一生、事业与为投资者构建更美好金融世界的使命
一段人生、一段事业,以及为投资者建设更美好金融世界的使命
约翰·C·博格,先锋集团创始人,在“费城杰出人士演讲系列”上的发言
梅里恩板球俱乐部,宾夕法尼亚州哈弗福德
2012 年 10 月 10 日
《圣经·马可福音》6 章 4 节有言:“先知在本乡、本族、本家,是得不到尊重的。”这句话无疑适用于许多职业,但今晚在这个房间里,我们看不到丝毫这样的迹象。座无虚席,有这么多我漫长人生中的老朋友,还有我的家人。实际上,是你们这些“费城杰出人士”,这个演讲系列才以你们命名。感谢各位的光临!
A Life, a Career, and a Mission to Build A Better Financial World for Investors Remarks by John C. Bogle, Founder, The Vanguard Group at the “Fabulous Philadelphian Speaker Series” Merion Cricket Club Haverford, PA October 10, 2012 There’s a Biblical saying, from Mark 6:4, that “a prophet is without honor in his own country, and among society in his kindred home town.” There’s doubtless a lot of careers to which that message applies, but there’s surely no evidence of it here in this room tonight. A full house, so many friends of my long lifetime, members of my family. It is actually you who are the “Fabulous Philadelphians” for whom this speaking series is named. Thank you all for coming!
我在这次讲话里要谈的内容跨度很大。对于关心商业中人性一面的朋友,我认为你们会喜欢开头部分;如果你们对金融感兴趣,中间部分值得看;而要是你们关注股市,那最后一部分是重点。至于我没有涉及的无数话题,我会在最后留出充足时间供问答。
I’m going to cover a lot of ground in my remarks. For those of you who are interested in the human side of business, I think you’ll like the first part of my talk; if you’re into finance, the middle part; and if you follow the stock market; the last part. And for the infinite number of subjects I haven’t touched, I’ll leave plenty of time for questions and answers at the end.
从某种意义上说,我的职业生涯始于大约 70 年前,地点就在蒙哥马利大道对面,所以我决定把今晚演讲的标题定为“一段人生、一份职业,以及为投资者构建更美好世界的使命”。因为我想强调,在我们金融体系永恒的数学动力学之外,人的因素不可避免地扮演着重要角色。
Since my career, in a sense, began right across Montgomery Avenue from here almost 70 years ago, I decided to title my remarks this evening, “A Life, a Career, and a Mission to Build a Better World for Investors.” For I want to emphasize that, along with the eternal mathematical dynamics of our financial system, the human element inevitably plays a major role.
“钻石宝地” 所以我不由自主地要从我职业生涯的起点谈起——就在费城郊区。正如天普大学创始人拉塞尔·康维尔在他举世闻名的演讲中所承诺的那样,我就在自家后院里找到了自己的“钻石宝地”。
“Acres of Diamonds” So I can’t help but begin with some reflections on where my career began—right here in suburban Philadelphia. Just as Temple University Founder Russell Conwell had promised in his world-famous oration, I found my own “Acres of Diamonds” right here in my backyard.
1943 年,当父母带着我们“博格尔三兄弟”搬到这里时,家境十分艰难。我们全家挤在阿德莫尔蒙哥马利大道一栋房子的三楼临时隔出来的公寓里;后来又搬到哈弗福德玫瑰巷一个车库顶上只有两个半房间的住处,地方小得我每逢假期从普林斯顿回家时,只能睡在其中一个车库里——泥地地面,什么也没有。
When our parents brought the “three Bogle boys” here in 1943, we were in tough straits. We all lived in a makeshift third-floor walk-up apartment in a house on Montgomery Avenue in Ardmore; and then to 2 ½-rooms over a garage on Rose Lane in Haverford, so small that when I came home from Princeton for holidays, I slept in one of the garages, dirt floor and all.
我对那个时代的美好回忆之一:在圣诞节回家休假期间,我在阿德莫尔邮局上夜班。我依然记得凌晨 3 点 15 分从车库房间出来,沿蒙哥马利大道艰难走去上班的情景。雪花飘落,夜色寒冷而寂静,一辆车都看不到,街灯柔和,我在家和大学面临的挑战都抛在了一边。走在路上,我清晰地记得自己细数着拥有的福气。那个时刻,始终是我成长岁月中最持久的记忆之一。我当时真是个幸运的家伙。
One of my beautiful memories of that era: while home on Christmas vacation, I worked the graveyard shift at the Ardmore Post office. I still remember plodding down Montgomery Avenue from my garage room at 3:15 AM to begin my job. The snow was falling, the night cold and silent, not a car to be seen, the street lights soft, the challenges I faced at home and college put aside. As I walked, I distinctly remember counting my blessings. That moment remains one of my most enduring memories of those formative years. I was one lucky guy.
在那个时期,我的父母分开了,但我们是幸运的——跟着我们深爱的母亲搬进了哈弗福德盖布尔斯一套真正的两居室公寓,就在克里克特俱乐部对面,蒙哥马利大街的另一侧。(如果你好奇的话,从这边看,它在三楼左手边。)我想,你可以说,我从那里走出了一条很长的路。在我的职业生涯中,从服务生、兼职邮局职员,到创立并担任数十年的首席执行官,管理着如今全球最大的共同基金集团(资产规模达 2 万亿美元)。连我自己都感到惊讶!
During this era, my parents separated, but we got lucky, moving with our beloved mother to a real two-room apartment at Haverford Gables, right across Montgomery Avenue from the Cricket Club. (If you’re curious, it’s on the third floor, left, from here.) You could say, I suppose, that I’ve come a long way from there. In my career, from waiter and then part-time post office clerk to founder and for decades chief executive of what is now the largest ($2 trillion of assets) mutual fund complex in the world. It surprises even me!
我在一个亲密却破碎的家庭中长大,父母在我大学毕业后一年相继离世。但就在 56 年前的此刻此地,我再次亲历了“钻石遍地”的故事。我找到了伊芙,我们共同养育了一个亲密且“完整”的家庭,如今包括 6 个孩子、4 个女婿儿媳、12 个孙辈,很快还将迎来我们的第 4 个孙女婿或孙媳妇,总共 28 口人。马尔克斯真是料事如神!
I was raised in a close but broken family, and both of my parents died the year after I graduated from college. But right here, 56 years ago, it was “Acres of Diamonds” all over again. I found Eve, and we have raised a close but “together” family that now includes six children, four children-in-law, twelve grandchildren, soon to have, our, well, fourth grandchild-in-law, 28 in all. Malthus knew what he was talking about!
我今晚为什么要跟你们讲这段往事?我想,有两个原因。第一,是想提醒大家,在我们的人生中,任何事情都可能发生。(“永不放弃。永不。永不。永不。永不!”是我们家长期信奉的座右铭。)第二,是因为那些塑造我金融职业生涯的价值观,固然源于我的天性(这是当然),但也同样源于我的后天教养——我的成长经历,以及一些人所认为的那场漫长而艰辛的、争取自立与经济保障的斗争,从中我懂得,我们必须为所得而付出,努力成就自己。
Why on earth am I telling you about this saga tonight? For two reasons, I think. First, as a reminder that in this life of ours, anything can happen. (“Never give up. Never. Never. Never. Never. Never!” is a long-time family motto.) Second, because the values that have shaped my career in finance are a product of my nature (of course), but also of my nurture—my upbringing and what some would consider a long, hard, struggle for self-reliance and financial security, learning that we must work for what we get, trying to make something of myself.
我所面对并克服的这些挑战,将这个出身平凡的灵魂带到了今天的位置——一个智力不过中等、乐于承担责任、能与各行各业的人相处融洽,并且不仅渴望改变自己的人生,也渴望为我们整个社会中的人们带来改变的人。
These challenges I’ve faced and overcame are what have taken this soul from a humble background to where I am today—a person of no more than decent intelligence, eagerness to accept responsibility, an ability to get along with individuals from all walks of life, and a passion to make a difference, not only in my own life, but for the human beings in our society at large.
老实说,我一个人走不到今天。一路走来,我仰仗了极度的执着、太多的好运,还有无数不可思议——往往纯属机缘——的际遇,你们今晚在座的绝大多数人甚至无法想象。我所取得的一切成就,都离不开许多人的关爱与支持。正如我在新书《文化的冲突:投资与投机》的献词中所致谢的,借用约翰·邓恩那句永恒的智慧:“没有人是一座孤岛,可以自全。”
Let me be honest, I’ve not gotten here by myself alone. I’ve been the beneficiary of a relentless determination, and so much good luck and so many incredible—often fortuitous— breaks that would be impossible for most of you here tonight even to imagine them. I didn’t do whatever I’ve been able to do without the love and support of lots of other human beings. As my dedication of my new book, The Clash of the Cultures: Investment vs. Speculation acknowledges, citing John Donne’s eternal wisdom, “No man is an island, entire of itself.”
教育是改变人生的力量。优秀的学校教育对于塑造我的价值观、磨砺我的思维、培养求知欲和成就职业生涯起到了至关重要的作用。我深爱的母亲下定决心,要让她的三个儿子接受一流的教育。在来到费城之前,我们住在新泽西海岸边,每年租住不同的房子,我高中一、二年级就读于马纳斯宽中学。尽管母亲当时只能为我们每人支付 100 美元的学费,但她不知怎么说服了布莱尔学院收下我们三个孩子。布莱尔学院为我们提供了奖学金和勤工俭学的机会。我在那里当餐厅服务员——这份工作几乎贯穿了我整个高中时代,冬春夏秋四季不断——高年级时还当上了服务生领班。
Education Makes the Difference A wonderful education was essential in shaping my values, sharpening my mind, honing my intellectual curiosity, and developing my career. My beloved mother was determined that her three boys would receive first-class schooling. Before coming to Philadelphia, we lived on the New Jersey shore, renting a different place every year and attending Manasquan High School in my freshman and sophomore years. Somehow—despite being able to pay only $100 in tuition for each of us—she persuaded Blair Academy to take her boys under its wing. Blair provided us with scholarships and jobs. I was a waiter—for almost a decade, my perennial job, winter, spring, summer and fall—and, as a senior, captain of the waiting crew.
在那次改变人生的机遇到来之前,我能有所作为的概率微乎其微。布莱尔学院——这所学校确实出色,拥有卓越的老师们,感谢他们,坚持要求我做到优秀,绝不容许我说“不”——我倾尽全部的决心,才达到了他们的高标准。这是一份极为珍贵的恩赐,因为布莱尔直接把我送进了普林斯顿大学,而那里有一条与我职业生涯直接相连的道路在等待着我。
Before that life-changing opportunity, the odds were miniscule that I would ever make something of myself. Without Blair Academy—a truly great school, with marvelous masters who, bless them, demanded that I excel and wouldn’t take no for an answer. It took all of the determination at my command to measure up to their high standards. It was a remarkable blessing, for Blair led me directly to Princeton, where a remarkably direct link to my career lay in waiting.
普林斯顿同样为我提供了工作和奖学金,让我得以自食其力(好像还有别的选择似的!)。我的早年岁月毫无建树,大二那年还差点丢了奖学金,那会过早地终结我的大学生涯。一个光明未来的预后似乎暗淡无光,但我那执着的毅力(我向你保证,不是靠我的脑子!)拯救了我,成绩开始好转,并持续上升,我得以接受了一流的通识教育。毕业时,我获得了经济学优等荣誉。
Princeton, too, provided me with jobs and scholarships, and I was able to be self-sustaining (as if there were any alternative!). My early years were bereft of distinction, and in my sophomore year I almost lost my scholarship, which would have prematurely put an end to my college career. The prognosis for a bright future seemed grim, but my plodding determination (not, I assure you, my brains!) bailed me out, my grades improved, and continued to improve, and I went on to get a first-class liberal education. When I graduated, it was with High Honors in Economics.
普林斯顿论文这件事是怎么发生的?简单!因为我在大四选到了一个完全吸引我的论文题目。这个题目此前从未有人写过,正是我一直寻找的。它涉及一个“规模虽小却充满争议”的行业(就像我自己一样!)。我第一次了解到它,是在法尔斯通图书馆的阅览室里,偶然翻开 1949 年 12 月的《财富》杂志。(就像我那次在雪中步行到阿德莫尔邮局一样,那一刻我记忆犹新,仿佛就在昨天。)杂志第 116 页开始了一篇关于婴儿期共同基金行业的文章,标题是“波士顿的大钱”。当时,整个基金行业管理的资产只有 25 亿美元。今天,行业资产已达 12 万亿美元,而先锋领航的 2 万亿美元在其中占据了令人惊叹的 16%——也就是说,每投入共同基金的 6 美元中,就有 1 美元投在了我们的基金里。
The Princeton Thesis How did that ever happen? Simple! Because I found a subject for my senior thesis that totally engaged me. It was a subject on which no thesis had ever before been written, just what I’d been looking for. And it involved an industry that was “tiny but contentious” (just like I was!). I learned of it for the first time when, in the reading room of Firestone library, I happened to open the December 1949 issue of FORTUNE magazine. (Like my snowy walk to the Ardmore Post Office, I remember that moment as if it were yesterday.) There, on page 116 began an article on the infant mutual fund industry, entitled “Big Money in Boston.” Then, the entire fund industry oversaw only $2 ½ billion of assets under management. Today, industry assets are $12 trillion, with Vanguard’s $2 trillion now representing an amazing 16 percent of that total—one dollar of every six invested have been placed in our mutual funds.
我认为,这篇论文出自一个刚过二十岁的年轻人之手,堪称工整扎实——即便远非完美无瑕。¹ 在分析了基金行业的历史之后,我提出了如何让这个行业未来对投资者更友好的一些想法。以下摘自论文原文,请仔细听。
The thesis, I think, was a workmanlike—if hardly flawless—effort by a young man barely out of his teenage years.1 After analyzing the fund industry’s past, I offered my ideas of how to make it a better industry for investors in the future. Here are some verbatim quotations from the thesis. Listen carefully, please.
[共同基金]应当以尽可能高效、诚实、经济的方式运营……通过降低销售费用和管理费,可以最大化未来的增长……基金无从宣称自己优于市场平均……投资公司的主要职能是管理[其]投资组合,其他一切皆为配角……共同基金的首要角色应当是服务其股东。
[Mutual funds] should be operated in the most efficient, honest, and economical way possible . . . Future growth can be maximized by reducing sales charges and management fees . . . Funds can make no claim to superiority over the market averages . . . The principal function of investment companies is the management of [their] investment portfolios. Everything else is incidental . . . The principal role of the mutual fund should be to serve its shareholders.
如果你用那些词语来形容今天的先锋集团,你当然是对的。但如果你只看到一个大四学生稚嫩又充满理想主义的空谈,你也没错。但无论如何,正是我论文里提出的那些天真却崇高的目标——效率、诚实、经济、低成本、指数基金、股东优先,总而言之,让投资者获得公平待遇——为我的整个金融职业生涯奠定了基础。
If you see today’s Vanguard described by those words of course you’re right. But if you see only the mouthings of a callow and idealistic college senior; you’re also right. But whatever the case, it was those naïve but noble goals expressed in my thesis—efficiency, honesty, economy, low costs, index funds, serving shareholders first, in all, a fair shake for investors—that set the stage for my entire career in finance.
从大学到职场 几乎在我毕业的同时,我就从高远的理念转向了现实中那个你死我活的投资行业。行业先驱沃尔特·摩根,普林斯顿大学 1920 届毕业生,读了我的论文。1951 年我毕业时,他在自己 1928 年于费城创立的威灵顿基金给了我一份工作。我那位伟大的导师——愿上帝保佑他!——喜欢我;他信任我;在我对自己都缺乏信心的时候,他对我充满信心;他给了我一个可以自行判断的机会。这本书由麦格劳-希尔在 2001 年出版,作为我的著作《约翰·博格论投资:第一个 50 年》的最后一章。
From College to Business Almost immediately, my move began from lofty ideas to their implementation in the real dog-eat-dog business of investing. Industry pioneer Walter Morgan, Princeton Class of 1920, read the thesis and, when I graduated in 1951, offered me a job at his Wellington Fund, the firm he founded here in Philadelphia in 1928. My great mentor—bless his soul!—liked me; he trusted me; he had confidence in me when I had little confidence in myself; and he gave me the break of You can judge for yourself. It was published by McGraw-Hill in 2001 as the final chapter of my book John Bogle on Investing: The First 50 Years.
一生相伴——在他身边工作,这是又一次改变人生的机遇,而这位导师在我整个职业生涯中一直在塑造我的价值观。
a lifetime—a job at his side, yet another life-changing opportunity with a man who has helped shape my values all through my career.
我满怀热忱、深信不疑地吸收了沃尔特·摩根的保守投资理念。这套理念合情合理,为投资者带来了良好的回报。惠灵顿基金是一只保守的平衡型基金,约三分之二的资产投资于股票——用于实现收入和资本的增长——三分之一投资于债券——用于获取当期收入和保全资本。惠灵顿基金投资高度分散,运营成本低,专注于长期。它是为投资者设计的,与投机者的需求相去甚远,简直让人难以想象。与当今基金行业——一家大型基金管理公司通常运营多达 200 只甚至更多基金——截然不同,该公司的全部资产基础仅有一只共同基金,资产规模只有 1.5 亿美元。
I absorbed Walter Morgan’s conservative investment philosophy with relish and conviction. It made sense, and served investors well. Wellington Fund was a conservative balanced fund, with about two-thirds of its assets invested in stocks—for growth of income and capital—and one-third in bonds—for current income and conservation of capital. Wellington was broadly diversified, operated with low expenses, and focused on the long term. It was designed for investors, and was as far from the needs of speculators as one could possibly imagine. Unlike todays fund industry—in which a large fund manager usually operates as many as 200 funds or more—the firm’s entire asset base consisted of a single mutual fund with but $150 million in assets.
“狂飙年代” 20 世纪 60 年代中期,投资游戏的规则变了。我们的市场开始聚焦股票价格(投机),而非内在价值(投资)。那是共同基金行业历史上最糟糕的时期之一。像惠灵顿这样的平衡型基金失宠了——“过于保守”。华尔街的新生代(当时一本畅销书的书名)吹捧那个令人遗憾的“狂飙年代”,那些经验甚少但信心爆棚的年轻热门基金经理似乎能为基金投资者创造出惊人的回报。谁能蠢到认为这种猖獗的短期投机和那些惊人回报能够长期持续?
The “Go Go” Era In the mid-1960s, the rules of the investment game changed. Our markets began to focus on stock prices (speculation) rather than intrinsic values (investment). It was one of the sorriest eras in the history of the mutual fund industry. Balanced funds like Wellington fell out of favor—“too conservative.” The New Breed on Wall Street (the title of a book of that time) praised that lamentable “Go-Go Era,” where hot young managers with little experience but loads of confidence appeared to create box-car returns for fund investors. Who could have been stupid enough to believe that this rampant short-term speculation and those box-car returns could endure over the long term?
唉,说来惭愧,我就是那个蠢人。我上钩了,换句话说,我抓住机会,试图把惠灵顿管理公司改造成新时代的弄潮儿之一。1965 年,摩根先生让我担任公司负责人,当时我 35 岁,过度自信,我们面临着巨大的竞争压力,不得不随大流。摩根先生告诉我接手公司,“不惜一切代价”解决我们的问题。在 20 世纪 60 年代初期,惠灵顿基金的业绩表现大幅下滑——甚至相对于其他保守的平衡型基金也是如此——我确信我们需要新的投资组合经理。但是,与我师从摩根先生学到的投资历史教训相反,我天真地认为,我们还需要推出自己的狂飙基金,并拓展到当时快速成长的企业养老金基金管理业务——这个市场当时由纽约几家主要银行掌控。(唉,这些银行后来也屈服于“新时代”的幻觉。我狂妄自大且愚蠢,但周围不乏同路人,这绝不能成为借口。)
Alas, to my shame, I was. I bit, as it were, at the opportunity to recast Wellington Management Company as one of the movers and shakers of the new era. Mr. Morgan had made me the head of the firm in 1965 when I was an overly-confident 35 years of age, and we were under great competitive pressure to follow the crowd. Mr. Morgan told me to take charge and “do whatever it takes” to fix our problems. During the early 1960s—Wellington Fund’s performance returns had slipped significantly—even relative to other conservative balanced funds—and I was sure that we needed new portfolio managers. But, contrary to the lessons of investment history that I had learned at Mr. Morgan’s knee, I naively believed that we also needed to offer our own Go-Go fund, and to expand into the burgeoning business of managing money for corporate pension funds, a market then controlled by the leading New York banks. (These banks, alas, would also succumb to the “new era” illusion. That I had plenty of company in my arrogant stupidity is no excuse whatsoever.)
我急于留下自己的印记,于是安排了一次与当时最热门的新公司之一——波士顿的桑代克、多兰、佩因和刘易斯公司——的合并。他们是新时代的明星,但这些明星很快就变成了彗星,迅速燃烧殆尽。但突然间,我们有了自己的狂飙基金、新的资金管理团队,并进入了养老金管理领域。这家大型、成熟、保守的公司与年轻、规模小得多的狂飙新贵合并了。为了让合并成功,我与他们分享了我在惠灵顿管理公司的投票控制权,我们于 1966 年完成了合并。
I was eager to make my mark, and I arranged a merger with one of the hottest new firms of the era—the Boston firm of Thorndike, Doran, Paine, and Lewis. They were among the stars of the new era, stars that soon turned out to be comets and quickly burned out. But suddenly we had our Go-Go fund, our new money managers, and our entry into the field of pension management. The large, established, conservative firm combined with the young, far smaller, Go-Go upstart. To make the merger happen, I shared with them my voting control of Wellington Management Company, and we merged in 1966.
“石头、剪刀、布” 从某种意义上说,那场不明智且适得其反的合并,是数十年后美国企业界疯狂并购热潮的先兆。正如我几年前写到的,并购的冲动就像儿童游戏“石头、剪刀、布”。那些财务前景离奇、股价被推高的“纸”公司能够吞并那些真正制造产品、提供必要服务的“石头”公司。最糟糕的例子之一是在 2002 年,那块名为“时代华纳”的石头被美国在线(AOL)这张纸给包住了。那场合并以惨败告终。
“Rock, Paper, Scissors” In a sense, that unwise and counterproductive merger was a harbinger of the crazy merger boom among American corporations that took place decades later. As I would write a few years ago, the urge to merge was like the children’s game of “Rock, Paper, Scissors.” Paper companies with outlandish financial prospects and inflated stock prices were able to take over rock companies which actually made products and provided necessary services. One of the worst examples was when, in 2002, the rock that was Time-Warner was covered by paper issued by AOL. The merger failed miserably.
我们也是如此。在这里,惠灵顿是石头,那家波士顿公司是纸。我们那些新的“神童”经理们只在接下来短短几年里干得不错(尽管他们让惠灵顿基金自身的业绩变得更糟),然后在 1973-74 年的市场崩盘中惨败——那次令人震惊的暴跌最终以 50% 的熊市跌幅告终。但尽管我的新合伙人是对我们股东失职的资金管理人,我才是该公司的首席执行官。1974 年 1 月,我的新合伙人们联合起来,解雇了我,接管了惠灵顿管理公司。虽然当时在我看来(现在亦然)这出于政治算计、反复无常,且极其不公,但我必须承认,在做出合并决定时,我犯了一个真正可耻的错误,并为此付出了惨痛的代价。但难道这不正是公平的本质吗?
So did we. Here, Wellington was the rock and the Boston firm the paper. Our new “whiz-kid” managers did well for just a few more years (though they made the performance of Wellington Fund itself even worse) and then failed badly in the market crash of 1973-74, a bracing snap that culminated in a 50 percent bear market decline. But although my new partners were the money managers who failed our shareholders, I was the chief executive of the firm. In January 1974, my new partners banded together, fired me, and took over Wellington Management Company. While that struck me then (as it does now) as political, capricious, and grossly unfair, I have to acknowledge that, in doing the merger, I had made a truly disgraceful decision, and I had paid a terrible price in return. But isn’t that the essence of fairness?
先锋领航登场 先锋领航如何像凤凰一样从这场灾难中诞生的故事,今晚难以详述。(你会在《文化的冲突》一书中找到全部细节。)你真正需要知道的是,我不会轻易认输。我很快以极大的热情奋起反击,采取了一种前所未有的、崭新的共同基金管理方式。无论是有意还是无意,我创立的这家新公司的价值观,与我 23 年前那篇普林斯顿论文中所阐述的价值观几乎完全相同。(继续——甚至可以说是推进——我之前的类比,先锋领航成了剪刀,剪断了那张包住惠灵顿这块石头的波士顿纸。)
Enter Vanguard The story of how Vanguard was born, phoenix-like, out of this cataclysm is too complicated to describe tonight. (You’ll find it all in The Clash of the Cultures.) All you really need to know is that I don’t take defeat easily. I quickly fought back with a passion, and took a new and untried approach to mutual fund management that had never existed before. Whether by accident or design, the values of the new firm I created were virtually identical to the values I had expressed in that Princeton thesis of 23 years earlier. (Continuing—if not pushing—my earlier analogy, Vanguard became the scissors that cut the Boston paper that had covered the Wellington rock.)
基金的运营完全为股东利益服务,这将消除委托人与代理人之间、基金股东与基金管理公司之间普遍存在的固有利益冲突。管理公司的目标是使其资本的回报最大化,而股东则寻求其资本回报的最大化。(如果你明白《圣经》中“一个人不能侍奉两个主”的告诫,你就会明白我的意思。)消除(或至少管理)这种冲突,需要真正的互助——共同基金,其管理层完全专注于服务股东,并以非营利为基础运营。
Running funds for the exclusive benefit of shareholders would eliminate the inherent conflict of interest that prevails between principals and agents, between fund shareholders and fund management companies. The managers are in business to maximize the return of their capital, while the shareholders seek to maximize the return on their capital. (If you understand the Biblical warning that “no man can serve two masters,” you’ll get what I mean.) Eliminating (or at least managing) that conflict demanded mutual funds that were actually mutual—with the management focused solely serving shareholders, and operating on a non-profit basis.
为股东运营基金还需要审慎的管理;长期的投资理念;尽可能广泛的分散投资以降低风险;专注于管理而非营销;大幅削减运营和投资成本;取消所有销售佣金,直接向投资者提供基金;以及重点投资那些聚焦于广泛、可区分的市场板块、能提供相对可预测回报的基金。
Running funds for shareholders also called for prudent management; a long-term investment philosophy; the broadest possible diversification to reduce risk; a focus on management rather than marketing; slashing operating and investment costs; eliminating all sales commissions and offering funds directly to investors; and emphasizing funds that focused on broad, discrete market sectors offering returns that are relatively predictable.
当然,这一策略的终极体现就是市场指数共同基金,由于其成本极低,能够持续且紧密地匹配整个股票市场(或整个债券市场)所产生的回报。可以公平地说,基金行业憎恨这些想法。同样可以公平地说,一开始,即便是投资者自己也几乎没有理解这些想法的含义。但在 1974 年 9 月这家新公司成立时,我毫不怀疑我们将最终彻底改变共同基金投资方式,并成为行业领导者。这就是为什么我选择了“先锋领航”这个名字。
Of course the apotheosis of this strategy is the market index mutual fund, which, given its minimal costs, can consistently and closely match the returns generated by the entire stock market (or the entire bond market). It’s fair to say that the fund industry hated these ideas. It’s also fair to say that, at the outset, even investors themselves barely understood their implications. But in September 1974 when the new firm began, I had no doubt that we would ultimately revolutionize mutual fund investing and become the industry leader. That’s why I chose the name “Vanguard.”
我们的第一个决定是创立世界上的第一只指数共同基金。这只最初被称为“博格尔的蠢行”的基金,如今已是全球最大的股票基金。我经常说:“我接任先锋领航掌门人的新工作,与我离开惠灵顿掌门人的旧工作时的境况相同:‘满怀激情地被解雇’。”的确,当我着手打造一个更好的捕鼠器,并最终致力于构建一个更好的金融世界时,我确实是满怀激情地被解雇了。
Our first decision was to start the world’s first index mutual fund. Originally dubbed “Bogle’s Folly,” that once tiny index fund is now the largest equity fund of all. As I have often said, “I took on my new job as head of Vanguard under the same circumstances that I left my old job as head of Wellington: “Fired with enthusiasm.” And so I was indeed fired with enthusiasm as I set out to build a better mousetrap and, finally, to build a better financial world.
当今金融市场 现在,让我们从企业的人文层面转向商业层面,谈谈我们当今的美国金融市场。这些教训也反映在《文化的冲突》一书中。在书中,我讲述了传统的长期投资智慧如何被当今的投机蠢行所排挤。当今的金融市场主要由投机者的老巢所驱动,他们专注于转瞬即逝的股票价格,相互对赌,其结果就像黑夜紧随白天一样确定无疑。一个投资者赢了赌局,另一个就输了。
The Financial Markets Today Now, let’s move from the human side of enterprise to the business side, and talk a bit about our American financial markets today. These lessons are also reflected in The Clash of the Cultures. In it, I tell the story of how the wisdom of traditional long-term investment has come to be crowded out by today’s folly of speculation. Our financial markets today are largely driven by dens of speculators who focus on ephemeral stock prices, where they bet against one another with the outcome as certain as the night follows the day. One investor wins the bet, the other loses the bet.
但这场游戏并不对称,因为华尔街的赌场每次都能赢,这意味着对于作为一个群体的投资者来说,跑赢股市——在数学上、同义反复地——在任何情况下都是一个零和游戏。但由于那些昂贵的赌场庄家,投资变成了一场输家的游戏——因为运营赌场的成本高昂。
But the game is not symmetrical, for the Wall Street casino wins every time, meaning that for investors as a group, beating the stock market is—mathematically, tautologically—under all circumstances a zero-sum game. But because of those expensive croupiers, investing becomes a loser’s game because of the huge costs of running the casino.
我们每天都如此关注的股价的瞬间暴涨暴跌,本质上毫无意义——(如果你喜欢莎士比亚)“一个白痴讲的故事,充满了喧嚣与骚动,却毫无意义”。或者(如果你喜欢股神沃伦·巴菲特的导师本杰明·格雷厄姆的那个说法)“一个巨大的洗衣房,机构们在这里大量接收彼此的洗好的衣服……真正毫无道理或逻辑可言。”在今天的洗衣房里,股票每天、每分钟、每纳秒都以巨大的成交量易手。(1951 年我进入这个行业时,证券交易所的日成交量不到 200 万股;如今,一个典型交易日有 80 亿股易手。)
These momentary leaps and falls in stocks that we pay so much attention to each day are essentially meaningless—(if you like Shakespeare) “A tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”. Or (if you like that formulation by all-time great investor Benjamin Graham, Warren Buffett’s mentor) “a huge laundry in which institutions take in large blocks of each other’s washing . . . without true rhyme or reason.” In today’s laundry, stocks change hands at enormous volume every day, every minute, every nanosecond. (When I joined this industry in 1951, stock exchange daily volume was less than 2 million shares a day; today 8 billion shares are traded on a typical day.)
我们当然利用股票市场进行投资,因为投资股票是唯一现实且广泛可用的方式,让我们成为资本的所有者,并从我们主要企业的长期增长中获益,而这种增长与美国经济的增长密切同步。在理想情况下,我们的企业代表着我们通过所有权建立不断增长的家庭财富基础的最佳方式,而不是通过——嗯——家族储蓄的贷出方身份赚取固定回报,并在某个未来日期获得偿还。
We use the stock market to invest, to be sure, because investing in stocks is the only realistic and broadly-available means in which we can be owners of capital, and obtain the benefits of the long-term growth of our major corporations, which in turn closely parallels the growth of our American economy. In the ideal, our corporations represent the best way for us to build a growing family wealth base through ownership, rather than the, well, loanership of family savings earnings a fixed rate of return, and getting repaid at a certain future date.
持有股票 vs. 持有公司 当然,个股极其危险。资本主义向我们保证,在自由开放的市场和不受束缚的竞争下(我们还没到那一步!),企业必须每天为其生存权而战。在当今信息技术、互联网上激烈的价格竞争、快速创新、杠杆率增加以及全球商业对手云集的时代,个股的风险从未如此之高——想想那些如今受到威胁的老牌企业,比如惠普;想想黑莓(RIM);想想美国银行;想想美国国际集团(AIG);还有数十家其他公司,它们曾经拥有整个世界,如今却陷入了困境。
Owning Stocks vs. Owning Corporations Of course individual stocks are extremely risky. Capitalism assures us that with free and open markets and unfettered competition (we’re not there yet!), corporations have to fight each day for their right to exist. In this day and age of information technology, feverish price competition on the Internet, rapid innovation, increased leverage, and with business rivals all over the globe, the risk of individual stocks has seldom been higher—think of established firms now threatened, like Hewlett-Packard; think Blackberry (RIM); think Bank of America; think AIG; and there are scores of others, companies that had the world at their fingertips, yet have fallen on hard times.
但拥有我们国家的所有企业——包括苹果这样的大赢家,以及伊斯曼柯达(难以置信!)那样的输家——所承担的风险,只有持有单一公司股票的一小部分。这样一个完全多元化的投资组合,长期来看大概率会增长(但并非保证),原因就在于其内在动力:将巨额资本投入生产性用途,赚取资本回报,将部分回报分配给所有者/股东,并将剩余现金流再投资于企业,以推动未来增长。
But owning all of our nation’s corporations—including big winners like Apple as well as those losers like Eastman Kodak (unbelievable!)—carries only a fraction of the risk of owning individual companies. Such a totally diversified portfolio is an odds-on bet (but not a guarantee!) to grow over the long-term, simply because of its internal dynamics; putting vast sums of capital to work productively, earning a return on that capital, distributing part of that return to their owner/shareholders, and reinvesting the remainder of the cash flow in the business for future growth.
但需要明白的是,股市对公司股票的定价方式在短期内风险极高:经济衰退会导致企业盈利下降,高估值——甚至是投机性估值——也会潮起潮落。然而,债券——股票的主要替代品——尽管利息票息受到良好保护,违约率通常也较低,但可以说风险甚至更大。为什么?因为虽然我们储蓄的美元价值相当安全,但美元本身的价值往往会随着时间的推移而缩水,因为通货膨胀会侵蚀它。即使每年仅 3% 的通货膨胀率,也会在十年内将今天 1 美元的购买力(相对于名义价值)降低到 74 美分,并在半个世纪内降低到 22 美分。今晚在座的许多人,在过去 50 年里都亲眼目睹了这一切。
But understand that the way the stock market values the shares of companies is very risky in the short-term; recessions subject our corporations to lower earnings; high—even speculative—valuations ebb and flow. But, bonds—the major alternative to stocks—despite their well-protected interest coupons and generally low default rates are, arguably, even riskier. Why? Because while the dollar value of our savings is fairly secure, the value of the dollar itself tends to shrink over time, as inflation takes its toll. Even at 3 percent per year, inflation would cut the purchasing power value (vs. nominal value) of today’s $1.00 to 74 cents over a decade and to 22 cents over a half-century. Many of you here tonight have witnessed just that in the past 50 years.
因此,对股票投资者来说(我个人观点),最有效的策略就是持有整个股市,以尽可能低的成本持有它,并永远持有,无论发生什么。然后,利用本杰明·格雷厄姆简单而深刻的观察结果,来运用投资的智慧,让自己摆脱投机的愚蠢行为:“短期内,股票市场是一台投票机;长期来看,它是一台称重机。”唉,在最近的时代,我们已经忘记了这种智慧。
So the most productive strategy for equity investors (my opinion) is to own the entire stock market, own it at the lowest possible cost, and hold it forever, come what may. Then capitalize on the wisdom of investing, and free yourself from the folly of speculation, with Benjamin Graham’s simple but profound observation: “In the short-run, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long-run it is a weighing machine.” Alas, in the recent era, we’ve forgotten that wisdom.
今日投资 但无论我们的金融体系本质上有何缺陷,我们都必须投资。我们有责任将资金投入使用,但要远离赌场——那个由兑换商和赌场庄家掌舵并大发横财的赌场……仅在去年一年,他们平均每人就赚了 36.295 万美元(这正是今天公布的薪酬平均数)。“这是个伟大的国家,不是吗?”
Investing Today But no matter how flawed the nature of our financial system has become, invest we must. It is our responsibility to put our money to work but to stay out of the casino—that casino where the money changers and croupiers sit in the driver’s seat and get rich . . . to the tune of $362,950 each in the last year alone (the average salary reported this very day). “Is this a great country, or what?”
当然,我相信,重点放在低成本股票指数基金上的策略是最优策略——仅仅因为它着眼于长期,并保证你能公平地分享股市慷慨提供的任何正向回报——或者,就此而言,公平地承担市场恶意施加给我们的任何负向回报。(同样的因素也适用于通过低成本债券指数基金持有债券市场。)这是一种既简单又深刻的投资策略。“简约之庄严,存在于节俭之帝国。”
Of course, I believe that a strategy focused largely on low-cost equity index funds is the optimal strategy—simply because it focuses on the long-term, and guarantees you of your fair share of whatever positive returns the stock markets are generous enough to deliver—or, for that matter your fair share of whatever negative returns our markets are mean-spirited enough to inflict on us. (The same factors apply to owning the bond market through a low-cost bond index fund.) As investment strategy that is as simple as it is profound. “The majesty of simplicity in an empire of parsimony.”
如果你偏爱主动管理型基金,你应该知道,长期挑选出卓越的基金经理并不容易。即使你希望永不赎回你所持有的任何一只基金,你的基金投资组合也无可避免地会一次又一次地更新。在未来几年里,你肯定会经历数十只基金和基金经理的更替。历史表明,目前市场上约 7000 只主动管理型基金中,约有 3500 只将在未来十年内消亡。即使你持有的一只基金能够存活下来,它在未来 25 年内也可能会更换大约 5 位不同的基金经理。如果你持有,比如说,4 只共同基金,并且——打破概率——它们都存活下来了,那么你的钱将由 20 位不同的基金经理管理。你必须认识到,考虑到它们更高的成本,它们跑赢指数基金的机会即使不是不可想象的,也是难以逾越的。只有指数基金才是一只可以终身持有的基金。
If you favor actively-managed funds, you should know that picking winning managers over the long term is not easy. Even if you wish never to liquidate one of your fund holdings, your fund portfolio will inevitably roll over again and again. In the years ahead, you’re sure to run through scores of funds and fund managers. History suggests that about 3,500 of today’s 7,000 active funds will go out of business during the coming decade. And even if a fund that you own endures, it is apt to have about five different managers in the next 25 years. If you own, say, four mutual funds and—defying the odds—all survive, your money will have been run by 20 different managers. You must realize that, given their higher costs, the chances of their outpacing the index fund are insuperable, if not inconceivable. Only the index fund is a fund for a lifetime.
今日投资 在 8 月份《纽约时报》的一篇文章中,我被(准确地)引用说:“这是我所见过的最糟糕的投资时机。”确实如此。因为尽管股票未来回报的前景极有可能是积极的,尽管低于长期平均水平,但这是基于我 25 年前开发的、经受了时间考验的现实回报预期方法得出的结论。在该方法中,我将股票回报分为两个部分:投资回报和投机回报。(这是本次演讲的数学部分!)
Investing Today In a New York Times piece in August, I was quoted (correctly) as saying “this is the worst time for investing that I’ve ever seen.” It is. Because while the prospects for future returns on stocks are highly likely to be positive, albeit below long-term norms, based on the methodology I developed for realistic return expectations a quarter century ago that has met the test of time. In it, I separate stock returns into two components: investment return, and speculative return. (This is the math part of the talk!)
我表明,未来的投资回报——当前的股息收益率(今天约为 2%)加上随后的盈利增长(可能约为 5%)——按名义美元计算,可能会在 7% 左右,远低于 9% 的历史平均水平——长期来看,这是一个巨大的差距。考虑一下,每 1 美元按 7% 的回报率投资四分之一个世纪将增长至 5.4 倍;按 9% 投资,则增长至 8.6 倍。
I show that future investment returns—the current dividend yield (about 2 percent today) plus subsequent earnings growth (probably about 5 percent) would likely be around 7 percent, measured in nominal dollars, well below the historical norm of 9 percent—a huge gap over the long-term. Consider that each dollar invested at 7 percent over a quarter century would grow by 5.4 times; at 9 percent, by 8.6 times.
第二个要素,投机回报,完全取决于投资者的观点和行为,我们可以通过投资者愿意为股票的未来盈利支付多少美元来轻松衡量。如果十年后的估值相比今天约 16 倍的市盈率大幅提高或降低,投机回报可能成为股市表现的一个重要因素。例如,估值升至 20 倍每年可以增加近 2 个百分点,将 7% 的回报率提高到 9%。而估值跌至 12 倍则每年会侵蚀约 3 个百分点,将 7% 的回报率降至仅 4%。
The second element, speculative return, depends entirely on investor opinion and investor behavior, and we can easily measure it by the number of dollars that investors are willing to pay for future earnings on stocks. If valuations a decade hence were materially higher or lower than today’s price-earnings multiple of about 16 times, speculative return could be an important factor in the stock market’s performance. For example, a valuation of 20 times could add almost 2 percentage points per year, raising that 7 percent to 9 percent. And a drop to 12 times would cost about 3 percentage points, dropping the 7 percent return to just 4 percent.
但这些是估值相对较大的变动,我看不到多少理由认为市盈率会大幅上升(从而产生正向投机回报)或大幅下降(从而产生负向投机回报)。因此,我预计未来十年内,这 7% 的可能投资回报率,既不会因投机回报而得到显著增强,也不会被显著削弱。
But those are fairly big moves for valuations, and I don’t see much reason either for multiples to rise much (and thus produce positive speculative returns) or to fall much (and thus produce negative speculative returns). So I expect that possible 7 percent investment return to be neither materially enhanced nor materially depleted by speculative return during the coming decade.
但即使股票似乎能够提供足够的回报,几乎所有审慎的投资者仍然需要平衡的投资组合,包括债券以降低风险和抑制波动。资产配置的基本规则是基于年龄:年轻时少配债券,随着年龄增长增加债券配置。然而,现在的债券收益率是我自 1951 年进入这个领域以来的最低水平。唉,今天的收益率是未来十年你将从债券中获得的总回报的极佳预测指标。最坏的情况是:(所谓的)无风险利率——基于 10 年期美国国债——目前为 1.6%,低于 1980 年 11.6% 的高点。
But even if stocks seem apt to provide adequate returns, nearly all prudent investors still need a balanced portfolio, including bonds to reduce risk and contain volatility. The basic rule of asset allocation is age-based; less bonds when you are young, and more bonds as you age. Yet bonds today offer the lowest yields since I came into this field in 1951. Alas, today’s yields are excellent predictors of the total returns you’ll earn on bonds over the coming decade. Worst case: the (so-called) risk-free rate—based on the 10-year Treasury bond—is now 1.6 percent, down from a high of 11.6 percent in 1980.
还有两个数学事实:1.6% 的回报率将使你的资本在未来 10 年内仅增长 17%;而在相同时间内,11.6% 的回报率将使资本增长三倍。所以,是的,持有股票和债券的均衡配置至关重要,但它不太可能提供我们在 1980 年代和 1990 年代有幸经历的丰厚回报,尽管可能比我们在 21 世纪迄今为止所见到的要好。(在过去 12 年中,债券是主导。在未来十年,将是股票承担重任。)
Two more mathematical facts: a 1.6 percent return would increase your capital by just 17 percent during the next 10 years; in the same length of time with an 11.6 percent return would multiply capital three times over. So, yes, holding a balanced stock-and-bond allocation is essential, but it will not likely provide the kinds of handsome returns we were lucky enough to experience during the 1980s and 1990s, albeit better than we have seen thus far during the 21st century. (During the past 12 years, bonds were the driver. In the coming decade; it is stocks that will have to do the heavy lifting.)
当然,投资者并不局限于 10 年期美国国债。持有一只期限稍长的投资级公司债券,可能会产生大约 3% 的收益率。因此,同时持有国债和公司债,并赚取大约 2.5% 的收益率似乎是合理的。全债券市场指数基金——70% 投资于国债和其他政府债券——目前的收益率仅为 1.7%。但全公司债券指数基金将产生大约 3.2% 的收益率。因此,尽管我非常喜爱全债券市场指数基金,但它需要更多地配置公司债券。
Of course, investors are not limited to U.S. Treasury 10-year bonds. Owning an investment grade corporate bond with a somewhat longer maturity should produce a yield of perhaps 3 percent. So it seems it is reasonable to own a mix of Treasurys and corporates, and earn about 2 ½ percent. The Total Bond Market Index Fund—70 percent in Treasuries and other governments—now yields only 1.7 percent. But a Total Corporate Bond Index Fund would generate a yield about 3.2 percent. So, much as I love the total bond market index fund, it needs to be more heavily seeded with corporates.
那么,让我们把这些预测放在一起。如果未来十年股票的年回报率有望达到 7% 左右,债券回报率约为 2.5%,那么一个传统的 60% 股票、40% 债券的平衡投资组合应该能提供约 5.5% 的回报,这与过去十年相差不大。(尽管正如我之前指出的,过去十年是债券,而非股票,领先。)这个回报率远低于此类投资组合 7.5% 的历史回报率。而且这些是名义美元,而非实际美元。如果我们有 2.5% 的通货膨胀率,那么 5.5% 的回报率将降至 3%。在我们今晚会面之际,这就是投资现实。
So, let’s put these projections together. If it’s reasonable to expect stocks to return around 7 percent annually during the coming decade, and bonds to return perhaps 2 ½ percent, a traditional balanced portfolio with 60 percent stocks and 40 percent bonds should provide a return of 5 ½ percent, not so different from the past decade. (Although, as I noted earlier, it was bonds, not stocks that led the way.) This return is far below the 7 ½ percent historical return on such a portfolio. And those are nominal dollars, not real dollars. If we have inflation of 2 ½ percent, that 5 ½ percent return drops to 3 percent. As we meet tonight, that’s the investment reality.
寻找“足够”的回报 如果这在某种意义上对你来说“不够”,那么赚取覆盖生活开支收入的选项很简单,但并不容易:减少家庭开支(无论多么痛苦);利用今日的低利率通过借款来加杠杆投资组合(一种非常危险的策略);适度动用部分本金(但这不能永远持续);通过持有垃圾债券(其信用风险高得多)来追求更高收益;或者增加高股息股票的头寸(这有相当大的波动风险)。但总的来说,只对你的资产配置进行适度调整;避免剧烈变动,而应采纳边际调整。在现实世界中,如你所见,是福不是祸,是祸躲不过。俗话说,天下没有免费的午餐。
Seeking Returns that are “Enough” If that’s not, in some sense, “enough” of a return for you, the options to earn income that will cover your living costs are simple, but not easy: reduce your household expenses (no matter how painful); leverage your portfolio by borrowing at today’s low interest rates (a very risky strategy); spend moderate amounts of your capital (but you can’t do that forever); reach for higher yields by owning junk bonds (with their far higher credit risk); or increase your position in high dividend stocks (which have considerable volatility risk). But in general, make only moderate changes in your asset allocations; avoid box-car changes in favor of marginal changes. In the real world, as you see, for every pro, there’s a con. As it is said, there’s no such thing as a free lunch.
或者有吗?事实上,确实有一种非常简单的方法可以增加你的收入回报,同时完全不改变风险。这让我回到了今晚讨论的起点。一个简单的数学事实是,由于共同基金的高昂费用,被动管理的全市场股票指数基金通常持有与主动管理型基金平均相同的组合,并产生大致相同的总股息收益率,比如股票 2.1%,债券 2.7%。但主动型股票基金扣除约 1.3% 的费用后,留给你的只有 0.8%。主动型债券基金扣除约 0.8% 的费用后,留给你的只有 1.9%。另一方面,对于成本仅为 0.1% 的指数基金,股票指数基金的净收益率达到 2.0%,债券为 2.6%。各自的收益率提升——股票基金提升 120%(!),债券基金提升近 40%——唾手可得,且无需增加任何风险敞口。
Or is there? In fact, there is one remarkably easy way to increase your income return and leave risk absolutely unchanged. And this brings me full circle in my discussion this evening. The simple mathematical fact is that, because of high mutual fund expenses, the passively-managed all-stock-market index fund typically holds the same composite portfolio as the average actively-managed fund, and generates about the same gross dividend yield, say, 2.1 percent for stocks and 2.7 percent for bonds. But active stock funds subtract expenses of about 1.3 percent, leaving just 0.8 percent for you. Active bond funds subtract about 0.8 percent in expenses, leaving just 1.9 percent for you. On the other hand, for an index fund with a cost of a mere 0.1 percent, the net yield on the stock index fund comes to 2.0 percent, bonds to 2.6 percent. The respective yield enhancements—120(!) percent higher for stock funds and almost 40 percent higher for bond funds—are there for the taking, without any increase in risk exposure.
指数基金的主导地位 近年来,向指数基金的转变已经步入正轨。在过去五年半的时间里,基金投资者已将约 3000 亿美元从成本相对较高的主动管理型股票基金中撤出,并注入超过 6000 亿美元到低成本的被动管理型股票指数基金中。在当今低收益的环境下,指数化投资比以往任何时候都更具吸引力,明智的投资者正用他们数千亿美元的资金为之投票。
The Dominance of the Index Fund In recent years, the move toward index funds has come into its own. During the past five and one-half years, fund investors have moved some $300 billion out of relatively high-cost, actively-managed equity funds and poured over $600 billion into low-cost, passively managed equity index funds. In today’s low yield environment, indexing is even more attractive than ever before, and wise investors are voting for it with their hundreds of billions of dollars.
那么,我对当今金融体系的运作是否满意?不,我一点都不满意!但我感到欣慰的是,那些多年前我在普林斯顿提出的极其简单的理念,已经开始发挥作用。指数股票型基金正迅速接近主动管理型股票共同基金资产的 50%,并且还在同步增长。在如今低市场收益率和高共同基金费用的环境里,我预计这种增长还会加速。
So am I satisfied with how our financial system is working today? No I am not! But I am pleased with how those remarkably simple ideas that I expressed at Princeton all those years ago have began to work. Index equity funds are rapidly approaching 50 percent of the assets of active equity mutual funds, and growing apace. In these days of low market yields and high mutual fund expenses, I expect that growth to accelerate.
一位记者最近报道说,看到自己理想化的梦想成真,我抱着“近乎孩子般的喜悦”。(他说得很准确,除了那个“近乎”之外!)但我很早就明白,在这个我们称之为世界的滑稽地方,所谓成功其实是一段旅程,而不是一个目的地。我的漫长旅程——可以说大约在 65 年前,就在街对面那个漆黑、严寒、风雪交加的清晨,沿着蒙哥马利大街一路下坡走到阿德莫尔邮局的那一刻开始——仍在继续。也许它永远不会结束……
A journalist recently reported that I take “almost childlike delight” in seeing my idealistic dreams come true. (He was accurate, I think, except for the almost!) But I’ve long since realized that what passes for success in this funny world of ours is really a journey, not a destination. My long journey, one that arguably began some 65 years ago right across the street, on that dark, bitterly cold, and snowy early morning hike down Montgomery Avenue to the Ardmore Post Office, continues. Perhaps it will never end . . .