致:金融中介机构——关于我们如何从美国企业界的经验中获益

2002 · 演讲 · 原文约 6577 词
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备忘录致金融中介机构

主题:我们如何从美国企业界的经验中获利

——约翰·C·博格(先锋集团创始人兼前首席执行官)在 2002 年美国寿险理事会年度会议“商业解决方案 2002”上的演讲

加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥

2002 年 10 月 14 日

在股市泡沫于 2000 年 3 月达到顶点前八个月,我碰巧做客路易斯·鲁凯瑟的《华尔街一周》。当一位嘉宾问我,会给一位重仓科技股和互联网股的投资者什么建议时,我唯一能想到的回答是:“我会建议他读一读《非同寻常的大众幻想与群体性癫狂》。”

MEMORANDUM TOFinancial Intermediaries RE: How We Can Profit From the Experience of Corporate America Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder and Former CEO, The Vanguard Group Before Business Solutions 2002 The Annual Conference of the American Life Insurance Council San Diego, CA October 14, 2002 Eight months before the stock market bubble reached its bursting point in March 2000, I happened to appear on Louis Rukeyser’s Wall Street Week. When one of the panelists asked me what advice I would give to an investor heavily committed to technology and internet stocks, the only answer I could think of was: “I’d advise him to read Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.”

我只希望那些听过我警告的投资者能立刻冲进社区图书馆,去读那本关于早年金融繁荣与崩溃的经典纪实录——荷兰的郁金香狂热、英国的南海泡沫等等。在投资世界里,最廉价的教育就是我们能从别人的经历中学到的东西。所以今天,我要谈谈公司治理的失败,那是导致那次泡沫的一个主要因素,以及两家金融中介机构——共同基金和保险公司——如何能从那段经历中获益。

I can only hope that investors who heard my warning quickly dashed out to their local libraries and read that classic chronicle of earlier financial booms and busts—Tulipmania in Holland, the South Sea Bubble in Great Britain, and so on. In the world of investing, the cheapest education is what we learn from the experience of others. And so today I’ll discuss the failure of corporate governance that was a major contributor to that bubble, and how two financial intermediaries—mutual funds and insurance companies—can profit from that experience.

当我回答那个问题时,情况已经显而易见——不仅对我,对沃伦·巴菲特等许多其他人也是如此——我们正身处一个泡沫之中。我们也知道,所有泡沫迟早都会破灭。但尽管我们可能知道会发生什么,却永远不知道何时发生。于是,股市又继续上涨了八个月,才开启了漫长而痛苦的下跌,这是自 1929 年至 1933 年以来最糟糕的熊市。纳斯达克指数目前较其峰值下跌了近 80%,纽约证券交易所指数则下跌了 40%。

When I answered that question, it was obvious—not only to me—but to many others, from Warren Buffett on down—that we were in a bubble. We also knew that, sooner or later, all bubbles burst. But while we may know what is going to happen, we never know when. And so the stock market continued its ascent for eight more months before beginning its long, painful decline, the worst bear market since 1929-1933. The NASDAQ Index is now down nearly 80% from its peak and the New York Stock Exchange Index is down 40%.

在最近一次泡沫的高峰期,投资者似乎认定,35 倍的平均市盈率和 1% 的股息率是合理的。(历史常态是 15 倍和 4%。)17 万亿美元的股票市值相当于我们国家 9 万亿美元国内生产总值的 190%,这也没问题。(常态大约是 80%。)一家公司的价值竟然可以称得上是其未来现金流贴现值的很多倍。(这是不可能的。因为,无论计算多么困难,它的价值正好就等于这个总和。)于是,清算到来了。它一直持续到今天,市场已经回归——即使还没有完全回到——那些陈旧的常态:17 倍的市盈率,2% 的股息率,以及相当于 GDP 85% 的估值。

At the peak of the recent bubble, investors seemed to decide that an average price-earnings ratio of 35 times and a dividend yield of 1% were reasonable. (The historical norms are 15 times and 4%.) That there was no problem when the $17 trillion value of the stock market was equivalent to 190% of the $9 trillion value of our nation’s gross domestic product. (The norm is about 80%.) That a corporation could somehow be worth many times the discounted value of its future cash flows. (It can’t. For, however difficult to calculate, its value is precisely equal to that sum.) And so the reckoning came. It has continued to this day, and the market has reverted toward, if not yet quite to, most of those threadbare old norms—a p/e of 17 times, a dividend yield of 2%, and a valuation of 85% of GDP.

尽管每一场金融泡沫都各有不同,但大多数都与抛弃传统金融标准有关。正如《金融狂热简史》(Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Speculation)作者爱德华·钱思乐提醒我们的那样,狂热会暴露出我们体系中最糟糕的一面:“投机泡沫往往发生在金融创新和放松管制的时期……监管松懈是另一个常见特征……企业倾向于为满足投机者的短期快感而经营,而非为投资者的长期利益考虑。” 此外,泡沫常常带有沙上城堡的特质——稳健的商业实践被侵蚀,诚信与道德标准被妥协,金融失当行为悄然潜入体系。

While each financial bubble is different, most have been associated with the abandonment of traditional financial standards. As Edward Chancellor, author of “Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Speculation,” reminded us, manias bring out the worst aspects of our system: “Speculative bubbles frequently occur during periods of financial innovation and deregulation . . . lax regulation is another common feature . . . there is a tendency for businesses to be managed for the immediate gratification of speculators rather than the long-term interests of investors.” What is more, bubbles often take on the attributes of castles built on sand, as sound business practices erode, integrity and ethics are compromised, and financial misfeasance creeps into the system.

1. 美国企业界在泡沫中的角色 第一个重大受害者是安然公司(Enron),《纽约时报》在其崩塌时将其描述为“一场灾难性的企业内爆……涉及该公司的审计师、律师和董事……监管机构、金融分析师、信用评级机构、媒体和国会……这是治理体系的全面失败”。所有传统的守门人似乎都失职了,且正如我们在接下来的几个月中所知,安然只是我们企业体系失利的首个证据。很快,其他多米诺骨牌接连倒下,包括世通公司(Worldcom)、阿德尔菲亚(Adelphia)、环球电讯(Global Crossing)和泰科国际(Tyco)。我们之中,谁能知道下一家倒下的公司会是谁?

1. Corporate America’s Role in the Bubble The first major casualty was Enron, described by The New York Times when it fell apart as a “catastrophic corporate implosion . . . that encompassed the company’s auditors, lawyers, and directors . . . regulators, financial analysts, credit rating agencies, the media, and Congress . . . a massive failure in the governance system.” All of the traditional gatekeepers seem to have failed, and as we were to learn in the ensuing months, Enron was but the first evidence of the failure of our corporate system. Soon other dominoes were falling, including Worldcom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and Tyco. Who among us can know which corporation will be next to fall?

相对于美国 7500 家公众持股公司,我们迄今已知的作恶者数量相对较少。于是有人告诉我们,不该让几颗老鼠屎坏了一锅汤。我接受这个前提,但不同意这个结论。我们的公司体系已被扭曲的商业实践渗透殆尽:几乎每家公司都盯着自家股价,发布不切实际(且无法实现)的盈利增长预测,并把通用会计准则推到极限。当我们的行为准则变成“别人都这么干,所以我也可以”时,诚信与道德便荡然无存,整个资本主义的理念也随之变质。

Relative to the 7500 publicly-held corporations in America, the malefactors we know of so far are relatively few in number. As a result, we’re told that we shouldn’t let a few bad apples spoil the barrel. While I accept the premise, I disagree with the conclusion. Our corporate system has been permeated by distortions of sound business practices: Virtually all corporations focus on its prices of their stocks, present unrealistically high (and unachievable) projections of earnings growth, and push generally accepted accounting principles to their limit. When our rule of conduct becomes, “I can do it because everyone else is doing it,” integrity and ethics go out the window and the whole idea of capitalism is soured.

财务操纵。这世上从不缺反派角色。太多企业——为了满足自己夸大的增长预期——先大吹特吹增长潜力,再无所不用其极(无论合法还是非法)地去兑现那些激进的盈利指引。表外特殊目的实体被大量创设,主要目的就是藏匿债务;虚幻的交易误导了投资者;虚假的关联交易抬高了报表上的销售额。就在未来回报前景不断下行的同时,养老金计划假定的未来收益率却被越调越高。而当会计原则那个宽松的约束限度被撑到极限之后,紧随其后的往往就是财务数字的刑事操纵。

Financial Manipulation There are more than enough villains to go around. Too many of our corporations have vastly overstated their growth potential and then have tried to force the fulfillment of their aggressive earnings guidance by fair means or foul. Off-balance-sheet special purpose enterprises have been created, largely to conceal debt; illusory transactions have misled investors; and sham inter-company transfers have raised reported sales volumes. Assumed future returns on pension plans were raised even as the prospects for future returns tumbled. And when the loose envelope of accounting principles could be pushed no further, criminal manipulation of financial figures often followed.

而这远非罪孽清单的终点:巨额股票期权薪酬让企业高管大发其财,他们成功吹高了自家股价,却未给企业创造分毫价值。他们在泡沫驱动的高价位上抛售大量个人持股,而事后却有数百万持有公司退休计划股票的员工变得一贫如洗。审计师们从咨询业务中攫取巨额费用,沦为管理层的同伙,而非管理层财务报告独立专业的评估者。企业利润被大幅虚报,投资者终于意识到,他们所承担的风险远比自己当初讨价还价时想象的要大得多。

And that’s hardly the end of the list of sins: Enormous compensation from stock options enriched corporate executives who succeeded in hyping the price of their stocks without increasing the value of their corporations. They sold huge amounts of their own shares at bubble-driven prices, but in the aftermath millions of their employees who held company stocks in their retirement plans were impoverished. Auditors garnered enormous fees from their consulting activities, becoming partners of management rather than independent professional evaluators of management’s financial reporting. Corporate profits, it turns out, were substantially overstated, and investors came to realize that they had assumed risks that were far larger than those for which they bargained.

资本发展与赌场

可悲的是,这些问题在投资专业人士中几乎被忽视。为了追逐巨额的投资银行手续费,华尔街那些利益冲突的卖方分析师丧失了客观性,对危险信号视而不见。就连我们大型金融机构的买方分析师,也为了追求亮眼的投资业绩,抛开自己受过的训练、积累的经验以及怀疑精神,投身到这场狂潮中。毕竟,业绩大幅增长能吸引来更多资金管理,而庞大的资金规模能带来高昂的管理费。因此,投资者本身——尤其是机构投资者——对股市泡沫负有相当大的责任。无论他们是否意识到这一点,也不管是出于天真还是贪婪,他们都加入了一场市场参与者欢庆股价上涨的愉快合谋。他们忘记了本杰明·格雷厄姆告诉我们的道理:股市短期是一台投票机,长期则是一台称重机。投资者参与的是基于股价会涨的期望的短期投机,而非基于公司价值会增长的信心的长期投资。这是感知对现实的胜利。但迟早,感知会回归现实,而不是相反。

Capital Development and the Casino Sadly, those problems went almost unnoticed among investment professionals. In the search for huge investment banking fees, Wall Street’s conflicted sell-side analysts lost their objectivity and ignored the signs of trouble. Even the buy-side analysts of our large financial institutions engaged in their own search for glowing investment performance, put aside the lessons of their training and experience as well as their skepticism, and joined in the mania. After all, large performance gains draw in assets to manage, and large assets generate large fees. So investors themselves—especially institutional investors—share much of the responsibility for the bubble in stock prices. Aware of it or not, and whether through naivete or greed, they joined the happy conspiracy of market participants that reveled in rising stock prices. They forgot that while in the short run, as Benjamin Graham told us, the stock market is a voting machine, in the long run it is a weighing machine. Investors engaged in short-term speculation based on the hope that the price of a stock will rise, rather than long-term investment based on the faith that value of a corporation will grow. It was the triumph of perception over reality. But sooner or later, perception returns to reality, not the other way around.

远在这一轮泡沫形成之前——事实上在 1929 年泡沫破裂、大萧条降临后不久,凯恩斯勋爵就曾警告我们,当投机压倒实业时会发生什么:“在世界最大的投资市场之一——纽约,投机的影响力极其巨大……美国人很少‘为收益而投资’,除非抱定资本增值的希望,否则他不会轻易买入一项投资。这不过是说,他把希望寄托在估值常规基础的有利变动上,换句话说,他是一个投机者。但当实业沦为投机漩涡上的一个泡沫时,局面就严重了。当一个国家的资本开发成为赌场活动的副产品时,这件事很可能就干不好。”而在最近这个时代,它确实没有干好。

Long before this latest bubble—in fact shortly after the 1929 bubble had burst and the Great Depression was upon us, Lord Keynes warned us of what happens when speculation achieves predominance over enterprise: “In one of the greatest investment markets in the world, namely, New York, the influence of speculation is enormous . . . it is rare for an American to ‘invest for income,’ and he will not readily purchase an investment except in the hope of capital appreciation. This is only another way of saying that he is attaching his hopes to a favorable change in the conventional basis of valuation, i.e., that he is a speculator. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a mere bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” And so in the recent era, it has been ill-done.

品格的失败 公司治理领域终见改革浪潮涌动,我们正着手将美国的资本发展进程从投机转向实业。但比改善治理实践更关键的,是必须确立更高层次的治理准则。开国先贤们笃信高尚的道德标准、公正的社会秩序,以及事务运作中的德性操守。这些信念塑造了我们国家的根本品格。倘若品格至关重要——我对此深信不疑——那么当今商业与金融模式的伦理沦丧、美国企业界的财务操纵、我们投资管理从业者明知错误却仍接受的做法、令人沉默的趋同心态、让贪婪淹没理性的自私,都在侵蚀着未来岁月所需的品格——在这场大熊市及其所反映的投资幻灭之后,在"9·11"之后的新时代,这种品格比以往任何时候都更加不可或缺。那些通过商业与金融活动谋求回报者的动机,曾令亚当·斯密这样的人物都为之赞叹,认为那是“某种宏大、美丽而崇高的事物,值得为之付出辛劳与焦虑”。我无法想象今天在座的各位有人会用这样的词汇来描述 21 世纪初的美国公司治理体系。

A Failure of Character At last we are beginning a wave of reform in corporate governance and are undertaking the task of turning America’s capital development process away from speculation and toward enterprise. But there’s even more at stake than improving governance practices. One must also establish a higher set of governance principles. This nation’s founding fathers believed in high moral standards, in a just society, and in the virtuous conduct of our affairs. Those beliefs shaped the very character of our nation. If character counts—and I have absolutely no doubt that character does count—the ethical failings of today’s business and financial model, the financial manipulation of corporate America, the willingness of those of us in the field of investment management to accept practices that we know are wrong, the conformity that keeps us silent, the selfishness that lets greed overwhelm reason, all erode the character we’ll require in the years ahead, more than ever in the wake of this great bear market and the investor disenchantment it reflects, and especially in the post-September 11 era. The motivations of those who seek the rewards earned by engaging in commerce and finance struck the imagination of no less a man than Adam Smith as “something grand and beautiful and noble, well worth the toil and anxiety.” I can’t imagine that anyone in this room today would use those words to describe our corporate governance system at the outset of the 21st century.

所以这是美国企业界的一个可悲年代。严重的道德错误已经铸成,无辜的人受到了伤害,其中许多伤害不可挽回。尽管这些失败中的大部分——我再说一遍,没有——蔓延到共同基金和人寿保险等金融服务行业,但我们这两个行业的人都可以从中吸取很多教训。我认为我们能学到的基本教训是,当管理层将自身利益置于长期股东利益之上时,麻烦就在前方。

So this is a sorry era in Corporate America. Serious ethical mistakes were made, and innocent people have been hurt, many of them irreparably. While most of these failings have not—I repeat not— found their way into the financial services industries such as mutual funds and life insurance, there is much that we in both of our industries can learn from them. The fundamental lesson we can learn, I think, is that when management places its own interests ahead of the interests of long-term shareholders, trouble lies ahead.

2. 共同基金行业:把股东放在第一位?

2. The Mutual Fund Industry: Putting the Shareholder First?

我们在企业美国看到的这些问题,在我所在的共同基金领域有诸多影响。尽管太多企业管家未能赢得我们的信任,但恐怕我们这些机构管理者,也活该得到如今这样的公司治理。我们只关注短期投机,牺牲了长期投资,而在治理问题上,我们的声音之所以引人注目,仅仅是因为我们一直保持沉默。我们没有认识到,所有权不仅意味着权利,还意味着责任,因此也没能履行好企业公民的职责。我们最大的 100 家金融机构持有近 50% 的公司股份,我们掌控着企业美国,理应让我们的声音被听到。

The problems we see in Corporate America have many implications in my own field of mutual funds. While too many of our corporate stewards have failed to earn our faith, we institutional managers have, I fear, gotten the corporate governance that we deserve. We have focused on short-term speculation at the expense of long-term investing, and our voices on governance have been conspicuous solely by their silence. We have failed to recognize that ownership entails not only rights but responsibilities, and as a result have failed to act as good corporate citizens. With our 100 largest financial institutions holding almost 50% of all of corporate shares, we control corporate America, and we ought to make our voice heard.

只要我们主动站出来表明立场,我们终将重返一个时代——在这个时代里,美国商业与金融界的巨大创造力将从对股票价格的短期关注(即投机)转向对企业价值的长期关注(即实业)。当这一天到来时,我们终将获得应得的良好治理,而我们的企业管家也会作出恰当的回应。这一转变,反过来将造福我们的投资者和我们的国家。

If only we take the initiative to stand up and be counted, we will at last return to an era in which the great creative energy of American business and finance shifts from its short-term focus on the price of a stock—speculation—to a long-term focus on the value of the corporation—enterprise. When we do, we will at last get the good governance we deserve, and our corporate stewards will respond appropriately. That change, in turn, will well-serve both our investors and our nation.

这个过程已经开始。艾萨克·牛顿爵士不仅在他的第三运动定律——每个作用力都有一个大小相等、方向相反的反作用力——上是正确的,他对我们金融市场系统的判断也是对的。熊市是牛市作用的必然反作用。更重要的是,一场强大的反作用力已经开始对抗华尔街、会计行业以及那些我们曾信任的企业受托人的不可接受行为。国会通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》,要求高级企业管理人员证明公司财务报表的真实性,规定出售股票后随后重述盈利的高管必须吐出利润,用新的联邦上市公司会计监督委员会取代会计行业的自我监管,以及其他一些有益条款。

This process is already beginning. Sir Isaac Newton was not only right in his third law of motion—for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction—he was right about our system of financial markets. The bear market is the inevitable reaction to the action of the bull market. What is more, a powerful reaction has already begun to the unacceptable actions of Wall Street, of the accounting profession, and of those we trusted to be our corporate stewards. Congress has passed the SarbanesOxley bill, requiring senior corporate managers to attest to the validity of their companies’ financial statements, providing for disgorgement of profits by executives who sell stocks and later restate earnings, and replacing self-regulation of accountants with a new federal Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, as well as other salutary provisions.

纽约证券交易所已经出台了一套强有力的公司治理指引,包括提高董事独立性、审计委员会和薪酬委员会的新标准,甚至设立了独立于企业管理层的“首席董事”。(我认为我们应该更进一步,要求董事会主席由独立董事担任,将治理权与管理权分离。)新成立的“会议委员会关于公众信任与私营企业的蓝丝带委员会”(我很荣幸担任委员)已经就高管薪酬提出了一套强有力的最佳实践,关于公司治理和会计准则的最佳实践也将很快出台。

The New York Stock Exchange has produced a powerful set of guidelines for corporate governance, including greater director independence, new standards for audit committees and compensation committees, and even a “lead director” who is independent of corporate management. (I believe that we should go further, and require that the board chairman be an independent director, separating the powers of governance from the powers of management.) And the newly-formed Conference Board Blue-Ribbon Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise (on which I’m honored to serve) has already produced a strong set of best practices on executive compensation, with best practices on corporate governance and on accounting standards soon to follow.

基金的沉默 然而,在这一片繁忙的蜂巢中,共同基金行业却基本上保持沉默。基金沉默的原因显而易见。

The Silence of the Funds In this beehive of activity, however, the mutual fund industry remains largely silent. The reasons for the silence of the funds are clear.

惰性:“我们向来没怎么搞过股东积极主义,为什么现在要开始呢?”

1. Inertia: “We’ve never done much in the way of shareholder activism. Why should we start now?”

2. 投资策略:平均投资组合换手率高达惊人的每年 110%,这意味着普通基金持有普通股票的平均时间仅为 11 个月。“我们是交易者,而非所有者,那凭什么要表现得像所有者一样?”

2. Investment Strategy: With an average portfolio turnover at an astonishing 110% per year, the average fund holds the average stock for an average of 11 months. “We are traders, not owners, so why should we behave as owners?”

3. 利益冲突:“那些股票占据我们投资组合核心地位的公司,是我们最好的客户——因为我们管理着它们的养老金和储蓄计划。为什么要投票反对管理层,冒失去它们业务的风险呢?”

3. Conflict of Interest: “The corporations whose shares dominate our portfolios are our best clients, for we manage their pension and thrift plans. Why vote against management and take the risk of losing their business?”

不过,我们在企业公民身份上的失败只是诸多不足之一。我们并未充分代表长期投资者的利益,然而法律要求我们必须这样做。《1940 年投资公司法》序言呼吁共同基金应“按照股东利益……(而非)投资顾问和承销商利益进行组织、运营和管理”。尽管有这一崇高原则,我担忧在共同基金行业中,将股东利益置于首位——也就是所谓的受托责任——更多是被违背而非遵守。

But our failure of corporate citizenship is only one of our shortcomings. We have not adequately represented the interests of our long-term investors. Yet the law requires us to do just that. The preamble to the Investment Company Act of 1940 calls on mutual funds to be “organized, operated, and managed . . . in the interests of shareholders . . . (rather than) in interest of investment advisers and underwriters.” Despite that high principle, I fear that placing our shareholders first—fiduciary duty, if you will—is more honored in the breach than in the observance in the mutual fund industry.

这种背离的第一个证据在于共同基金所有权的高昂成本。股票型共同基金的直接成本,以管理费和运营费用与基金资产的比率(即“费用率”)来衡量,平均基金每年约为 1.6%,若按基金资产加权则为 1.3%。(规模较小的基金通常费率更高。)这笔成本中只有极小一部分——可能不到十分之一——实际用于投资管理。更大比例的资金流向了销售、营销和运营。但基金投资者支付的费用中,最大部分体现为运营基金的基金管理公司所攫取的丰厚利润。(税前利润率达到 40% 至 50% 的情况并不少见。)而费用率远非基金股东承受的唯一成本。事实上,若再计入销售费用、110% 换手率所隐藏的成本以及机会成本(基金很少满仓),股票基金所有权的总成本几乎翻倍,每年至少达到 2.5%。

The first evidence of this breach lies in the high costs of mutual fund ownership. Direct costs of equity mutual funds, as measured by the ratio of management fees and operating expenses to fund assets (the “expense ratio”), come to about 1.6% per year for the average fund, and 1.3% if weighted by fund assets. (Smaller funds typically have higher fees.) A tiny proportion of this cost—perhaps less than one-tenth—is actually spent on investment management. Much more goes to sales and marketing and operations. But the largest part of the fees paid by fund investors is represented by the substantial profits garnered by the management companies that operate the funds. (Pre-tax profit margins of 40% to 50% are not uncommon.) And the expense ratio is hardly the only cost fund shareholders incur. Indeed, when we add in sales charges, the hidden costs of that 110% turnover, and opportunity cost (funds are rarely fully invested), the total cost of equity fund ownership nearly doubles, to at least 2 ½% per year.

成本重要吗?当然重要!而且对金融机构来说最为重要。为什么?因为大多数消费品的价值是由口味、格调、声望和形象这些难以衡量的因素决定的,而金融产品的价值几乎完全是由所有资产中最好衡量的一样东西——金钱——来决定的。在那些(1)成本容易计算,(2)成本与回报直接相关,(3)成本随时间复利累积的金融工具中,成本最为关键。不消说,共同基金正是这一定义的完美范本。

Do costs matter? You bet they do! And they matter most in financial institutions. Why? Because while much of the value of most consumer goods is measured by immeasurable factors such as taste and tone and prestige and image, the value of financial products is measured almost entirely by that most measurable of all assets, dollars. And costs matter most in those financial instruments for which costs are (1) easily calculable, (2) directly related to returns, and (3) compounded over time. It should go without saying that the mutual fund is the paradigm of that definition.

成本到底有多重要?

How Much Do Costs Matter?

成本到底有多重要?我们来算算,对于一个长期投资者而言,成本意味着什么——假设股市年化回报率为 10%,每年 2.5% 的成本在 30 年里会吞噬掉多少收益。按 30 年复利计算,1,000 美元在股市获得 10% 年回报后,将增长到 17,500 美元。相当不错!同样是这 1,000 美元,投入一只普通基金,扣除成本后每年赚 7.5%,最终会增长到 8,750 美元。也不算太差!但只有市场收益的一半——8,750 美元的无谓损失,完全由金融中介的成本造成。换句话说,中介没出一分钱资本,没承担一丝风险,却拿走了 50% 的收益;投资者投入了 100% 的资本,承担了 100% 的风险,只拿到 50% 的收益。我坚定地站在那些认为这远远不够的人一边。

How much do costs matter? Let’s consider what costs mean to a long-term investor, and see what toll a 2 ½% annual cost would take on a 10% stock market return over, say, thirty years. When compounded over thirty years, $1,000 earning the 10% stock market return would grow to $17,500. Pretty nice! That same $1,000 invested in the typical fund, earning 7 ½% after costs, would grow to $8,750. Not too bad! But only half as much as the market—a dead-weight loss of $8,750 engendered solely by reason of the costs of financial intermediation. Put another way, the intermediaries put up 0% of the capital, took 0% of the risk, and garnered 50% of the return, the investor put up 100% of the capital, took 100% of the risk, and received 50% of the return. Put me squarely in the camp of those who don’t think that’s good enough.

这个简单的例子既展现了复利增长的奇迹,也暴露了复利成本的残酷。但故事还不止于此。中介费用是以当期美元支付的,而投资者的最终资本必须用不变购买力美元来衡量。假设未来通胀率为 2.5%。结果:市场的实际年回报率为 7.5%;基金投资者的实际回报率为 5%。最初每 1,000 美元的最终购买力,在市场中的实际价值降至 8,750 美元,而在基金中仅剩 4,300 美元。这当然远非那张展示 10% 复利魔力表格上所显示的 17,500 美元。

That simple example reflects both the miracle of compounding returns and the tyranny of compounding costs. But the story gets worse. Intermediation costs are paid in current dollars, while the investor’s final capital must be measured in constant dollars. Let’s assume a future inflation rate of 2 ½%. Result: Real annual return for the market, 7.5%; real return for the fund investor, 5%. The final purchasing power of each initial $1,000 falls to $8,750 in real terms in the market, and to only $4,300 in the fund. We’re surely a long way from that $17,500 that appears on a table showing the magic of compounding 10% returns.

如果基金业不愿正视这些变革的必要性并降低其成本,那么投资者认识到这一点只是时间问题——他们将会用脚投票。但我的行业问题远不止这些经济层面的因素。基金管理者已从股东资源的审慎守护者,蜕变为自身产品的轻率推广者——这一事实更严重地动摇了投资者对其基金受托人的信任。我们迎合公众口味,推出新基金以利用每一波市场热潮;我们大肆宣扬最热门基金获得的惊人回报,从而加剧了问题的严重性。

If the fund industry doesn’t wish to recognize the need for these changes and reduce its costs, it is only a matter of time until investors will recognize it—and they will vote with their feet. But my industry’s problems transcend these economics. Investors’ faith in their fund trustees has been shaken even more emphatically by the fact that fund managers have moved away from being prudent guardians of their shareholders’ resources and toward being imprudent promoters of their own wares. We pander to the public taste by bringing out new funds to capitalize on each new market fad, and we magnify the problem by heavily advertising the boxcar returns earned by our hottest funds.

这种强大营销的结果是,共同基金投资者的表现远逊于基金本身。他们在股市泡沫见顶前夕投入股票基金的资金,远远多于市场估值合理得多的时候;随后,又把绝大部分资金投向了科技类基金和科技导向的增长型基金(包括互联网基金!),同时撤出了价值型基金的仓位——可敬的是,价值型基金在泡沫膨胀时表现滞后,在泡沫破裂时却稳如磐石。

The result of this powerful marketing is that mutual fund investors have fared far worse than mutual funds themselves. They invested infinitely more in equity funds during the period immediately preceding the peak of the stock market bubble than when values were at far more reasonable levels, and then invested the overwhelming portion of their dollars in technology funds and technology-oriented growth funds (including internet funds!) and took their money out of value funds which, bless them, both lagged as the bubble inflated and held steady as it burst.

一个没有丑闻的行业?

An Industry Without Scandal?

2001 年初,一项独立研究显示,1984 年至 2000 年间,股市本身的年均回报率为 16%,而普通共同基金的年均回报率为 13%,考虑到基金成本约为每年 2.5% 至 3%,这一差异大致在预期范围内。但由于我刚才描述的市场择时和逆向选择问题,普通共同基金投资者的年均回报率仅为 5%。如今,熊市已将这一累计市场回报率降至约 11%,普通共同基金的回报率降至约 8%。这一关系表明,在这段对股市而言相当出色(从某个点到另一个点来看!)的时期里,普通基金投资者的回报率为 0%(!)。一无所获。这不是一个我们应当引以为傲的记录。

Early in 2001, an independent study showed that while the annual return of the stock market itself averaged 16% per year during the 1984-2000 period, the return of the average mutual fund averaged 13%, about the differential one would expect, given that fund costs amounted to about 2 ½% to 3% per year. But, because of the market timing and adverse selection issues I’ve just described, the annual return of the average mutual fund investor averaged just 5%. Today, the bear market has reduced that cumulative market return to about 11%, and the return of the average mutual fund to about 8%. That relationship suggests that the return of the average fund investor, during this excellent (from point to point!) period for stocks, was 0%(!). Nothing. It is not a record of which we should be proud.

正如我们行业领袖们所言,“共同基金行业从未出过重大丑闻”,当然也绝不像我之前描述的那些企业作恶者所制造的丑闻。但无可争议的是,我们为基金股东提供的令人震惊的回报缺口,本身就是一桩丑闻。因此,我们最好从美国企业这段令人遗憾的时期中吸取教训,整顿好自己的家业。

As our industry leaders accurately say, “the mutual fund industry has never had a major scandal,” and certainly nothing like those we’ve seen among the corporate malefactors whom I’ve earlier described. But it’s surely arguable that the astonishing shortfall in return that we’ve provided to our fund shareholders is itself scandalous. So we’d best learn from this recent sorry era in corporate America and put our own house in order.

我们不仅必须降低投资者承担的成本,还必须延长投资策略的视野。我们不仅要大幅减少推销术,更要大力加强受托责任。同时,我们必须致力于改善公司治理和提升公司价值。如果我们真正做到以客户为先,想象一下,共同基金行业在未来几年能为投资者提供多么优质的服务。

We must not only reduce the costs our investors incur, but increase the horizons of our investment strategies. We must not only focus far less on salesmanship, but far more on stewardship. And we must commit ourselves to improving corporate governance and corporate value. If we simply put our clients first, just imagine how well the mutual fund industry can serve investors in the coming years.

3. 人寿保险行业 我希望,对于自己行业的坦诚,能让我同样坦诚地谈谈美国人寿保险行业应当从企业界的失败中吸取的一些教训。正如罗伯特·彭斯所写:“哦,但愿上帝赐予我们哪怕最微小的恩赐,能让我们像别人看我们那样看清自己。”我希望,我这个外行对你们行业的看法,能既有建设性,又有所帮助。

3. The Life Insurance Industry My candor about my own industry, I hope, gives me license to address with equal candor some lessons that the life insurance industry might learn from the failings of the Corporate America. As Robert Burns wrote, “Oh that God would give us the very smallest of gifts to be able to see ourselves as others see us.” And I hope the views of this outsider to your business will be both constructive and helpful.

各位所在的行业近年来大体上没有爆发公司和金融丑闻,但你们确实不得不面对一些关于不当市场行为和过于激进的销售手法的严重指控,并为此付出了巨额和解代价。然而,困扰你们行业的最大丑闻实际上发生在大约一个世纪前。当时,纽约州参议院的阿姆斯特朗调查将人寿保险公司叫去训斥,原因包括“过高的薪酬、裙带关系、不道德且不稳健的商业做法,以及欺诈性的管理…… 很明显,互助公司并没有致力于利他性地追求保单持有人的利益。”¹ 调查还揭露了“给予外勤代理人的过高佣金、不充分的会计程序…… 以及利用公司资金来支撑高管们私下利益攸关的华尔街证券价格。”² 如果说这些表述今天早上就能轻松被用来形容我们报纸上报道的美国企业界,那么引发阿姆斯特朗调查的那件事也同样如此。那是一场奢华的“路易十四”化妆舞会,一场展现凡尔赛宫辉煌的盛大派对,据称耗费了 10 万美元(按今天的美元计算是 210 万美元),由一位名叫詹姆斯·哈森·海德的时髦年轻花花公子在 1905 年举办,他是当时巨擘公平人寿保险公司的副总裁兼主要股东。这场被当时媒体描述为“世纪社交盛事”的舞会,在公司内部引发了一场备受瞩目的权力斗争,并且抖出了足够多的肮脏家丑,惊动了州参议院,随后参议院揭露出整整一系列直接损害保单持有人利益的腐败行业做法。随之而来的公众关注激怒了民众,使保险业倒退了好几年,直到随之而来的改革带来的有益效果开始显现。

While your industry’s recent record has been largely free of corporate and financial scandal, you have had to face up to some serious charges of improper market conduct and overly-aggressive sales practices, and have settled them at huge expense. But the greatest scandal that plagued your industry actually took place almost a century ago. Then, the Armstrong Investigation in the New York State Senate called the life insurance companies on the carpet for “their excessive salaries, nepotism, unethical and unsound business practices, and fraudulent management . . . It became clear that mutuals had not dedicated themselves to the altruistic pursuit of policyholder profits.”1 The investigation uncovered “excessive commissions to field agents, inadequate accounting procedures . . . and company funds used to support prices of Wall Street securities in which officers were intimately interested.”2 If those phrases could easily have been written about Corporate America in our newspapers this very morning, so could the event that precipitated the Armstrong Investigation. It was a lavish Louis the Fourteenth costume ball, a spectacular party that unveiled the splendor of Versailles, said to have cost $100,000 (in today’s dollars, $2.1 million) given in 1905 by a dashing young playboy named James Hazen Hyde, a vice president and leading stockholder of the giant Equitable Life. This “social event of the century,” as it was described in the press of that day, ignited a highly-publicized power struggle within the company, and enough dirty laundry popped into view to alarm the State’s senate, which then unveiled a whole panoply of corrupt industry practices that directly impaired the interests of policyholders. The attendant publicity infuriated the public and set the insurance industry back for years before the beneficial effects of the consequent reform took hold.

“过犹不及,成功亦然” —— 如果你觉得这段小插曲听起来像是你几周前刚读到的某件事,那你观察力很强。它确实很像泰科国际当时的总裁 L·丹尼斯·科兹洛夫斯基为他妻子在撒丁岛举办的那场奢华的 40 岁生日派对。不,不是凡尔赛宫。但那是罗马帝国主题,服务员身着托加袍、头戴花环,还有一个米开朗基罗《大卫》的大型冰雕,周围环绕着贝类海鲜和鱼子酱,嗯,还有从冰雕里流出斯托利伏特加酒,注入客人的水晶杯中。成本是 210 万美元——其中一半由泰科的公众股东支付——恰好与近一个世纪前公平人寿的那场化妆舞会的实际成本相同。我不确定该说是“过犹不及,成功亦然”,还是“万变不离其宗”。

“Nothing Succeeds Like Excess” If that brief anecdote sounds to you like one you read about just a few weeks ago, you are very observant. As it happens, it quite resembles the extravagant 40th birthday party thrown in Sardinia by Tyco International’s then-chief-executive L. Dennis Kozlowski for his wife. No, not Versailles. But a Roman Empire theme, complete with waiters dressed in togas and wreaths on their heads, and a large ice sculpture of Michaelagelo’s David, surrounded by shellfish and caviar and, well, exuding Stoli vodka into the guests’ crystal glasses. The cost—one-half of which was paid by the Tyco public shareholders—was $2.1 million, precisely the real cost of the Equitable costume ball of nearly a century earlier. I’m not sure whether to say, “nothing succeeds like excess,” or “the more things change the more they remain the same.”

我相信,美国企业界的这些过度行为最终会得到缓解,不仅是因为泰科派对这个恶劣的典型,也是因为我们已经看到的国会和监管机构的回应,以及公众对改革的强烈呼声,正如一个世纪前保险业的过度行为最终被平息一样。但这需要时间,而且我愿意相信,这种变革不仅是由领导调查的纽约州参议员弗兰克·阿姆斯特朗推动的,也是由保险业先驱菲兰德·巴尼斯特·阿姆斯特朗推动的,他在 1917 年以写下一本名为《偷窃许可证:人寿保险,骗局中的骗局》的书结束了自己的职业生涯。作为业内知情人士,他详细列举了曾使一些业内最大公司蒙羞的会计小把戏和政治腐败。

I’m sure that Corporate America’s excesses will be ultimately mitigated, not only by the egregious example of the Tyco party but by the response we are already seeing from Congress and regulatory agencies, and by the public outcry for reform, just as the insurance industry’s excesses of a century ago were finally subdued. But it took time, and I like to think that change was fostered not only by New York State Senator Frank Armstrong, who led the investigation, but by Philander Banister Armstrong, an insurance industry pioneer who culminated his career by writing, in 1917, a book entitled A License to Steal: Life Insurance, the Swindle of Swindles. An industry insider, he catalogued the accounting peccadillos and political graft that had scandalized some of the industry’s largest companies.

虽然人寿保险的那些老问题今天已不必让我们担心,但我提到后面这位阿姆斯特朗先生有两个原因。第一,他恰好是我的曾祖父。第二,和他曾孙一样,他也信奉给予保单持有人最好的财务条款。在 1875 年的一次演讲中,他说:“先生们,你们必须认识到,费用最低的公司将拥有最终优势,(而且)拥有这种优势的公司最渴望纠正当前弊病。为了挽救我们的行业免于毁灭,我们必须立即着手进行大刀阔斧的改革。第一步必须是削减费用。” 他是你们行业的传道者,并且他有自己改革的方式:“人寿保险,”他写道,“已成为现代文明的必需品之一,应该按成本价提供。”我猜你可以说,苹果的苹果的苹果,确实没有离树太远!

While those old problems of life insurance need not concern us today, I mention the latter Mr. Armstrong for two reasons. One, he just happens to be my great-grandfather. Two, like his great-grandson, he was also a believer in giving policyholders the best possible financial terms. In an 1875 speech, he said: “Gentlemen, you must recognize that companies having the smallest expense will have the ultimate advantage (and) that companies having this advantage are the most desirous of correcting present abuses. To save our business from ruin, we must at once undertake a vigorous reform. The first step must be to reduce expenses.” He was a missionary for your industry, and he had his own way of reforming it: “Life insurance,” he wrote, “has become one of the necessities of modern civilization, and it should be furnished at cost.” I guess you could say that the apple’s apple’s apple didn’t fall very far from the tree!

人寿保险作为一种投资 那么让我们来谈谈人寿保险的成本。就像在共同基金中一样,在运营、投资和销售产品过程中产生的成本,会一分不差地直接从保单持有人资产所获得的回报中扣除。然而,在保险业中,这种联系要模糊得多,并且在你们这个领域,你们拥有定价灵活性,可以使任何特定产品更具吸引力,尽管这只能以让另一种产品吸引力下降为代价。你们可能会争辩说,你们销售的产品,其大部分价值体现在,当被保险人走到生命尽头时,向幸存者支付的面额赔付。

Life Insurance as an Investment So let’s talk about the cost of life insurance. Just as in mutual funds, the costs incurred in operating, investing, and selling the product come directly, dollar for dollar, out of the returns earned on the policyholders’ assets. In the case of insurance, however, the linkage is much less obvious, and in your field you enjoy the pricing flexibility to make any given product more attractive, albeit only by making another less so. The product you are selling, you may argue, provides most of its value in the form of the face-amount payment that come to survivors when the insured comes to the end of his or her days.

尽管如此,大多数保险仍然是一种投资,而且越来越如此。如今,年金准备金,而非保险准备金,已在你们行业的业务中占据主导地位。虽然你们的客户不会(也许不能)像共同基金投资者那样计算费用比率,但我仔细阅读了你们的《人寿保险公司实况手册》,并估算了一下你们每年的运营费用。包括税收在内,这些成本在 2000 年约为 720 亿美元,导致费用比率约占你们 3.2 万亿美元总资产的 2.3%——完全消耗了你们投资资产 7.0% 回报率的三分之一,剩下三分之二增加到保单持有人的资源中。虽然我自称对你们行业的会计实务并不专业,但我要指出的是,尽管人寿保险作为满足家庭收入维持和死亡保障需求的手段可能很有价值,但它是一种昂贵的投资方式——事实上,从保单持有人的投资回报中消耗的比例,比共同基金行业要显著得多。

Nonetheless, most insurance is an investment, and increasingly so. Today, annuity reserves, not insurance reserves, have come to dominate your industry’s book of business. While your clients don’t (and perhaps can’t) calculate an expense ratio in the manner that a mutual fund investor can, I’ve perused your Life Insurers Fact Book and estimated your annual operating expenses. Including taxes, these costs came to about $72 billion in 2000, resulting in an expense ratio equal to about 2.3% of your $3.2 trillion asset total—consuming fully one-third of the 7.0% rate of return on your investment assets, leaving two-thirds to be added to the resources of your policyholders. While I claim no expertise on the accounting practices of your business, I would observe that, valuable as it may be as a medium for meeting the needs of families for income maintenance and death protection, life insurance is an expensive way to invest— indeed consuming significantly more of your policyholders’ investment returns than is the case in the mutual fund industry.

客户回报与营销力量之间的张力 对于金融服务的提供者——共同基金和保险公司——来说,在通过最小化成本来服务保单持有人的需求,与不损害你激励销售队伍的能力之间,存在着强烈的张力。调和提高保单持有人的投资回报与提供强大激励来销售更多保单这两者,并非易事。由于人寿保险成本中销售成本占比很高(40% 的成本是支付给代理人的佣金,剩下的 60% 代表总部和分支办公费用),降低成本的主要方法似乎是越来越强调直接、免佣金的销售。除非我猜错了,否则任何想通了如何调和这一困境的公司,都将面临巨大的机遇。

The Tension Between Client Return and Marketing Power For both financial service providers—mutual funds and insurance companies—a strong tension exists between the need to serve policyholders by minimizing costs without jeopardizing your ability to provide incentives to the field force. It is not easy to reconcile enhancing the investment return of the policyholder with providing powerful incentives to sell more policies. Since life insurance costs are heavily weighted by sales costs (40% of costs are commissions to agents, the remaining 60% represents home-and field-office expenses), the major means of reducing costs would appear to be an increasing emphasis on direct, commission-free, sales. Unless I miss my guess, a great opportunity awaits any company that figures out how to reconcile that dilemma.

另一方面,我相信你们大多数人会争辩说,“人寿保险是卖出去的,而不是买来的”,无论好坏,这句格言今天似乎仍然成立。但随着消费者知识不可避免的增长,随着他们教育水平的提高,以及随着信息时代使比较购物变得更加便利,很难争辩说这种动力不会逐渐——尽管也许像冰川移动般缓慢——从卖方驱动系统转向买方驱动系统。明智的保险公司不能忽视这种可能性,因为提高保单持有人的回报很可能有助于增强公众对你们产品和行业的信心。

On the other hand, I’m sure most of you would argue that “life insurance is sold and not bought,” and, for better or worse, that aphorism seems to remain true today. But as the knowledge of consumers inevitably grows, as their education levels rise, and as the Information Age facilitates comparison-shopping, it’s hard to argue that the dynamics will not gradually—although perhaps glacially—shift from a seller-driven to a buyer-driven system. Wise insurers cannot afford to ignore such a potentiality, for increasing policyholder returns could well serve to enhance public confidence both in your product and in your industry.

你们不必告诉我这并不容易。1977 年 2 月,在我创立先锋集团后不久,我们取消了所有佣金,并且——一夜之间!——抛弃了已分销我们基金份额近 50 年的经纪-交易商网络,立即开始直接向投资者分销我们的基金,不收取销售佣金。你们可以猜到,新业务急剧下滑。因此,即使是正常的份额赎回,我们也经历了持续的现金流出。但情况在两年内发生了逆转,此后我们每年都享有正现金流。事实上,在过去十年中,我们近 3500 亿美元的现金流是我们在整个行业中最大的总数。

You don’t need to tell me it’s not easy. In February 1977, shortly after I started Vanguard, we eliminated all commissions and abandoned—overnight!—the broker-dealer network that had distributed shares of our funds for nearly 50 years, immediately beginning to distribute our funds to investors directly, without sales loads. As you might guess, new business plummeted. So even with normal share liquidations we experienced a steady cash outflow. But the situation reversed within two years, and we’ve enjoyed positive cash flow every year since. Indeed, over the past ten years our nearly $350 billion of cash flow represented the largest total in our entire industry.

但是,可能让你们感兴趣的不仅仅是我们作为免佣分销商的经历。我们还有一个特点,使我们在基金行业中独一无二:我们的互助结构。我们的运营公司实际上由我们的基金股东拥有,我们在“按成本”的基础上运营。(依稀让人想起阿姆斯特朗爷爷!)最终结果是,我们的费用比率目前约为我们股票、债券和货币市场基金总资产的 0.27%。另一方面,我们的主要竞争对手的费用比率约为 1.07%。结果:费用优势为 0.80%(80 个基点),将其应用于我们目前 5200 亿美元的资产基础,仅在 2002 年就将为我们的投资者每年节省超过 40 亿美元。换句话说,假设股票、债券和货币市场的总毛回报率为 5%,我们可以将近 95% 的回报交付给投资者,而我们的同行则交付不到 80%。事实是,我们的互助结构不仅塑造了我们的投资策略和营销策略,也塑造了我们的公司策略。“策略追随结构。”

But it is not only our experience as a no-load distributor that might interest you. We also have a characteristic that makes us unique in the fund industry: Our mutual structure. Our operating company is actually owned by our fund shareholders, and we operate on an “at cost” basis. (Shades of Grandpa Armstrong!) The net result is that our expense ratio is presently running at about 0.27% of the combined assets of our stock, bond and money market funds. Our major rivals, on the other hand, operate at an expense ratio of about 1.07%. Result: An expense advantage of 0.80% (80 basis points) which, when applied to our current $520 billion asset base, will result in annual savings of more than $4 billion for our investors in 2002 alone. Put another way, assuming a 5% combined gross return in the stock, bond, and money markets, we could deliver almost 95% of that return to investors, while our peers would deliver less than 80%. The fact is that our mutual structure is the force that shapes not only our investment strategy and our marketing strategy, but our corporate strategy as well. “Strategy follows structure.”

公众股东 vs. 互助结构 鉴于互助结构在我们的领域赋予了我们如此惊人的优势,我隐约感到困惑的是,为什么互助结构——人寿保险领域最大公司的传统标志——几乎消失了。1980 年,五大人寿保险公司中有四家是互助公司;今天一家都没有了。现在,如果去互助化使你们能够更高效、更具成本效益地服务保单持有人,我很容易理解这一点。而且,如果转向拥有公众股东的传统公司结构确实增强了你们的资本基础,并通过提供“货币”使你们更容易进行收购,我很想看看你们收购了谁,以及这些合并被证明有多成功。(到目前为止,看起来已经转制的互助公司被收购的可能性似乎大于去收购别人。而在我的行业,我相信大型金融集团对基金公司的收购,更可能给共同基金股东带来负担,而不是为他们服务。)

Public Stockholders vs. Mutuality With the staggering advantages the mutual structure has accorded us in our field, I find myself vaguely puzzled about why mutuality—the traditional hallmark of the largest companies in the life insurance field—has almost vanished. In 1980, four of the five giant life companies were mutuals; today none are. Now, if de-mutualization enables you to serve your policyholders more efficiently and cost-effectively, I can easily relate to that. And if moving to a traditional corporate structure with public shareholders in fact enhances your capital base and facilitates your ability to make acquisitions by giving you the “currency” to do so, I’ll be interested to see who you acquire and how successful the combinations prove to be. (So far, it looks as though mutuals that have converted have been less likely to acquire than to be acquired. And in my industry, I believe that the acquisition of fund firms by large financial conglomerates have been more likely to burden mutual fund shareholders than to serve them.)

此外,上市公司还面临着那些已在企业界引发严重问题的相同压力:设定盈利目标的压力,接着是达成这些目标的压力。上市还让高管和员工有机会获得丰厚的股票期权,不过在最近的泡沫中,只有最精明的高管——那些有智慧、运气或贪心在泡沫破裂前卖出的人——才实现了巨额收益。但我严重怀疑,从互助制转为股份制所带来的潜在优势,是否可能被其劣势(尤其是企业文化的巨大转变以及公众对人寿保险态度的潜在负面变化)所大大抵消。

What is more, publicly-owned insurers face those very same pressures that have caused such problems in Corporate America: Pressures to set earnings targets, followed by pressure to meet them. Public ownership also offers executives and staff the opportunity for rich stock options, though in the recent bubble, only the sharpest executives—those with the intelligence, or the luck, or the cupidity to sell before the bubble burst—realized box-car gains. But I seriously wonder whether the potential advantages of the shift involved in moving from mutual form to stock form might not be vastly outweighed by the disadvantages, particularly the extraordinary change in corporate culture and the potential negative change in public attitudes about life insurance.

简而言之,无论你采取互助制还是股份制,你至少拥有一个令共同基金竞争对手(其中大多数当然不是互助结构)望尘莫及的惊人优势:你为投保人所赚取的投资收益以免税方式累积,而我们的行业则没有这样的优势。这很公平。但是,当这种内部积累超出了常规业务的范畴,并被作为税务套利工具出售给企业时,我怀疑你们的行业是否可能因此危及自身最大的竞争优势之一。这值得深思。

Suffice it to say that, whether you are mutual or stock in form, you enjoy at least one staggering advantage over your mutual fund rivals (most of which, of course, are not mutual in structure): The investment income you earn for those you insure builds up on a tax-free basis, while no such advantage accrues to our industry. And that’s fair enough. But when this inside build-up goes beyond the ordinary course of your regular business and is sold to corporations as a tax-arbitrage play, I wonder whether your industry might not risk jeopardizing one of its largest competitive advantages. It’s worth thinking about.

当今的挑战:变额年金 这便引出了一个我们两行业交汇的领域。不能再像以前那样说:“人寿保险是人寿保险,共同基金是共同基金,两者永不相交。”因为我们在变额年金领域相遇了。而年金已成为你们业务的驱动力。半个世纪前,年金保费只有人寿保险保费的七分之一。十五年前,两者持平。到 2000 年,3000 亿美元的年金保费是人寿保险保费 1300 亿美元的两倍多。如今,变额年金主导着你们的年金业务。在 1990 年代初期,变额年金保费仅为 50 亿美元(占总量的 4%),但到 1999 年,变额年金保费达到 1370 亿美元,实际上超过了固定年金保费,然而随着股市泡沫破裂,在 2001-2002 年又急剧回落。

Today’s Challenge: Variable Annuities This brings me to an area where our industries join forces. No longer can it be said that, “life insurance is life insurance and mutual funds are mutual funds, and never the twain shall meet.” For we meet in the field of variable annuities. And annuities have become the driving force in your business. A half-century ago, premiums on annuities were one-seventh those on life insurance. Fifteen years ago they were equal. By 2000, annuity considerations of $300 billion were more than double life premiums of $130 billion. And it is variable annuities that now dominate your annuity business. Only $5 billion of your annuity premiums (4% of the total) as the 1990s began, variable annuity premiums of $137 billion in 1999 actually exceeded fixed premiums, only to fall back sharply during 2001-2002 as the stock market bubble burst.

变额产品领域由保险公司主导,它们使用的是传统基金公司而非保险公司自身运营的共同基金。事实上,在 TIAA-CREF——这个领域的“800 磅大猩猩”,拥有 1300 亿美元的变额年金资产——之后,最大的 11 家供应商都是大型基金集团。总体而言,保险公司仅管理着总资产的 13%。这种将共同基金份额与年金保障相结合的方式,对供应商来说具有极高的经济意义。但遗憾的是,对投资者而言并非如此。平均基金费用为 0.9%,平均保险包装成本为 1.3%,总费用率达到 2.2%。考虑到投资组合换手率和其他成本无疑与我之前为普通基金估算的 1.2% 相当,这将使年度总费用拖累达到 3.4%。此外,对于那些因故未能坚持到底的保单持有人所收取的退保费用,只会进一步增加总拖累。因此,尽管变额年金巨大的税收递延内部积累优势对投资者是一个强有力的好处,但许多独立观察人士认为,它完全被成本所施加的高额门槛费率所压倒。

The variable product field is dominated by insurance firms using mutual funds operated by traditional fund firms rather than the insurance companies themselves. Indeed, after TIAA-CREF—the 800-lb. gorilla of the field with $130 billion of variable annuity assets—the 11 largest providers are major fund complexes. In all, insurance companies manage but 13% of the total. This combination of mutual fund shares with annuity protections makes consummate economic sense for the providers. But, alas, the same cannot be said for the investors. Average fund expenses come to 0.9%, and average insurance wrap costs come to 1.3%, for a total charge of 2.2%. Given that portfolio turnover and other costs doubtless parallel the 1.2% that I estimated earlier for regular funds, that would bring the total annual expense drag to 3.4%. And surrender charges imposed on policyholders who, for whatever reason, fail to stay the course, can only add to this total drag. Thus, while the enormous tax-deferred inside build-up advantage of variable annuities is a powerful benefit to investors, many independent observers believe it to be totally overwhelmed by the huge hurdle rate imposed by costs.

更重要的是,变额年金的投资价值,就像它们的表亲普通共同基金一样,被近期泡沫破裂前股市的高回报所严重夸大。2000 年底,7800 亿美元变额年金资产中约有 85% 投资于股票基金,通常是其类别中最激进的那些。随着普通基金的平均资产价值从泡沫顶峰下跌 50%,而吸收了大部分现金流的激进基金下跌 65%,总资产已降至 5200 亿美元。如今,变额年金正同时承受着股价暴跌和高昂成本带来的消耗效应。(例如,每年 3.33% 听起来可能并不那么糟糕,但它在 15 年内消耗了近 40% 的投资。)此外,保证保单面值支付的死亡抚恤金,必将对保险公司的资源施加额外负担,除非且直到市场收复失地。

What is more, the investment merits of variable annuities, just like those of their regular mutual fund cousins, were heavily exaggerated by the high returns of the stock market before the recent bubble burst. Some 85% of the $780 billion of variable annuity assets at the end of 2000 was represented by equity funds, often the most aggressive in their class. With the asset value of the average fund now off 50% from their level at the bubble’s peak, and the aggressive funds that were the recipient of most of the cash flows down 65%, total assets are down to $520 billion. Now, variable annuities are contending with the depleting affect of both tumbling stock prices and heavy costs. (While, say, 3 1/3% per year may not sound all that bad, it consumes nearly 40% of an investment over 15 years.) In addition, death benefits that guarantee the payment of the face of policies are sure to impose an additional burden on the resources of insurance companies, unless and until the market recoups the lost ground.

与共同基金经理一样,变额年金的发行机构只能观望、等待并希望投资回报能够改善。但是,同样与基金行业一样,保险业必须努力改善向客户提供变额年金的财务条款。这似乎并非不可能:费用最低的两项计划的总费用率平均为 50 个基点,不到 2.2% 平均水平的四分之一,而且两者均不收取销售费用。任何能够挑战它们的保险公司都面临着一个巨大的机遇。更重要的是,很难想象那些通过激进的销售推广手段(如高额退保费用和所谓的“红利”,实际上不过是把年金领取人自己的钱还给他们)来获取分销渠道的高成本年金,无论其营销多么出色,最终不会给这个产品带来麻烦。请不要忘记,在一个日益知情的投资者群体中,你们行业的信誉是一项无价的资产。

Like mutual fund managers, variable annuity issuers can only watch and wait and hope that investment returns will improve. But, again like the fund industry, the insurance industry must work to improve the financial terms on which variable annuities are offered to clients. It doesn’t appear to be impossible: The two programs with the lowest costs carry all-in expense charges averaging 50 basis points, less than one-quarter of the 2.2% average, and neither carry sales loads. Any insurance firm that can challenge them has quite an opportunity before it. What is more, it’s hard to imagine that high-cost annuities that garner distribution by aggressive sales promotion techniques such as high surrender charges and purported “bonuses” in which the annuitants are simply given their own money back, however good for marketing, won’t come back to haunt this product. Please don’t forget that in an increasingly informed investor community, your industry’s credibility is a priceless asset.

但推动金融服务公司前进的,不仅仅是竞争现实。开明的自身利益表明,我们的服务越来越需要公众的信任。而在这些艰难的金融市场中,这种信任,就像我们对美国企业管家的信任一样,不仅正在受到考验,而且被发现有所不足。对于你们和我们的行业而言,预警即预装备。

But it is more than competitive realities that should motivate financial service firms. Enlightened self-interest suggests that our services increasingly demand public trust. And in these difficult financial markets that trust, like our trust in the stewards of America’s corporations, is not only being tested, it is being found wanting. For both your industry and mine, forewarned is forearmed.

回归未来 保险业的资产,如同共同基金行业的资产一样,已被我今天所讨论的美国企业失败所严重消耗。在熊市中,不仅股票资产暴跌,固定收益资产也遭受了重大的信用降级,甚至发生了一些广为人知的破产。对于那些在任何一个领域(或两个领域)都忽视了投资质量的人来说,弥补损失为时已晚,但我们的两个行业都有责任采取更积极的方法来提升企业价值,通过实践健全的公司治理并要求高信用质量来实现。

Back to the Future Assets of the insurance industry, like those of the mutual fund industry, have been deeply depleted by the failures of corporate America that I have discussed today. And it is not only equity assets that have tumbled in the bear market, but fixed-income assets that have suffered major credit downgrades and even some well-publicized bankruptcies. It is too late for those who have ignored investment quality in either arena (or both) to recoup, but it is incumbent on both of our industries to take a more aggressive approach to enhancing corporate value by practicing sound corporate governance and demanding high credit quality.

我很抱歉传递了一个严酷的信息。但这是一个现实的信息,尤其是当我们展望未来时。回顾过去,我们可以沉醉于二十年的丰饶之中,期间股票平均年回报率为 11%,债券平均年回报率为 9%。慷慨的金融市场回报对我们的行业尤其重要,因为,在成本不变的情况下,回报率越高,我们的运营、投资、交易和营销费用所消耗的比例就越低。因此,控制投资者和保单持有人的成本必须始终是重中之重。

I apologize for being the purveyor of a tough message. But it is a realistic one, especially as we look to the future. Looking back, we can revel in the bounty of two decades in which returns on stocks have averaged 11% per year and returns on bonds have averaged 9% per year. Generous financial market returns are especially important to our industries for, holding costs constant, the higher the return, the lower the proportion consumed by our operating, investment, trading, and marketing expenses. So controlling investor and policyholder costs must remain a high priority.

鉴于目前股票价格大幅下降,加上一些指标表明我们已处于公允价值区间,我认为合理的预期表明未来每年的股票回报率将在 7% 到 10% 之间。如果我们足够幸运地将年通胀率控制在 2%,那么未来的实际回报率将在 5% 到 8% 之间,大致属于“正常”水平,因为股票的长期实际回报率平均为 6.5%。对于债券,目前 5% 的收益率表明未来实际回报率为 3%,大致与历史常态持平。

Given the present vastly depleted level of stock prices, together with metrics that suggest we are now in a fair value range, I believe that reasonable expectations suggest future annual stock returns in the 7% to 10% range. If we are lucky enough to hold the annual inflation rate to 2%, future real returns would be in the 5% to 8% range, or roughly “normal,” in that the long-term real return on stocks has averaged 6 ½%. For bonds, the current 5% yield would suggest a future return of 3%, in real terms, about equal to the historical norm.

因此,从某种意义上说,金融市场是“回归未来”。旧秩序已经改变。如果我们要维持客户的信心,就必须整顿好各自的家园,为新的秩序做好准备。我无法想象,每一天过去,公众会不更加知情,我们最好不仅要让那些将财务未来托付给我们的客户得到公平的待遇,而且还要让他们拥有诚实的股份以及充满诚信的待遇。只有这样,我们才能向客户确认,我们已经从我今天所描述的美国企业界表亲们的痛苦经历中吸取了教训——这些经历直接影响了我们两个行业合计 9 万亿美元的资产基础——并为光明的未来做好了准备。保险、年金以及共同基金所依据的概念,依然像以往一样坚实。现在要靠我们以一种将客户放在首位的方式来实施它们。

So in a sense it is “back to the future” in the financial markets. The old order hath changeth. If and if we are to maintain the confidence of our clients, we must get our respective houses in order and ready ourselves for the new order. It is impossible for me to imagine that each passing day does not come with an increasingly aware public, and we’d best not only give those who have entrusted their financial future futures to us a not only a fair shake, but an honest stake and, an integrity-laden shake. It is only by doing so that we will affirm to our clients that we have learned from the painful experience of our cousins in corporate America that I’ve described today—experience that has directly affected the $9 trillion asset base of our combined industries—and readied ourselves for a bright future. The concepts underlying insurance and annuities, and mutual funds too, remain as sound as they have always been. It is up to us to implement them in a manner that puts our clients first.

注:本演讲所表达的意见不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的观点。© 版权所有 2002 约翰·C·博格尔

Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management. © Copyright 2002 by John C. Bogle