先锋编年史——PRIMECAP基金的故事
先锋集团年鉴——PRIMECAP 基金的故事 作者:约翰·博格
早在 1984 年夏天,发生了一件奇妙的、多少有些偶然的事件,后来成为了先锋集团历史上的一个亮点。我当时在加利福尼亚州面试候选基金经理,为我认定需要设立的、用以平衡我们以温莎基金为主导的价值型基金线的新成长型基金物色人选。到 80 年代初期,由无与伦比的基金经理约翰·内夫掌舵的温莎基金,已占到我们股权型基金资产基础整整一半。到了 1984 年,温莎基金坐拥 25 亿美元资产,成为全美最大的股权型基金。但时代在变,风格也有兴衰,我想在其资产高速增长势必放缓之前,就做好准备,采取行动。
The Annals of Vanguard—The Story of PRIMECAP Fund By John C. Bogle Way back in the summer of 1984, a wonderful—if sort of random—happening took place that would become a highlight in Vanguard’s history. I was in California interviewing prospective managers for a new growth fund that I believed we needed to balance out our value-oriented fund lineup, dominated by the Windsor Fund. By the early 1980s, Windsor—led by its peerless portfolio manager, John B. Neff—came to represent fully one-half of our equity-oriented fund asset base. By 1984, with assets of $2.5 billion, Windsor was the nation’s largest equity fund. But times change and styles go in and out of favor, and I wanted to be prepared to act before its rapid rate of asset growth inevitably declined.
在 1960 年代的“狂飙”时代以及随后 1972—1974 年的股市崩盘之后,许多成长型基金的管理人纷纷摇摇欲坠,最终倒下了。(最惨重的失败之一是威灵顿管理公司旗下的 Ivest 基金——在其 1974 财年暴跌 44%[!]——最终在 1981 年被彻底终结。)但在幸存者中,我们“照例找出了那些熟悉的面孔”,我拜访了其中四家,但没有发现明显的候选人。在此过程中,我得知米切尔·J.(米奇)米利亚斯——我在他担任威灵顿管理公司职务期间(1969—1970 年)曾与他密切合作,之后他去了洛杉矶的巨头资本集团(美国基金)——正在制定创立一家新资产管理公司的计划。* PRIMECAP 管理公司成立 米奇和霍华德·B. 肖(与他共同管理该公司新推出的 AMCAP 基金的同事)对资本集团规模日益壮大感到不安,同时对该集团在其庞大的股票基金(至今仍然规模巨大)与规模虽小但正在成长的 AMCAP 之间分配交易的方式感到沮丧。
In the aftermath of the “Go-Go” Era of the 1960s and the stock market crash of 1972-1974 that followed, many growth fund managers had faltered and then failed. (One of the worst failures was Wellington Management’s Ivest Fund—down 44 percent(!) during its 1974 fiscal year—finally put out of its misery in 1981.) But among the survivors, we “rounded up the usual suspects,” and I visited four of them, with no obvious candidate emerging. Along the way, I learned that Mitchell J. (Mitch) Milias—with whom I had worked fairly closely during his time at Wellington Management Company (1969-1970) before he moved on to the giant Capital Group (American Funds) in Los Angeles—was working on a plan to start a new asset management firm.* PRIMECAP Management Is Formed Uncomfortable with Capital’s growing size, Mitch and Howard B. Schow, his co-manager of the firm’s new AMCAP fund, were frustrated by Capital’s process for allocating transactions among its huge equity funds (still huge today) and the tiny but growing AMCAP.
实际上,惠灵顿是通过我们 1968 年收购数据供应商 Financial Dynamics 而“得到”米奇的。当时我们是一家上市公司(没错,我们是的!),我说服董事们用股票而非现金来完成这笔收购。结果证明,这个决定并不愚蠢——因为惠灵顿的股价在随后的市场崩盘中,从每股 50 美元的最高点跌至每股 4.875 美元的最低点。
- Actually, Wellington “acquired” Mitch through our purchase of data provider Financial Dynamics in 1968. We were a public company then (oh, yes we were!), and I persuaded our directors to use stock, not cash, for that purchase. As it turned out, that decision proved not to be stupid, for Wellington’s stock would fall from a high of $50 per share to a low of $4.875 following the market crash.
他们决定离开大都会人寿,与西奥·A·科洛科特隆斯一起创办自己的公司。大都会人寿大为震惊,因为他们的专业人员从不离职。(或者说,在那之前从未有人离职过。)
They decided to leave Capital and, along with Theo A. Kolokotrones, start their own firm. Capital was startled, for their professionals never leave. (Or, never left ‘til then.)
新合伙人为公司取名为 PRIMECAP 管理公司,并于 1983 年 9 月 15 日在加州帕萨迪纳就近开设了办公室。PRIMECAP 逐渐吸引了一批蓝筹养老金客户。一年后我顺道拜访,与米奇重叙旧谊,也再次结识了霍维。我们相处甚欢,他们似乎对我试探性的提议深有共鸣。我大致这样说:“……我们懂共同基金这门生意,懂它的运营和分销需求。我们没兴趣管钱。你们懂股票市场,已证明自己是专业的资金管理人。但你们对那些外围——尽管必不可少——的商业活动没兴趣。所以,我们一起创办一只基金吧。我们负责运营和分销;作为基金的投资顾问,你们负责投资。你们一分钱都不用花,基金成立和运营的所有成本都由我们承担。”
The new partners named their firm PRIMECAP Management Company, opening an office in nearby Pasadena, CA. on September 15, 1983. PRIMECAP gradually attracted a blue-chip list of pension clients. When I dropped in a year later, I renewed my friendship with Mitch and my acquaintance with Howie. We got along famously, and they seemed to resonate to my tentative proposal. Essentially, I said: “ . . . We understand the mutual fund business, its operations, and its distribution requirements. We aren’t interested in managing money. You understand the stock market and have proven yourselves as professional money managers. But you aren’t interested in those peripheral—albeit essential—business activities. So let’s start a fund together. We’ll do the operations and distribution; as the fund’s adviser, you’ll do the investing. It won’t cost you a penny, for we’ll bear all of the costs of forming and operating the fund.”
他们赞同这个想法,但表示需要时间考虑我的出价。米奇很想做成这笔交易,而霍华德告诉他,自己同意的前提是“我们必须能信任杰克”。回想早年两人都在惠灵顿团队共事的经历,米奇对霍华德说,他和我的信任纽带坚不可摧。于是我们就此达成了交易——双方没有请任何一位律师介入,没有任何书面文字,也没有任何一方签署文件。
They liked the idea, but wanted time to consider my offer. While Mitch was eager to do the deal, Howie told him that he was on board “only if we can trust Jack.” After those earlier years on the Wellington team together, Mitch told Howie that he and I had a bond of trust that could never break. And so we had our deal, without a single lawyer on either side, and without a single word in writing; a deal unsigned by any of the three participants.
PRIMECAP 基金于 1984 年 8 月 20 日注册成立,其高管和董事与先锋集团其他基金相同(当时我们的总资产为 88 亿美元)。该基金以 10 万美元的资产起步,在那个年代,这笔钱不得不由我个人提供(法律问题禁止先锋集团持有自己旗下的基金。我是不是运气很好!)。在最终签署了投资顾问合同之后,PRIMECAP 于 1984 年 11 月 1 日开始投资运营。
PRIMECAP Fund was incorporated on August 20, 1984, with the same officers and directors as the other Vanguard Funds. (Our total assets were then $8.8 billion.) It began with $100,000 of assets which, in those days, I had to personally provide. (Legal issues precluded Vanguard’s ownership of its own funds. Wasn’t I lucky!) PRIMECAP commenced investment operations on November 1, 1984, after we had finally inked our signatures on the investment advisory contract.
我们来看看事实记录。PRIMECAP 基金早期表现不错。1984 至 1986 年,它的回报跑赢标普 500 指数约 16 个百分点。然后,在 1987 至 1989 年间,它失误了,落后指数 25 个百分点,使得基金在头七年的整体表现略微低于基准。或许是我没能充分让先锋基金董事会的其他成员明白,基金业绩的起落是不可避免的,结果有几位董事敦促我终止那份顾问合同。我当然拒绝了。(而且就这么扛过去了!)
Let’s Look At The Record PRIMECAP Fund performed well during its early years. During 1984-1986, it outpaced the S&P 500’s return by some 16 percentage points. Then, during 1987-1989, it faltered, underperforming the index by 25 percentage points and leaving the Fund’s performance, on balance, slightly below par during its first seven years. Perhaps I hadn’t adequately schooled my fellow Vanguard fund directors about the inevitable ebb and flow of fund performance, and a few of them urged me to terminate the advisory contract. Of course I refused to do so. (And got away with it!)
接下来的事已是历史。在随后的 24 年多时间里(见附录 I),此类潮起潮落持续上演——在我们这一行,这无可避免。尽管 PRIMECAP 在其中的 15 年里跑赢了标普 500 指数,但它又在 1996 年以及 2000–2002 年“新经济”泡沫破裂、熊市接踵而至期间落后于标普。不仅如此,在那些表现出色的年份里,PRIMECAP 往往以惊人的幅度超越市场,而阶段性的平庸回报,差距通常很小。结果是:如果在基金成立时投入 1 万美元,到 2015 年年中,这笔投资将增长至 51.5 万美元,几乎是将近标普 500 指数 26.1 万美元总回报的两倍。(年化回报率:13.7% vs. 11.2%。)
The rest is history. During the 24-plus years that followed (see Appendix I), these ebbs and flows continued—in our profession, an inevitability. While PRIMECAP outpaced the S&P 500 in 15 of these years, it again lagged the S&P in 1996 and during 2000-2002 when the bubble of the “new economy” burst, giving way to another bear market. What’s more, during the winning years, PRIMECAP often outpaced the market by remarkable margins, while the periodic intervals of sub-par returns were usually by small margins. Result, an initial investment of $10,000 in the fund at its inception would have grown to $515,000 by mid-2015, almost double the $261,000 total return for the S&P 500. (Annualized, 13.7 percent vs. 11.2 percent.)
先锋集团显著的成本优势对其基金的成功产生了重大影响。由于 PRIMECAP 基金的费用率比同类基金低约 1 个百分点,在该基金存续期内领先同类基金 3.3 个百分点的超额收益中,先锋集团的这一成本优势贡献了近三成。(该基金约一半的费用源于先锋集团的运营效率与规模经济,另一半则归因于咨询费占基金资产的比例相对较低。)† 这便是低成本与长期复利效应的魔力被无限放大!
Vanguard’s remarkable cost advantage had a major impact on the fund’s success. With PRIMECAP’s expense ratio roughly 1 percentage point less than its peer funds, Vanguard’s cost advantage accounted for just under 30 percent of the 3.3 percentage point edge that the fund’s lifetime record reflects. (Almost one-half of the fund’s expenses reflect Vanguard’s operations efficiencies and economies, the other one-half is due to the relatively low ratio of advisory fees to the fund’s assets.)† The magic of low-costs and long-term compounding writ large!
基金吸引投资者注意花了些时间。资产规模在 1988 年达到 2 亿美元(当时,我们觉得这已经很不错了!),1994 年突破 10 亿美元,并在 2000 年初跃升至 220 亿美元。随后市场环境严峻,资产在 2002 年降至 140 亿美元。但自那以后,在良好的市场条件下(大部分时候!)、出色的业绩和充裕的现金流的共同作用下,PRIMECAP 基金的增长使其费用率大幅下降。自 1990 年以来,费用率已下降一半:从 0.75% 降至 0.37%。先锋集团的运营成本从 0.24% 降至 0.17%;PRIMECAP 管理公司的咨询费从 0.51% 降至 0.20%。虽然费率不高,但绝对金额已变得相当可观——仅 2014 年一年,PRIMECAP 和 Capital Opportunity 基金向 PRIMECAP 管理公司支付的咨询费总额就超过 2.27 亿美元。
It took a while for the fund to attract the attention of investors. Assets reached $200 million in 1988 (then, we thought that was pretty good!), crossed $1 billion in 1994, and leaped to $22 billion in early 2000. In the tough market environment that followed, assets dipped to $14 billion in 2002. But with good markets (mostly!) since then, good performance, and good cash † PRIMECAP Fund’s growth has resulted in a sharply declining expense ratio. Since 1990, it has fallen by one-half; from 0.75 percent to 0.37 percent. Vanguard’s operating costs have fallen from 0.24 percent to 0.17 percent; PRIMECAP Management’s advisory fees have fallen from 0.51 percent to 0.20 percent. While the fee rate may be low, the dollars have become large—the advisory fees paid to PRIMECAP management for both PRIMECAP and Capital opportunity funds totaled more than $227 million in 2014 alone.
运转方面,PRIMECAP 基金以 46 美元开启第四个十年。来自晨星(Morningstar)的“黄金”评级,是对这只基金成就的纪念。
flows, PRIMECAP begins its fourth decade with $46. A “Gold” rating (from Morningstar) commemorates the fund’s achievement.
先锋集团评估基金经理的“四个 P” 我们为什么选中 PRIMECAP 来管理先锋的新成长型基金?在 1985 年的第一份年报里,我试着回答过这个问题。现转述并补充年报中的原话:与 PRIMECAP 的几位合伙人建立合作关系,是我们共同经营第一年里既重要又愉快的一部分。我们选中这家公司,依据的是以下“四个 P”。
Vanguard’s “Four Ps” in Evaluating Fund Managers What explains our selection of PRIMECAP to manage Vanguards new growth fund? I tried to answer that question in our first annual report (1985). Paraphrasing and supplementing the words in the report: Developing working relationships with the principals of PRIMECAP has been an important and enjoyable part of our first year in business together. Our selection of the firm was based on these “four Ps”.
1. 人。谁来管理这只基金?PRIMECAP 的员工是杰出的投资专业人士,拥有极佳声誉,这源于他们在资产管理领域总计 85 年的经验。
1. People. Who are the managers of the fund? The people of PRIMECAP are outstanding investment professionals with sterling reputation, borne of a total of 85 years of experience in money management.
2. 投资哲学。他们试图实现什么目标?执行一种以增长为导向的投资哲学。(我也非常欣赏这些经理人对长期的专注,这一点从该基金极低的换手率中可以清楚看出——2007 年至 2013 年间,年换手率已降至仅 5%。)
2. Philosophy. What are they seeking to accomplish? The implementation of an investment philosophy with a growth orientation. (I also loved the managers’ focus on the long term, which is clear from the fund’s low portfolio turnover—down to just 5 percent annually in 2007-2013.)
3. 投资组合。他们如何实施自己的投资理念?由 PRIMECAP 管理的养老金投资组合包含多种蓝筹股,其中有些偏向成长型,有些提供丰厚的收益率,有些被视为潜在收购目标,还有些则属于对利率敏感的行业。
3. Portfolio. How do they go about implementing their philosophy? The pension portfolios managed by PRIMECAP includes a mix of blue-chip stocks, some with a growth orientation; some with generous yields; some companies deemed possible subjects of takeover bids, and some in businesses deemed interest-sensitive.
4. 投资业绩。他们的过往记录如何?我强调过,“过往业绩”不是第一个考量标准,而是最后一个。它确实重要,但必须放在前三项因素的背景下看待。我还提醒,肯定会有跑赢同业的时期——也会有跑输的时期!(这更像一个显而易见的见解,而非高明的预测!)获取有竞争力的长期回报才是目标。
4. Performance. What has their record been? I emphasized that “past performance” wasn’t the first criterion, but the last. Important, yes, but only in the context of the other three factors. I also warned that there would surely be periods of outpacing its peers—and periods when it does not! (An obvious insight rather than a brilliant forecast!) Earning competitive long-term returns is the goal.
这些概念,在我看,已经经受了时间的检验。
These concepts, it seems to me, have met the test of time.
年报亮点——1986–1999 年‡ 在经历了早期那几年表现落后的时期之后,我在 1989 年年报中坦率地写道,“我们的回报大幅落后于”标普 500 指数“的出色回报”,前五年我们的年化回报率为 18.4%,而标普 500 指数为 19.7%。展望 1990 年代时,我认为股票 10% 的回报率或许是一个合理的预期,“若由 PRIMECAP 的管理人运作,也许会锦上添花”。
Annual Report Highlights – 1986-1999‡ After those few early years of lagging performance, I frankly chronicled in the 1989 Annual Report that “our return significantly lagged the excellent return” of the S&P 500, completing our first five years with an 18.4 percent annual return compared to 19.7 percent for the S&P 500. As I looked ahead to the decade of the 1990s, I thought a 10 percent return on stocks might be a reasonable expectation, “perhaps nicely enhanced” by PRIMECAP’s managers.
天哪,我真是严重低估了股市未来的回报率!1990 年代那十年,正如我在 1999 年年报中写到的,标普 500 指数的年回报率为 18.2%。但我对 PRIMECAP 基金的预测是准确的;该基金获得了 21.8% 的回报率,将市场回报率漂亮地提升了 3.6 个百分点。(不过在 2000-2002 年期间,这些收益被熊市严重侵蚀了。把这三个熊市年份算进去,包含回调在内的这十三年里,年化回报率骤降至:标普 500 指数 9.7%;PRIMECAP 基金 13.1%——这确实是一个可观的领先幅度。)
Boy, did I underestimate the stock market’s future return! During the decade of the 1990s, as I wrote in the 1999 Annual Report, the S&P 500 Index delivered an annual return of 18.2 percent. But I was accurate regarding PRIMECAP; the fund earned a return of 21.8 percent; nicely enhancing the market’s return by 3.6 percentage points. (In 2000-2002, however, those gains were severely eroded by the bear market. Including those three years, the annual rates of return for the thirteen years including the fall, had tumbled to: S&P 500, 9.7 percent; PRIMECAP, 13.1 percent—a handsome margin indeed.)
在 1997 年年报的早些时候,我再次强调,先锋集团惊人的规模经济效应为我们的 PRIMECAP 基金经理们提供了顺风:“我们更低的费用让基金在竞争中占据先手。我们的费用率现在是 0.51%,远低于同行平均的 1.50%。我们完全预期,这每年约 1 个百分点的相对回报优势将持续存在,并将助力 PRIMECAP 管理下基金的增长。因为,共同基金投资者正在认识到——尽管速度缓慢——成本确实要紧。”
Earlier in the 1997 Annual Report, I again stressed the contribution of Vanguard’s staggering economies of scale in putting the wind at the back of our PRIMECAP managers: “Our lower expenses provide our Fund with a head start over our competition. Our expense ratio is now 0.51 percent, far less than the 1.50 percent expense ratio of our average peer. We fully expect this enhancement of roughly 1 percent per year relative return to persist and to abet the growth of the funds under the aegis of PRIMECAP. For, as mutual fund investors are learning, however slowly, costs matter.”
1999 年 12 月 31 日,我作为该基金董事的任期结束了。但在随后的几年里,我一直信守在 1999 年年报中做出的承诺:“我将在新成立的先锋集团部门中保持活力与积极性……并将继续作为 PRIMECAP 基金的股东,对你们的利益‘鹰’眼相待。”‡ 在翻阅这些年报时,我在 1991 年的报告中找到了自己最喜欢的一句话:“我们为此刻的任务带来的,不是奇术,而只是我们投资组合经理的勤勉、经验、专业技能和投资才能。”
My role as director of the fund ended on December 31, 1999. But in the years that followed, I have kept the promise that I made in that 1999 Annual Report: “I will remain vigorous and active in a newly-created Vanguard unit . . . (and) will continue to keep an eagle eye on your interests as PRIMECAP Fund shareholders.” ‡ As I reviewed these annual reports, I found a favorite phrase of mine in the report for 1991 . . . “We bring to the task at hand, not thaumaturgy, but only the diligence, experience, professional skills, and investment competence of our portfolio managers.”
这就是我所做的,而且我(无论是个人角度还是职业角度)都非常高兴,因为自那以后,该基金的业绩一直极为出色。
That’s what I have done, and I’m delighted (personally and professionally!) that the Fund’s results since then have been outstanding.
PRIMECAP 与先锋资本机会基金
1994 年,我的董事会施加了巨大压力,要求我修改先锋集团的核心价值——提供具有较高相对可预测性的基金,转而加入一些更激进、风险更高且可预测性较低的基金。我愚蠢地顺应了这一策略,并做出了一项营销决策,而非投资决策。(过往的惨痛经历早已告诫我,这种做法的明智程度堪忧。)于是,1995 年,我们成立了先锋地平线基金,共四只基金,其策略的后果相对难以预测。先锋资本机会基金便是其中之一。
PRIMECAP and Vanguard Capital Opportunity Fund In 1994, our board exerted substantial pressure on me to modify Vanguard’s central value of offering funds with high relative predictability by adding some more aggressive and riskier funds, with less predictability. Unwisely, I went along with that strategy and made a marketing decision to do so, not an investment decision. (Hard experience had warned me about the lack of wisdom in such an approach.) So in 1995, we formed Vanguard Horizon Funds, four funds with strategies whose outcomes were relatively unpredictable. Among those funds was Vanguard Capital Opportunity Fund.
我选择(只能怪我自己,不能怪别人)了一位激进的基金经理——加利福尼亚的胡西克资本管理公司,它当时已经在管理先锋摩根成长基金的一部分,让它来负责该基金的投资组合。胡西克在这里获得了更灵活的投资权限,包括卖空股票(即押注这些股票的价格会下跌)。他们的策略执行失败了。1997 年,标普 500 指数全年上涨 33%,但资本机遇基金的总回报率却是负 8%。难以置信!我们终止了与胡西克的合作关系,PRIMECAP 接受了我们的邀请,成为该基金的投资顾问。
I selected (I cannot blame anyone but myself) an aggressive manager, California’s Husic Capital Management Company, already running a segment of Vanguard’s Morgan Growth Fund, to manage the fund’s portfolio. Here, Husic would have a more flexible mandate, including the ability to sell stocks short (i.e., betting that their prices would decline). Their implementation of the strategy failed. In 1997, with the S&P 500 up by 33 percent for the year, the total return on Capital Opportunity Fund was minus 8 percent. Incredible! We terminated our relationship with Husic, and PRIMECAP accepted our offer to become the fund’s investment adviser.
还有什么可说的?4P 法则再次奏效。自 1998 年接管以来,Capital Opportunity 基金在 16 年间实现了每年 12% 的年化收益率,而同期标普 500 指数为 9%,该基金还获得了晨星(Morningstar)的“黄金”评级。在 PRIMECAP 管理下起步时,其资产规模仅为 6300 万美元,如今 Capital Opportunity 的投资组合价值已超过 140 亿美元。
What’s to be said? Again, the 4 P’s paid off. In the 16 years since taking the reins in 1998, Capital Opportunity Fund has earned an annual return of 12 percent per year, compared to 9 percent of the S&P 500, and also has been awarded the “Gold” rating from Morningstar. Beginning its era under PRIMECAP management with just $63 million in assets, the value of the Capital Opportunity portfolio now exceeds $14 billion.
如今的 PRIMECAP 管理公司。PRIMECAP 基金最初的 3 位投资组合经理是:豪伊(已故)、米奇(他于 2013 年底从资本机会基金的资深经理职位上退休),以及默默奉献的西奥·科洛科特罗内斯——他至今仍是 PRIMECAP 的领导人之一。此外,多年来团队中还吸纳了浸淫于 PRIMECAP 稳健投资理念、如今已历练成熟的投资专业人士,包括乔尔·弗里德、阿尔·莫迪凯和莫·安萨里,他们各自管理着先锋集团旗下两只基金的部分仓位。他们凭借实力赢得了今日的成功。
PRIMECAP Management Today The three original portfolio managers of PRIMECAP Fund were Howie (now gone), Mitch (who retired as senior manager of Capital Opportunity at year-end 2013), and the unsung hero, Theo Kolokotrones, still one of PRIMECAP’s leaders. Also added to the staff over the years are now-seasoned investment professionals steeped in PRIMECAP’s sturdy investment values, including Joel Fried, Al Mordecai, and Mo Ansari, each running parts of both funds under the Vanguard aegis. They have earned the success that they have achieved.
回顾往昔
随着先锋领航的资产规模和员工人数不断膨胀——从 1984 年 PRIMECAP 基金刚上线时的约 90 亿美元,增长到如今惊人的 2.3 万亿美元(这个数字大得我实在不太想去细想)——很多情况已经变了。我常常说(最早是在 1992 年):“看在上帝的份上,让我们永远把先锋领航打造成一个让判断力至少有资格与流程一较高下的地方。”这在今天是一个巨大的挑战,因为我们先锋员工的规模已经从 1984 年的 660 人增长到了如今约 1.5 万人。
In Retrospect As Vanguard’s assets and staff had grown—from some $9 billion when PRIMECAP first came on board in 1984 to $2.3 trillion today (a number so large I don’t really want to think about it)—much has changed. I’ve often said (first back in 1992), “For God’s sake, let’s always keep Vanguard a place where judgment has at least a fighting chance to triumph over process.” That’s a huge challenge today, for the size of our Vanguard crew has grown from 660 in 1984 to some 15,000 crew members today.
我们已不可避免地——我这么认为——成为一个由众多不同单元聚合而成的实体:科技(远远最大的一块)、投资管理(管理指数基金、债券基金和货币市场基金,并监督我们的外部经理人)、市场营销与分销(到 2013 年,我们派驻全国各地的“批发商”数量——他们负责拜访券商和注册投资顾问——显然已激增至 60 人)、产品开发、财务与会计、法律与合规,以及为大约 2000 万股东账户提供记录保管服务。
We have become—inevitably, I think—an aggregation of many different units— technology (by far the largest), investment management (managing index funds, bond funds, and money markets, and overseeing our external managers), marketing and distribution (with the number of our “wholesalers” calling on brokers and registered investment advisers across the nation apparently burgeoning to a staff of 60 by 2013), product development, financial and accounting, legal and compliance, and record-keeping for the accounts of some 20 million shareholders.
自省 我写下这段简史,唯恐我们忘记当初的模样——由一个意志专断、近乎独裁的领导者引领,他执意要在基金投资领域掀起一场革命,其标志是 1974 年我们创建了至今仍独一无二的基金股东所有/共同结构;一年后又创立了全球第一只指数共同基金。这些创始理念至今仍在驱动我们的成长。我竭尽全力将投资置于营销之上;从不(好吧,几乎从不)为增长而追求增长。(我的第一条营销法则:“市场份额必须靠赢得,而非靠购买。”)是的,我习惯了按自己的方式行事,也并非世上最善于倾听的人。但最重要的是,我致力于服务——高效、经济、诚实(这是我早年普林斯顿大学论文里的原话)——那些“实实在在、真诚坦率的普通人”,也就是我们的客户,并培养一支认同我这一使命的团队。
Introspection I write this brief history lest we forget the way we were—led by a single-minded virtual dictator, hell-bent on creating a revolution in fund investing, exemplified by the creation of our (still) unique fund-shareholder-owned/mutual structure in 1974; and our creation of the world’s first index mutual fund a year later. These founding precepts continue to drive our growth. I did my best to place a higher priority on investing rather than marketing; never (well, almost never) seeking growth for growth’s sake. (My first rule for marketing: “Market share must be earned and not bought.”) Yes, I was used to getting my own way, and I was not the world’s best listener. But above all, I was interested in serving—effectively, economically, and honestly (the words from my ancient Princeton University thesis) the “down-to-earth, honest-to-God human beings” who are our clients, and building a crew who shared my belief in that mission.
在那些旧日时光里,我们行动迅速,没有委员会,也没有部门壁垒。对于缺乏理由支撑的异议,我们几乎毫无耐心。我们秉持着对股东严格履行受托责任的原则来运营——股东代表了我们唯一的责任——并且以信任为纽带做出承诺。
In those ancient days, we acted quickly, we had no committees and no silos. And we brooked little patience for dissent unsupported by reason. We operated on strict principles of fiduciary duty to our shareholders—who represent our sole responsibility—and made our commitments with a bond of trust.
那些“美好旧时光”的最佳典范,就是先锋 PRIMECAP 基金,以及如今的先锋资本机会基金。对于三十年前那场看似不太可能的合作中的合伙人而言——当时它只是庞大基金帝国里一个相对较小、易于管理的单元——结果无疑相当成功。PRIMECAP 通过为那些信任我们、并把资金托付给这些基金的股东带来非凡回报,很好地赚取了其顾问费。这家公司在主动管理型基金领域为先锋集团增添了光彩。
The best part of those “good old days” is exemplified by Vanguard PRIMECAP Fund, and now Vanguard Capital Opportunity Fund. For the partners in that unlikely venture of thirty years ago—a relatively small and manageable unit in a giant fund complex—it has surely worked out well. PRIMECAP has well earned their advisory fees by producing the extraordinary returns that these funds have delivered to the shareholders who placed their trust in us. The firm has added luster to Vanguard’s reputation in actively-managed funds.
当然,先锋集团变了。PRIMECAP 也变了。但为了不犯下“怀旧”这桩显然的过错,投资行业也变了;金融体系也变了;这个国家也变了;世界和其中的几乎一切也都变了。然而,只要我们不忘我们引以为傲的过去,继续坚守我们的投资战略和人文价值观,先锋集团就将在我们可以预见的未来,继续在同行中屹立最高。
Of course, Vanguard has changed. So has PRIMECAP. But lest I commit the apparent sin of “nostalgia,” so has the investment profession changed; so has the financial system; so has the nation; so has the world and almost everything that’s in it. But as long as we don’t ignore our proud past and continue to maintain our investment strategy and human values, Vanguard will continue to stand tallest among our peers for as far ahead as we can imagine.
约翰·C·博格尔(2014 年 6 月起草备忘录;2015 年 7 月更新)
John C. Bogle (Memorandum drafted June 2014; updated July 2015.)
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
附录一:PRIMECAP 基金数据,1984 年 – 2015 年 6 月 年度回报 累计回报 多市值 PRIMECAP 相对于 标普 500 的倍数 PRIMECAP 资产(百万美元) PRIMECAP 成长型基金 标普 500 成长型指数 标普 500 多市值 PRIMECAP 成长型基金 标普 500 成长型指数 标普 500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1984* 4.9% 2.6% 2.8% 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.02 2 1985 35.8 31.8 30.8 1.42 1.35 1.34 1.05 54 1986 23.5 18.7 14.7 1.76 1.60 1.54 1.10 133 1987 -2.3 5.3 3.1 1.72 1.69 1.59 1.02 165 1988 14.7 16.6 14.3 1.97 1.97 1.82 1.00 186 1989 21.6 31.7 31.4 2.40 2.59 2.39 0.92 279 1990 -2.8 -3.1 -3.4 2.33 2.51 2.31 0.93 305 1991 33.1 30.5 46.0 3.10 3.28 3.37 0.95 486 1992 9.0 7.6 7.9 3.38 3.53 3.64 0.96 646 1993 18.0 10.1 14.2 3.99 3.88 4.15 1.03 791 1994 11.4 1.3 -2.5 4.45 3.94 4.05 1.13 1,554 1995 35.5 37.6 33.9 6.02 5.42 5.42 1.11 3,237 1996 18.3 23.0 18.8 7.13 6.66 6.44 1.07 4,204 1997 36.8 33.4 22.0 9.75 8.88 7.86 1.10 8,186 1998 25.4 28.6 26.0 12.23 11.42 9.90 1.07 11,210 1999 41.3 21.0 49.3 17.28 13.82 14.79 1.25 17,912 2000 4.5 -9.1 -12.4 18.06 12.56 12.95 1.44 21,762 2001 -13.3 -11.9 -26.1 15.65 11.07 9.57 1.41 18,888 2002 -24.5 -22.1 -29.9 11.82 8.62 6.71 1.37 14,378 2003 38.0 28.7 34.7 16.30 11.10 9.03 1.47 21,726 2004 18.5 10.9 10.7 19.32 12.30 10.00 1.57 27,296 2005 8.7 4.9 8.9 20.99 12.91 10.89 1.63 28,543 2006 12.5 15.8 7.4 23.61 14.95 11.69 1.58 31,505 2007 11.6 5.5 14.6 26.35 15.77 13.39 1.67 33,395 2008 -32.3 -37.0 -42.2 17.83 9.93 7.74 1.80 21,974 2009 34.6 26.5 35.5 24.00 12.56 10.49 1.91 28,832 2010 13.0 15.1 18.3 27.12 14.46 12.41 1.88 30,506 2011 -1.8 2.1 -4.1 26.64 14.76 11.90 1.80 27,571 2012 15.4 16.0 14.9 30.74 17.12 13.66 1.80 29,254 2013 39.86 32.39 34.84 42.99 22.67 18.42 1.90 39,639 2014 18.83 13.69 9.27 51.09 25.77 20.13 1.98 46,310 2015 年 6 月 0.73 1.23 4.79 51.46 26.09 21.09 1.97 46,108 累计 5046 2509 2009 年化 13.7 11.2 10.5 *基金于 1984 年 11 月 1 日开始运营。
Appendix I: PRIMECAP Fund Data, 1984 - 6/2015 Annual Returns Cumulative Returns Multi- PRIMECAP Total Multi-Cap PRIMECAP S&P Cap relative to Assets (in PRIMECAP Growth Fund 500 Growth S&P 500 $Mil) Fund S&P 500 Funds Avg. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1984* 4.9% 2.6% 2.8% 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.02 2 1985 35.8 31.8 30.8 1.42 1.35 1.34 1.05 54 1986 23.5 18.7 14.7 1.76 1.60 1.54 1.10 133 1987 -2.3 5.3 3.1 1.72 1.69 1.59 1.02 165 1988 14.7 16.6 14.3 1.97 1.97 1.82 1.00 186 1989 21.6 31.7 31.4 2.40 2.59 2.39 0.92 279 1990 -2.8 -3.1 -3.4 2.33 2.51 2.31 0.93 305 1991 33.1 30.5 46.0 3.10 3.28 3.37 0.95 486 1992 9.0 7.6 7.9 3.38 3.53 3.64 0.96 646 1993 18.0 10.1 14.2 3.99 3.88 4.15 1.03 791 1994 11.4 1.3 -2.5 4.45 3.94 4.05 1.13 1,554 1995 35.5 37.6 33.9 6.02 5.42 5.42 1.11 3,237 1996 18.3 23.0 18.8 7.13 6.66 6.44 1.07 4,204 1997 36.8 33.4 22.0 9.75 8.88 7.86 1.10 8,186 1998 25.4 28.6 26.0 12.23 11.42 9.90 1.07 11,210 1999 41.3 21.0 49.3 17.28 13.82 14.79 1.25 17,912 2000 4.5 -9.1 -12.4 18.06 12.56 12.95 1.44 21,762 2001 -13.3 -11.9 -26.1 15.65 11.07 9.57 1.41 18,888 2002 -24.5 -22.1 -29.9 11.82 8.62 6.71 1.37 14,378 2003 38.0 28.7 34.7 16.30 11.10 9.03 1.47 21,726 2004 18.5 10.9 10.7 19.32 12.30 10.00 1.57 27,296 2005 8.7 4.9 8.9 20.99 12.91 10.89 1.63 28,543 2006 12.5 15.8 7.4 23.61 14.95 11.69 1.58 31,505 2007 11.6 5.5 14.6 26.35 15.77 13.39 1.67 33,395 2008 -32.3 -37.0 -42.2 17.83 9.93 7.74 1.80 21,974 2009 34.6 26.5 35.5 24.00 12.56 10.49 1.91 28,832 2010 13.0 15.1 18.3 27.12 14.46 12.41 1.88 30,506 2011 -1.8 2.1 -4.1 26.64 14.76 11.90 1.80 27,571 2012 15.4 16.0 14.9 30.74 17.12 13.66 1.80 29,254 2013 39.86 32.39 34.84 42.99 22.67 18.42 1.90 39,639 2014 18.83 13.69 9.27 51.09 25.77 20.13 1.98 46,310 6/2015 0.73 1.23 4.79 51.46 26.09 21.09 1.97 46,108 Cumulative 5046 2509 2009 Annualized 13.7 11.2 10.5 *Fund began operations on 11/1/1984.
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
附录二:资本机会基金数据,1995 年 - 2015 年 6 月
| 年份 | 年度回报率 | 累计回报率 | 资本机会基金资产(百万美元) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 资本机会基金 | 标普 500 指数 | 多资本成长指数 | 资本机会基金 | 标普 500 指数 | 多资本成长指数 | 资本机会基金相对于标普 500 指数 | ||
| 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | |||||
| 1995\* | -1.8 | 11.1 | 3.2 | 0.98 | 1.11 | 1.03 | 0.88 | 81 |
| 1996 | 13.4 | 23.0 | 18.8 | 1.11 | 1.37 | 1.23 | 0.82 | 117 |
| 1997 | -7.9 | 33.4 | 22.0 | 1.03 | 1.82 | 1.50 | 0.56 | 63 |
| 1998 | 32.0 | 28.6 | 26.0 | 1.35 | 2.34 | 1.88 | 0.58 | 206 |
| 1999 | 97.8 | 21.0 | 49.3 | 2.68 | 2.83 | 2.81 | 0.94 | 2,367 |
| 2000 | 18.0 | -9.1 | -12.4 | 3.16 | 2.58 | 2.46 | 1.23 | 5,056 |
| 2001 | -9.7 | -11.9 | -26.1 | 2.85 | 2.27 | 1.82 | 1.26 | 5,209 |
| 2002 | -27.9 | -22.1 | -29.9 | 2.06 | 1.77 | 1.28 | 1.16 | 3,696 |
| 2003 | 49.7 | 28.7 | 34.7 | 3.08 | 2.28 | 1.72 | 1.35 | 6,398 |
| 2004 | 21.8 | 10.9 | 10.7 | 3.75 | 2.52 | 1.90 | 1.49 | 8,548 |
| 2005 | 8.4 | 4.9 | 8.9 | 4.06 | 2.65 | 2.07 | 1.54 | 8,408 |
| 2006 | 16.9 | 15.8 | 7.4 | 4.75 | 3.07 | 2.22 | 1.55 | 9,329 |
| 2007 | 10.6 | 5.5 | 14.6 | 5.26 | 3.23 | 2.55 | 1.63 | 9,711 |
| 2008 | -39.0 | -37.0 | -42.2 | 3.21 | 2.04 | 1.47 | 1.57 | 5,510 |
| 2009 | 49.0 | 26.5 | 35.5 | 4.78 | 2.58 | 2.00 | 1.85 | 8,455 |
| 2010 | 11.1 | 15.1 | 18.3 | 5.31 | 2.96 | 2.36 | 1.79 | 8,623 |
| 2011 | -6.1 | 2.1 | -4.1 | 4.99 | 3.03 | 2.26 | 1.65 | 7,229 |
| 2012 | 18.4 | 16.0 | 14.9 | 5.90 | 3.51 | 2.60 | 1.68 | 7,557 |
| 2013 | 42.80 | 32.39 | 34.84 | 8.43 | 4.65 | 3.51 | 1.81 | 11,669 |
| 2014 | 18.95 | 13.69 | 9.27 | 10.03 | 5.29 | 3.83 | 1.90 | 13,713 |
| 2015 年 6 月 | 3.47 | 1.23 | 4.79 | 10.38 | 5.35 | 4.01 | 1.94 | 14,134 |
| 累计 | 938 | 435 | 301 | |||||
| 年化 | 12.5 | 8.8 | 7.2 |
\* 基金于 1995 年 8 月 14 日开始运作。
Appendix II: Capital Opportunity Fund Data, 1995 - 6/2015 Annual Returns Cumulative Returns Cap. Opp. Total Multi-Cap Multi- Relative Assets Capital Growth Capital S&P Cap to (in Opportunity S&P Funds Opportunity 500 Growth S&P 500 $Mil) Fund 500 Avg. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1995* -1.8 11.1 3.2 0.98 1.11 1.03 0.88 81 1996 13.4 23.0 18.8 1.11 1.37 1.23 0.82 117 1997 -7.9 33.4 22.0 1.03 1.82 1.50 0.56 63 1998 32.0 28.6 26.0 1.35 2.34 1.88 0.58 206 1999 97.8 21.0 49.3 2.68 2.83 2.81 0.94 2,367 2000 18.0 -9.1 -12.4 3.16 2.58 2.46 1.23 5,056 2001 -9.7 -11.9 -26.1 2.85 2.27 1.82 1.26 5,209 2002 -27.9 -22.1 -29.9 2.06 1.77 1.28 1.16 3,696 2003 49.7 28.7 34.7 3.08 2.28 1.72 1.35 6,398 2004 21.8 10.9 10.7 3.75 2.52 1.90 1.49 8,548 2005 8.4 4.9 8.9 4.06 2.65 2.07 1.54 8,408 2006 16.9 15.8 7.4 4.75 3.07 2.22 1.55 9,329 2007 10.6 5.5 14.6 5.26 3.23 2.55 1.63 9,711 2008 -39.0 -37.0 -42.2 3.21 2.04 1.47 1.57 5,510 2009 49.0 26.5 35.5 4.78 2.58 2.00 1.85 8,455 2010 11.1 15.1 18.3 5.31 2.96 2.36 1.79 8,623 2011 -6.1 2.1 -4.1 4.99 3.03 2.26 1.65 7,229 2012 18.4 16.0 14.9 5.90 3.51 2.60 1.68 7,557 2013 42.80 32.39 34.84 8.43 4.65 3.51 1.81 11,669 2014 18.95 13.69 9.27 10.03 5.29 3.83 1.90 13,713 6/2015 3.47 1.23 4.79 10.38 5.35 4.01 1.94 14,134 Cumulative 938 435 301 Annualized 12.5 8.8 7.2 *Fund began operations on 8/14/1995.
自 PRIMECAP 管理公司接管管理职责以来,1998 年 2 月 1 日至统计日累计回报率 917%,对比标普 500 指数的 191% 和道琼斯指数的 169%,年化回报率 14.2%,同期标普 500 年化 6.3%,道琼斯年化 5.8%。
Since PRIMECAP Management assumed management responsibilities, 2/1/1998 Cumulative 917 191 169 Annualized 14.2 6.3 5.8