查理·芒格文稿/演讲实录:2000年反垄断法的滥用

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反垄断法的荒谬应用

查尔斯·T·芒格 2000 年 9 月

就我从微软反垄断案所能判断的,司法部似乎认为:任何销售不断演进、功能繁多的产品——通过给每个新模型增加新功能来持续改进产品的卖家——只要:(1) 它经常以包含所有功能的一口价销售产品;(2) 它拥有主导市场份额;且 (3) 卖家通过添加一个显然必不可少的功能来“追赶”竞争对手——这个功能与别人首先推向市场的产品具有相同作用——那它就自动违反了反垄断法。

如果上诉法院愚蠢到认同微软案初审法院的裁决,那么美国几乎所有占主导地位的高科技企业都将被迫放弃全世界公司面临威胁时的标准竞争做法——当它们面临首先在别处推向市场的更先进技术的威胁时。

没有任何其他国家像这样束缚自己最强企业的手脚。看看美国自己的历史,我们就能明白原因何在。想想福特汽车公司。1912 年,当福特是美国占主导地位的汽车制造商时,一家小公司——通用汽车的前身——发明了一种司机可以在车内使用的自动启动器,而不用下车摇动发动机曲柄。福特的回应是,在自己的汽车上添加了自家的自动启动器(其“一口价”套餐)——从而巩固了其主导业务,并限制了小竞争对手的侵蚀。我们真的希望这种行为成为非法的吗?

或者想想波音公司。假设波音公司销售美国 90% 的客机,尽管飞机不断增加更好的功能,却始终以一口价为基础。我们真的希望波音公司停止努力增强其竞争地位吗?——因为它添加这些受欢迎的功能既帮助了旅客,又提高了安全性——仅仅因为其中一些功能是其他制造商首先推向市场的?

微软案提出的问题是:(1) 什么是将独立的“新产品”“捆绑”到占主导地位的旧产品上这种不可允许的非法的“搭售”行为?(2) 什么是改进市场上占主导地位的现有“一口价”产品这种可允许的合法行为?

解决方案很简单,可以避免荒谬的结果和争论。我们需要一条简单、有利于改进的规则:只要有某种合理的理由认为产品用户在某种程度上受益,那么新功能就始终是可允许的改进。

现代时代的本质是,最高生活标准通常出现在这样的地方:那里有许多非常成功的公司,它们主要通过狂热地致力于改进“一口价”产品来维持其高市场份额。

近年来,一个微观经济趋势对于帮助美国追赶那些开发出更好、更便宜产品的外国制造商至关重要:我们的制造商学会了从更少、更值得信赖的供应商那里购买越来越大、功能更全的“一口价”套餐。这一必要的现代趋势现在正受到司法部的威胁。

微软可能有一些很多人不喜欢的文化特质,但很可能好的软件现在正是在这样的文化中才能得到最好的开发。微软否认自己关注其行为的竞争影响,这可能是不明智的。但在像本案这样的案件中,法律顾问通常建议采取这种策略,因为微软内部个人的动机是混杂的,因人而异。合理的反垄断政策不应实质性地处罚那些让政府证明其指控的被告。如果司法部现任的掌权者们允许这种诉讼策略考量主导反垄断法的发展——这是一项严肃的事业,在本案之外会产生严重的后果——那么他们就不配掌握反垄断政策的指导权。

虽然我从未持有微软的股票,但我长期以来从两个角度观察其软件的改进。首先,我是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的官员兼部分所有者,该公司是《世界百科全书》的出版商。我非常钦佩这部产品,因为我知道创作它有多难,而且我从小就与它一起成长,发现它在我漫长的一生中一直帮助着我。

但是,尽管我们对《世界百科全书》精心照料,当微软开始在其软件包中几乎不增加价格地包含整套百科全书时,这本百科全书的业务价值受到了严重且永久的损害。此外,我相信微软这样做是希望加强其强大的业务,并且知道这会损害我们的业务。

即便如此,尽管对《世界百科全书》造成了巨大损害,我仍然相信微软有权像它那样改进其软件,并且我们的社会——尽管对某些公司造成了损害——当其强大的企业能够充分改进其产品以保持强大时,会获得巨大的收益。

其次,我担任《每日日报》公司的董事长兼部分所有者,该公司出版许多律师和法官经常阅读的小型报纸。很久以前,这家公司在高度计算机化的运营中受制于 IBM。然后,在更加计算机化的运营中,它又受制于 DEC。现在,它几乎 100% 地使用个人计算机上令人难以置信的廉价微软软件,运营更加高度计算机化,包括利用微软浏览器的互联网接入。

鉴于《每日日报》公司那些曾经占主导地位的供应商一个接一个地消失的历史,微软的业务地位在我看来岌岌可危。然而,至少在一段时间内,微软产品在我们业务以及其他领域的无处不在,在巨大程度上帮助了我们——同时也帮助了使用我们出版物的法院。

但如果微软不总是通过添加诸如 Explorer 这样的功能来改进其产品——Explorer 是微软如果不想开始倒退而是前进,就不得不以追赶的方式添加到 Windows 中的互联网浏览器——那么微软的软件对我们和法院来说就是一种糟糕的产品。

司法部几乎不可能提出比它现在提出的要求更具危害性的一系列要求了。如果它胜诉,我们国家最终将束缚其表现最好的高科技企业。而这一切都是为了获取无人能理性预测的公众利益。

英特尔公司的安迪·格鲁夫曾广泛引用一句话描述他的业务:“只有偏执狂才能生存。”不久前,英特尔被迫退出了它曾经占主导地位的硅芯片业务。如果情况确实如此,那么鉴于微软如此害怕落后、如此热衷于改进其产品,它应该获得一枚奖章,而不是面临反垄断起诉。

查尔斯·T·芒格是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的副董事长,以及《每日日报》公司的董事长兼部分所有者。

本文的一个版本于 2000 年 9 月 1 日发表在《华盛顿邮报》。

A Perverse Use of Antitrust Law. by Charles T. Munger. September 2000. As best I can judge from the Microsoft antitrust case, the Justice Department believes that any seller of an ever-evolving, many-featured product--a product that is constantly being improved by adding new features to every new model--will automatically violate antitrust law if: (1) it regularly sells its product at one all-features-included price; (2) it has a dominant market share and (3) the seller plays "catch-up" by adding an obviously essential feature that has the same function as a product first marketed by someone else. If appellate courts are foolish enough to go along with the trial court ruling in the Microsoft case, virtually every dominant high-tech business in the United States will be forced to retreat from what is standard competitive practice for firms all over the world when they are threatened by better technology first marketed elsewhere. No other country so ties the hands of its strongest businesses. We can see why by taking a look at America's own history. Consider the Ford Motor Co. When it was the dominant U.S. automaker in 1912, a small firm-a predecessor of General Motors-invented a self-starter that the driver could use from inside the car instead of getting out to crank the engine. What Ford did in response was to add a self-starter of its own to its cars (its "one-price" package)-thus bolstering its dominant business and limiting the inroads of its small competitor. Do we really want that kind of conduct to be illegal? Or consider Boeing. Assume Boeing is selling 90 percent of U.S. airliners, always on a one-price basis despite the continuous addition of better features to the planes. Do we really want Boeing to stop trying to make its competitive position stronger-as it also helps travelers and improves safety by adding these desirable features-just because some of these features were first marketed by other manufacturers? The questions posed by the Microsoft case are: (1) what constitutes the impermissible and illegal practice of "tying" a separate new product to a dominant old product, and (2) what constitutes the permissible and legal practice of improving an existing one-price product that is dominant in the market. The solution, to avoid ridiculous results and arguments, is easy. We need a simple, improvement-friendly rule that a new feature is always a permissible improvement if there is any plausible argument whatever that product users are in some way better off. It is the nature of the modern era that the highest standards of living usually come where we find many super-successful corporations that keep their high market shares mostly through fanatical devotion to improving oneprice products. In recent years, one microeconomic trend has been crucial in helping the United States play catch-up against foreign manufacturers that had developed better and cheaper products: our manufacturers learned to buy ever-larger, one-price packages of features from fewer and more-trusted suppliers. This essential modern trend is now threatened by the Justice Department. Microsoft may have some peculiarities of culture that many people don't like, but it could well be that good software is now best developed within such a culture. Microsoft may have been unwise to deny that it paid attention to the competitive effects of its actions. But this is the course legal advisers often recommend in a case such as this one, where individuals' motives at Microsoft were mixed and differed from person to person. A proper antitrust policy should not materially penalize defendants who make the government prove its case. The incumbent rulers of the Justice Department are not fit to hold in trust the guidance of antitrust policy if they allow such considerations of litigation style to govern the development of antitrust law, a serious business with serious consequences outside the case in question. While I have never owned a share of Microsoft, I have long watched the improvement of its software from two vantage points. First, I am an officer and part owner of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., publisher of the World Book Encyclopedia, a product I much admire because I know how hard it was to create and because I grew up with it and found that it helped me throughout a long life. But despite our careful stewardship of World Book, the value of its encyclopedia business was grossly and permanently impaired when Microsoft started including a whole encyclopedia, at virtually no addition in price, in it software package. Moreover, I believe Microsoft did this hoping to improve its strong business and knowing it would hurt ours. Even so, and despite the huge damage to World Book, I believe Microsoft was entitled to improve its software as it did, and that our society gains greatly--despite some damage to some companies--when its strong businesses are able to improve their products enough to stay strong. Second, I am chairman and part owner of Daily Journal Corp., publisher of many small newspapers much read by lawyers and judges. Long ago, this corporation was in thrall to IBM for its highly computerized operation. Then it was in thrall to DEC for an even more computerized operation. Now it uses, on a virtually 100 percent basis, amazingly cheap Microsoft software in personal computers, in a still more highly computerized operation including Internet access that makes use of Microsoft's browsers. Given this history of vanished once-dominant suppliers to Daily Journal Corp., Microsoft's business position looks precarious to me. Yet, for a while at least, the pervasiveness of Microsoft products in our business and elsewhere helps us--as well as the courts that make use of our publications-in a huge way. But Microsoft software would be a lousy product for us and the courts if the company were not always improving it by adding features such as Explorer, the Internet browser Microsoft was forced to add to Windows on a catch-up basis if it didn't want to start moving backward instead of forward. The Justice Department could hardly have come up with a more harmful set of demands than those it now makes. If it wins, our country will end up hobbling its best-performing high-tech businesses. And this will be done in an attempt to get public benefits that no one can rationally predict. Andy Grove of Intel, a company that not long ago was forced out of a silicon chip business in which it was once dominant, has been widely quoted as describing his business as one in which "only the paranoid survive." If this is so, as seems likely, then Microsoft should get a medal, not an antitrust prosecution, for being so fearful of being left behind and so passionate about improving its products. Charles T. Munger is vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and chairman and part owner of Daily Journal Corp. A version of this article appeared in the Washington Post on September 1, 2000.