共同基金的秘密

2002 · 演讲 · 原文约 751 词

译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文，也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。

打开来源正文

共同基金的隐秘性

Mutual Fund Secrecy

共同基金的隐秘性

Mutual Fund Secrecy

约翰·C·博格尔的演说

Remarks by John C. Bogle

创始人兼前董事长，先锋集团

Founder and Former Chairman, The Vanguard Group

《纽约时报》

The New York Times

December 14, 2002

27 年前，当我创立如今已是全美第二大共同基金公司时，我竭尽全力打造一家能够践行《1940 年投资公司法》序言中所载理想的企业：共同基金应当为股东利益而非管理者利益而管理。如今，我曾参与开创的这个行业，正在挥霍一个向公众证明这一理想仍然重要的机会。

When I founded what is now the country's second-largest mutual fund organization 27 years ago, I did my best to create a company that would live up to the ideal enshrined in the preamble to the Investment Company Act of 1940: that mutual funds should be managed in the interest of their shareholders rather than in the interest of their managers. Now the industry I helped to create is squandering an opportunity to show the public that this ideal still matters.

上周是证券交易委员会提案的征求意见截止日，该提案要求共同基金向公众披露它们在公司代理投票中如何表决。美国多数大型共同基金公司反对这项新规则。然而，超过 7000 名个人投资者致函证交会，支持这些要求，预计证交会将在未来几周内颁布或撤回该规则。我加入了支持者的行列，选择与这个我参与超过半个世纪的行业唱反调。

Last week was the deadline for comment about the Securities and Exchange Commission's proposal to require mutual funds to tell the public how they voted their shares in corporate proxy elections. Most of the country's largest mutual fund companies oppose the new rule. More than 7,000 individual investors, however, wrote to the S.E.C. in support of the requirements, which the commission is expected either to issue or withdraw in the next several weeks. I joined them in this support, casting my lot in opposition to the industry that I've been part of for more than a half-century.

尽管我已不再担任先锋集团（Vanguard Group）的高管或董事，我的观点仍反映出我在创建先锋时努力体现的那些原则和价值观——当时和现在一样，先锋是唯一真正“互助”的共同基金集团。（自成立以来，先锋集团一直由其共同基金成员共同拥有，并以成本价为其服务。）

While I no longer serve as an officer or director of the Vanguard Group, my views reflect the principles and values that I tried to make manifest in the creation of Vanguard, then as now the only mutual fund group that is truly ''mutual.'' (Since its inception, the Vanguard Group has been owned by its mutual fund members, and it serves them on an at-cost basis.)

但不论基金的组织架构是否模仿先锋集团，共同基金的董事、高管和经理人都是代理人，而基金持有人才是委托人。管理层唯一应尽的责任就是为后者行事。因此，每位共同基金持有人都有权知道自己所持组合中各公司股票的投票情况，这应当是不言自明的。这些持有人本就是这些股票的局部所有者，如果剥夺他们获取这一信息的权利，那就从根本上颠倒了委托人与代理人关系的普遍共识。

But whether structured like Vanguard or not, mutual fund directors, officers and managers are the agents; the fund shareholders are the principals. It is management's responsibility to act solely on their behalf. It would thus seem self-evident that each mutual fund shareholder has the right to know how the shares of the corporations in his or her portfolio are voted. Such shareholders are partial owners of these stocks, and to deny them that information would stand on its head the common understanding of the principal-agency relationship.

基于这层关系，证券交易委员会提案背后的信托原则似乎无可争议。不过，当基金被要求披露投票情况时，可能会产生一些业务上的麻烦。例如，投下反对管理层的票，可能会让基金经理更难从公司获取信息，或更难赢得为其养老金计划提供建议的资格。有争议的投票还可能引来不必要的公众关注。

Given that relationship, the fiduciary principle underlying the S.E.C's proposal seems beyond controversy. Nonetheless, when funds are required to report their votes, some business difficulties may arise. Votes against management, for example, may make it harder for fund managers to get information from a corporation or to win the right to advise its pension plan. Controversial votes may draw unwanted publicity.

然而，我对行业中的其他说法持怀疑态度。尽管许多基金经理声称披露信息成本过高，但与去年股东们为基金管理支付的 750 亿美元相比，这点开销微不足道。另一些经理则声称，与企业管理层“幕后”合作更有效。如果真是这样，那就让他们列出与管理层接触的次数以及讨论过的问题清单。没有这些细节，这类说法就缺乏可信度。

Yet I am skeptical of other industry claims. While many fund managers claim disclosure would be too expensive, it would be trivial compared with the $75 billion that shareholders paid for fund management last year. Other managers claim it is more effective to work ''behind the scenes'' with corporate management. If so, let them present a record of the number of contacts made with managements and the issues discussed. Without these details, such statements lack credibility.

在 1940 年向国会提交的报告中，美国证券交易委员会呼吁共同基金承担“有益的角色，代表那些在投资公司同样持有权益的企业中，为数众多、不善表达且影响力薄弱的个人投资者”。凭借其研究工作，共同基金“不仅服务于自身利益，也服务于其他公众股东的利益”。

In its 1940 report to Congress, the S.E.C. called on mutual funds to serve ''the useful role of representatives of the great number of inarticulate and ineffective individual investors in corporations in which investment companies are also interested.'' With their research, mutual funds ''not only serve their own interests but the interests of other public stockholders.''

那份报告发布时，基金持有的美国公司股份不到所有企业股份的 1%。如今，基金持有约 23% 的全部股票。然而，这个行业迟迟未能履行这一使命——这个角色不仅有用，而且根据传统的受托人原则也是必需的。

When that report was issued, funds owned less than 1 percent of the shares of all United States corporations. Today, funds own some 23 percent of all stocks. Yet this industry has waited far too long to honor that mandate -- a role that is not only useful but also required under traditional principles of trusteeship.

共同基金在公司治理问题上的长期忍耐和懈怠，对于公司治理和会计监管方面的失败负有不可推卸的责任——这些失败正是造成近期股市泡沫及随后的熊市的主要力量之一。如果公司的所有者都不关心治理问题，还能指望谁来承担这个责任？

By their long forbearance and lassitude on corporate governance issues, mutual funds bear no small share of the responsibility for the failures in corporate governance and accounting oversight that were among the major forces creating the recent stock market bubble and the bear market that followed. If the owners of our corporations don't care about governance, who else is there to assume that responsibility?

提高问责制的第一步，是让共同基金的代理人披露，他们代表作为委托人的股东，对所持股份是如何投票的。基金早就该停止作为企业所有者时的被动姿态，去承担起企业公民的重要责任了。

The first step toward greater accountability is for mutual fund agents to disclose how they vote the shares they own on behalf of their shareholder principals. The time has long since come for funds to cease their passivity as corporate owners and to assume the important responsibilities of corporate citizenship.

注：本文所表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard's present management.

返回博格尔研究中心观点文章版块

Return to Op-Ed Articles in the Bogle Research Center