在基金行业,共同性与指数化主导一切
在基金行业,共同化与指数化主宰风潮
与先锋集团创始人约翰·博格的对话
全国农村公用事业合作金融公司“资本创意:驱动未来”大会
弗吉尼亚州尚蒂伊
2012 年 11 月 13 日
作为 1974 年先锋集团的创始人,能有机会探讨我们真正的共同结构,以及它如何终于开始重塑共同基金行业,我倍感荣幸。而且这个话题尤为贴切,因为贵组织与先锋集团一样,也是一家“合作机构”。我们的愿景、使命、原则和价值观与你们极为相似。套用 CFC 的使命陈述,“我们的目标不是最大化自身收入,而是向股东提供价格合理的金融产品与服务,同时遵循稳健的财务管理原则。”
In the Fund Industry, Mutuality and Indexing Rule the Seas A Conversation with John C. Bogle Founder, The Vanguard Group National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation Conference on Capital Ideas: Powering into the Future Chantilly, VA November 13, 2012 As the founder of Vanguard way back in 1974, it’s a special honor for me to have this opportunity to discuss our truly mutual structure, and how it is at last beginning to reshape the mutual fund industry. And it seems particularly appropriate, for much like your organization, Vanguard is also a “cooperative.” Our vision, our mission, our principles, and our values are very much like yours. Paraphrasing CFC’s stated mission, “our goal is not to maximize our income, but to offer our shareholders affordable financial products and services, consistent with sound financial management.”
所谓共同基金——其实根本谈不上“共同”——则截然不同:它们基本上是一些公司空壳,持有由股票和债券构成的高度分散的投资组合,自身没有任何雇员。它们为数不多的公司高管通常同时在基金管理公司兼任相同职务,而正是这家管理公司组建了这些基金、运营它们,并收取高额费用为基金的存续提供几乎全部必要服务。这些服务包括行政管理、投资组合策略与标的选择,以及向公众销售基金份额。基金从诞生之日起,就是其管理公司/顾问的附庸。
So-called mutual funds—they’re not really mutual at all—are quite different; they are largely corporate shells, diversified portfolios of stocks and bonds with no employees of their own. Their few corporate officers usually hold the same posts with the funds’ management company, which organizes the funds, operates them, and provides, in return for a substantial fee, essentially all of the services necessary for the funds’ existence. These services include administration; portfolio strategy and investment selection; and distribution of fund shares to the public. The fund is, from birth, a captive of its management company/adviser.
基金管理公司运营于四种截然不同的公司结构之一。(1)私有制,通常由管理基金的投资专业人士主导。直到 1958 年,这种形式基本上构成了整个基金行业。随后,我们的法院裁定,私营管理人可以进行公开上市。如今,前 50 大基金管理公司中,仅有 9 家仍属私有。
Fund management companies work under one of four different and distinct corporate structures. (1) Private ownership, usually dominated by the investment professionals who manage the funds. Until 1958, this form essentially constituted the entire fund industry. Then, our courts decided that private managers could go public. Today, only nine of the largest 50 fund management companies remain privately owned.
(2) 公众持股,实际控制权通常由管理公司高管掌握,但公众投资者持有该管理公司广泛分散的股份。在这 50 家大型基金集团中,有 10 家(包括 T. Rowe Price 和富兰克林坦伯顿)采用这种公众持股结构。
(2) Public ownership, with working control usually held by management company officials, but with public investors holding widely diffused amounts of the management company’s shares. Among those 50 major fund groups, ten firms (including T. Rowe Price and Franklin Templeton) operate under this public ownership structure.
(3)综合企业所有制,即大型多元化金融公司(包括高盛和摩根大通)旗下运营自己的共同基金管理公司,通常是为了多元化收入来源并赚取相对稳定的管理费收入。在其他情况下,综合企业通过收购现有的基金管理公司(包括马萨诸塞金融服务公司和普特南公司),往往付出可观收购成本来实现这一目的。在规模最大的 50 家基金管理公司中,有 30 家由综合企业持有,这种所有制模式已成为行业标准。
(3) Conglomerate ownership, under which giant diversified financial firms (including Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan) operate their own mutual fund management companies, often to diversify revenue sources and earn generally steady fee income. In other cases, conglomerates have acquired existing fund management companies (including Massachusetts Financial Services and Putnam), often at substantial acquisition costs. With 30 of the largest 50 fund managers owned by conglomerates, this ownership model has become the industry standard.
(4)互惠所有权结构,即基金的股东实际拥有管理公司,该公司按成本运营。目前真正采用这种结构的共同基金公司只有一家——先锋集团,这家公司由我于 1974 年创立,当时管理资产仅为 12 亿美元。尽管我们的架构尚未被其他公司效仿或复制,但先锋已发展成为业内规模最大的公司,管理着 2 万亿美元的资产。
(4) Mutual ownership, under which the shareholders of the funds actually own the management company, which operates on an at-cost basis. Only one mutual fund complex is truly mutual—Vanguard, the firm that I founded in 1974, then with assets under management of a mere $1.2 billion. While our structure has yet to be emulated or duplicated, Vanguard has become by far the largest firm in the industry, supervising $2 trillion in assets.
尽管 40 家拥有某种公开所有者的基金管理公司在数量上占主导地位,但它们在行业资产中的份额却相对较小——约 6 万亿美元,不到行业总资产 12.5 万亿美元的一半。10 家私营和互助型公司规模格外庞大,它们管理着约 4.5 万亿美元。
While the 40 fund management companies with public owners of one kind or another predominate the number of firms, their share of industry assets is smaller relatively smaller—about $6 trillion, less than half of the $12.5 trillion industry total. The 10 privately-held and mutual firms are disproportionally large, with these firms managing some $4.5 trillion.
在前三种所有权形式的任何一种中,管理公司在不同程度上都面临着深刻的利益冲突。它们希望通过汇集更大规模的资产、稳步提高管理费收入和利润,从而在自己的所有权份额上获得尽可能高的回报。但这一目标直接牺牲了它们有义务服务的共同基金股东所获得的回报。讽刺的是,对于上市公司和集团控股公司而言,这种利益冲突甚至比私人持有的管理公司更为严重。可以说,它们既有信托责任为自己的股东最大化回报,也有责任为基金股东最大化回报。要理解这个问题的严重程度,只需想想《圣经》中的警告:“一个人不能侍奉两个主人。”
Under each of the first three forms of ownership, to varying degrees, management companies face a profound conflict of interest. They wish to earn the highest possible return on their ownership stake, by gathering ever-larger pools of assets and steadily increasing their management fee revenues and profits. But this objective comes at the direct expense of the returns that they deliver to the mutual fund shareowners whom they are duty-bound to serve. For the publicly-owned and conglomerate-owned firms, the conflict of interest is, ironically, even more severe than for the privately-held managers. Arguably, they have a fiduciary duty to maximize the returns of both their own shareholders and their fund shareholders. To understand the severity of the problem, just consider the Biblical warning, “no man can serve two masters.”
没有简单的答案。我想明确指出,尽管在共同基金(由基金份额持有人所有)的架构下,管理者不会面临如此直接的冲突,但即便是当今唯一一家采用共同基金架构的管理者(也就是我们),也难免会遇到自身利益问题——例如,在高管薪酬、大兴土木以及提供完全透明度这些方面。这种共同基金架构,或许能实现管理者与股东利益的“更完美结合”,但它并非完美无缺,最终还是要取决于当下控制这家组织的那些高管们的品格、价值观和原则。
No Easy Answers I want to be clear that while such a direct conflict does not face a manager operating under the mutual (fund-shareholder-owned) structure, even today’s sole mutual manager (that’s us), inevitably faces issues of self-interest—for example, in executive compensation, in edifice-building, and in providing complete transparency. Such a mutual structure may be “a more perfect union” of the interests of both managers and shareholders, but it is not perfect, inevitably dependent on the character, the values, and the principles of the executives who control the organization at any moment in time.
这些代理问题早已被哈佛商学院教授迈克尔·C·詹森(Michael C. Jensen)充分认识。他在 1976 年那篇开创性论文中描述了代理关系,以及公司所有权的成本与收益如何分配、分配给谁。由于股东与公司管理者之间的关系完全符合纯粹代理关系的定义,那么就不难发现:在股权高度分散的现代公司中,所有权与控制权分离所引发的诸问题,与代理问题的普遍性密切关联。如何激励一个“代理人”表现得像是在最大化“委托人”的福利,这是一个相当普遍性的挑战。借用詹森博士的原话:“这个问题存在于所有组织里——在企业中的每一个管理层级,在大学里,在(没错)相互保险公司里,在合作社里,在政府机关和局署里,(以及)在工会里。”
These agency issues were well-recognized by Harvard Business School professor Michael C. Jensen, whose seminal 1976 paper described agency relationships and how and to whom the costs and rewards of corporate ownership are allocated. Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits precisely the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the separation of ownership and control in the modern diffused-ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. The challenge of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the welfare of the “principal” is quite general. Quoting Dr. Jensen, “It exists in all organizations at every level of management in firms, in universities, in [yes] mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, (and) in unions.”
詹森命题的逻辑无可否认:它指出,经理人很少会最大化那些他们有责任服务的股东的利益,反而主要是在为自己谋利。更重要的是,这一命题的真理性,已在我们大型企业和投资机构的实际运作中,一次又一次地得到了证实。
It is impossible to deny the logic of the Jensen thesis that posits that managers rarely maximize the interests of the shareholders they are duty-bound to serve, and instead mainly look out for themselves. More important, its truth has been confirmed, over and over again, by actual experience in the functioning of our giant corporations and investment institutions.
在我超过 61 年的职业生涯中,亲身经历了这些企业结构的全部类型:首先,在私营企业工作了 9 年;其次,在该公司于 1960 年公开发行股票后,我在这家上市公司任职了 14 年;第三,1974 年被该公司解雇后,我又在同年创立的共同公司先锋领航(Vanguard)工作了 38 年。对于这四种结构的优劣势,我有着深刻的理解,因为每种结构我都有相当丰富的经验。
In my personal experience over a 61-plus year career I’ve run the gamut of these structures: First, nine years at a privately-held firm; second, fourteen years at the publicly-held firm it became after a public offering of its shares in 1960; and, after being fired from the firm in 1974, 38 years with Vanguard, the mutual company I founded later that year. I understand well the pros and cons of these four structures, for I have had considerable experience in each.
1974 年的那次变更彻底改变了我经营这家新公司的方式(我一直经营到 1996 年),采用了一种前所未有的共同所有制结构。这种结构让我有能力着眼长远;几乎不必为了华尔街设定盈利目标、然后(不择手段地)去实现它们;也免于被那些对公司只有肤浅了解的华尔街证券分析师指手画脚、告诉我该怎么经营;而最重要的是,免于营销压力——公司增长始终次于以“最有效率、最诚实、最经济的方式”服务股东。(这句直接引自我 1951 年普林斯顿大学关于共同基金行业及其在经济中应有角色的高年级论文。)简单说,共同所有制结构提供了自由,让我不必关注一家公司股票那短暂而波动的价格,而是专注于构建公司必须长期为客户提供的持久内在价值,并以尽可能低的价格提供卓越的产品和服务。
That 1974 change radically altered the way I ran the new business (which I did until 1996) with an unprecedented mutual structure. The ability to take the long view; the (near) immunity to setting targets on earnings for Wall Street, and then having to meet them (by fair means or foul); freedom from having Wall Street security analysts with only a superficial knowledge of the business telling me how to run it; and, above all, freedom from of the pressures on marketing, with company growth remaining secondary to serving shareholders “with management operating in the most efficient, honest, and economical way possible.” (A quote directly from my 1951 Princeton senior thesis on the mutual fund industry and its proper role in our economy.) Simply put, the mutual structure provided the freedom to focus, not on the ephemeral and volatile price of a corporation’s stock, but on building the enduring intrinsic value that a corporation must provide to its clients over the long term, and offering excellent products and services at the lowest possible prices.
策略服从结构。重要的是,相互型“成本价”架构在很大程度上决定了我们将遵循的战略。下面从七个关键领域说明相互型基金管理公司与其他公司的差异:1. 盈利策略 · 相互型公司——为基金股东实现资本回报最大化。 · 经理人所有制公司——服务于两个主人:既需为管理公司股东最大化回报,又要为共同基金股东最大化收益,两者存在冲突。
Strategy Follows Structure Importantly, the mutual “at-cost” structure largely dictated the strategies that we would follow. Here’s how mutual mutual fund management companies differ from others, in seven key areas: 1. Profit Strategy · Mutual firm—Maximize return on capital for fund shareholders. · Manager Ownership—Serving two masters: conflicting mandates to maximize returns—management company stockholders vs. mutual fund shareholders.
2. 定价策略 · 共同基金——成本越低,股东回报越高。 · 基金经理——市场能承受什么就定什么价。
2. Pricing Strategy · Mutual—The lower the cost, the higher the return to shareholders. · Manager—Whatever the traffic will bear.
3. 服务策略 · 互助型——服务卓越,按成本收费。 · 管理型——服务卓越,但为了实现卓越必须提高成本。 4. 风险管理策略 · 互助型——投资组合风险和成本低,同时仍提供有竞争力的收益回报。 · 管理型——追逐更高的收益率,承担更高风险,以弥补自身的更高成本。
3. Service Strategy · Mutual—Service excellence, offered at cost. · Manager—Service excellence, but costs must be increased in order to achieve it. 4. Risk Management Strategy · Mutual—Low portfolio risks and costs, but still providing competitive income yields. · Manager—Reaching for higher yields, with higher risks, to compensate for their higher costs.
5.“产品”策略 · 满足型——你做什么就卖什么:中规中矩的基金;明确的细分市场;钟爱指数基金。 · 市场经理型——什么好卖就做什么:激进的基金和跟风基金;指望一杆清台;憎恨指数基金。(为什么?对基金经理来说,利润太低——如果还有利润的话。)
5. “Product” Strategy · Mutual—Sell what you make: Middle-of-the-road funds; defined market segments; love index funds. · Manager—Make what will sell: Aggressive funds and fad funds; hope for home runs; hate index funds. (Why? Low—if any—profit to managers.)
6. 营销策略 · 共同基金——需求拉动。投入精力极少;费用支出低。 · 投资经理——供给推动。积极投入以募集资产。
6. Marketing Strategy · Mutual— Demand pull. Minimal effort; low expense commitment. · Manager— Supply push. Spend aggressively to gather assets.
7. 时间视野 策略 · 共益型基金——长期、价值导向;提升基金股东的内在价值;不受华尔街压力影响。 · 经理人型基金——短期且专注于经理人自身股票价格;受华尔街喜怒无常的摆布。
7. Time Horizon Strategy · Mutual—Long-term, value oriented; increase intrinsic values for fund shareholders; free from Wall Street pressures. · Manager—Short-term and focused on price of the manager’s stock; subject to the whims of Wall Street.
结果如何?
How Has It All Worked Out?
共同基金结构——这是一项关于共同基金治理的实验,如今这些策略已实施超过 38 年——至今仍未被模仿或复制。先锋集团的结构在共同基金史上依然独一无二。结果如何?数字说明了一切。
The mutual structure—an experiment in mutual fund governance that has now had those strategies in place for more than 38 years—has yet to be emulated or copied. Vanguard’s structure remains unique in the annals of mutual fund history. How has it all worked out? The numbers tell the story.
虽然我无意在各位面前“推销”先锋集团的共同基金产品线,但你们确实有权知道,我们这段旅程迄今是否卓有成效。那么,让我们看看三个事实:(1)从最初微不足道的 14 亿美元资产起步,如今管理资产规模已接近 2 万亿美元——年化复合增长率达到 21%。(图 5)你们可以看到,这一增长几乎是一条直线,几乎从未中断。
While I have no intention to “plug” the Vanguard line-up of mutual funds before this audience, I do believe you have a right to know whether our journey, so far, has been a productive one. So, let’s look at three facts: (1) Since our humble beginning with $1.4 billion of assets, today’s assets under management is now approaching $2 trillion—a compound annual growth rate of 21 percent. (Chart 5) As you can see, that growth has been almost a straight line, virtually uninterrupted.
先锋资产管理规模增长(单位:美元)
总资产:1.93 万亿美元
| 年份 | 资产规模 |
|---|---|
| 1974 | 14 亿美元 |
| 1980 | 5.57 亿美元 |
| 1990 | 5610 亿美元 |
| 2000 | 55.7 亿美元 |
| 2012 | (图中显示 1974 年为 14 亿美元,1980 年为 5.57 亿美元,1990 年为 5610 亿美元,2000 年为 55.7 亿美元,2012 年为 1.93 万亿美元) |
(2)当然,我们是蓬勃发展的基金行业的一部分,该行业资产从 500 亿美元增长到 12.5 万亿美元,这主要归功于:(a)美国历史上最伟大的二十年牛市(1980-2000 年);(b)货币市场基金的发展;以及(c)IRA 和延迟纳税储蓄计划等税收递延投资选择的大幅增加。但先锋集团增长得更快(图表 6),我们在股票和债券基金行业资产中的市场份额——在 1980 年代末期略有下降之后——在随后的 26 年间每年都在增长,目前已达到 17.4%。据我所知,此前行业最大公司的资产份额历史最高往往在 10% 到 13% 之间。因此,我们正在行业主导地位方面开辟新天地。
Vanguard Asset Growth $ 10,000,000 Total Assets Total Assets: $1.93T 1,000,000 $55.7 Bil 100,000 2000 $561 Bil 10,000 1974 $1.4 Bil 1,000 1974 1980 1990 2000 2012 (2) Of course, we were part of a burgeoning fund industry, whose assets rose from $50 billion to $12.5 trillion, thanks largely to (a) the greatest two-decade bull market in U.S. history (1980-2000); (b) to the development of the money market fund; and (c) the huge increase in tax-deferred investment options such as the IRA and the tax-deferred thrift plans. But Vanguard grew far faster, (Chart 6) and our market share of 6 percent of industry stock and bond fund assets—after declining slightly through the late 1980s—has grown in each of the 26 years since, to today’s 17.4 percent. As far as I can tell, the previous highs in asset share for the industry’s largest firms regularly topped out at between 10 percent and 13 percent. So we are breaking new ground on industry dominance.
长期基金领导者的市场份额 20% 先锋集团 17.4% 18% 先锋集团长期市场份额 16% 行业领导者的市场份额* 富达 先锋集团 14% 13.9% 12.0% MFS 美国 12% 10.7% 富达 12.8% 8.9% 10% 美国 富达 9.5% 9.6% 先锋集团 8% 10.6% 富达 8.8% 6% 4% 先锋集团 4.1% 2% 0% 1974 1980 1990 2000 2012 *仅包含拥有两年或以上领导地位的公司。
Market Share of Long-Term Fund Leaders 20% Vanguard 17.4% 18% Vanguard Long-Term Market Share 16% Market Share of Industry Leader* Fidelity Vanguard 14% 13.9% 12.0% MFS American 12% 10.7% Fidelity 12.8% 8.9% 10% American Fidelity 9.5% 9.6% Vanguard 8% 10.6% Fidelity 8.8% 6% 4% Vanguard 4.1% 2% 0% 1974 1980 1990 2000 2012 *Includes only firms with two or more years of leadership.
(3)值得注意的是,我们目前的份额似乎不仅不会趋于平稳,反而将以更快的速度增长。自 2008 年以来,我们占据了行业总现金流量的近 80%(图 7),其中包括 170% 的股票基金流量,这主要得益于指数基金接受度的迅速提升以及低成本日益被认可的重要性——简单来说,这些因素将股票市场回报的分配从华尔街的基金经理和庄家手中,转移到了那些用辛苦赚来的钱为退休生活做保障的美国家庭口袋里。
(3) Remarkably, our present share seems likely not to level off, but to increase at an even more rapid rate. Since 2008, we have accounted for almost 80 percent of the industry’s total cash flows, (Chart 7) including 170 percent of equity fund flows, driven largely by the rapidly-growing acceptance of index funds and the increasingly-recognized importance of low costs, which, simply put, divert the allocation of stock market returns away from the money managers and croupiers of Wall Street, and into the pockets of the nation’s families who are investing their hard-earned dollars to secure their retirement.
股票基金资金流量——2008-2012 年
| 年份 | 先锋基金 | 行业其余部分 | 指数基金 | 主动基金 | 股票基金总计 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | 600 亿美元 | 519 亿美元 | 400 亿美元 | 291 亿美元 | 148 亿美元 |
| 2009 | 228 亿美元 | 249 亿美元 | -371 亿美元 | -101 亿美元 | -100 亿美元 |
| 2010 | -329 亿美元 | -200 亿美元 | -300 亿美元 | -42 亿美元 | -400 亿美元 |
| 2011 | -500 亿美元 | … | … | … | … |
先锋基金占股票指数基金资金流入的 56%;仅占主动股票基金资金流出的 11%;占股票基金总资金流量的 170%。
Equity Fund Cash Flow—2008-2012 $ 600 $519 400 $ 291 Vanguard 300 Rest of the Industry $148 $ Billions 100 $ 228 $ 249 $-371 $ -101 -100 $ -329 -200 -300 $ -42 -400 -500 Index Funds Active Funds Total Equity Vanguard accounts for 56% of inflows of equity index funds; only 11% of outflows of active equity outflows; and 170% of total equity fund flows.
是的,我们的互助结构与你们不同,但在一点上我们完全一致,那就是合作型结构往往最能满足客户与顾客的需求。在未来岁月里,这一理念只会变得更加重要。
Yes, our mutual structure is different from yours, but we remain as one in the notion that cooperative forms of structure, finally, are so often the most effective ways of meeting the needs of our clients and customers. In the years ahead, this concept can only grow in importance.