害怕崩盘

1995 · 专栏 · 原文约 3606 词
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认为市场要暴跌了?这个我不反对——除非你觉得你能预测时间,或者存在比持有优质股票更好的生存策略。

Think the market's headed for a fall? No argument here--unless you think you know when, or that there's a better survival strategy than owning great stocks.

作者:彼得·林奇 与 约翰·罗思柴尔德

By Peter Lynch with John Rothchild

道琼斯指数突破 4700 点,又让人担心起一场剧烈回调。这种担心是从 1990 年我们刚从上一次剧烈回调中恢复过来时就开始了。可能导致历史重演的原因数都数不完:太多的共同基金在追逐太少的股票,股价过高,道琼斯指数的股息收益率处于历史最低位——而我最喜欢的一条理由是——担心的投资者还不够多。

The Dow's passing 4700 has brought new worries about a nastycorrection. The worrying started as soon as we recovered fromthe last nasty correction, in 1990. There's no end to the listof probable causes for a repeat: Too many mutual funds are chasingtoo few stocks, stocks are overpriced, the dividend yield onthe Dow is at an all-time low, and-- this one is my favorite--notenough investors are worried.

我在此正式附和林奇的预测:另一场大调整即将来临。如果有牧场的话,我会拿整个牧场来赌。它可能发生在今年、明年,或者红袜队赢得世界大赛的那一年(别指望了!),但迟早会来。你最先是在这里看到的。

Let me go on record with Lynch's prediction: Another big correctionis on the way. I'd bet the ranch on it, if I had a ranch. Itmay come this year, next year, or the year the Red Sox win theWorld Series (don't hold your breath!), but sooner or later,it will happen. You read it here first.

我凭什么做出如此大胆的论断?自世纪之交以来,股市已 53 次出现 10% 及以上的跌幅。大致相当于每两年发生一次回调。* 在这 53 次回调中,有 15 次跌幅达到 25% 或以上。也就是说,每六年就会遭遇一次恶性回调(也就是常说的熊市)。

On what do I base this bold assertion? Stocks have declined10 percent or more on 53 occasions since the turn of the century.That's roughly one correction occurring every two years.* And on 15 of these 53 occasions, stocks have declined 25 percentor more. That's one nasty correction (also known as a bear market)every six years.

据我所知,等这篇文章登上报刊时,另一场熊市可能已经降临。或者股市之神要等到道琼斯指数涨到 6500 点,才决定把它打回 4700 点,今天的最高点变成明天的低谷。又或者,我们可能直接从今天的点位一路跌到 3100 点。

For all I know, another bear may have arrived on the scene bythe time this article reaches the newsstands. Or the equity godsmay wait until the Dow reaches 6500 before they decide to knockit back to 4700, today's highs becoming tomorrow's lows. Or we could drop from today's levels straight down to 3100.

别搞错了:市场回调可能让人心生恐惧。人们会对经济、自己的投资组合以及所投资的公司失去信心。这就像一场风暴席卷而来,天空骤然黑暗。恐慌开始蔓延。

Make no mistake: Corrections can be scary experiences. People lose confidence in the economy, in their portfolios, and in the companies in which they've invested. It's like a storm that rollsin and blackens the sky. Fear sets in.

要是没有道琼斯、标普 500 这些指数来追踪“市场”的涨跌,我们根本就不会有回调这回事。你知道吗,纽约证券交易所上市股票的平均价格,在任意一年里的最高价和最低价之间差距有多大?百分之五十。也就是说,绝大多数股票每年都会从高点跌到低点,波动幅度达到 50%,而且根本没人当回事。

If only we didn't have indexes--the Dow, the Standard & Poor's500, and so forth--that enable us to track the ups and downs of "the market," we'd never have this problem with corrections. Do you know what the range is between the high and the low priceof the average stock on the New York Stock Exchange in any given year? Fifty percent. So most stocks fluctuate 50 percent fromtop to bottom every year, without any fanfare.

我们还记得道琼斯指数在 1987 年 8 月至 10 月间下跌 1000 点,那是近期最吓人的一次回调。但我们忘了,在那次下跌之前的 11 个月里,道琼斯指数曾上涨 1000 点——考虑到之前每涨 1000 点都花了四年时间,这轮上涨快得惊人。如果我们整个 1987 年都像陪审团一样与世隔绝,出来时会觉得那年市场没怎么动,谁也不会恐慌。

We remember the 1000-point drop in the Dow from August to October1987, the scariest correction in recent times. But we forgetthe 1000-point rise in the Dow in the 11 months preceding thatdrop--a remarkably fast gain, considering that it had taken theDow four years to tack on the previous 1000 points. If we hadbeen sequestered like a jury during all of 1987, we would havecome out thinking the market was flat for the year, and nobodywould have panicked.

但我们确实有各种指数,而且整天盯着它们的涨跌,所以必然会经历吓人的回调。如果从当前位置再涨 1000 点,道琼斯指数在短期内升到 5700 点,那么出现又一次大幅下跌的可能性就会显著增加。

But we do have indexes and we are preoccupied with their upsand downs, so we will have scary corrections. If we tack on another 1000 points from here and the Dow rises to 5700 in short order,the chances of another big decline increase considerably.

假设你同意我的预测,那我们该如何准备?多半是什么都不做。

Assuming you agree with my forecast, how can we prepare? Mostly by doing nothing.

这一点正是市场灾难与气象灾难的不同之处。既然我们已经学会采取行动保护自己免受暴风雪和飓风的侵害,那么试图为市场调整做好准备也就顺理成章了——尽管在这个例子里,像童子军那样时刻准备着可能会带来毁灭性的损失。投资者为了准备应对调整或试图预测调整而损失的钱,远多于调整本身造成的损失。

This is where a market calamity is different from a meteorological calamity. Since we've learned to take action to protect ourselvesfrom snowstorms and hurricanes, it's only natural that we wouldtry to prepare ourselves for corrections, even though this is one case where being prepared like a Boy Scout can be ruinous.Far more money has been lost by investors preparing for correctionsor trying to anticipate corrections than has been lost in correctionsthemselves.

第一个错误是对投资组合做对冲。胆小的投资者预测市场会下跌,便开始涉足期货和期权——这类投资在股票下跌时能获利。人们把这看作矫正保险。起初看似便宜,但期权每隔几个月就会过期,如果股票没有按预期下跌,投资者就得买入更多期权来续保。突然间,投资变得没那么简单了。投资者无法确定自己究竟是希望股票下跌,让这份保险发挥作用,还是希望股票上涨,好让自己的投资组合受益。

The first mistake is hedging the portfolio. Anticipating a dropin the market, the skittish investor begins to dabble in futuresand options, the kind of investment that will make a profit whenstocks decline. People think of this as correction insurance.It seems cheap at first, but the options expire every coupleof months, and if stocks don't go down on schedule, people haveto buy more options to renew the policy. Suddenly, investing isn't so simple. Investors can't decide whether they're rooting for stocks to falter, so their insurance will pay off, or fora rally, for the sake of the portfolio.

对冲是一件棘手的生意,连专业人士也没能真正掌握——否则,近年来怎么会有那么多对冲基金倒闭呢?对冲基金经理们的身影已经出现在失业队伍里了。

Hedging is a tricky business even the pros haven't mastered-- otherwise,why have so many hedge funds gone out of business in recent years?Hedge-fund managers have been sighted in unemployment lines.

第二个更普遍的错误是所谓的“减仓”仪式。这次,我们那些紧张的投资者再次担心回调迫在眉睫,于是卖掉部分或全部股票及股票型基金。或者他们会推迟买入自己看好的公司,手持现金等待崩盘。“安全总比后悔好,”他们对自己说,“我要等到清算日,当所有没料到这一切的傻瓜们哭天喊地、咬牙切齿时,我就趁机到处捡便宜货。”(然而,一旦市场触底,这些手持现金的人很可能继续拿着现金观望。他们在等待永远不会到来的进一步下跌,从而错过了反弹。)

The second and more prevalent mistake is the ritual known aslightening up. This time, our skittish investors, again fearingthe correction is imminent, sell some or all of their stocks and stock mutual funds. Or they put off buying stocks in companiesthey like and sit on their cash, waiting for the crash. "Better safe than sorry," they tell themselves. "I'll wait for the dayof reckoning, when all the suckers who didn't see this comingare wailing and gnashing their teeth, and I'll snap up bargainsleft and right." (But once the market reaches bottom, the cashsitters are likely to continue to sit on their cash. They'rewaiting for further declines that never come, and they miss therebound.)

他们可能仍自称是长期投资者,但实际并非如此。他们已把自己变成了市场择时者,除非择时非常精准,否则市场终将把他们甩在身后。

They may still call themselves long-term investors, but they'renot. They've turned themselves into market timers, and unlesstheir timing is very good, the market will run away from them.

大约 2700 个道琼斯点之前,择时交易非常流行。当时,共同基金的客户被鼓励在股票基金和货币市场基金之间来回转换,以此避开任何令人不快的回调。那些自封的“转换服务”头头们负责发出信号,他们为自己的精明建议收取高昂的费用(每年高达 3%)。人们支付给转换基金顾问的费用,是他们支付给基金本身管理费的两到八倍。

Market timing was quite popular about 2700 Dow points ago, whenclients of mutual funds were encouraged to switch back and forth from stock funds to the money market, thereby avoiding any unpleasant corrections. The signals were sent out by self-appointed heads of "switching services" who charged hefty fees (as high as 3percent a year) for their canny advice. People were paying their switch- fund advisors two to eight times as much as they paidin management fees to the funds themselves.

而在大多数州,理发师都得通过考试才能给人剪头发,但预测市场切换的人却不用考。我对还在为这种服务付费的人有个建议:在你们再付一分钱给“择时切换”服务之前,回头仔细看看他们过去给出的成绩。你们真的躲过了回调,还是错过了有史以来最大牛市里涨幅最好的那几个月?一想到有多少人做的是后者,我就不寒而栗。

Whereas in most states barbers have to pass a test before theyare allowed to cut hair, there is no test for switch forecasters. My advice for anyone who is still paying for such a service: Go back and carefully check the results before you give anotherpenny to a switching service. Have you really avoided the corrections,or have you avoided the best months of the greatest bull marketin history? It pains me to think how many people have done thelatter.

回顾追溯到 1954 年的标普 500 指数,可以看出在股市出现最大涨幅的短暂区间内,错过行情的代价有多高昂。如果你在这 40 年间始终全仓持股,年化投资收益率为 11.4%。如果你错过了涨幅最大的 10 个月,收益率就降到了 8.3%。如果错过涨幅最大的 20 个月,收益率是 6.1%;错过涨幅最大的 40 个月,收益率就只有 2.7%。想象一下:如果你在 40 年里为了躲避回调而错失了 40 个关键月份,你的股票组合表现还不如储蓄账户。

A review of the S&P; 500 going back to 1954 shows how expensiveit is to be out of stocks during the short stretches when theymake their biggest jumps. If you kept all your money in stocksthroughout these 40 years, your annual return on investment was11.4 percent. If you were out of stocks for the ten most profitablemonths, your return dropped to 8.3 percent. If you missed the20 most profitable months, your return was 6.1 percent; the 40 most profitable, and you made only 2.7 percent. Imagine that:If you were out of stocks for 40 key months in 40 years, trying to avoid corrections, your stock portfolio underperformed yoursavings account.

那台给我们揭示上述事实的电脑,还给出了另一组数据:从 1965 年开始,如果你每年 1 月 1 日向标普 500 指数投入 2000 美元,你的年化回报率是 11%。如果你运气不好,每年都在市场最高点投那 2000 美元,你的年化回报率也有 10.6%。

The same computer that gave us that revelation also contributedthe following: If you invested $2,000 in the S&P; 500 on January1 of every year since 1965, your annual return has been 11 percent.If you were unlucky and managed to invest that $2,000 at thepeak of the market in each year, your annual return has been 10.6 percent.

如果你足够幸运,在市场的低点投入那 2000 美元,最终年化回报率也只是 11.7%。换句话说,从长期来看,择时好坏并没有太大区别。重要的是你一直坚守在股市中。

Or if you were lucky and invested the $2,000 at the low pointin the market, you ended up with 11.7 percent. In other words,in the long run it doesn't matter much whether your timing isgood or bad. What matters is that you stay invested in stocks.

最近,《福布斯》发布了全球富豪排行榜,这让我想起一个事实:榜单上从未有过靠预测市场时机上榜的人。如果真的能精准预测市场回调,按理说早就有人靠这个赚到几十亿美元了。

Recently, Forbes published its hit parade of the richest peoplein the world, and I was reminded that there's never been a market timer on the list. If it were truly possible to predict corrections, you'd think somebody would have made billions by doing it.

至今没人能做到这一点,这件事本身就告诉我们:想躲过下跌有多难。沃伦·巴菲特在《福布斯》富豪榜上排名第二,他是靠选股——而不是频繁进出——达到这个位置的。

The fact that nobody has done so ought to tell us somethingabout our chances of dodging the drops. Warren Buffett weighsin at No. 2 on the Forbes list. He got there by picking stocksand not by switching in and out of them.

巴菲特在其职业生涯中只做过一次这样的切换,那是 1960 年代末期,当时的华尔街疯狂迷恋一批精选的成长型公司,对它们来说,再高的价格都不算高。在最愚蠢的顶点,麦当劳的市盈率高达 83 倍,迪士尼则是 76 倍,而在理性时期,它们的市盈率可能只有 20 倍。这两家公司,以及所谓的“漂亮五十”中的另外 48 家公司,被高估到如此程度,以至于它们花了十年时间才追上自己的股价。所以,如果你想要比我已经给出的建议更具体的指引,那就学学沃伦·巴菲特,抛掉那些市盈率高达 83 倍的股票吧。否则,就保持原状,不要试图去战胜市场调整。

Buffett switched only once in his career, in the late 1960s,when Wall Street fell so hopelessly in love with a select groupof growth companies that no price was too high to pay for them.At the point of maximum silliness, McDonald's was selling for 83 times earnings and Disney for 76, whereas in saner times,they might sell for 20 times earnings. These two companies, and 48 others in the so-called Nifty Fifty, were so overvalued thatit took them ten years to catch up to their price tags. So ifyou're looking for more concrete advice than I've offered sofar, take a tip from Warren Buffett and get out of stocks that are selling for 83 times earnings. Otherwise, stay the courseand resist the temptation to outsmart corrections.

在向你们讲述这些时,我假设你们是打算长期持有股票的人——二十年乃至更久。如果未来某个时候你需要用到这笔钱做别的事,那就永远不要拿它投资股票。二十年的投资期限是合理的,这段时间应该足够让你的股票度过最糟糕的时期,比如 1966 年到 1982 年那一段,当时道琼斯指数从 1000 点的峰值跌到了 777 点的谷底。这里有一个让人安心的要点:如果你把股息也算进去,在这令人沮丧的 16 年里,标普 500 指数的总回报率是 75.37%,折合年化 3.5%。多亏了股息,市场调整并不像人们说的那么糟糕。

In telling you this, I'm assuming you're in stocks for the longhaul: two score years or beyond. Never invest money in stocksif you are going to need it for some other purpose in the foreseeablefuture. Twenty years is a reasonable horizon for investing. Thatought to be long enough for your stocks to overcome the worstof times, such as the stretch between 1966 and 1982, when theDow stumbled from a peak of 1000 to a nadir of 777 And here'sa reassuring point: When you include the dividends, stocks inthe S&P; 500 gave a total return of 75.37 percent during that depressing 16-year period, or 3.5 percent annualized. Thanksto dividends, corrections aren't necessarily as bad as they'remade out to be.

一旦你意识到自己有能力熬过任何市场回调,那么市场灾难本身反而变成了捡便宜货的好机会。

As soon as you realize you can afford to wait out any correction,the calamity also becomes an opportunity to pick up bargains.

第 83 页的表格列举了几个例子,展示了近代史上最惨烈的四次市场修正(1973-74 年、1981-82 年、1987 年和 1990 年)如何反过来帮了我们一把——它们给了我们以跳楼价买入优质公司的机会。既然以前发生过,就一定会再次重演。

The table on page 83 shows a few examples of how the four nastiest corrections in recent history (1973- 74, 1981-82, 1987, and 1990) actually paid us a favor by giving us the chance to buy greatcompanies at fire-sale prices. If it's happened before, it will happen again.

一场修正的解剖

THE ANATOMY OF A CORRECTION

不同类型的公司在这四次调整中表现如何?所有股票下跌的幅度都一样吗?为了回答这些问题,我请《价值》杂志的研究员黛博拉·庞特帮忙,她又拉上了标普公司、弗兰克·罗素公司和萨菲安投资研究公司。我们共同制作了一张大表格(见下页),涵盖四大类别,每个类别由一个指数代表:大公司用标普 500 指数,小公司用罗素 2000 指数,成长型公司用萨菲安成长指数,周期型公司用萨菲安周期指数。

How have different types of companies fared in those four corrections?Do all stocks correct equally? To answer those questions, I enlistedthe help of Deborah Pont, my dogged researcher at Worth, whoin turn enlisted the help of Standard & Poor's, the Frank RussellCo., and Safian Investment Research. Together, we came up witha large table (on the next page) involving four broad categories,each represented by an index. Large companies are representedby the S&P; 500; small companies by the Russell 2000; growth companiesby the Safian growth index; and cyclical companies by the Safian cyclical index.

从这些数字中能清楚看出,成长型公司是其中两次调整期间和之后的表现明星,在 1990 年的萨达姆·侯赛因调整中也稳住了阵脚。唯一让人恨不得没持有它们的时刻是 1973—1974 年,那时成长股已经被严重高估,这一点我们前面已经提到过。

It's obvious from these numbers that growth companies were thestar performers during and after two of these corrections, andthey held their own in the Saddam Hussein correction of 1990.The only time you wished you didn't own them was 1973–74, whengrowth stocks were grossly overpriced, as we've already mentioned.

对于没钻研过这个话题的人,我解释一下:成长型公司是无论经济环境如何都能稳健经营的企业,与周期型公司相反——后者在大富大贵和贫困潦倒之间来回摇摆。典型的成长型公司包括生产软件和软饮的公司、制药商和快餐连锁、特色零售商和服务相关企业,甚至还有一家香烟制造商菲利普·莫里斯。标普公司行业报告编辑、潜心研究市场调整的萨姆·斯托瓦尔把这些公司称为“吃它喝它抽它,看病埋单全用它的股票”。

For those who haven't boned up on the subject, a growth company is a steady performer that can prosper in all economic conditions, as opposed to a cyclical, which lurches from rags to riches and back again. A typical lineup of growth companies includes those that make software and soft drinks, drug makers and fast-food chains, specialty retailers and service-related businesses, and even a cigarette manufacturer, Philip Morris. Sam Stovall, editor of Standard & Poor's Industry Reports and an avid student of corrections, calls these the "eat 'em, drink 'em, smoke 'em,and pay-for-it-by-going-to-the- doctor type stocks."

在 1987 年那场臭名昭著的熊市之后——道琼斯工业股票从 8 月高点跌到 10 月低点跌幅达 33%,其中包括单日暴跌 508 点的可怕经历——成长股的投资者仍领先 8.5%,而且每晚能睡个好觉。1990 年,成长股在下跌时比周期股多跌了一点点,但远好于其他三类股票,而在上涨时又跟上了周期股的步伐。

After the infamous 1987 bear market, when investors in the Dow industrial stocks were traumatized by a 33 percent loss from the August top to the October bottom, including the terrifying 508-point one-day drop, investors in growth stocks were still ahead by 8.5 percent and getting a good night's sleep. In 1990,growth stocks lost a bit more ground than the cyclicals on the downside but far less than the three other categories of stocks, and they've kept pace with the cyclicals on the upside.

我向来是成长型公司的粉丝,但在为这篇文章收集数据的过程中,我惊讶地发现:自 1949 年以来,投资萨菲安名单上的 50 只成长股获得了超过 230 倍的回报,而周期股只有 19 倍。无论是单独持有还是作为共同基金的一部分,成长股带给投资者的心碎更少、回报更多。

I've long been a fan of growth companies, but in the courseof collecting data for this article, I was amazed to discoverthat since 1949, an investment in the 50 growth stocks on Safian's list has returned over 230-fold, while the cyclicals have returned only 19-fold. Whether they are owned individually or as an elementof mutual funds, growth stocks have given their owners fewer heartaches and many happy returns.

零息债券的理由——也就是说,你根本不该持有任何债券

THE CASE FOR ZERO PERCENT BONDS--THAT IS, YOU SHOULDN'T OWNANY

这就引出了我在第二本书《战胜华尔街》中描述的一种投资策略。如果我能让你相信它的好处,你将再也不买债券或债券基金,永远满仓股票。

This brings me to an investment strategy I described in my second book, Beating the Street. If I convince you of its merits, you will never again buy a bond or a bond fund, and you'll stay fully invested in stocks forever.

持有债券的理由主要有两个:它们提供收入以便支付账单,它们为投资组合增加压舱石。除非你说的是短期债券(两到四年),否则压舱石的说法是错的。长期债券的波动性几乎和股票一样大。它们也有自己的调整:利率上升时,债券价格下跌的速度和股票价格一样快。如果你不打算持有债券至到期,你就和持有股票一样暴露在潜在损失中。而如果持有至到期,债券没有上涨空间来回报你的风险。你一路上收取利息,但最终最好的结果不过是收回本金。

There are two main arguments for owning bonds: They give you income so you can pay the bills, and they add ballast to your portfolio. Unless you're talking about bonds of the short-term variety (two to four years), the ballast argument is false. Long-term bonds can be almost as volatile as stocks. They have their own corrections: When interest rates go up, bond prices go down Justas fast as stock prices. If you're not willing to hold a bond to maturity, you're exposing yourself to potential losses, the same as in stocks. And bonds have no upside to reward you for this risk if they're held to maturity. You collect the interest along the way, but in the end, the best you can hope for is to get reimbursed.

在本世纪的 90 年里,债券只有一次跑赢股票——20 世纪 30 年代。它们在 80 年代接近过,但 90 年代上半期,股票再次证明了其优越性。如今人们活得更长了,许多为了收入而买债券的退休人员发现,他们最终需要的钱比预想的多。他们本可以在本金上获得一些增长,但却没有得到。

In the nine decades in this century, bonds have outperformed stocks only once--in the 1930s. They came close in the 1980s,but in the first half of the 1990s, stocks have once again proved their superiority. People are living longer these days, so many retirees who buy bonds for the income are discovering that they may end up needing more money than they thought they would. They could use some growth in their principal, but they aren't getting it.

我提出的策略可以两全其美:通常来自债券的生活费,加上股票的增长。具体操作如下:你把 100% 的投资资本投入到定期支付股利的公司组合中。你可以走捷径,投资标普 500 指数基金,当前收益率约为 3%。或者,你也可以挑选一些穆迪认定的“股利成就者”。这些公司无论发生什么,都习惯年复一年地提高股利。

The strategy I'm proposing can offer the best of both worlds: money to live on that normally comes from bonds, and growth that comes from stocks. Here's how it works. You sink 100 percent of your investment capital into a portfolio of companies that pay regular dividends. You could do this the easy way and invest in an S&P; 500 index fund, currently yielding about 3 percent. Or you could select a few "dividend achievers," as identified by Moody's. These are the companies that have a habit of raising their dividends year after year no matter what.

根据穆迪最新名单,至少有 332 家上市公司已经连续十年以上做到了这一点。名单上有些不知名的公司,但也有许多熟悉的名字,比如沃尔玛、孩之宝、菲利普·莫里斯和默克。(要花 19.95 美元获取一份《股利成就者手册》,可拨打穆迪电话 800-342-5647,分机号 0546。)

According to the latest Moody's list, no fewer than 332 publicly traded companies have accomplished this for at least ten years in a row. The list includes some obscure names but also a lot of familiar ones, the likes of Wal-Mart, Hasbro, Philip Morris, and Merck. (To get a copy of the Handbook of Dividend Achieversf or $19.95, call Moody's at 800-342-5647, extension 0546.)

既然股利来自盈利,这些股利成就者如果没有在其核心业务上取得持续成功——无论是什么业务——就不可能积累这样的记录。所以你看到的是具有持久力的盈利企业群。

Since dividends are paid out of earnings, these dividend achiever scouldn't have compiled such a record without having enjoyed consistent success in their core business, whatever it is. So you're looking at a group of profitable enterprises with staying power.

假设你有 10 万美元进行长期投资,每年需要 7000 美元的收入来维持生计。你可以通过购买一只付息 7% 的 30 年期债券来获得这个收入。但相反,你接受林奇的建议,避开债券,建立一个支付 3% 股利的股票组合。第一年你获得 3000 美元股利。因为你生活需要 7000 美元,收入端还差 4000 美元,但这可以解决:你卖掉 4000 美元股票。

Let's say you've got $100,000 to invest for the long term, and you need an income of $7,000 per annum to make ends meet. Youc an get it by purchasing a 30-year bond paying 7 percent. But instead, you take Lynch's advice, shun the bonds, and build a portfolio of stocks that pays you a 3 percent dividend. In the first year you get $3,000 in dividends. Since you need $7,000to live on, you're $4,000 short on the income side, but that can be solved. You sell $4,000 worth of stock.

卖掉 12 个月前刚买的股票听起来可能有点疯狂,但请听我解释。假设股价上涨了 8%,这是股票的历史常态。(长期来看,股票在价格上涨上回报 8%,在股利上回报 3%,总回报率为 11%。)如果不动它,算上股利和价格上涨,第一年后你的组合价值将是 11.1 万美元。但你不这么做。你取出 3000 美元股利,并卖掉 4000 美元的股票。把这 7000 美元装进口袋后,第二年开始时账户余额是 10.4 万美元。

It may sound crazy to be selling shares that you bought 12 months earlier, but bear with me. Let's assume the prices have gone up 8 percent, which is the historical norm for stocks. (Overtime, stocks return 8 percent on the price gains and 3 percent on the dividends, for a total return of 11 percent.) Between the dividends and the price gains, your portfolio would be worth$111,000 after the first year if you left it alone. But you don't. You take out the $3,000 in dividends and you sell the $4,000chunk of stock. After putting this $7,000 in your pocket, you begin year two with $104,000 in the account.

下页表格会告诉你接下来发生了什么。你投资的公司照常提高了股利,所以第二年组合给你带来 3120 美元收入。第二年结束时,你只需卖出 3880 美元股票就能达到 7000 美元目标。此后每年,随着股利上涨和股价上升,你需要卖出的股票越来越少以覆盖开支。在第 16 年,仅靠股利你就能获得 7000 美元,从这时起,你再也不用卖出一股股票来获得惯常的支出。事实上,你的支出还在增加。

You can see from the table on the next page what happens next. The companies in which you've invested raise their dividends as usual, so in the second year, the portfolio gives you an income of $3,120. At the end of year two, you have to sell only $3,880worth of stock to reach your $7,000 goal. Every year thereafter, as dividends are raised and stock prices go up, you're selling less and less stock to cover your expenses. In year 16, you receive$7,000 out of the dividends alone, and from this point forward, you never have to sell a single share to get the customary payout. In fact, your payout goes up.

这些数字是理论上的,但它们基于本世纪股票和股利的平均回报。假设这些结果未来仍然成立,20 年后,你的原始 10 万美元将增长为 34.914 万美元。比起始时富了三倍多,而且一路上还花掉了 14.682 万美元的股利。如果走债券路线,你会收到 14 万美元利息,并拿回 10 万美元本金。

These numbers are theoretical, but they're based on the average returns from stocks and dividends over this entire century. Assuming these same results hold for the future, after 20 years, your original $100,000 will have grown into $349,140. You'll be more than three times richer than when you started, on top of the$146,820 worth of dividends you've spent along the way. By taking the bond route, you would have received $140,000 in interest and gotten your $100,000 back.

如果这个股利策略如此出色,为什么没有更多人利用它呢?我认为原因和为什么人们持有更多债券而不是股票(目前是 9.4 万亿美元对 6.5 万亿美元)相同——尽管长期来看股票明显更赚钱。他们认为自己运气不好。他们担心下一次糟糕的调整,并且确信调整就发生在他们投资股票后的第二天。也许你把自己也算在这群倒霉蛋里了。

If this dividend strategy is such a great idea, why aren't more people taking advantage of it? I suspect it's the same reason they own more bonds than stocks ($9.4 trillion to $6.5 trillion, at current count) when stocks are clearly more profitable overtime. They think they're jinxed. They're worried about the next nasty correction, and they're convinced it will happen the day after they invest in stocks. Perhaps you count yourself as one of this unlucky crowd.

应对崩盘恐惧的最好方法,是假设最糟情况并审视结果。那么,假设你真的运气不好,你把 10 万美元全部投入股利成就者后的第二天,市场经历了历史上最糟糕的行情,你的组合一夜之间损失了 25% 的价值。

The best way to cope with the fear of crashing is to assume the worst and examine the results. Let's assume, then, that you are jinxed, and the day after you invest your entire $100,000 in dividend achievers, the market has its worst session in history and your portfolio loses 25 percent of its value overnight.

富达的鲍勃·贝克维特算了一下。尽管立即损失了 25%,但如果你坚持计划,卖出股票来补充收入,并在路上收取 14.682 万美元的股利,20 年结束时你的组合价值将是 18.535 万美元。这不如 34.914 万美元好,但比 10 万美元债券多出 8.535 万美元。

Fidelity's Bob Beckwitt ran the numbers. In spite of the immediate25 percent loss, if you stuck with the plan, sold shares to augment the return, and collected your $146,820 in dividends along the way, at the end of the 20th year your portfolio would be worth$185,350. That's not as good as $349,140, but it puts you $85,350ahead of the $100,000 bond.

让我们设想一个更可怕的案例:持续 20 年的衰退。国家陷入大萧条以来最糟糕的萧条。在这场旷日持久的危机中,公司难以提高利润,股价和股利分别以正常增长率 8% 和 3% 的一半增长。然而,如果你坚持计划,每年从账户中取出 7000 美元,你最终将拥有一个 10 万美元的组合——和债券拿回本金完全一样。

Let's imagine an even more terrible case: a recession that lasts 20 years. The country is in its worst slump since the Great Depression. In this prolonged crisis, companies struggle to increase their profits, and instead of share prices and dividends increasing at the normal rate of 8 percent and 3 percent, respectively, these returns are cut in half. Still, if you stuck with the program and removed $7,000 from the account each year, you'd end up with a $100,000 portfolio--exactly the same as getting your principal back from a bond.

再说一遍,这些计算是理论上的,但结果对股票如此有利,以至于存在很大的容错空间。人人都可能倒霉,整个国家都可能倒霉,但只要你将资金投入股票 20 年或更久,股票仍然会比债券表现更好。这时候,男性退休人员会说:“我等不了 20 年,因为我已经 65 岁了,预期寿命是 68.2 岁。我只能活 3.2 年。” 事实上,如果一个男人活到 65 岁,他很可能会活到 85 岁;如果他和妻子都活到 65 岁,两人中有一个很有可能活到 90 岁。人们熬过调整的时间比自己以为的要多,这正是我们不应担心下一次或下下次调整的主要原因。

Again, these calculations are theoretical, but the results areso favorable to stocks that there's a lot of room for error.Everybody can be unlucky, the whole country can be unlucky, andstocks will still do better than bonds--assuming you keep yourmoney in stocks for 20 years or longer. This is where male retireeswill say: "I don't have 20 years to wait, because I'm 65 alreadyand my life expectancy is 68.2. I only have 3.2 years to live."In fact, if a man gets to 65, he's likely to make it to 85, andif he and his wife both reach 65, there's a good chance one ofthem will make it to 90. People have more time than they thinkto ride out corrections, which is the main reason we shouldn'tbe worried about the next one, or the one after that.

最后,我留给你华尔街最新的悲观报告:专家说股价会崩盘,因为太多人变成了长期投资者。在他们看来,长期投资的想法如此流行,以至于它肯定是错的。这是否意味着地球真的是平的?*

I'll leave you with the latest gloomy report from Wall Street:Experts say stock prices will collapse because too many peoplehave become long- term investors. The way they see it, the ideaof long-term investing is so popular, it has to be wrong. Doesthat mean the earth really is flat?

  • 1994 年春,我们经历了一次隐性调整。道琼斯指数从 1 月 31 日高点分别三次下跌 10%,每次都在交易日结束前收复失地。很少有人注意到,但也许这正是 1995 年市场如此之好的原因:半年一度的下跌已经从我们身边悄悄溜走了。
  • In spring 1994, we had a stealth correction. The Dow dropped10 percent from its January 31 high on

three separate occasions,managing to recover its losses before the end of the tradingday in each instance. Few people took notice, but maybe that'swhy 1995 has been such a good market: The semiannual declinehas already sneaked past us.

问自己我为什么持有这些公司?

ASK YOURSELFWHY DO I OWN THESE COMPANIES?

当市场修正来袭,周围的人们惊慌失措——正如吉卜林所说——我们可以从以下事实中找到安慰:长期来看,让股票有价值的不是“市场”,而是你所拥有的公司股份的盈利能力。随着企业利润增长,公司会变得更值钱,迟早它们的股票会以更高的价格卖出。历史上,企业利润每年增长 8%。这 8%,加上 3% 的股息收益率,正是……

When a correction hits and people around us are losing theirheads, as Kipling would say, we can find reassurance in the following:What makes stocks valuable in the long run isn't "the market."It's the profitability of the shares in the companies you own.As corporate profits increase, corporations become more valuable,and sooner or later, their shares will sell for a higher price.Historically, corporate profits have advanced by 8 percent ayear. This 8 percent, along with the 3 percent dividend yield,is what

这 11% 的年回报率就是这么来的。可能从来没有哪一年它们的总回报恰好是 11%,但这是长期的平均值。无论有没有市场回调,这就是股票能带来的收益,因为这就是企业能创造的价值。

accounts for the 11 percent annual return. There maynever have been a year when they had a total return of exactly11 percent, but that's the average over time. Corrections orno corrections, that's what stocks produce, because that's whatcorporations produce.

即使企业利润增长率降至 6%、5% 或 4%,股票仍会上涨,只是涨幅较低。加上 3% 的股息,你将获得 9%、8% 或 7% 的总回报。在大多数十年里,这仍比债券的收益更高。归根结底,要成为一名股票投资者,你必须相信美国乃至全球的企业拥有一个不错的未来,并且公司将继续提升其利润。如果你和我一样对此深信不疑,那么你永远不会在市场回调中恐慌。——菲利普·费雪

Even if corporate profits grew at 6, 5, or 4 percent, stockswould still advance, albeit at this lower rate. Adding in the3 percent for the dividends, you'd get a 9, 8, or 7 percent totalreturn. That's still a better return than you'd get from bondsin most decades. Ultimately, to be an investor in stocks, youhave to believe that American business has a decent future, aswell as business worldwide, and that corporations will continueto increase their profits. If you are as convinced of this asI am, then you'll never panic in a correction. --P.L.