the time, 10-year TIPS yielded -1.04%, promising significant losses in real terms for anyone who lent money to the U.S. government for a decade. The problem was not limited to government bonds. The S&P 500 hit its highest ever cyclically adjusted P/E outside of a few months around the peak of the 2000 Internet Bubble, and almost all other assets around the world had joined in the fun, as shown in Exhibit 3.
附录 3风险/回报权衡图 2021 年 12 月
| 预期年化 7 年实际收益率 | 新兴市场股票 5% |
|---|---|
| 4% | |
| 3% | |
| 2% | |
| 斜率 = +0.6 | 国际小盘股 1% |
| 国际大盘股 0% | |
| 新兴市场债券 | |
| 斜率(不含新兴市场)= +0.1 | 等权风险组合 -1% |
| 现金 -2% | 通胀保值国债 |
| MSCI 全球指数 -3% | |
| 美国国债 -4% | |
| 美国小盘股 -5% | |
| 国际国债 | 房地产投资信托基金 |
| 美国大盘股 -6% | |
| 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% | |
| 预期年化 7 年波动率 |
本着完全披露的精神,尽管我们在当时已撰写了多篇文章,警告投资者关于股票泡沫以及债券收益率过低的问题,但我们仍尚未在正式文章中将其称为“久期”泡沫。在这个泡沫中,问题尤其不在于投资者承担风险却得不到回报。见《政府债券已给予我们如此之多,它们还能再给予什么?》(因克 2020 年)、《投机与投资:为何当今的飞股如此可能坠落回地面》(因克 2021 年);以及《让狂欢开始吧:(临近尾声的)美国首次泡沫盛宴》(格兰瑟姆 2022 年)。
到此时,我们已明确考虑多种将均衡利率纳入预测的情景,这张图就是这些情景的加权平均值。如果我们只采用 2000 年或 2007 年时的估值假设,预测结果本会更加悲观,回归线的斜率也会变为负值。
风险/回报回归线的斜率正常值为 +0.6,尽管这很大程度上是由于当时新兴市场股票并未特别高估。将新兴市场股票从回归结果中排除后,斜率降至 +0.1,这当然并不令人鼓舞,但仍不似 2007-08 年“万物泡沫”那样的灾难。这一次的麻烦在于,几乎所有资产的预期实际收益率都是负值。16 同样,在风险资产内部进行分散也无济于事,因为一个等权重的风险资产组合,其预期收益率与 MSCI 全球指数非常接近。降低风险,就像投资者在 2007 年可能做的那样,从股票转向政府债券,同样没有帮助,因为政府债券的估值过高程度丝毫不亚于股票。这个泡沫遍布所有类型的长期资产。股票和房地产,其久期甚至比典型的长期资产还要长。
截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日 | 来源:GMO
EXHIBIT 3RISK/REWARD TRADE-OFF DECEMBER 2021 5% Expected Annualized 7-Year Real Return Emerging Equities 4% 3% 2% Slope = +0.6 Int'l. Small Caps 1% Int'l. Large Caps 0% Emerging Bonds Slope ex-EM = +0.1 -1% Equal-Wtd Risk Port. -2% Cash TIPS MSCI World -3% U.S. Gov't. Bonds -4% U.S. Small Cap -5% Intl. Gov't. Bonds REITS U.S. Large Caps -6% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Expected Annualized 7-Year Volatility In the spirit of full disclosure, although we had written several pieces warning investors about both a stock As of 12/31/2021 | Source: GMO bubble and the problem of excessively low bond yields at the time, we had yet to label it a “duration” bubble in print. In this bubble, the trouble was not particularly that investors weren’t getting paid to take risk. See Government Bonds Have Given Us So Much, Do They Have Anything Left to Give? (Inker 2020), Speculation and The slope of the risk/reward regression line was normal at +0.6, although that was largely due to Investment: Why Today's Highfliers Are so Likely to Fall emerging equities, which were not particularly overpriced at the time. Excluding emerging equities Back to Earth (Inker 2021); and Let the Wild Rumpus Begin: (Approaching the End of) The First U.S. Bubble Extravaganza from the regression results in a slope of +0.1, which is certainly uninspiring, but still not the disaster (Grantham 2022). of the 2007-8 Everything Bubble. The trouble this time was the fact that almost all expected returns were negative in real terms.16 Again, diversification within risk assets didn’t help much, as an equal-By this point, we were explicitly considering multiple scenarios for incorporating equilibrium interest rates into weighted portfolio of risk assets had a very similar expected return as MSCI World. De-risking, as our forecasts, and this chart is the weighted average of an investor might have done in 2007, by moving from stocks to government bonds, also didn’t help those scenarios. If we had only been making the valuation assumptions we made in 2000 or 2007, the forecasts since government bonds were no less overvalued than stocks. This bubble spanned across all kinds would have been even more negative, and the slope of the of long-duration assets. Equities and real estate, which have even more duration than a typical regression line would have been negative.
债券也被一同卷入了固定收益资产领域。17 尽管投资者更习惯于从久期角度思考固定收益工具,而非那些现金流可变的资产,但对我们的不可知论投资者而言,这却构成了一个几乎无法解决的问题——无论是通过向债券进行风险转移,还是通过跨风险资产进行多元化配置,都无法化解这一难题。18 面对这些预测,现金的预期回报率比债券或股票更高,但现金的实际收益率却为零。如果存在任何有意义的可能性,即尽管估值偏高,资产却在某种程度上仍属“正常”定价,那么如果你相信存在泡沫,就不得不在泡沫破裂前持有现金这一资产——但现金却是一项无论是否存在泡沫都注定会因通胀而贬值的资产!如果泡沫有可能在短期内破裂,那么转向短期投资的吸引力显而易见,因为在这种情况下,债券和股票的回报率将远为负面。而考虑到当时的高通胀水平,泡沫在相对短期内破裂的催化剂已相当明确。即便如此,这一判断仍可能成为我们的不可知论投资者职业生涯中迄今为止最艰难的抉择。2021 年对于风险平价投资组合而言同样是一场彻头彻尾的噩梦。尽管风险平价投资组合看似分散了多种风险,但它们本质上高度依赖的一种风险恰恰是久期风险——在久期泡沫中,这无疑是完全错误的押注。
bond, were caught up alongside fixed income.17 While investors are more used to thinking about the duration of fixed income instruments than assets with variable cash This posed an almost impossible problem for our agnostic investor–one that neither de-risking into flows, it’s easy to explain why equities and real estate are bonds nor diversification across risk assets could fix.18 Given these forecasts, cash had a better longer duration than traditional bonds. While a bond has a maturity date, equities and real estate are perpetuities. expected return than bonds or stocks, but cash yielded literally zero. If there was any meaningful Beyond that fact, their cash flows grow with inflation, which possibility that, despite the valuations, assets were somehow still “normally” priced, the one asset means expected cash flows, even in the fairly distant future, have a meaningful contribution to their present value. And that you had to own if you believed there was a bubble—cash—was an asset that guaranteed losses just as with bonds, the lower the yield on those assets, the after inflation, whether there was a bubble or not! The appeal of moving to short-term investments higher the duration gets. if there was a chance that the bubble might burst sooner rather than later was obvious, as in that 2021 was also an utter nightmare for risk parity portfolios. case, returns on bonds and stocks would be far more negative. And given how high inflation was at While risk parity portfolios offer ostensible diversification the time, there was a pretty clear catalyst for the bubble to burst in the relatively near term. Even with across a variety of risks, the one risk they inherently lean heavily into is duration risk—exactly the wrong call in a this clue, this event was almost certainly the toughest call of our agnostic investor’s career so far. duration bubble.
这可能是个泡沫,但还有大量其他投资机会 | p6 对我们来说,这算是一个比较容易的判断,不过部分原因是我们有“作弊”的方法。到 2021 年底,我们已经将无基准投资组合中 60% 的资产转移到了流动性另类投资中——策略包括股票多空、并购套利和全球宏观。尽管流动性另类投资策略确实承担风险,但它们以比传统资产短得多的久期来承担风险。流动性另类投资的目标是在现金基础上产生回报,而不是在债券或股票基准之上。在 2021 年,这非常有帮助,因为现金不仅预期回报高于许多其他资产,而且一旦估值回归较早发生而不是较晚,其风险也小得多。通胀在 2022 年并未迅速消退,因此回归确实很快。一个 60% MSCI ACWI/40% 彭博美国综合债券的投资组合在 2021 年 12 月至 2022 年 9 月期间实际亏损了 26%。在无基准投资组合中,我们能够将该亏损基本减半,降至 14% 的实际亏损。19 结果,虽然那个 60/40 投资组合直到今年夏天才重回 2021 年 12 月的水平,但我们能够在 2023 年收复失地,并且截至撰写本文时,自 2021 年久期泡沫峰值以来,我们的表现领先 60/40 投资组合 14%。20 AI 泡沫 2022 年秋季引人瞩目,不仅因为它标志着 2021 年久期泡沫回调的低点,也因为它见证了 ChatGPT-3.5 的发布,这引发了 AI 热潮的开端。这确实是一次真正技术突破,几乎没有疑问,尽管 AI 在此之前已取得一些令人瞩目的成就,尤其是 2016 年攻克计算上极其复杂的围棋,以及 2020 年解决蛋白质折叠问题。与 1990 年代末的互联网类似,自 2022 年以来的 AI 已经捕获了全球投资者的想象力,不过这一次,多头们提出了更宏大的主张——承诺在几年内就会诞生超级智能计算机和人形机器人,让人类劳动变得多余。21 自第一款聊天机器人发布以来,AI 相关股票表现异常出色,无论是受大规模盈利增长驱动(如英伟达),还是受永不熄灭的希望驱动——即它们最终会以某种方式受益,尽管现金流迅速萎缩(如特斯拉)。这些 AI 股票帮助推动标普 500 指数超越了 2021 年的估值峰值,而该峰值现在按周期调整后的盈利计算,比 2000 年的峰值低约 10%。图表 4 展示了基于我们 2025 年 9 月预测的风险/回报散点图。22 图表 4:风险/回报权衡 2025 年 9 月 8% 预期年化 7 年实际回报 新兴市场股票 国际小盘股 6% 4% 国际大盘股 19 美国政府 等权风险投资组合
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p6 It was an easier call for us, although that’s partly because we had a way to cheat. By the end of 2021, we had moved 60% of our Benchmark-Free portfolio to liquid alternatives—strategies like equity long/short, merger arbitrage, and global macro. Though liquid alternatives strategies do take risk, they do so in a much shorter-duration way than traditional assets. Liquid alternatives seek to generate returns on top of cash, rather than on top of bond or stock benchmarks. This was incredibly helpful in 2021, given cash had not only a higher expected return than many other assets, but also much less risk in the event valuation reversion occurred sooner rather than later. Inflation did not quickly recede in 2022, so reversion was indeed quick. A 60% MSCI ACWI/40% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond portfolio lost 26% in real terms between December 2021 and September 2022. In Benchmark-Free, we were able to cut that basically in half, to a 14% real loss.19 As a result, while that 60/40 portfolio didn’t regain its December 2021 level until the summer of this year, we were able to recapture the losses in 2023, and as of this writing, we are 14% ahead of the 60/40 portfolio since the 2021 Duration Bubble peak.20 The AI Bubble The fall of 2022 was notable, and not merely because it marked the low of the drawdown from the 2021 Duration Bubble. It also marked the release of ChatGPT-3.5, which sparked the beginning of the AI boom. There is little question that it was a true technological breakthrough, although AI already had some impressive accomplishments before that, notably mastering the computationally intractable game of Go in 2016 and solving protein folding in 2020. Like the internet in the late 1990s, AI since 2022 has captured the imagination of investors around the world, although in this case, the bulls are making even grander claims—promising superintelligent computers and humanoid robots poised to render human work unnecessary within a handful of years.21 AI-related stocks have done exceptionally well since the release of that first chatbot, whether driven by massive earnings growth (Nvidia) or unrelenting hopes that they will somehow benefit in the end despite their rapidly diminishing cash flow (Tesla). These AI stocks have helped drive the S&P 500 above its 2021 valuation peak, which is now about 10% below the 2000 peak on cyclically adjusted earnings. Exhibit 4 shows the risk/reward scatterplot based on our September 2025 forecasts.22 EXHIBIT 4: RISK/REWARD TRADE-OFF SEPTEMBER 2025 8% Expected Annualized 7-Year Real Return Emerging Equities Int'l. Small Caps 6% 4% Int'l. Large Caps 19 U.S. Gov’t. Equal-Wtd Risk Port.
虽然 14% 的跌幅超过 26% 的一半,但 14% 的亏损需要约 16% 的涨幅才能回本,而 26% 的亏损则需要约 35% 的涨幅——是前者的两倍多。截至 2025 年 11 月 18 日,一个 60% MSCI 全球指数/40% 彭博美国综合债券指数的投资组合自 2021 年底以来的回报率为 +6.8%,而同期我们的无基准策略回报率为 +20.8%(扣除费用后)。人工智能确实看起来像一场技术突破,这并不意味着它就不可能是一个泡沫。互联网曾是一个突破。铁路,以及更早之前的运河,也曾经是突破。投资者似乎特别容易高估投资技术突破的回报,尤其是因为他们往往会投入大量资金,导致竞争大大侵蚀了该投资资本的回报。需要注意的是,这张图表与 2000 年的版本惊人地相似。风险/回报回归线的斜率也几乎一致。
While 14% is more than half of 26%, a 14% loss requires a TIPS Bonds Slope = +0.4 ~16% gain to regain the loss, whereas a 26% loss requires a 2% Emerging Bonds ~35% gain–more than twice as much. Cash Intl. Gov't. Bonds REITS 20 0% As of November 18, 2025, a 60% MSCI ACWI/40% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate bond portfolio has returned MSCI All Country World U.S. Small Cap +6.8% since the end of 2021 vs. our Benchmark-Free -2% Allocation Strategy’s return of +20.8%, net of fees, for the U.S. Large Caps same period. -4% 21 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% The fact that AI truly does appear to be a technological breakthrough certainly does not mean it can’t be a bubble. Expected Annualized 7-year Volatility The internet was a breakthrough. Railroads and, before them, canals were breakthroughs. Investors seem to be As of 9/30/2025 | Source: GMO particularly prone to overestimating the returns on investing in technological breakthroughs, not least because they tend to throw so much money at them that competition decimates Notice this chart is strikingly similar to the 2000 version. The slope of the risk/reward regression the return on capital on that investment.
再一条线是 +0.4,美国大盘股再次成为全球最被高估的资产,而等权重的风险资产组合所提供的预期回报远高于 MSCI 世界指数。这些预期回报针对的是以美元计价的投资者,并且是我们所设想的各种均衡利率情景的加权平均值。
line is again +0.4, U.S. large cap stocks are again the most overvalued asset around, and the equal-These expected returns are for U.S. dollar-based investors weighted portfolio of risk assets again offers a much higher expected return than MSCI World. Our and are a weighted average of the different equilibrium interest rate scenarios we contemplate.
这可能是一个泡沫,但还有大量其他可投资标的 | p7 本·因克尔的资产配置团队联合主管兼投资组合经理指出,一个不可知论投资者可以构建一个投资组合——如果泡沫真的存在,这个组合有望取得显著优势;即便一切正常,它也应该表现不俗。我并不是说,在美国股市过去 15 年来跑赢全球其他市场如此之多的背景下,选择持有几乎不含美股的投资组合是件容易事,但将正常比例的资金留在股市中,对于该团队的产品而言是可行的。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p7 Ben Inker agnostic investor can build a portfolio that deserves to win handily if the bubble is a bubble and Mr. Inker is Co-Head of should also do just fine if all is normal. I don’t mean to say that choosing to own a portfolio with GMO’s Asset Allocation team little or no U.S. equities in it is easy to do given U.S. equities have beaten the rest of the world by and a portfolio manager as much as they have over the last 15 years, but keeping a normal amount of money in equities is for the team’s products. Mr.
Inker 是 GMO 董事会的成员,也是一家奢侈品公司的合伙人——上一轮两个泡沫没提供这样的机会。如今,构建一个由风险资产组成的多元化投资组合,这些资产的定价能够带来等同于股票甚至更高的回报,是一件直截了当的事。虽然在这个投资组合中,美国股票最显眼的就是它们的缺席,但仍有大量资产可供选择。他于 1992 年加入 GMO,当时刚获得耶鲁大学经济学学士学位。在 GMO 工作的这些年里,Inker 先生曾担任量化股票和资产配置团队的分析师、多只股票及资产配置组合的投资组合经理、国际量化股票的联合负责人,以及量化发达市场股票的首席投资官。他持有 CFA 特许资格认证。结论:对于担心人工智能可能是个泡沫但又不完全确信的不可知论投资者来说,好消息是,今天你不需要确定性就能转向一个不那么依赖人工智能交易的组合。大量其他风险资产正以合理甚至诱人的估值交易,即便当前金融市场被理性定价,将你的组合从人工智能宠儿转向那些资产,长期来看也不会有预期回报的牺牲。
Inker is a member of the a luxury the last two bubbles didn’t allow for. Today, building a diversified portfolio of risk assets GMO Board of Directors and a partner of the firm. that are priced to deliver equity-like-or-better returns is straightforward. While in this portfolio U.S. He joined GMO in 1992 following the completion equities are most notable for their absence, there are still plenty of assets to choose from. of his bachelor's degree in Economics from Yale University. In his years at GMO, Mr. Inker has Conclusion served as an analyst for the Quantitative Equity For the agnostic investor who is worried that AI might be a bubble but isn’t entirely convinced, the and Asset Allocation teams, as a portfolio manager good news is that today, certainty is not required to move to a portfolio that is less dependent of several equity and asset allocation portfolios, as Co-Head of International Quantitative Equities, and on the AI trade. Plenty of other risk assets are trading at fair or even compelling valuations, and as CIO of Quantitative Developed Equities. He is a even if today’s financial markets turn out to be rationally priced, there is no long-run expected CFA charterholder. return give-up for tilting your portfolio away from the AI darlings and into those other assets.
全球范围内价值股都相当便宜,而在美国与 EAFE 市场,深度价值股的交易折价幅度正处在有记录以来最宽之列。美国以外的中小盘价值股同样具有吸引力,尤其是在日本,它们既受益于日元被严重低估,也受益于企业控制权市场的开放。流动性另类资产则得益于现金类资产体面的收益率,以及各类资产之间宽幅的估值价差;而政府债券的定价,在全球经济持续运转的情况下既能提供体面的收益率,在经济衰退中又能带来资本利得。
当然,如果市场整体继续上涨,我们当前类似 2000 年的机会集,完全有可能演变成 2007 年甚至 2021 年那样的两难局面——让投资者进退维谷。但要想走到那一步,我们需要看到大量资产都交出良好回报,而不仅仅是人工智能板块的持续升空。对于“不可知论”投资者而言,尽管涨势持续会让选择变得更艰难,但他们也可以从已经到位的充分分散化投资组合所带来的强劲回报中得到安慰。从泡沫的角度看,人工智能算是不可知论投资者最容易应对的那一类。
Value stocks everywhere are very cheap, and in the U.S. and EAFE markets, deep value stocks are Disclaimer trading at some of the widest discounts on record. Non-U.S. small value stocks are also attractive, The views expressed are the views of Ben Inker particularly in Japan, where they benefit from both a very undervalued yen and the opening of through the period ending November 2025 and are the market for corporate control. Liquid alternatives benefit from decent yields on cash and wide subject to change at any time based on market and valuation spreads across various asset classes, and government bonds are priced to provide other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation capital gains in a recession and a decent yield if the global economy holds together. for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific It’s always possible that if markets in general continue to move higher, our current 2000-like securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes opportunity set might turn into a 2007- or even a 2021-like dilemma for investors. But to get there, only and are not intended to be and should not be we’d need to see good returns from a wide array of assets, not just continued levitation in AI. While interpreted as recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. agnostic investors would face more difficult choices if the rally continues, they could also take solace in the strong returns of the well-diversified portfolios that got them to that point. As bubbles Copyright © 2025 by GMO LLC. go, AI looks like one of the easy ones for an agnostic investor to handle.
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这很可能是一个泡沫,但还有大量其他标的可供投资 | 第 8 页 附录 GMO 资产配置组合在泡沫顶峰时的表现 图表 5 展示了 GMO 资产配置组合在每次泡沫期间的持仓情况,以及 GMO 无基准配置策略当前的配置。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p8 APPENDIX GMO Asset Allocation Portfolios at Bubble Peaks Exhibit 5 shows the positioning of GMO’s Asset Allocation portfolios during each bubble, as well as the current allocation for the GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy.
**展品 5GMO 在泡沫峰值期的资产配置**
2000 年
互联网泡沫
2007-8 年
万物泡沫
2021 年
长端泡沫
2025 年
人工智能泡沫
GMO 全球资产配置\*
基准无关型\* 资产配置策略
基准自由型配置策略
新兴市场 5%
美国机会价值 5%
美国大型股 15%
房地产投资信托 15%
11%
资源股权 4%¹
优质股 25%
发达市场(除美国外)6%
新兴市场(除中国外)6%
美国大型价值股 2%
美国小型价值股 8%
日本价值股 6%
国际机会价值股 9%
新兴市场股权 15%
发达市场(除美国外)小型价值股 5%
日本基本面价值股 6%
房地产投资信托 6%
日本小型价值股 3%
国际大型价值股 12%
美国债券 10%
股票多空策略 18%
发达市场(除美国外)小型价值股 5%
国际小型价值股 1%
绝对收益与现金
新兴市场 10%
43%
新兴市场股权 8%
股权错位策略 15%²
通胀保值债券 50%
另类资产 43%
另类资产配置 13%
美国债券 37%
新兴市场债券 2%
美国国债 19%³
战略性固定收益 30%
通胀保值债券 5%
资产支持证券/结构化产品 2%
国际政府债券 2%
新兴市场债券 10%
信用债 11%
新兴市场债券 3%
新兴市场债券 2%
来源:GMO
\*GMO 全球资产配置策略的基准为 65% MSCI ACWI/35% 彭博美国综合指数。基准自由型配置策略于 2001 年秋季推出。基准无关型投资组合代表 1999 年秋季向客户推荐的投资组合。
¹ 包含 GMO 的资源及气候变化策略。
EXHIBIT 5GMO ASSET ALLOCATION AT BUBBLE PEAKS 2000 2007-8 2021 2025 INTERNET BUBBLE EVERYTHING BUBBLE DURATION BUBBLE AI BUBBLE GMO’s Global Asset Allocation* Benchmark-Agnostic* Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy Emerging Markets U.S. Opp. Value 5% U.S. Large 15% REITs 15% 11% Resource Equity 4%1 Quality 25% Developed ex-U.S. 6% Emerging ex-China 6% U.S. Large Value 2% U.S. Small Value 8% Japan Value 6% Int'l Opportunistic Value 9% Emerging Equity 15% Dev. ex-U.S. Small Value 5% Japan Fund. Value 6% REITs 6% Japan Small Value 3% Int'l Large Value 12% U.S. Bonds 10% Equity Long/Short 18% Dev ex-U.S. SC Value 5% Int'l Small Value 1% Absolute Return & Cash Emerging Markets 10% 43% Emerging Equity 8% Equity Dislocation 15%2 TIPS 50% Alternatives 43% Alternative Allocation 13% U.S. Bonds 37% Emerging Debt 2% U.S. Treasury Notes 19%3 Strategic Fixed TIPS 5% Income 30% ABS/Structured Prod. 2% Int'l Gov't Bonds 2% Emerging Debt 10% Credit 11% Emerging Debt 3% Emerging Debt 2% Source: GMO *GMO’s Global Asset Allocation Strategy has a 65% MSCI ACWI/35% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate benchmark. Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy was incepted in the fall of 2001. Benchmark Agnostic portfolio represents the portfolio proposed to clients in the fall of 1999. Includes GMO’s Resources and Climate Change strategies.
股票错位策略的总配置比例为 18.9%(含另类配置内的敞口)。对 美国国债的头寸敞口不应脱离投资组合的整体久期特征(含抵押品及其他敞口)来单独考量。
Total allocation to Equity Dislocation is 18.9% inclusive of exposure within Alternative Allocation. The headline exposure to U.S. Treasury Notes should not be considered in isolation of the portfolio’s overall duration profile inclusive of collateral and other exposures.
上述信息基于该策略中选取的一个代表性账户,因其限制最少且最能体现该策略的实施情况。权重数据截至所示日期,且可能发生变化。上文所列的组别代表根据专有方法确定的敞口,并会随时间推移而调整。
The above information is based on a representative account in the strategy selected because it has the fewest restrictions and best represents the implementation of the strategy. Weightings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. The groups indicated above represent exposures determined pursuant to proprietary methodologies and are subject to change over time.
2000 年互联网泡沫
2000 年,我们的主要多资产组合采取的是平衡策略,围绕基准权重设定了明确的允许偏离范围。
The 2000 Internet Bubble In 2000, our primary multi-asset portfolio was a balanced strategy with defined allowable ranges around benchmark weights.
我们对美国大盘股的持仓低配了 32%,而对美国小盘价值股和房地产投资信托基金(REITs)的组合超配了 14%,对国际发达市场股票保持中性,对新兴市场股票超配了 5%,对固定收益类资产超配了 12%。我们当时内心充满矛盾——一方面,我们承担着相对于基准指数而言极高的跟踪误差;另一方面,我们又把 15% 的仓位浪费在美国大盘股上,而我们认为,当时这些股票在全球范围内提供了最差的风险/回报比。1999 年秋季,这种矛盾促使我们与客户探讨一种不受基准约束的投资方式——在这种方式下,我们永远不会仅仅为了控制相对于基准指数的跟踪误差而持有资产。
We were 32% underweight U.S. large cap stocks, 14% overweight a combination of U.S. small value and REITs, neutral on international developed stocks, 5% overweight emerging market equities, and 12% overweight fixed income. We were torn by the fact that we were taking crazy amounts of tracking error versus the benchmark while also wasting 15% of our portfolio on U.S. large cap stocks, which we believed offered the worst risk/reward trade-off in the world at the time. In the fall of 1999, that tension prompted us to talk to clients about investing in a benchmark-free manner in which we would never hold assets solely to control tracking error relative to a benchmark.
可能是个泡沫,但还有许多其他可投资的方向 | p9 我们直到 2001 年秋季才被雇来管理一个没有实时基准的投资组合,但对于那些更关心实际收益而非跟踪误差的投资者,我们当时认为合适的投资组合被标为“无视基准”。这个无视基准的投资组合将 40% 配置在风险资产中,分别投向房地产投资信托、新兴市场股票和新兴市场债券。其余 60% 则配置在通胀保值债券(50%)和美国投资级债券(10%)。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p9 We weren’t hired to run a live benchmark-free portfolio until the fall of 2001, but we’ve labeled the portfolio we believed to be appropriate at the time for investors who cared more about earning real returns than tracking error “Benchmark Agnostic.” Our Benchmark-Agnostic portfolio had 40% of its allocation in risky assets, split between REITs, emerging equity, and emerging debt. The other 60% was in TIPS (50%) and U.S. investment-grade bonds (10%).
2007-8 万物泡沫 等到下一次泡沫来临时,我们已将不少资产配置客户转移到了无基准组合。到 2007 年年中,我们已经调整为一个非常防守型的组合,并在 2008 年整个夏季持续降低风险,最终在 2008 年 8 月形成了我们称为“2007-8 万物泡沫”的组合,见图表 5。
2007-8 Everything Bubble By the time the next bubble came about, we had transitioned a number of our asset allocation clients to benchmark-free portfolios. We had moved to a very defensive portfolio by mid-2007 and continued taking risk off the table through the summer of 2008, culminating in the August 2008 portfolio we’ve labeled “2007-8 Everything Bubble,” shown in Exhibit 5.
2008 年是我们对股票配置最低的一年(全部投资于 GMO 优质策略),也是对现金和流动性替代品配置最高的一年。我们还配置了相当规模的债券。
2008 marked our lowest ever allocation to stocks (all of which were invested in the GMO Quality Strategy) and our highest allocation to cash and liquid alternatives. We also had a healthy allocation to bonds.
2021 年的久期泡沫 到 2021 年底,我们的股票配置比例已接近追平 2008 年的低谷,而另类策略的配置则超过了 2008 年的水平。
2021 Duration Bubble By the end of 2021, we came close to matching our 2008 low point in equity allocation and exceeded our 2008 allocation to alternative strategies.
在股票多空策略及其他另类投资中,非传统短期策略占组合的 60%。此外,约一半的信用配置投向浮动利率证券,这类证券实际上也没有任何利率久期。我们将这个组合称为“2021 年久期泡沫”。
Between equity long/short and other alternatives, non-traditional short-duration strategies made up 60% of the portfolio. Furthermore, about half of the credit allocation was to floating rate securities, which also had effectively no interest rate duration. We’ve labeled that portfolio “2021 Duration Bubble.”
2025 年 AI 泡沫:如今,我们认为,尽管存在 AI 泡沫,GMO 的“无基准策略”仍有望实现强劲的预期回报,这主要归功于其持有的股票与这一主题几乎无关或完全无关。
2025 AI Bubble Today, we believe GMO’s Benchmark-Free Strategy has a strong expected return despite the AI Bubble, largely by virtue of owning stocks that have little or nothing to do with that theme.
当前配置大约是 50% 股票、28% 流动性另类资产和 20% 美国国债。根据我们当前的预测,我们的无基准投资组合预期实际回报率(如果我们的预测完全准确)为 6.5%,而 60% MSCI ACWI / 40% 彭博美国综合债券投资组合的预期实际回报率仅为 0.2%。如果一切最终都归于正常——尽管表面情况并非如此——该投资组合的预期实际回报率为 4.5%,与 60/40 基准组合(假设其同样回归正常)的回报率一致。
Current allocations are about 50% stocks, 28% liquid alternatives, and 20% Treasuries. Given our current forecasts, our Benchmark-Free portfolio has an expected return of 6.5% real23 (if our forecasts are spot on) versus 0.2% real for a 60% MSCI ACWI/40% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond portfolio. If everything turns out normal despite appearances, the portfolio has an expected return of 4.5% real, in line with the 60/40 benchmark if it, too, proves normal.
尽管该投资组合中股票的权重略低于一半,但在 2025 年已上涨 17.9%,比 60% MSCI 全球指数 / 40% 彭博美国综合债券指数的组合高出 4.5 个百分点,比标普 500 指数高出 4.1 个百分点。尽管人工智能给人的感觉是唯一有人关心的投资故事,但非美国股票,尤其是深度价值型股票,今年的表现已显著跑赢标普 500 指数。到目前为止,并不需要押注人工智能交易就能取得强劲回报。即便人工智能泡沫还会继续膨胀一段时间,这一趋势持续下去也完全有可能。水涨船高,并不一定只抬升那些最贵的船。
Despite having a little less than half of its weight in equities, this portfolio has risen 17.9% in 2025, 24 more than 4.5% ahead of a 60% MSCI World/40% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond portfolio and 4.1% ahead of the S&P 500. Despite the fact that AI feels like the only investment story anyone cares about, non-U.S. stocks, particularly deep value stocks, have significantly outpaced the S&P 500 this year. So far, it has not been necessary to lean into the AI trade to achieve strong returns. Even if the AI Bubble continues to inflate for a while longer, it is perfectly plausible that this trend continues. A rising tide need not only lift the most expensive boats.
假设我们的各项策略表现与其基准一致。选股阿尔法会在这一回报基础上增加收益,但流动替代方案除外——对于该类资产,我们假设“股票错位策略”的回报将比现金收益高出 6%,原因是全球范围内价值股与成长股之间存在巨大价差;而“替代配置策略”的回报则假设比现金收益高出 4%,鉴于总体上存在不错的机会集合。
Assuming our strategies perform in line with their benchmarks. Security selection alpha would add to that return, except in the case of liquid alternatives, where we assume Equity Dislocation will return 6% above cash due to the wide spread between value and growth stocks globally, and Alternative Allocation, where we are assuming 4% above cash given a generally good opportunity set.
截至 2025 年 11 月 12 日。
As of November 12, 2025.
这可能是个泡沫,但还有很多其他可投资的标的 | p10 截至 2025 年 9 月 30 日的美元年化总回报率(净额) 成立以来 1 年 3 年 5 年 10 年 成立日期 全球资产配置策略 1988 年 6 月 30 日 11.77% 15.78% 7.88% 6.67% 8.43% GMO 全球资产配置指数 12.14% 16.56% 8.62% 8.50% 7.93% + 回报数据包含一笔于 2024 年 12 月 16 日收到的大额一次性诉讼和解款项。该事件对 2024 年年度业绩贡献了 0.80%(基于一个代表性账户)。其他期间(包括该日期)的业绩也受到了正面影响,有时影响显著。若无此款项,业绩在绝对值和相对基准上都会更低。可应要求提供更多信息。
It’s Probably a Bubble, But There Is Plenty Else to Invest In | p10 AVERAGE ANNUAL TOTAL RETURN (NET) IN USD AS OF 9/30/2025 Since Inception 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year Inception Global Asset Allocation 6/30/1988 11.77% 15.78% 7.88% 6.67% 8.43% Composite GMO Global Asset 12.14% 16.56% 8.62% 8.50% 7.93% Allocation Index + Returns include a substantial, one-time litigation settlement recovery received on December 16, 2024. This event contributed 0.80% to 2024 annual performance, based on a representative account. Performance for other periods, including this date, was also positively impacted, sometimes materially. Without this recovery, performance would have been lower in both absolute terms and relative to the benchmark. Additional information is available upon request.
截至 2025 年 9 月 30 日的美元平均年化总回报率(净回报) 自成立以来 1 年 3 年 5 年 10 年 成立时间 无基准配置组合 2001 年 7 月 31 日 12.57% 13.95% 7.66% 5.34% 7.77% 消费者价格指数 3.08% 3.01% 4.51% 3.16% 2.53% 在 2012 年 1 月 1 日之前,该组合中的账户是一项更广泛实际回报策略的主要组成部分。自 2012 年 1 月 1 日起,组合中的账户开始作为独立投资进行管理。回报中包括 2024 年 12 月 16 日收到的一次性重大诉讼和解款。根据一个代表性账户计算,该事件对 2024 年度业绩贡献了 2.45%。其他时期(包括该日期)的业绩也受到正面影响,有时影响重大。若无此项和解款,业绩在绝对值和相对基准两方面都会更低。更多信息可应要求提供。
AVERAGE ANNUAL TOTAL RETURN (NET) IN USD AS OF 9/30/2025 Since Inception 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year Inception Benchmark-Free 7/31/2001 12.57% 13.95% 7.66% 5.34% 7.77% Allocation Composite CPI Index 3.08% 3.01% 4.51% 3.16% 2.53% Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served as the principal component of a broader real return strategy. Beginning January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment. Returns include a substantial, one-time litigation settlement recovery received on December 16, 2024. This event contributed 2.45% to 2024 annual performance, based on a representative account. Performance for other periods, including this date, was also positively impacted, sometimes materially. Without this recovery, performance would have been lower in both absolute terms and relative to the benchmark. Additional information is available upon request.
所引用的业绩数据代表过往表现,并不预示未来业绩。
Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance.
净回报为扣除模拟咨询费及适用情况下的业绩报酬后的数据。这些回报已包含交易成本、佣金、境外收入及资本利得的预扣税,并按实际情况纳入了股息及其他收入再投资的收益。组合内各账户实际支付的费用可能高于或低于所采用的模拟费用。GMO LLC 声称符合全球投资业绩标准(GIPS®)。全球投资业绩标准(GIPS®)组合报告可通过 GMO.com 获取,在策略页面的文档部分点击 GIPS® 组合报告链接即可查阅。GIPS® 是 CFA 协会拥有的注册商标。CFA 协会并不背书或推广本机构,也不保证本文内容的准确性或质量。实际费用已在 GMO 的 ADV 表格第二部分中披露,各策略的组合报告中亦同步列明。
Net returns are presented after the deduction of a model advisory fee and incentive fee if applicable. These returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. Fees paid by accounts within the composite may be higher or lower than the model fees used. GMO LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). A Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) Composite Report is available on GMO.com by clicking the GIPS® Composite Report link in the documents section of the strategy page. GIPS® is a registered trademark owned by CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein. Actual fees are disclosed in Part 2 of GMO's Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s Composite Report.