Wesco金融董事长致股东信,1988财年(查理·芒格)
WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
致股东的信
致各位股东:
1988 日历年,合并“正常”经营利润(即所有非正常经营利润和所有证券出售净收益之前)从上一年的 1661.2 万美元(每股 2.33 美元)增至 2356.4 万美元(每股 3.31 美元)。
合并净利润(即扣除非正常经营亏损和所有证券出售净收益之后)从上一年的 1521.3 万美元(每股 2.14 美元)增至 3008.9 万美元(每股 4.22 美元)。
总部设在奥马哈,目前主要从事再保险业务。过去两年合并净利润的明细如下(除每股金额外,均以千美元计)(1):
| 截至 1988 年 12 月 31 日 | 截至 1987 年 12 月 31 日 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 金额 | 每股 | 金额 | 每股 | |
| Westco “正常”经营净利润(亏损): | ||||
| 互助储蓄(Mutual Savings) | $ 4,694 | $ .66 | $ 2,895 | $ .41 |
| Westco-金融保险业务 | 12,094 | 1.70 | 9,459 | 1.33 |
| 精密钢铁(Precision Steel)业务 | 3,167 | .44 | 2,450 | .34 |
| 所有其他“正常”经营净利润 (2) | 3,609 | .51 | 1,808 | .25 |
| 西科 “正常”经营净利润合计 | 23,564 | 3.31 | 16,612 | 2.33 |
| 出售鲍厄里储蓄银行(Bowery Savings Bank)权益收益 | 4,836 | .68 | — | — |
| 出售有价证券净收益 | 1,689 | .23 | 1,208 | .17 |
| 互助储蓄注销预付 FSLIC 保险费 (3) | — | — | (1,935) | (.27) |
| 精密钢铁洪水损失 | — | — | (672) | (.09) |
| Westco 合并净利润 | $30,089 | $4.22 | $15,213 | $2.14 |
{ 所有数字均已扣除所得税。
(2) 扣除储蓄和贷款及保险子公司之外拥有的有价证券的间接贷款利息和租金收入,以及房产租赁收入(扣除外部租户费用后)。
(3) 保险储备金,包括预付给 FSLIC(美国联邦储蓄与贷款保险公司,负责为储蓄贷款协会账户提供保险的联邦机构)的存款保险费。
这一补充盈利明细与采用标准会计准则的审计财务报表略有不同。提供此补充明细是因为它被认为对股东有用。
WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS To Our Shareholders: Consolidated "normal" operating income (i.e., before all unusual operating income and all net gains from sales of securities) for the calendar year 1988 increased to $23,564,000 ($3.31 per share) from $16,612,000 ($2.33 per share) in the previous year. Consolidated net income (i.e., after unusual operating losses and all net gains from sales of securities) increased to $30,089,000 ($4.22 per share) from $15,213,000 ($2.14 per share) in the previous year. in Omaha and currently engaged principally in the reinsurance business. Consoli- dated net income for the two years just ended breaks down as follows (in 000s except for per-share amounts) (1): Year Ended December 31, 1988 December 31, 1987 Per Amount Wesco Per Share Amount Share Wesco "Normal" net operating income (loss) of: Mutual Savings $ 4,694 $ .66 $ 2,895 $ .417 Wesco-Financial Insurance business . 12,094 1.70 9,459 1.33 Precision Steel's businesses 3,167 .44 2,450 .34 All other "normal" net operating income (2) 3,609 .51 1,808 3.31 16,612 25 23,564 2.33 Gain on sale of interest in Bowery Savings Bank 4,836 .68 - - Net gains on sales of marketable securities .... 1,689 .23 1,208 .17 Writeoff by Mutual Savings of prepaid FSLIC insurance premiums (3) - - (1,935) (.27) Flood loss at Precision Steel (672) (.09) Wesco consolidated net income $30,089 $4.22 $15,213 $2.14 { All figures are net of income taxes. After Educing of mary leaded four eats, linterest and end of the Mum san elena ans marketable securities owned outside the savings and loan and insurance subsidiaries. outside tenants, (3) INsurance reserve, consting of deposit insurance premiums prepaid to Fsic, the U.S. agency which insures accounts in savings and loan associations. This supplementary breakdown of earnings differs somewhat from that used in audited financial statements which follow standard accounting convention. The supplementary breakdown is furnished because it is considered useful to shareholders. 1
互助储蓄
互助储蓄 1988 年“正常”净经营利润为 469.4 万美元,较上年的 289.5 万美元增长 62%。1988 年如此高的百分比增长部分源于偶然:当年大部分时间里,利率曲线恰好精准适应互助储蓄的需求;而进入 1989 年,随着短期利率与中期利率变得近乎一致,净息差已经受损。
此外,这些“正常收益”数据来自一家绝非正常的储蓄与贷款机构。
互助储蓄 1987 年底与 1988 年底的独立资产负债表列于本年报末尾。这些报表显示:(1) 储蓄账户总额从上一年的 2.87 亿美元增至 2.89 亿美元;(2) 股东权益与储蓄账户负债之比极高(接近美国任何成熟储蓄与贷款机构的最高水平);(3) 储蓄账户负债中有相当一部分被现金等价物和有价证券所抵消;(4) 1988 年底贷款组合(主要为房地产抵押贷款)约为 1.37 亿美元,较 1987 年底的 1.39 亿美元略有下降。
1988 年底的贷款组合虽然几乎不存在违约损失风险,但平均利率仅为 8.70%,可能接近美国储蓄与贷款机构中的最低水平,不过较 1987 年底的 8.38% 有所上升。由于贷款组合几乎全部由短期工具或利率随市场自动调整的工具构成,目前贷款组合中的未实现贬值金额,低于互助储蓄的有息证券及公用事业优先股中的净未实现升值。截至 1988 年 12 月 31 日,该升值约为 750 万美元。
尽管互助储蓄支付的储蓄平均利率与收取的贷款平均利率之间的“息差”仍然过低,无法提供可观的利润,但去年这一“息差”有所改善。此外,近几年来,因各种税收优惠投资(主要是优先股和市政债券)的影响,“息差”不足带来的劣势已逐年减轻。这种针对贷款利率不足的税收优惠对策的负面风险在于:如果整体利率水平大幅上升,优先股和市政债券(因其固定收益和长期限)的价值可能会下跌,并且无法提供足够收益来覆盖互助储蓄的利息成本。鉴于这一风险,互助储蓄的总投资额相对于其净资产规模被保持在保守水平。
根据联邦监管定义,互助储蓄仍是一家“合格储蓄机构”,要求其 60% 的资产投于各类住房相关领域。它计划继续将几乎全部应收贷款保持在预期存续期较短或利率随市场波动的状态。所有新增浮动利率贷款均设有每年 25% 的“利率上限”,这一上限比竞争对手机构提供的正常“市场利率加 2.5 个百分点”的“上限”高出十多个百分点。当然,为了获得这种额外的利率上升保护,互助储蓄降低了对借款人提供的初始利率。
Mutual Savings Mutual Savings' "normal" net operating income of $4,694,000 in 1988 repre- sented an increase of 62% from the $2,895,000 figure the previous year. The high percentage increase in 1988 was partly fluke. The interest rate curve happened to be precisely adapted to Mutual Savings' needs during most of the year, and already, in 1989, net interest margins are impaired as short-term rates and intermediate-term rates have become more or less identical. Moreover, these "normal-income" figures come from a decidedly abnormal savings and loan association. Separate balance sheets of Mutual Savings at yearend 1987 and 1988 are set forth at the end of this annual report. They show (1) total savings accounts rising to $289 million from $287 million the year before, (2) a very high ratio of shareholders' equity to savings account liabilities (near the highest for any mature U.S, savings and loan association), (3) a substantial portion of savings account liabilities offset by cash equivalents and marketable securities, and (4) a loan portfolio (mostly real estate mortgages) of about $137 million at the end of 1988, down slightly from $139 million at the end of 1987. The loan portfolio at the end of 1988, although containing almost no risk of loss from defaults, bore an average interest rate of only 8.70%, probably near the lowest among U.S. savings and loan associations, but up moderately from 8.38% at the end of 1987. Because the loan portfolio is almost entirely made up of instruments of short maturity or bearing interest rates that adjust automatically with the market, there is now less unrealized depreciation in the loan portfolio than the net unrealized appreciation in Mutual Savings' interest-bearing securities and public utility preferred stocks. That appreciation at December 31, 1988 was about $7.5 million. While the "spread" between Mutual Savings' average interest rates paid on savings and received on loans remains too low to provide respectable profits, this "spread" improved last year. Moreover, the disadvantage from inadequate "spread" has been reduced in each recent year by the effect of various forms of tax- advantaged investment, primarily preferred stock and municipal bonds. The negative side of this tax-advantaged antidote to inadequate interest rate margin on loans is the risk that preferred stock and municipal bonds, with their fixed yield and long life, will decline in value and not provide enough income to cover Mutual Savings' interest costs, if the general level of interest rates should sharply rise. In view of this risk, Mutual Savings' total commitment is kept conservative, relative to the amount of its net worth. Mutual Savings remains a "qualified thrift lender" under the federal regulatory definition requiring 60% of assets in various housing-related categories. It plans to continue keeping substantially all loans receivable either with short expected lives or with interest rates that fluctuate with the market. All new variable-rate loans are "capped" at the 25% per annum level, which is over ten percentage points higher than the normal 2½-points-over-market "cap" offered by competing associations. Naturally, to gain this extra protection from interest rate increase, Mutual Savings 2
“偿还”的方式是:(1) 利率的息差(spread)更低,(2) 无法按期望的额度发放贷款。
正如附注 10 所述,西科金融在互助储蓄公司的权益账面价值(1988 年 12 月 31 日为 4970 万美元)高估了按账面价值出售或清算后可实现的税后金额。如果互助储蓄公司的全部净资产按报告中的 4970 万美元账面价值出售,母公司实际到手的金额将远低于 4970 万美元,因为要缴纳巨额所得税——会计上指定为股东权益的约 4700 万美元,在多数税务处理中被视为坏账准备。
互助储蓄公司不仅有证券未实现增值这种隐藏价值,还有房地产方面的隐藏价值。手中持有的止赎房产(主要为圣巴巴拉海滨或附近 22 英亩土地)经过长期持有,其价值已远超资产负债表上 540 万美元的入账成本。由于土地使用法规的执行,这项地产的合理且兼顾社区利益的开发已被拖延了 13 年以上。但奇迹般地,土地平整、街道和公用设施工程现已接近完工,该地块上已获批开发 32 套住宅(其间留有大片开放空间)的重要建筑工程也已启动。互助储蓄公司计划将这一开发项目打造成各方面都一流、景观品质独一无二的社区。
房地产中的隐藏价值受限于获批的住宅数量(32 套),以及其中只有约一半能拥有较好的海景视野。额外的限制还来自于私属道路、排污和公用设施改造及连接、景观美化,以及非标准化的、顺应环境的住宅适应性改造等高昂成本。此外,政府机构强加的各种收费和负担——包括沉重的考古义务——将大幅降低我们原本可能获得的回报,而这笔回报在 1970 年代初期的分区规划和开发环境下是可以实现的。我们已将土地价值的很大一部分“奉送”给了圣巴巴拉县,以换取使用土地的许可。如今在加州,这类结果司空见惯,尤其是在沿海地区。
上述段落中描述的这家储蓄与贷款机构,长期来就与大多数其他机构截然不同,1988 年又增添了一项显著的新异常。互助储蓄公司将其在联邦住宅贷款抵押公司(即广为人知的“房地美”)优先股的头寸增至 240 万股(附带股份)。这占总股本的 4%,是任何单一持有人的法定上限。截至撰写本信时,这 240 万股已全部发行并缴款。互助储蓄公司的平均成本为每股 29.89 美元,而 1988 年底纽约证券交易所的交易价格为每股 50.50 美元。因此,按 1988 年底的交易价格计算,互助储蓄公司在房地美股票上的未实现税前利润约为 4950 万美元。按当前税率计算,潜在税后利润约为 2920 万美元,合西科公司每股 4.10 美元。
"pays" by (1) getting lower "spreads" over an interest rate index, and (2) not being able to make loans in amounts desired. As pointed out in Note 10 to the accompanying financial statements, the book value of Wesco's equity in Mutual Savings ($49.7 million at December 31, 1988) overstates the amount realizable, after taxes, from sale or liquidation at book value. If all Mutual Savings' assets, net of liabilities, were to be sold for the $49.7 million reported as book value, the parent corporation would receive much less than $49.7 million after substantial income taxation imposed because about $47 million of what is designated shareholders' equity for accounting purposes is considered bad debt reserves for most tax purposes. Mutual Savings has not only a buried value in unrealized appreciation of securities but also a buried value in real estate. The foreclosed property on hand (mostly 22 acres at or near the oceanfront in Santa Barbara) has become worth over a long holding period considerably more than its $5.4 million balance sheet carrying cost. Reasonable, community-sensitive development of this property has been delayed over 13 years in the course of administration of land-use laws. But, miraculous to report, grading, street and public utilities work is now nearly finished, and significant other construction work is now under way on the property for an authorized development into 32 houses interspersed with large open areas. Mutual Savings plans to make the development first-rate in every respect, and unique in the quality of its landscaping. The buried value in real estate is limited by the small number of houses allowed (32) and by the fact that only about half of such houses will have a significant ocean view. Additional limitation will come from prospective high cost of private streets, sewage and utility improvements and connections, landscaping, and non-standard- ized, environmentally sensitive adaptation of housing to the site. Also, various charges and burdens, including heavy archaeological obligations imposed by govern- mental bodies, will drastically reduce our potential recovery from what it would have been had the zoning and development climate of the early 1970s continued into the present era. We have "given" a very large fraction of the value of our land to the County of Santa Barbara in exchange for permission to use it at all. In California these days such results are common, particularly in coastal areas. The savings and loan association described in the foregoing paragraphs, quite different from most other associations for a long time, added a significant new abnormality during 1988. Mutual Savings increased its position in preferred stock of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (widely known as "Freddie Mac") to 2,400,000 when-issued shares. This is 4% of the total shares outstanding, the legal limit for any one holder. As this letter is written, all of these 2,400,000 shares have been issued and paid for. Mutual Savings' average cost is $29.89 per share, compared to a price of $50.50 per share in trading on the New York Stock Exchange at the end of 1988. Thus, based on 1988 yearend trading prices, Mutual Savings had an unrealized pre-tax profit in Freddie Mac shares of about $49.5 million. At current tax rates the potential after-tax profit is about $29.2 million, or $4.10 per Wesco share outstanding. 3
房利美是一个混合体,由一家联邦机构(联邦住房贷款银行委员会)运营,但现在归私人所有,主要由机构投资者持有。房利美主要通过购买住房抵押贷款来支持住房市场,将这些贷款立即转化为它担保并迅速出售的抵押贷款支持证券。在这个过程中,房利美赚取费用和“利差”,同时避免了大部分利率变动风险。这是一门比大多数(甚至可以说是前 10% 的)储蓄贷款协会好得多的生意,房利美近年来在股本上获得的惊人百分比回报率就证明了这一点。
按房利美当前的股息率(每股每年 1.60 美元),互助储蓄银行在其每股平均成本 29.89 美元上的税前收益率仅为 5.35%。税后,股息收益率仅为 4.4%。但房利美在提高其盈利和股息率方面有着非常可信的记录,从而推动了其股票市场价格的上涨。市场价格上涨是因为房利美的“优先”股实质上等同于普通股。以下是 1985-1989 年的数据:
| 年份(截至 12 月 31 日) | 房利美每股盈利 | 每股股息 | 年末股价 | 全部平均股本回报率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1985 | 2.98 美元 | 0.53 美元 | 9.19 美元 | 30.0% |
| 1986 | 3.72 美元 | 1.13 美元 | 15.17 美元 | 28.5% |
| 1987 | 4.53 美元 | 1.10 美元 | 12.13 美元 | 28.2% |
| 1988 | 5.73 美元 | 1.25 美元 | 50.50 美元 | 27.5% |
| 1989(已公布) | ? | 1.60 美元 | ? | ? |
对于一只在 1988 年底仅以每股 50.50 美元出售的股票来说,上述数字异常出色。我们认为,投资者反应低于标准的原因可能是以下因素的某种组合:(1)投资者对房利美缺乏了解,以及(2)担心控制房利美的联邦官员会管理不善,或者在国会压力下,对房利美的私人所有者不公平。
当然,存在一些风险,即房利美会忽视对新私人所有者的信托责任、降低信贷标准或在未来利率走势上押注,从而毁掉其非凡的生意。但我们认为,这种结果不太可能发生。倾向于认为这种结果可能发生的人,很大程度上是因为联邦储蓄与贷款保险公司(FSLIC,这家美国机构为储蓄贷款协会的存款人账户提供保险)那数十亿美元规模的戏剧性破产事件,而对联邦官员持负面看法。这种反应很自然,因为越来越清楚的是,FSLIC 最终的破产,是由于监管机构未能及早干预以解决那些很容易诊断且状况正在迅速恶化的问题,从而加剧了危机。
但 FSLIC 和房利美是两个独立的实体,影响它们业务的环境截然不同。随着世界的变化,FSLIC 的麻烦大致有以下的历史和成因:
(1)在其最初几十年里,储蓄贷款行业生活在 1930 年代立法规定的体系下。银行和协会支付的利率都由法律固定在低水平,但与银行相比,(i)协会拥有每年多支付 0.25% 的吸引存款优势,以及(ii)税收优势。设定利率管制是为了抑制竞争,以防止 1920 年代激进的银行业务之后普遍发生的吸收存款机构倒闭事件重演。作为交换,协会享有了类似卡特尔联盟的优势和联邦存款保险,但被要求将资产集中在住房贷款上,并在防止贷款违约损失方面保持保守。当时协会的标准做法是借短(通过吸收活期存款)贷长(通过发放固定利率的长期抵押贷款)。协会依靠抵押贷款利率与法定的低存款利率之间大约两个百分点的“利差”生存。
(2)这个体系始终存在一个内在风险:利率可能普遍且急剧上升。在这种情况下,政府将被迫提高存款利率,以使协会能够留住存款。届时,协会将因被旧抵押贷款的固定利率合同所束缚而陷入亏损。但在低通胀和政府固定存款利率缓慢上升的时期,协会通过持续“以增长摆脱”利润率的困境来适应这种风险。协会仅通过在更高利率下发放更大规模的新抵押贷款,就“平均提高了”整个抵押贷款组合的利率。尽管储户的利率被强制压低,但这种必要的持续增长,当然得益于协会拥有的每年 0.5% 的吸引存款利率优势。这个体系包含了许多明智且具有建设性的犬儒主义,类似于美国开国元勋们所采取的。体系的创建者希望协会在通过支持住房来帮助公民的同时,不要给联邦存款保险公司 FSLIC 造成损失。因此,像本·富兰克林知道的那样,“空口袋很难站直”,创建者直接赋予了协会显著的竞争和税收优势,使得高管们在做正确之事的同时也能轻松获益。同时,由于创建者害怕 1920 年代资本主义野心引发的过度行为带来的损失,更甚于害怕更社会化进程带来的低效率,所有联邦特许和大多数州特许的协会都是“互助”机构。这类机构由存款人“拥有”,因此不可能让任何股东致富。在最初的几十年里,这个既靠胡萝卜又靠大棒的体系,如同联邦住房管理局(FHA),是美国历史上最成功的体系之一。它以极小的成本带来了巨大的好处。
(3)自然而然地,少数州特许的股东所有制协会(包括互助储蓄银行,它只是名义上的“互助”机构)在适当时候变得比它们的“互助”同行更具侵略性,并利用政府赋予的竞争优势使其股东致富。在长期繁荣期间,这一过程因它们在美国发展较快的地区专注于高收益的成片住宅开发贷款而得到加速。随后,羡慕加上逻辑推理导致了许多原先“互助”协会转为股东所有制,这种转变因激励机制不同,增加了管理层为了获得超额回报而愿意承担风险的倾向。这种高风险承担态度最终蔓延到储蓄贷款行业的很大一部分,包括那些保留了“互助”机构身份但以往保守的机构。
(4)但是,最终,政府货币贬值的趋势和利率随着恶性通货膨胀而急剧上升的趋势,共同削弱了储蓄贷款行业的繁荣。而此时该行业的结构设计得更多是为了在一切顺利时产生超额利润,而非在问题频出时防止损失。随着利率上升,即使是只持有高等级、长期固定利率抵押贷款的协会也遭受了巨大损失。大多数实力较弱的协会变得资不抵债,无可救药。
(5)在这种新的高利率环境下,大多数协会被证明无法通过“增长摆脱”困境。突然间,以前银行和协会的双头垄断面临着来自“货币市场基金”的新竞争——这些基金支付更高的利息,还提供支票书写特权——同时也面临着更容易获得的美国国债的竞争。存款不仅无法增加,而且无法阻止其萎缩。
(6)为了防止存款外流(这往往会削弱住房市场),立法者取消了对所有储蓄账户的利率管制。接着,在不合理拖延之后,立法者允许住房贷款利率随市场浮动,这在英国早已是通行的明智做法。即便如此,许多协会仍然是“无可救药”的破产者,因为负债端利率已大幅上升,而资产端却对应着固定且过时的利率。受损较小但仍具清偿力的协会,在没有该行业早年拥有的“优势”情况下,难以维持足够的股本。
(7)在这个困难时期,国会和州立法机构为了回应储蓄贷款机构经营者不恰当地使用“自由市场”标签的请求,认为通过“帮助”协会赚更多钱来缓解财务压力似乎是合乎逻辑的。使用的方法是修改协会的投资规则,以便它们能够通过从事更具风险且更难管理的资产部署来试图扩大“利差”,这些部署如果一切顺利就能带来高收益。存款保险得以保留。
(8)但是,存款保险、放宽的资产部署规则以及可以向储户支付不受控制的利率这三者并存,产生了可怕的后果。新体系(尽管有一些新的反增长规则的轻微阻碍)使得几乎任何协会,即使规模很小、地处偏远、由骗子或傻瓜经营,也能快速且几乎不受限制地扩张。当任何协会都能利用政府的信用,并且能够承诺支付吸引任何所需储蓄金额所需的高利率时,对规模的唯一限制就是必须将储蓄的一个很小比例与净资产相匹配。对于具有增长意识的协会来说,这不算什么大问题。政府宽厚地降低了所需的净资产比例。而在这一帮助下,当增长如此之大以至于需要更多净资产来满足宽松的一般标准时,这些净资产在扩张期间很容易在账面上被创造出来很长一段时间。毕竟,让任何银行或储蓄贷款协会在一段时间内报告高额利润,从而迅速增加报告的净资产,是小儿科的事情。只需发放贷款(或其他资产部署),这些贷款既能(i)提供高额的初始利息或应计利润,又能(ii)因承担的风险而导致可能很高但最终会延迟的损失。总有房地产运营商愿意签署任何形式的承诺或做出任何预测,以换取现金。房地产群体是出了名的乐观,其中还包括相当一部分像让马克·吐温将“矿”定义为“属于骗子的地下洞”那样的人。此外,在当代,仅仅通过将资金以固定利率长期借给信誉良好的借款人,就可以获得良好的短期结果,从而用致命的利率变动风险替代了信贷质量差带来的致命风险。利用一种或多种这种短期、高利润报告的策略,许多小型协会很快成长为庞然大物,通常通过向股票经纪人(和其他经纪人)支付佣金来吸引所需的巨额存款。利用经纪人获取存款的做法与后来的破产有很高的相关性。
(9)新体系包含了一个“失控反馈模式”,这正是每位明智的工程师或商人都学会畏惧的。它不仅可能(也确实)诱使那些始终倾向于不良行为的人采取不当行动,还诱使一些过去值得尊敬但正遭受厄运的协会。一旦你因任何原因成为输家并资不抵债,且很可能完蛋,这个体系仍然允许你用一个巨大的赌注(无论赌利率还是商业成果)去冒险,赌上你希望的所有政府资金(你自己的钱已经没了),有机会让你恢复健康。而且,如果第一次赌注不成功,你总是可以“加倍下注”。这就是输家的“翻本”机会。
完全可以预见的是,由于可以聘请经纪人,他们以高于正常的利率(并非难卖的货)来寻求政府保险的存款,使得输家的“翻本”安排得更快、规模更大。结果就像是从《爱丽丝梦游仙境》里出来的。也许是吸收存款机构监管史上第一次,政府(用《巴伦周刊》约翰·利斯西欧尖刻的话说)正在制造广泛的“资金涌入小型问题机构,并在此过程中将它们变成大型问题机构”。
对于最初的赢家——那些在风险投资中精明或幸运的人——来说,“翻本”的可能性更是大得多。一个一夜暴富的储蓄贷款家族试图在这种获胜情况下锦上添花。该协会提议向一位家族高管支付总计近 1000 万美元的年薪。然后,在政府监管机构反对后,该家族满足了于仅约 500 万美元的普通薪酬(包括奖金和特别退休金)。但减少后的普通薪酬被一个巨大的新“激励”中的狮子份额所补充,以激励他们关注业务。高管们被授予了以有吸引力价格购买“垃圾债券”发行人期权或其他证券的权利,而这些证券只有在协会购买了“垃圾债券”后才能以这样有吸引力的价格获得。(“垃圾债券”是利率高且信用支持极差的债券,银行在其不那么宽松的监管体系下基本上被禁止购买。近年来,很大一部分“垃圾债券”是为帮助那些害怕或正遭受敌意收购艺术家“突袭”的公司进行高杠杆收购和重组提供融资而发行的。目前的惯例是,由存款保险的银行为企业巨额债务中担保程度最高的部分提供融资,这部分被最大化到让银行监管者感到沮丧和烦躁但尚未到反叛的程度。然后,一些有存款保险的协会[以及其他机构]会持有优先级远低于多层高级债务[包括但不限于银行债务]的贷款头寸,以至于称其为“贷款头寸”都显得有些词不达意。这种对受保险机构整体监管中的反常现象[连同许多其他反常现象]之所以成为可能,是因为整体监管被划分为四个体系[协会和银行各自有州和联邦体系],其中一些体系进一步细分,造成了更多的“巴尔干化”。)
这种非凡的成功,反过来又具有失控反馈的可能性,因为其自身作为“翻本”成功的案例更为人所知和羡慕,这种启蒙得益于那些通过销售风险投资赚取佣金或“利差”的经纪人。在许多情况下,迅速蔓延的赢家“翻本”游戏尚未结束。我们所知道的是,早期阶段看起来像许多投机泡沫,而这些泡沫最终都会伴随着一次大崩盘。
解除管制和存款保险并存所催生的“翻本”游戏还有其他重要后果。那些试图“以增长摆脱”困境或一心追求一夜暴富荣耀的协会所承诺的高利率,往往会“抬高”那些本欲保守但野心较小的协会为储蓄所支付的价格。因此,这些机构几乎被迫考虑高利率、高风险的资产,以便有机会在成本之上获得微薄的利润空间。于是,针对存款保险、无限利率的银行业,一种新格雷欣法则的建议诞生了:“坏贷款驱逐好贷款。”
考虑到可能的立法前提——几乎无限额的存款保险、不受控制的利率、广泛的资产配置自由裁量权以及问题出现时漫长的宽限期——每一条都神圣不可侵犯,那么这种新格雷欣法则所蕴含的根本问题或许无法解决。这个问题深深植根于事物的本质,其原则是,在一个复杂的系统中,你永远无法“只做一件事”。当某个变量被最大化时,其他变量往往以不希望的方式被最小化。在这种情况下,国会让每个人都能极其容易地以任何想要的方式和数量获得和投入资金,从而最大化了可投资资金的可用性,却以一种使得协会更难以安全地将资金以覆盖成本的利率进行再贷款的方式改变了储蓄贷款系统。国会因此最小化了安全赚取利润的机会。正如生物学家加雷特·哈丁(或者也许是经济学家乔治·斯蒂格勒)可能会说的那样:“还能怎样呢?”无论如何,据我们观察,结果大致是这样的:每一种安全、简单、以至于普通高管都能管理的储蓄贷款业务模式,只要能避免所有净利率变动风险和净信贷风险,都将无法产生净利润。因此,每一个希望继续存在的协会,要么被迫拥有非凡的先见之明,要么就得忍受某种净信贷风险和净利率变动风险的组合。这反过来又使得强健协会的正常盈利就像地震保险公司在没有地震的年份里一样。(请记住,现代住房贷款的利率向上浮动通常被“封顶”,仅比贷款发放时通行的抵押贷款利率高出 2.5 个百分点。)同时,由能力较差、较不诚实或运气较差的领导者指导的弱协会,在耗尽了股东权益后,往往会给为储蓄账户提供保险的政府机构带来巨大损失。这些损失可能会超过存款保险费所提供的资源。
事实上,一个试图依赖其资本薄弱的所有参加存款保险的客户在不受限制的资产管理和规模上都具备高于平均水平能力的政府机构,如果不期望看到巨大的保险损失,那它一定是“疯了”。我们现在的体系不是“自由市场”经济学。它是非经济学。
[此时,合乎逻辑的问题是:如果上述推理是正确的,为什么它不适用于银行?为什么为银行存款提供保险的联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)现在的状况比 FSLIC 好得多?我们认为答案是:(i)基本推理确实适用于银行,我们注意到,在已经存在存款保险的银行体系中引入无限利率后,不负责任的银行贷款、银行损失和 FDIC 损失都急剧增加;(ii)到目前为止,FDIC 的损失低于 FSLIC 的损失,原因包括以下几点:
(a)由于过去有利的势头效应,银行面临的利润短缺压力较小,特别是银行在支票账户上的长期垄断、潜在新进入者面临的困难,以及银行通过持续重新定价贷款来避免大部分利率变动风险的传统做法;以及
(b)在银行监管体系下,监管要严格得多,包括更好的国内资产质量控制。
第二个因素尤其重要。更严格的监管显然限制了存款保险公司的损失。事实上,如果银行监管的严厉程度能够加倍再加倍,以便当股本清算价值受损但尚未耗尽时就立即关闭银行,就像股票或商品交易所的清算系统一样,那么由特定高风险承担行为导致的存款保险公司损失的预期就会所剩无几。然而,这并不意味着,即使在这种严厉的监管下,银行也会避免采用那些变得如此常规的高风险形式,以至于如果麻烦降临,会立即让所有银行同时沉没。在这种情况下,被监管者往往倾向于将监管威胁视为纸老虎。银行机构(或许是明智地)认为,那个必须关闭所有银行的监管机构最终一个也不会关。类似的情况已经在不明智的海外贷款方面发生了。如果只涉及一家大银行,监管反应很可能严厉得多。相反,由于几乎所有大银行都受到巨额可疑海外贷款的威胁,银行监管机构现在对国内贷款(1 美元值 70 美分)要比对海外贷款(1 美元值 40 美分)严格得多。]
(10)上述所有情况恰逢全国范围内“投机倒把”活动普遍增加,其中常伴有欺诈成分。在这种环境下,新体系像专门为此设计一样,恰恰吸引了错误类型的人进入储蓄贷款行业。很难想象出一个比允许任何看似合理的团体控制一张储蓄贷款执照,并有权利用政府信用迅速筹集数百万甚至数十亿美元资金更不负责任的体系了。这在金融领域等同于在可卡因泛滥的街道上分发免费的机关枪,随之而来的自然是数十亿美元的欺诈损失。
(11)石油价格也出现了大幅暴跌,在依赖石油生产的地区造成了自 1930 年代以来最严重的萧条,导致许多保守的住房贷款违约。因此,即使通货膨胀和立法者从未改变储蓄贷款系统,FSLIC 也会遭受巨大(但可能不是致命的)损失。
(12)诚然,即使在新体系下,监管者或会计师仍有一些机会比他们实际做的更早地阻止 FSLIC 的流血。但会计师是由协会选择和支付报酬的,他们对客户有职业忠诚,也有自己的理念。可以理解的是,他们不愿在复杂情况的负面方面变得异常清晰之前就强制执行“死刑判决”。而监管者则被恐怖案例淹没,突然被置于野战医院(M.A.S.H.)单元的工作条件和分诊问题之下,同时拿着微薄的薪水。此外,将医疗类比进一步延伸也很贴切。国会不允许 FSLIC 采取很多适当的早期纠正措施。就像某些储蓄贷款管理层一样,国会不愿面对诚实记账和理性行动的后果——例如,增税。事实上,许多立法者直接干预联邦住房贷款银行系统,以保护特定的傻瓜、骗子,或者仅仅是运气不好的储蓄贷款经营者,使其免受破产带来的不愉快后果。因此,FSLIC 不仅像一名在野战医院条件下工作的医生,而且像一名被禁止引起新的痛苦(无论多么短暂)或进行任何输血(区别于未来输血的承诺)的医生。
(13)FSLIC 的最终结果很可能是在一场持续展开的、是美国历史上最大的金融混乱之一中损失超过 1000 亿美元。即使是一些最近被“救助”的协会,有了新的所有者,也很可能在以后某个时候给 FSLIC 造成新的损失——这些损失是由被宽松的资产部署规则所吸引的新管理层投机的性情造成的。
虽然联邦住房贷款银行委员会未能阻止 FSLIC 的破产,但考虑到其宏观经济根源和立法者随后行为,这种破产可能本来是无法阻止的。FSLIC 的“救助”虽然不完美,但在没有“新血”的野战医院条件下,可能已如预期般明智了。有一个欧·亨利的短篇小说,讲述的是上帝将一个年轻女犯带到他面前视为错捕,并派天国警察回去捉拿真正的罪犯——那个疏忽大意的父亲,是他把她养坏了。FSLIC 的烂摊子也是如此。重要的坏分子不是那些我们司空见惯的骗子和傻瓜,也不是那些不堪重负的行业监管者。真正的罪魁祸首是那些无知、自私的行业高管以及州和联邦立法者,他们本应更明智,不该让这个体系被如此构建。他们也应该更早采取行动纠正明显的错误,而不是事后成为帮凶。
事后看来,很明显,在 FSLIC 烂摊子形成的那些年里,一些最糟糕的行为来自于美国储蓄机构联盟。该联盟将对愚蠢想法的盲目忠诚与对成员协会的盲目忠诚结合在一起——这种忠诚通常将值得钦佩的和可鄙的机构等同视之。带着这种“过度的忠诚”,该联盟成为了适当监管和立法回应的有效敌人。我们羞愧地报告,在整个时期,互助储蓄银行及时支付了其联盟会费,并且对联盟的行为几乎没有提出异议。这一段是为赎罪所做的微小努力。我们因默许而错误地顺从了联盟采取的那些它错误地认为符合储蓄贷款行业长期利益的反社会立场。我们未来的行为会好一些:如果联盟未来不更负责任地行事,互助储蓄银行将退出。
我们认为,FSLIC 的麻烦并不意味着联邦管理者很可能会毁掉房利美。FSLIC 因监管者无法控制的原因而病入膏肓,而房利美则蓬勃发展。而且,国会现在显然对进一步放松持谨慎态度(迟到总比不到好),实际上渴望收紧储蓄贷款行业及其监管机构的资产质量标准。
房利美现在在抵押贷款、抵押贷款证券和债券发行市场中被视为一个几乎无风险的政府机构,尽管其债务在技术上并不得到美国政府的完全信用和信用担保。凭借这一巨大优势,房利美的控制者几乎总能获得对社会有建设性且财务回报良好的结果,只要他们避免采取显著风险破坏房利美的信用。与房利美为购房者提供的融资额相比,每年支付给私人所有者的股息微不足道,不到 1% 的一小部分。对股息安全性和增长性的需求反过来给体系施加了恰到好处的约束。没有理由改变方向。此外,正确的方向——涉及持续严格的信贷标准——已由近期依赖石油生产地区糟糕的住房贷款经验明确证明。在那里,即便是由明智、可敬的贷款人向拥有良好工作和还贷记录、并支付了大量首付的购房者发放的传统稳健住房贷款,也出现了大规模违约。这种经历强化了对高杠杆、提供信用担保的机构所要求的安全边际原则。正如在 1930 年代的恐怖之后银行的信贷标准长期保持稳健一样,房利美执行的住房贷款标准在 1980 年代优质住房贷款损失之后也可能长期保持稳健。如果真是这样,并且利率变动风险被谨慎地最小化,那么房利美的股票对互助储蓄银行来说可能是一项不错的长期投资。
我们关于投资房利美的推理讨论,在伯克希尔·哈撒韦集团内部是一个特例。通常,我们不披露此类推理。我们担心对未来的投资买入或卖出产生不良影响。(我们还避免展示我们经常出现的智力不足,但这并非此项政策的原因。)我们偏离常规做法,仅仅是因为我们已经建立了全部的投资头寸,并且我们不预期会提高法律限制,该限制阻止我们购买更多房利美股票。在这种情况下,我们完全支持披露。但我们不推荐 Wesco 股东购买房利美股票。我们从不希望鼓励 Wesco 股东在他们的个人账户中复制 Wesco 的投资。
联邦政府解决 FSLIC 破产问题的首次尝试将在 1989 年新法律颁布时进行。新法律可能会包含从以下列表中选取的要素组合:
(1)大幅增加应向 FSLIC 支付的存款保险费;
(2)提高协会的股本要求,无形资产不计入,并在股本低于最低要求时要求立即减少资产;
(3)大幅削减投资权限以限制风险资产(包括“垃圾债券”),并对倾向于承担风险的协会进行密切监控;
(4)对储蓄存款年增长率实行严格限制;
(5)禁止使用经纪人招揽存款;
(6)更严格的会计标准,包括更多禁止将换取长期承诺而收取的费用“前置”计入报告收入;
(7)对协会采取更严格、更迅速的清盘程序,包括那些受损但尚未资不抵债的协会;
(8)使监管和清盘案件更少受到个别国会议员干扰。
Freddie Mac is a hybrid, run by a federal agency (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board), but now owned privately, largely by institutional investors, Freddie Mac supports housing primarily by purchasing housing mortgage loans for immediate transmutation into mortgage-backed securities that it guarantees and promptly sells. In the process Freddie Mac earns fees and "spreads" while avoiding most interest- rate-change risk. This is a much better business than that carried on by most (or indeed most of the top 10% of) savings and loan associations, as demonstrated by Freddie Mac's remarkable percentage returns earned on equity capital in recent years. At Freddie Mac's current dividend rate ($1.60 per annum per share), Mutual Savings' pre-tax yield is only 5.35% on its $29.89 average cost per share. Post-tax, the dividend yield is only 4.4%. But Freddie Mac has a very creditable history of raising its earnings and dividend rate, thus contributing to increases in the market price of its stock. The market price increases because Freddie Mac's "preferred" stock in substance is equivalent to common stock. Here are figures for 1985-1989: Year-End Freddie Mac's Earnings Dividends Market Price Return Earned Year Ended 12/31: per Share per Share _per Share Average Equity on all 1985 $2.98 $ ,.53 $ 9.19 30.0% 1986 3.72 1.13 15.17 28.5 1987 4.53 1.10 12.13 28.2 1988 5.73 1.25 50.50 27.5 1989 (announced) ? 1.60 ? ? The above numbers are unusually good for a stock selling at only $50.50 per share at the end of 1988. We think the probable cause of substandard investor response is some combination of (1) lack of familiarity with Freddie Mac among investors and (2) fear that the federal officials who control Freddie Mac will mismanage it or not deal fairly with Freddie Mac's private owners, perhaps under pressure from Congress, There is, of course, some risk that Freddie Mac will ruin its remarkable business by ignoring fiduciary duties to new private owners, or reducing credit standards, or making bets on the future course of interest rates. But we consider such outcomes unlikely. The tendency to consider them likely rests largely in those who think ill of federal officials because of the dramatic, multi-billion-dollar insolvency of FSLIC (the U.S. agency which insures depositor accounts in savings and loan associations). This reaction is natural as it becomes ever more clear that the final FSLIC insolvency was augmented by regulatory failure to intervene early to solve easily diagnosed problems which were getting worse at a rapid rate. But FSLIC and Freddie Mac are two separate entities, and the circumstances affecting the business of each are radically different. As the world changed, the troubles of FSLIC had roughly the following history and causes: (1) In its early decades, the savings and loan industry lived under a system ordained by legislation in the 1930s. Interest rates paid by both banks and 4 associations were fixed by law at low levels, but with (i) a deposit-attracting advantage of 4% more per annum which could be paid by associations and (il) tax advantages for associations, compared with banks. The interest rate controls were created to dampen competition in an effort to prevent recurrence of the widespread failure of deposit-taking institutions which had followed the aggres- sive banking practices of the 1920s. In return for the cartel-like advantages granted and federal deposit insurance, associations were required to concentrate assets in home lending and to be conservative in risking losses from nonrepay- ment of loans. The standard practice of associations was then to borrow short (by taking demand deposits) and to lend long (by making long-term mortgage loans at fixed rates). Associations lived on an approximate two-percentage-point "spread" between the mortgage interest rate and the mandated low interest rate on deposits. (2) This system always had a built-in risk that interest rates would generally and sharply rise, in which case the government would be forced to raise interest rates on deposits in order to enable associations to hold deposits. Then associa- tions would be squeezed into losses because they were hooked by contract to fixed interest rates on old mortgages. But associations accommodated this risk, during periods of low inflation and slowly rising, government-fixed interest rates on deposits, by continuously "growing their way" out of profit-margin trouble. Associations simply "averaged up" the rate of interest on the whole mortgage portfolio by making ever larger amounts of new mortgage loans at higher interest rates. The necessary continuous growth, despite mandated low interest rates for savers, was made possible, of course, by the 4% per annum deposit-attracting rate advantage possessed by associations. The system contained much wise and constructive cynicism, akin to that of the country's founding fathers. The system's creators wanted associations not to cause losses to FSLIC, the federal deposit-insurer, while helping the citizenry by favoring housing. So, knowing like Ben Franklin that "it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright," the creators simply gave associations significant competitive and tax advantages that made it easy for executives to do well while doing right. Also, because the creators excesses of the 1920s, feared losses from capitalistic ambition more than they feared inefficiency from a more socialized process, all federally-chartered and most state-chartered associations were "mutual" institutions. Such institutions are "owned" by depositors and are therefore not capable of making any shareholder rich. In the early decades, this system, relying on carrot as well as stick, was, like the FHA, one of the most successful systems in U.S. history. It did a world of good at a trifling cost. (3) Naturally, the few state-chartered, shareholder-owned associations (including Mutual Savings, which was "mutual" in name only) in due course became more aggressive than their "mutual' brethren and used their govern- ment-mandated competitive advantage to make their shareholders rich. This process was aided by their emphasizing high-yielding tract-housing loans in the 5 faster-growing parts of the country during a long boom. And envy plus logic then caused many "conversions" of formerly "mutual" associations to shareholder ownership, which, featuring different incentives, increased managements' pro- clivity to endure risk in the hope of above-normal reward. The heavy-risk-taking attitude finally spread throughout a large percentage of the savings and loan industry, including formerly conservative "mutual" institutions that remained "mutual" institutions. (4) But, eventually, the tendencies of government to escalate currency debasement and of interest rates to rise sharply with sharp inflation combined to reduce the prosperity of the savings and loan industry, now structured more to produce extra profit when much went well than to prevent loss when much went wrong. As interest rates rose, even associations holding only high-grade, long-term, fixed-rate mortgages suffered large losses. Most gamier associations became hopelessly insolvent. (5) In this new high-interest-rate environment, it proved impossible for most associations to "grow their way" out of trouble. Suddenly, the former bank and association duopoly faced new competition from "money market funds" that paid higher interest and also provided check-writing privileges, as well as from U.S. Treasury obligations that were more conveniently available. Not only could deposits not be increased; they could not be kept from shrinking. (6) To prevent continuation of deposit outflows, which then tended to cripple housing, legislators decontrolled interest rates on all savings accounts. Next, after an irrational delay, the legislators allowed housing lending at interest rates that fluctuated with the market, a wise practice long standard in England. Even so, many associations remained insolvent "basket cases," because interest rates that had ratcheted upward on liabilities were matched against fixed and outdated rates on assets. Less impaired but still solvent associations had difficulty maintaining adequate equity capital without the "edge" possessed by the industry in its early years. (7) In this period of trouble it also seemed logical to Congress and state legislatures, responding to non-apposite use of "free-market" labels and re- quests from savings and loan operators, to try to relieve the financial pressure by "helping" associations make more money. The method used was revision of investment rules for associations so that they could attempt to widen "spreads" by engaging in much more risky and difficult-to-manage deployments of assets that promised high yields if everything worked right. Deposit insurance was retained. (8) But the coexistence of deposit insurance, liberalized asset deployment rules, and uncontrolled rates of interest which could be paid to savers had terrible consequences. The new system (despite minor impediments from some new anti-growth rules) enabled almost any association, even if small and remote and run by a crook or fool, to expand fast and almost without limit. When any association could use the government's credit and also promise to pay as high an interest rate as was required to bring in any desired amount of savings, the only 6 remaining limitation on size was the requirement that a small percentage of savings be matched with net worth. This was not much of a problem for growth- minded associations. The government, accommodatingly, reduced the percent- age of net worth required. And when, after this help, growth was so great that more net worth was required to meet the relaxed general standard, such net worth could easily be provided, on paper, for a long time during expansion. After all, it is child's play to make any bank or savings and loan association report high profits for a while, thereby rapidly augmenting reported net worth, by making loans (or other asset deployments) providing both (i) high initial interest or profit accruals and (ii) probable high ultimate but delayed losses caused by the risks assumed. There are always real estate operators willing to sign any sort of promise or make any sort of projection in exchange for cash. The real estate crowd is notoriously optimistic and also includes a significant fraction of people like those who caused Mark Twain to define a mine as "a hole in the ground owned by a liar." Also, good short-term results are often available, in modern times, from merely committing money to sound borrowers for a very long time at a fixed rate, thus substituting lethal risk from interest rate change for lethal risk imposed by bad credit quality. Using one or more of the short-term, high-profit-reporting strategies, many minor associations soon grew to gargan- tuan size, often paying stockbrokers (and other brokers) commissions to bring in the massive amounts of deposits desired. The practice of using brokers to gain deposits had a high correlation with later insolvencies. (9) The new system included a "runaway-feedback mode," exactly what every wise engineer or businessman learns to dread. It could and did entice into inappropriate conduct not only those always prone to bad behavior but also some associations that had formerly been admirable but were now suffering from bad luck. Once you were a loser and insolvent, for any reason, and very likely doomed, the system still granted you an opportunity to risk as much you wished of the government's money (your money was gone) in some massive gamble, on interest rates or business outcome, that had a chance of returning you to health. And, if the first gamble didn't work, you could always "double up." Such were the "parlay" possibilities for losers, The losers' "parlays" were, quite predictably, made much quicker to arrange and much grander in scope by the availability of brokers who were paid to solicit government-insured deposits at above-normal interest rates (not a hard sale). The result was right out of Alice in Wonderland. For perhaps the first time in the history of regulation of deposit-taking institutions, the government (in the wry words of John Liscio of Barron's) was creating widespread "runs of money into small problem institutions and in the process turning them into big problem institutions." For initial winners, shrewd or lucky in making risky investments, the "parlay" possibilities were immensely better. One instant-centimillionaire sav- ings-and-loan family tried to gild the lily under such winning circumstances. The association involved proposed payment to a family executive of total compensa- 7 tion pushing $10 million per year. Then, after government regulators objected, the family satisfied itself with ordinary compensation (including bonus and special retirement contribution) of a mere $5 million or so. But the reduced ordinary compensation was supplemented by a lion's share of a huge new "incentive" to pay attention to business. Executives were granted rights to buy at attractive prices options or other securities of "junk bond" issuers which were available to the association at those attractive prices only in return for purchase of "junk bonds". ("Junk bonds" are bonds with high interest rates and grossly substandard credit backing that banks are pretty well forbidden to buy under their less permissive regulatory system. In recent years a large proportion of "junk bonds" were issued to help finance highly leveraged acquisitions and restructurings of corporations fearing or suffering from "raids" by hostile- takeover artists. Current practice is for deposit-insured banks to finance the most secured portion of massive corporate debt, which portion is maximized to a point which makes bank regulators sullen and fretful but not mutinous. Then some deposit-insured associations [and others] take loan positions so junior to many layers of senior debt [including but not limited to debt to banks] that language is strained when one calls them "loan positions." This anomaly in the total regulation of insured institutions is made possible [along with many other anomalies] by the division of total regulation into four systems [state and federal systems for both associations and banks] with some systems further subdivided to provide additional Balkanization.) its own as examples of "parlayed" success became more widely known and Such extraordinary success, in turn, had runaway-feedback possibilities of envied, an enlightenment aided by brokers earning commissions or "spreads" by selling risky investments. In many cases, the end of the rapidly spreading winner's "parlay" game has not yet come. All we know is that the early phases look like many a speculative bubble which, in due course, was followed by a big bust. There were other important consequences of the "parlay" games made possible by coexistence of decontrol and deposit insurance. The high interest rates promised by associations trying to "grow their way" out of trouble, or bent on instant-centimillionaire glory, tended to "bid up" the prices paid for savings by less ambitious associations in the would-be-conservative category. These institutions were therefore almost forced to consider high-rate, high-risk assets, so that they might have some chance of obtaining a moderate margin over costs. And thus was born the suggestion of a new sort of Gresham's law for deposit- insured, unlimited-interest-rate banking: "Bad lending drives out good." The basic problem underlying this new form of Gresham's law may be impossible to solve, given the probable legislative premises that virtually unlim- ited deposit insurance, uncontrolled interest rates, wide discretion in deploying assets, and long grace periods when trouble comes, are each sacred. The problem is grounded deep in the nature of things, in the principle that in a complex system you can never "do merely one thing." When one variable is 8 maximized other variables often get minimized in an undesired way. In this case, in making money ultra-easy for everyone to get and invest in any amount and way desired, thus maximizing the availability of investable money, Congress changed the savings and loan system in a way that made it harder for associations to reloan the money safely at interest rates that covered costs. Congress thus minimized the opportunities for earning profits safely. As Garrett Hardin, the biologist, (or perhaps George Stigler, the economist) might say: "How could it be otherwise?"' At any rate, the result as we observe it seems to be, roughly, that every form of savings and loan operation that is safe and simple, so that ordinary executives can manage it, avoiding both all net interest-rate-change risk and all net credit risk, will provide no net profit. Therefore every association that wishes to continue to exist is forced either to be remarkably prescient or to endure some combination of net credit risk and net interest-rate-change risk. This, in turn, makes normal earnings at strong associations like those of an earthquake insurer in a year when there is no earthquake. (Remember, upward fluctuations in interest rates on modern home loans are typically "capped" a mere 2½ percent- age points over the mortgage interest rate prevailing when the loans were made.) Also, weak associations, guided by the less able, less honest, or less lucky, after exhausting shareholders' equity, tend to cause big losses to the government agency which insures savings accounts. These losses may exceed resources provided by deposit-insurance premiums. Indeed, a government agency that tries to depend on 100% of its thinly capitalized deposit-insurance patrons being of above-average ability in un- restricted asset management, unrestricted in scale, would be "bonkers" not to expect large insurance losses. The system we now have is not "free market" economics. It is non-economics. [At this point it is logical to inquire: If the foregoing reasoning is correct, why doesn't it apply to banks and why is the FDIC, which insures bank deposits, now in so much better shape than FSLIC? We think the answers are (i) that the fundamental reasoning does apply to banks, and we note that irresponsible bank lending, bank losses and FDIC losses all escalated dramatically after the installa- tion of unlimited interest rates in a banking system already containing deposit insurance, and (ii) that the FDIC losses are, so far, lower than FSLIC losses for reasons including the following: (a) the profit-shortage pressure has been lower at banks because of favorable momentum effects from the past, particularly including the banks' long monopoly in checking accounts, difficulties faced by would-be new entrants into banking, and traditional bank avoidance, through continuous repricing of loans, of most risk from interest rate change; and (b) there is much tougher regulation, including better domestic-asset- quality controls, under the bank regulatory apparatus. The second factor is particularly important. Tougher regulation clearly limits damage to the deposit-insurer. Indeed, if the toughness of bank regulation could be doubled and redoubled, so that it closed banks summarily when liquidating 9 value of equity was impaired but not exhausted, like the clearing system of a stock or commodity exchange, little would remain of expectancy of deposit- insurer loss from idiosyncratic high risk taking. It does not follow, however, that banks, even under such toughened regulation, would refrain from forms of high risk taking which became so conventional that trouble, if it came, would sink everyone at once. Under such circumstances, the regulated have a tendency to appraise regulatory threat as a paper tiger. Banking institutions (perhaps wisely) believe that the regulator which must close all banks will close none. Something like this has already occurred with respect to unwise foreign lending, where the regulatory response would, very likely, have been much tougher if only one big bank had been involved. Instead, with virtually all big banks threatened by huge holdings of dubious foreign loans, bank regulators are now much tougher on domestic loans worth 70¢ on the dollar than on foreign loans worth 40¢ on the dollar.J (10) All of the foregoing happened to coincide with a general nationwide increase in wheeler-dealer activity, often with a fraud component. In this environment the new system attracted precisely the wrong sort of people into the savings and loan business as if designed for this purpose. It would have been hard to invent a system more irresponsible than the one that allowed any half- plausible group to control a savings and loan charter carrying the right to use the government's credit in the prompt attraction of multiple millions, or even billions. This was the financial equivalent of distributing free machine guns in cocaine alley, and many billions of dollars of fraud losses naturally followed. (11) There also was a grand collapse in oil prices, creating the worst depression since the 1930s in oil-production-dependent areas, which caused many conservative home loans to go into default. Thus, FSLIC would have suffered large (but probably not lethal) losses even if inflation and legislators had never changed the savings and loan system. (12) To be sure, even under the new system some possibilities remained for regulators or accountants to stop some FSLIC hemorrhages earlier than they actually did. But the accountants were selected and paid by the associations and had professional loyalties to clients as well as concepts. They were understanda- bly loath to enforce death sentences until the negative aspects of complex situations became abundantly clear. And the regulators were overwhelmed by horror cases, being suddenly given the working conditions and triage problems of a M.A.S.H. unit, while receiving modest salaries. Moreover, the medical analogy fits when stretched further. FSLIC was not allowed by Congress to take much appropriate early corrective action. Just like certain savings and loan managements, Congress did not want to face the consequences — for instance, increased taxes — of honest bookkeeping and rational action. Indeed, many legislators intervened directly with the Federal Home Loan Bank system to protect particular fools or crooks, or merely unlucky savings and loan operators, from unpleasant consequences of insolvency. Thus FSLIC was not only like a doctor working under M.A.S.H.-unit conditions but also like such a doctor 10 forbidden to cause new pain, however brief, or make any blood transfusions (as distinguished from promises regarding future blood transfusions). (13) The final result for FSLIC could easily be a loss of over $100 billion in a continuously unfolding financial mess that is among the greatest in U.S. history. Even some recently "rescued" associations, with new owners, are likely to cause new FSLIC losses at some later time - losses caused by the speculative temperaments of new managements attracted by loose asset-deployment rules. While the Federal Home Loan Bank Board failed to prevent the insolvency of FSLIC, that insolvency was probably unpreventable, given its macroeconomic origin and subsequent conduct of legislators. FSLIC's "rescues," although imperfect, were probably as wise as could be expected under M.A.S.H.-unit conditions with no new blood available. There is an O. Henry short story in which God treats as a false arrest the bringing before Him of a miscreant young woman and sends the Heavenly Policeman back to bring in the real culprit, the neglectful father who raised her wrong. So also with the FSLIC mess. The important miscreants are not the crooks and fools who are always with us or the overburdened industry regulators. The real culprits are the ignorant, self-absorbed industry executives and state and federal legislators who should have known better than to let the system be crafted as it was. They also should have acted earlier to correct obvious errors, instead of becoming accessories after the fact. In retrospect, it is clear that some of the very worst behavior of all, in the years when the FSLIC mess was created, was that of the United States League of Savings Institutions. The League combined a blind loyalty to silly ideas with a blind loyalty to member associations — a loyalty which usually treated the admirable and the despicable as if they were just the same. Acting with such "loyalty to a fault", the League was an effective foe of proper regulatory and legislative response. We are ashamed to report that during the whole period Mutual Savings paid its League dues promptly and voiced little objection to League conduct. This paragraph is a minor effort at atonement. By silence we acquiesced wrongly as the League took antisocial positions which it incorrectly believed consistent with the long-term interest of the savings and loan industry. Our future behavior will be a little better: If the League does not act more responsibly in the future, Mutual Savings will resign. It does not follow, we think, from FSLIC's troubles that federal controllers are likely to ruin Freddie Mac. FSLIC was very sick from causes outside the regulators' control, whereas Freddie Mac is flourishing. And Congress, better later than never, is now plainly chary of further loosening, and in fact desires to tighten, asset quality standards in the savings and loan industry and its regulatory apparatus. Freddie Mac is now regarded in the mortgage, mortgage-securities and debt- issuing markets as a virtually risk-free government agency, even though its obliga- tions are not technically backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. With this enormous advantage, Freddie Mac's controllers can almost always get socially constructive and financially rewarding results, provided they refrain from taking 11 significant risk of ruining Freddie Mac's credit. The annual dividend to private owners is peanuts, a small fraction of 1%, compared to the financing Freddie Mac provides to buyers of housing. The need for the dividend's safety and growth disciplines the system in exactly the right way. There is no reason to change course. Moreover, the right course, involving continued tough credit standards, has been clearly demon- strated by the recent terrible home loan experience in oil-production-dependent areas. Conventionally-sound home loans then went sour in massive quantities, despite having been made by wise and honorable lenders to home buyers with good jobs and loan-payment histories who made substantial down payments. Such experi- ence reinforces the margin-of-safety principle required of highly leveraged institu- tions that guarantee credit. Just as bank credit standards remained sound for a long time after the horrors of the 1930s, home lending standards enforced by Freddie Mac may remain sound for a long time after the good-home-loan losses of the 1980s. If so, and if interest-rate-change risk is scrupulously minimized, Freddie Mac stock could be a good long-term investment for Mutual Savings. Our discussion of reasoning regarding investment in Freddie Mac is an anomaly within the Berkshire Hathaway group. Normally, we do not disclose such reasoning We fear bad effects on future investment buying or investment selling. (We also avoid display of our frequent mental inadequacies, but that is not the reason for the policy.) We depart from usual practice only because we have acquired a full investment position and we do not anticipate an increase in the legal limit which prevents us from buying more stock of Freddie Mac. Under these conditions, we are all for disclosure. But we are not recommending that Wesco shareholders purchase Freddie Mac stock. We never want to encourage Wesco shareholders to copy Wesco investments in their own personal accounts. The first attempt at resolution by the federal government of the FSLIC insolvency will be made when new laws are enacted in 1989. The new laws will probably contain a combination of elements selected from the following list: (1) sharp increase in deposit-insurance premiums payable to FSLIC; (2) higher equity capital requirements for associations, with no credit for intangibles, and with prompt asset reduction required when the equity-capital minimum is breached; (3) drastic reduction in investment powers to limit risky assets (including "junk bonds"), plus close monitoring of risk-prone associations; (4) strict limits on annual growth of savings deposits; (5) bans on use of brokers to bring in deposits; (6) tougher accounting standards, including more bans on "front-ending" into reported income of fees paid in exchange for long-term commitments; (7) tougher, more summary close-out procedures for associations, includ- ing those that are impaired but not insolvent; (8) more insulation of regulation and close-out cases from interference by individual members of Congress; 12
(9) 在联邦官僚机构内部改变监管控制权,旨在加强监管实践,包括将更多资源集中于明显的高风险案件;
(10) 暂停批准新的储蓄和贷款机构特许状;
(11) 联邦法律更多凌驾于州法律之上。
上述所有措施中,除了大幅提高存款保险费之外,显然都会倾向于减少未来的 FSLIC 损失,并且,最起码应该包含在任何还算明智的 1989 年拯救 FSLIC 的方案中。向 FSLIC 支付大幅提高的存款保险费,结果会是喜忧参半。一方面,FSLIC 将获得新的收入,用于偿还过去愚蠢的保险行为所产生的负债。另一方面,尚不清楚能有多少净新增收入可用。大幅提高的存款保险费也会增加 FSLIC 未来的损失,因为这会增加储蓄机构承受的压力,迫使它们去获取那些能提供更高收益、但风险也更高的资产,以覆盖更高的保险费。如果存款保险费按总负债每年增加 4%(这是可能发生的情况),听起来似乎无关紧要,也不足以威胁到偿付能力。但储蓄机构的自有净资产(如果存在的话)并不归政府所有,其所有者可能会将其从储贷行业中抽走。而且,忽略与净资产相匹配的资产所产生的收入,许多储蓄机构现在都将净利润与总负债之比达到每年 4% 视为一个遥不可及的梦想。毕竟,这些储蓄机构面对的是咄咄逼人的竞争机构,它们要么成本更低,比如货币市场基金(不支付存款保险费),要么在最大化安全收益方面更有经验,比如银行。从这个并不那么有利的竞争位置出发,去寻找那些并不那么显而易见的、能将收益率每年提升 4% 的方法,许多储蓄机构几乎肯定会陷入巨大的增量损失之中。其他机构则会因为股东权益回报率低于市场水平而退出储贷业务,而任何从系统中撤出的权益资本都将不再为 FSLIC 提供抵御损失的“缓冲”。
那些试图挽救 FSLIC 的人,在设定提高的存款保险费时,将面临与牧羊人相同的基本问题。但是,与牧羊人不同,政府缺乏知识来指导其预测:在哪个时点上,进一步的“密集剪毛”将违背“剪毛者”的利益。这引出了一个重要的问题:当你无法确定羊能承受多少时,在设置剪子、剪光整群羊,然后让它们自生自灭之前,你该留出多大的安全边际?
当前局势的政治因素,在我们看来,似乎更多是在制造一厢情愿的想法,而非理性的思考。我们不相信 1989 年通过的法案就能阻止 FSLIC 再次陷入大麻烦。
首先,再次审视一下我们现代立法者——那些试图挽救 FSLIC 的人——的记录。他们最初建立的系统,旨在通过以下两种方式来限制储贷机构的破产:
(1) 保护储蓄机构免受完全竞争(在同质化商品业务中,金钱是终极的同质化商品,竞争是残酷的力量)和完全税收的影响;
(2) 要求储蓄机构以极低风险的方式配置资产。
(9) changes in control of regulation within the federal bureaucracy, aimed at toughening of regulatory practice, including more concentration of resources on obvious high-risk cases; (10) a moratorium on approvals of new savings and loan charters; and (11) more override of state law by federal law. All the foregoing, except sharply higher deposit-insurance premiums, would clearly tend to reduce future FSLIC losses and should, as a minimum, be included in any half-sensible 1989 attempt to fix FSLIC. Payment to FSLIC of sharply higher deposit- insurance premiums would provide mixed results. On the one hand, FSLIC would get new revenue to help discharge liability from foolish insurance practices in the past. On the other hand, it is not clear how much net new revenue would be available. Sharply higher deposit-insurance premiums would also increase future FSLIC losses by increasing pressure on associations to acquire higher-risk assets promising the higher yields necessary to cover higher premiums. If deposit-insurance premiums are increased by 4% per annum on total liabilities (which could happen) it will sound trifling and not very threatening to solvency. But associations' net worth, where it exists, is not owned by the government and may be withdrawn by its owners from the savings and loan industry. And, ignoring revenue from assets matching net worth, many associations now look at net profits vs. total liabilities at the rate of 4% per annum as an unattainable dream. After all, the associations face aggressive competing institutions which either have lower costs, like money-market funds (which do not pay deposit-insurance premiums), or have more experience in maximizing safe yields, like banks. Starting from this not-so-hot competitive position and seeking not-so-obvious ways to stretch yields by 4% per annum, many associa- tions would, almost surely, be pressed into significant incremental losses. Others would quit the savings and loan business because of below-market returns being earned on shareholders' equity, and any equity capital withdrawn from the system would no longer "buffer" FSLIC against losses. The would-be FSLIC fixers, as they set increased deposit-insurance premiums, will face the same basic question faced by a keeper of sheep. But, unlike the sheepkeeper, the government lacks knowledge to guide prediction of the point at which additional closeness of shearing will be contrary to the interests of the shearer. This leaves an important question: When you don't know for sure what the sheep can stand, how much safety margin do you leave before you set the shears, shear the whole herd, and send it forth to fare as it will? The politics of the current scene seem to us to create more wishful thinking than sound thinking. We do not believe that the legislation adopted in 1989 will be likely to prevent recurrence of big trouble at FSLIC. First, consider again the record of our modern legislators, the would-be FSLIC fixers. They started with a system designed to limit association insolvencies by both: (1) protecting associations from full competition (a brutal force in a fungible commodity business, with money being the ultimate fungible commod- ity) and full taxes; and (2) requiring associations to deploy assets in a very low-risk way. 13
尽管这种胡萝卜加大棒的组合在一段时间内让这头“驴子”保持了合理控制 — 正如 1920 年代过度放纵引发破产潮后所设计的那样 — 但现代立法者实际上为了弥补胡萝卜的丢失,从损失控制体系中抽走了那根大棒。在负债利率被放开后的相当长一段时间里,他们又忽视了允许住房贷款资产利率浮动的明显必要性。而在这样做的同时,他们的表现仿佛更愿意把新的窃贼和自大狂诱入联邦存款保险的覆盖范围,并尽可能快地扩大那些已经受到保险的窃贼和自大狂的业务范围。然后,当联邦储蓄与贷款保险公司(FSLIC)的损失不断累积,一次就达到 100 亿美元左右时,立法者一再拖延,同时默许了几乎每一种愚蠢的、粉饰太平的权宜之计。现在,最后,我们听到许多呼声,要求找出“除了我之外”的替罪羊。我们几乎听不到任何要求重新审视假设的声音(包括免税和更能承受利率压力的机构,应将一部分资产投入住房贷款,而不是高换手率的股票交易和美国企业的超级杠杆化),也听不到(唉)考虑其他更适合现代事实的更极端选择的声音。相反,第一个得到默许的提案是,任何联邦层面的补救措施都必须符合那种幼稚的、不计入预算的会计处理方式,而这最终会增加联邦成本。这不是那种能让人们对修复者产生信心的修复记录。
其次,考虑一下所面临问题的难度。如前所述,这个问题很可能是个“巨型怪兽”(lalapaloosa),即便修复者比我们现在这些人强得多,也未必能解决。当你以特定方式混合某些元素时,就会得到硫酸,不管你愿不愿意,而在微观经济体系中,也存在类似的“无能为力法则”(impotency principles)。在现代条件下,要建立一个长期成功的、包含所有政治敏感机构希望保留的元素(例如,长期贷款借款人的利率“封顶”)的、由存款保险保障的储蓄与贷款体系,是完全无法想象的。因此,1989 年尝试的立法修复,可能仅仅是一个乡巴佬立法者试图促进教育、提议将圆周率四舍五入为整数 3 的做法的更复杂版本。这个例子的嘲讽之处,与其说是指向我们的立法者,不如说是指向人类思维的正常运作方式。面对复杂性,能够抛弃曾经成功的想法的能力极为罕见。诺贝尔奖得主马克斯·普朗克(Max Planck)指出,即使在物理学中(人类中最有才能的人以最高职责宣誓要让思想适应事实),你也从未真正改变过大多数老教授的想法。相反,正确的新思想要等到那些需要抛弃旧知识更少的新教授来广泛接受。
我们的看法是,所面临的问题是艰巨的,而且每个人都有“难以抛弃旧知识”的困难。当然,这些看法可能受到了我们自身思考记录的影响。如果问题不难,如果抛弃旧知识很容易,那么我们就很难为自己辩解,为什么互助储蓄银行(Mutual Savings)在 1980 年代初期因利率变化而遭受重创。
如果我们的预测是正确的,西科金融(Wesco)的股东几乎可以肯定,互助储蓄银行不仅会在 1989 年,而且会在第二次乃至更晚的时候受到损害。在每一种情况下,我们都将面临新的存款保险成本,以及因互助储蓄银行从未接近过的类型破产导致的投资权力的削减。随着立法变革的发生,互助储蓄银行很可能受到以下三方面的损害:
(1)明智的法律变革;
(2)因问题比争论不休的立法机构能够或愿意思考的难度更大而导致的不明智变革;
(3)因立法机构对烂摊子规模产生的报复性反应而导致的不明智变革。
我们最担心第三类变革,因为我们屡屡看到维多利亚时代首相那条铁律(大致记住的)的验证:“那些因改变而拒绝改进的人,将面临那些并非改进的改变。”
至少在我们经营的情况下,互助储蓄银行,排除其对房地美(Freddie Mac)的投资,长期前景依然平庸。
精密钢材公司(Precision Steel)
西科金融旗下精密钢材公司子公司,位于伊利诺伊州芝加哥郊外的富兰克林公园(Franklin Park),其业务在 1988 年为正常经营利润贡献了 316.7 万美元,比 1987 年的 245 万美元增长了 29%。1988 年利润增长是在产品销量略有下降的情况下实现的。收入增长了 14%,达到 6269.4 万美元。
在戴维·希尔斯特罗姆(David Hillstrom)的精湛领导下,精密钢材公司的业务在 1988 年继续提供了非凡的回报。
良好的财务结果有其根本原因,尽管这个原因不足以在没有卓越管理的情况下也产生同样的结果。精密钢材公司的业务,尽管名称普通,但在质量上已经超越了纯粹的商品型业务。精密钢材公司的许多客户,需要在短时间内获得可靠供应的特种等级高质量冷轧带钢、合理的价格、按需剪裁的技术卓越性,以及在供应短缺时被记住,他们正确地认为,在精密钢材公司的市场区域内,没有完全可比的替代选择。事实上,许多远离芝加哥的客户(例如,洛杉矶的客户)也会寻求精密钢材公司的服务。
即使是像 1988 年这样普遍不错的年份,钢材仓库能取得像精密钢材公司这样的业绩也不常见。我们在戴维·希尔斯特罗姆领导下看到的是,年复一年,乏味却卓越的稳定表现。我们乐于看到这一切,并与他共事。
Despite noting that this combination of carrot and stick kept the donkey under reasonable control for a long time, as it was designed to do after the insolvencies which followed excesses in the 1920s, the modern legislators actually removed the stick from the loss-control system in an attempt to compensate for the loss of the carrot. They also neglected, for a considerable period after interest rates of liabilities were unleashed, the obvious need to allow floating interest rates on home loan assets. And they acted, while they did this, as if they preferred to entice new thieves and megalomaniacs into coverage by federal deposit insurance and also to expand, as fast as possible, the operations of thieves and megalomaniacs already insured. Then, as FSLIC losses mounted, $10 billion or so at a time, the legislators delayed, and delayed, while going along with almost every form of foolish, paper-it-over expediency. And now, finally, we hear many cries for scapegoats in the "any one but me" category. We hear almost no cries for re-examination of assumptions (including exemption and can better bear interest rate crunches, to commit a share of assets to home loans, instead of high-turnover stock trading and the super-leveraging of corporate America, and (ill) consideration of other more extreme alternatives which fit modern facts). Instead, the first proposal, meeting tacit acceptance, is that any federal fix must qualify for mickey-mouse, off-budget accounting which will increase ultimate federal cost. This is not a fixing record which creates confidence in the fixers. Second, consider the difficulty of the problem faced. As suggested earlier, that problem may well be a "lalapaloosa" which would not yield to the efforts of fixers much better than those we have. When you mix certain elements in a certain way you get sulfuric acid, wish it or not, and there are similar "impotency principles" in microeconomic systems. Under modern conditions it is quite conceivably impossible to create a deposit-insured savings and loan system, successful over the long term, which includes all the elements (for instance "capped" interest rates for borrowers in long-term loans) that a politically sensitive body will want to preserve. Thus the legislative fix attempted in 1989 may be only a more sophisticated version of the attempt of the rustic legislator, aiming at facilitation of education, who proposed a law rounding Pi to an even three. The derision of this example is aimed not so much at our legislators as at the normal working of the human mind. In the presence of complexity the ability to unlearn a once-successful idea is seldom found. Max Planck, the Nobel laureate, noted that even in physics, wherein the ablest of mankind are sworn as their highest duty to improve ideas to fit facts, you never really changed the minds of most of the old professors. Instead, the wide acceptance of correct new ideas had to wait for new professors who had less to unlearn. Our views are that the problem faced is hard and that everyone has "unlearning difficulty." These views, of course, may have been shaped by our own thinking record. If the problem is not difficult, and if unlearning is easy, we would have 14 difficulty excusing ourselves for the clobbering Mutual Savings took from interest rate change in the early 1980s. If our predictions are right, Wesco shareholders can pretty well count on Mutual Savings being harmed not only in 1989 but also at a second and later time. In each case we will face both new deposit-insurance costs and reductions of investment powers caused by insolvencies of a type Mutual Savings never got near. As legislative changes are made Mutual Savings is likely to be hurt by all three of the following: (1) wise changes in laws; (2) unwise changes caused by the problems being more difficult than contentious legislative bodies are able or willing to think through; and (3) unwise changes caused by vindictive legislative reaction to the size of the mess. We fear changes in the last category because we so often see verifications of the iron prediction (roughly recalled) of the Victorian prime minister: "Those who will not face improvements because they are changes will face changes that are not improvements." At least as we operate it, Mutual Savings, ex its investment in Freddie Mac, continues to have mediocre long-term prospects. Precision Steel The businesses of Wesco's Precision Stéel subsidiary, located in the outskirts of Chicago at Franklin Park, Illinois, contributed $3,167,000 to normal net operating income in 1988, up 29% compared with $2,450,000 in 1987. The increase in 1988 profit occurred in spite of a small decline in pounds of product sold. Revenues were up 14% to $62,694,000. Under the skilled leadership of David Hillstrom, Precision Steel's businesses in 1988 continued to provide an extraordinary return. The good financial results have an underlying reason, although not one strong enough to cause the results achieved in the absence of superb management. Precision Steel's businesses, despite their mundane nomenclature, are steps ad- vanced on the quality scale from mere commodity-type businesses. Many customers of Precision Steel, needing dependable supply on short notice of specialized grades of high-quality, cold-rolled strip steel, reasonable prices, technical excellence in cutting to order, and remembrance when supplies are short, rightly believe that they have no fully comparable alternative in Precision Steel's market area. Indeed, many customers at locations remote from Chicago (for instance, Los Angeles) seek out Precision Steel's service. It is not common that steel warehouses have results like Precision Steel's, even in a generally good year like 1988. What we have watched under David Hillstrom's leadership is boring, repetitive excellence, year after year. We love to see it and to be associated with him. 15
Wesco-Financial Insurance Company
1985 年,西科集团新增了一项业务,是与西科 80% 的控股股东及最终母公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司共同投资的。在西科所有董事(包括彼得斯和卡斯珀斯家族中持有西科大量股份的股东)的热烈赞同下——没有他们的同意就不会采取这样的行动——西科于 1985 年将 4500 万美元的现金等价物投资于一家新成立的全资保险公司 Wesco-Financial Insurance Company(“Wes-FIC”)。1986 年和 1987 年又追加投资了 4500 万美元。
这家新子公司 Wes-FIC 通过另一家作为无利润中介的伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险子公司,分保了历史悠久 Fireman's Fund Corp.(在纽交所上市)全部保险业务的 2%。据此,在一份涵盖 Fireman's Fund 从 1985 年 9 月 1 日起四年期内所有赚取保费的合同下,Wes-FIC 承担了 Fireman's Fund 的定价、成本和损失所带来的收益和负担。这一安排使 Wes-FIC 的地位,几乎与它自己(而非 Fireman's Fund)直接承保了该业务 2% 时的情形完全一致。业绩差异只可能出现在保险的投资端,因为 Wes-FIC 将来自“浮存金”产生的资金进行投资,而不是 Fireman's Fund。Wes-FIC 在 1988 年分享到的赚取保费超过了 6200 万美元。
Wes-FIC 于 1988 年开始承保直接业务,这与再保险业务不同。它现在已在内布拉斯加州、犹他州和爱荷华州获得许可,但在阿拉巴马州仅承保了 41.2 万美元的直接保费,全部是超额度保险(允许非认可保险公司经营)。直接赚取保费为 10.8 万美元。
Wes-FIC 1988 年的“正常”净收入为 1209.4 万美元,而 1987 年为 945.9 万美元。这些数据有赖于证券销售收益,1988 年为 607.1 万美元(主要来自债券和优先股,包括 Bowery Savings Bank 的权益利息),而 1987 年仅有 9000 美元。这些项目在下文报告为“证券销售净收益”。Wes-FIC 1988 年的净收入因 1986 年《税制改革法案》导致其所得税拨备出现一项非经常性调整而受益约 26 万美元,1987 年则为 100 万美元。
即便是最优秀的意外伤害保险业务,其性质也决定了,在记账时必须预估并从已赚取保费中扣除所有未来成本和损失。这一过程中固有的不确定性,使得财务报表更像是“最佳诚实猜测”,而非像非保险类公司的账目那样典型。而意外伤害保险业务中的再保险部分,由于在损失报告链中多了一个或多个环节,通常比非再保险部分带来更多的会计不确定性。西科股东应时刻意识到,不仅 Wes-FIC 的会计有其固有的不完善性,其业务也固有周期性。
西科继续预期,在 Fireman's Fund 再保险合同的四年期内,其投资能获得合理回报。然而,Fireman's Fund 合同将于 1989 年 8 月到期,届时 Wes-FIC 将面临资金过剩而优质保险业务短缺的局面。这不是一个理想的状态,但也有比这更糟的情况。
所有其他“正常”净营业收入
所有其他“正常”净营业收入,扣除利息支出和一般公司费用后,从 1987 年的 180.8 万美元增加到 1988 年的 360.9 万美元。来源包括:(1) 西科拥有的帕萨迪纳办公楼群产生的租金(毛租金 243.6 万美元,不包括来自 Mutual Savings 的租金;该楼群主要租给外部租户,尽管 Mutual Savings 是一楼租户);(2) 由 Precision Steel 及其子公司以及母公司层面持有的现金等价物和有价证券所产生的利息和股息。
证券销售净收益
西科的证券销售净收益总额,所得税后合并计算,从 1987 年的 120.8 万美元增加到 1988 年的 652.5 万美元。如上所述,其中 607.1 万美元的收益是在 Wes-FIC 保险子公司实现的。
所罗门公司
1987 年 10 月 1 日,西科及其某些全资子公司以 1 亿美元的成本,购买了所罗门公司(“所罗门”)新发行的 10 万股 A 系列累积可转换优先股(无面值)。所罗门的主要业务由其子公司所罗门兄弟公司进行,这是一家领先的证券公司。我们的投资是总额 7 亿美元交易的一部分,其中西科的母公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的其他子公司投资了 6 亿美元。该交易的主要条款包括:(1) 优先股按年利率 9% 支付股息;(2) 以每股 1000 美元成本购买的优先股,可在 1990 年 10 月 31 日或之后(或在发生某些特殊事件时更早)转换为 26.31579 股所罗门普通股;(3) 该优先股须遵守强制性赎回条款,要求自 1995 年起,每年 10 月 31 日按每股 1000 美元加应计股息的价格赎回发行量的 20%,直至所有优先股都被赎清。
按照优先股设定的转换价格,如果 1990 年 10 月 31 日之后,所罗门普通股(在纽交所上市)的交易价格超过每股 38 美元,则在满足某些程序性要求的情况下,可以实现利润。在我们承诺购买这批新优先股时,所罗门普通股的交易价格在 30 美元出头。然而,就在西科新股票证书的墨迹刚干不久,1987 年 10 月 19 日的“黑色星期一”股市崩盘发生了,这给所罗门带来了暂时的巨额经营亏损以及信用评级下调。尽管在证券业公司中,所罗门在这场普遍灾难中只遭受了应有的沉重打击,但其普通股在崩盘后一度跌至每股 16 美元左右的低位。
到 1988 年底,在所罗门业务经过了大量建设性的调整以适应新形势后,其普通股交易价格回升至 24.25 美元。
作为优先股股息和股票赎回的潜在来源,所罗门的信用状况在 1988 年复苏期间有所改善,当时市场上优先股的一般股息率大致稳定。由于西科持有的优先股合同期限又缩短了一年,且其转换权的价值在这一年有所提升,我们认为,西科投资的公允价值略高于其成本,且任何此类超过部分的总金额,对截至 1988 年 12 月 31 日的西科而言并不重大。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事长沃伦·巴菲特以及以下署名人于 1987 年 10 月 28 日加入了所罗门的董事会,并对这一新的合作关系感到非常满意。
新子公司
1988 年底,西科以 820 万美元的价格收购了 New America Electrical Corporation(“New America Electric”)80% 的股权。其中 716.5 万美元是支付给 New America Fund 前股东清算信托的现金,103.5 万美元是一张为期十年、利率 10% 的应付票据,支付给 New America Electric 的首席执行官 Glen Mitchel,他保留了西科未收购的 New America Electric 20% 的股权。这种收购模式在伯克希尔·哈撒韦集团内部正变得越来越普遍,我们愿意在许多企业中成为 80% 的股东,而如果我们不欣赏和不信任持有另外 20% 股权并期望继续经营业务(几乎不需要我们帮助也不受我们妨碍)的人,我们是不会进入这些企业的。
Glen Mitchel 是以下署名人(西科的首席执行官)的长期朋友及受信任和尊敬的业务伙伴。事实上,由于西科的首席执行官及其家族持有的 New America Electric 股份比西科还多,我们整个交易是在沃伦·巴菲特(伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司即西科母公司的首席执行官兼大股东)的推荐和参与下,由西科董事会批准的。巴菲特先生在 New America Electric 中没有任何经济利益,他以及芒格先生和 Mitchel 先生都认为,截至 1988 年底,1025 万美元是对 New America Electric 100% 股权的公允估值。
New America Electric 是一家生产各种电气产品的制造商,产品包括开关设备、断路器、照明镇流器和启动器,以及用于码头、移动房屋和休闲车公园的电气设备。其工厂位于加利福尼亚州的橙县。
New America Electric 目前的账面净资产约为 640 万美元,包括超过 250 万美元的现金,并且有长期获得高资本回报率的历史,但当前收益因接近价格战严重状态的条件而有所下降。幸运的是,New America Electric 是一个成本非常低的制造商。其规模对西科而言(按会计术语)并不重大;因此我们尚未确定未来的报告方式。至少,基本的信息将在每年的《年报致股东信》中进行讨论。
这次收购之所以能被西科获得,是因为 Glen Mitchel 更倾向于拥有伯克希尔·哈撒韦集团子公司的少数股权(20%),而不是通过另一种选择,即通过新股公开发售使得 New America Electric 其他股份相当分散的情况下,拥有 New America Electric 的控股性 30% 股权。我们将努力不辜负 Glen Mitchel 的信任。
Wesco-Financial Insurance Company A new business was added to the Wesco group in 1985, in co-venture with Wesco's 80% owner and ultimate parent corporation, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. With the enthusiastic approval of all Wesco's directors, including substantial Wesco shareholders in the Peters and Caspers families, without whose approval such action would not have been taken, Wesco in 1985 invested $45 million in cash equivalents in a newly organized, wholly owned insurance company, Wesco- Financial Insurance Company ("Wes-FIC"'). Another $45 million was invested in 1986 and 1987. The new subsidiary, Wes-FIC, has reinsured, through another Berkshire Hathaway insurance company subsidiary as intermediary-without-profit, 2% of the entire book of insurance business of the long-established Fireman's Fund Corp. (listed on the NYSE). Wes-FIC thereby assumed the benefits and burdens of Fireman's Fund's prices, costs and losses under a contract covering all insurance premiums earned by Fireman's Fund during a four-year period commencing Septem- ber 1, 1985. The arrangement puts Wes-FIC in almost exactly the position it would have been in if it, instead of Fireman's Fund, had directly written 2% of the business. Differences in results should occur only from the investment side of insurance, as Wes-FIC, instead of Fireman's Fund, invests funds from "float" generated. Wes-FIC's share of premiums earned in 1988 exceeded $62 million. Wes-FIC in 1988 began to write direct business, as distinguished from reinsur- ance. It is now licensed in Nebraska, Utah and lowa, but it wrote only $412,000 in direct premiums, all surplus lines coverage (permitted for non-admitted insurers) in Alabama. Earned direct premiums were $108,000. Wes-FIC's "normal" net income for 1988 was $12,094,000, versus $9,459,000 faxes, or heret rimal ing 94, 6, 0s relied on sure or es ices of i come interest in Bowery Savings Bank) in 1988, compared with only $9,000 in securities gains in 1987. These items are reported as "Net Gains on Sales of Securities," below. Wes-FIC's net income benefitted by about $260,000 in 1988, versus $1 million in 1987, because of an unusual adjustment to its income tax provision caused by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It is in the nature of even the finest casualty insurance businesses that in keeping their accounts they must estimate and deduct all future costs and losses from premiums already earned. Uncertainties inherent in this undertaking make financial statements more mere "best honest guesses" than is typically the case with accounts of non-insurance-writing corporations. And the reinsurance portion of the casualty insurance business, because it contains one or more extra links in the loss-reporting chain, usually creates more accounting uncertainty than the non-reinsurance portion. Wesco shareholders should remain aware, not only of the inherent imperfections of Wes-FIC's accounting, but also of the inherent cyclicality of its business. Wesco continues to expect a reasonable return on its investment over the four years of the Fireman's Fund reinsurance contract. However, the Fireman's Fund contract ends with August in 1989, which will leave Wes-FIC with a "longage" of 16 capital and a shortage of good insurance business. This is not a desired position, but there are worse ones. All Other "Normal" Net Operating Income All other "normal" net operating income, net of interest paid and general corporate expenses, increased to $3,609,000 in 1988 from $1,808,000 in 1987. Sources were (1) rents ($2,436,000 gross, excluding rent from Mutual Savings) from Wesco's Pasadena office building block (predominantly leased to outsiders although Mutual Savings is the ground floor tenant) and (2) interest and dividends from cash equivalents and marketable securities held by Precision Steel and its subsidiaries and at the parent company level. Net Gains On Sales Of Securities Wesco's aggregate net gains on sales of securities, combined, after income taxes, increased to $6,525,000 in 1988 from $1,208,000 in 1987. As noted above, $6,071,000 of these gains were realized in the Wes-FIC insurance subsidiary. Salomon Inc On October 1, 1987 Wesco and certain of its wholly owned subsidiaries purchased 100,000 newly issued shares of Series A Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock, without par value, of Salomon Inc ("Salomon"), at a cost of $100 million. Salomon's primary business is transacted by its subsidiary, Salomon Brothers, a leading securities firm. Our investment was part of a $700 million transaction in which other subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Wesco's parent, invested $600 million. Principal terms of the transaction included the following: (1) the preferred stock pays dividends at the annual rate of 9%; (2) each preferred share, purchased at a cost of $1,000, will be convertible into 26.31579 shares of Salomon common stock on or after October 31, 1990, or earlier if certain extraordinary events occur; and (3) the preferred stock is subject to mandatory redemption provisions requiring the retirement, at $1,000 per share plus accrued dividends, of 20% of the issue on each October 31, beginning in 1995, so long as any shares of preferred stock remain outstanding. At the stated conversion price of the preferred stock, a profit (subject to certain procedural requirements) will be realizable whenever, after October 31, 1990, the common stock of Salomon (listed NYSE) trades at over $38 per share. At the time of our commitment to buy the new preferred, the common stock of Salomon was selling in the low 30s. However, shortly after the ink dried on Wesco's new stock certificates, the October 19, 1987 "Black Monday" stock market crash occurred, which caused temporary but substantial operating losses plus a lowered credit rating at Salomon. Although Salomon, among securities firms, suffered only its rough share of the general debacle, its common stock at one time after the crash traded as low as $16%. By the end of 1988 Salomon common stock was trading at $24¼ after much constructive adjustment of Salomon's business to new conditions. Salomon's credit as a potential source of preferred dividends and stock redemp- tions improved during its 1988 recovery, when generally available dividend rates on 17 preferred stock were roughly stable. With Wesco's preferred stock now one year shorter in contractual duration, and its conversion privilege enhanced in value during the year, we believe that the fair market value of Wesco's investment was somewhat in excess of its cost, and that the aggregate amount of any such excess was not material to Wesco, at December 31, 1988. Berkshire Hathaway's Chairman, Warren Buffett, and the undersigned joined the board of Salomon on October 28, 1987, and are very pleased with the new association. New Subsidiary At the close of 1988, Wesco acquired 80% of the stock of New America Electrical Corporation ("New America Electric") for a price of $8,200,000. Of this price $7,165,000 was cash paid to a liquidating trust for the former shareholders of New America Fund and $1,035,000 was a ten-year, 10% note payable to Glen Mitchel, CEO of New America Electric, who retains the 20% of New America Electric not acquired by Wesco. The pattern of this acquisition is getting to be a common one within the Berkshire Hathaway group, where we are willing to be an 80% owner in many a business we would not be in if we did not admire and trust people who retain the other 20% and are expected to continue to operate the business, with little help and no hindrance from us. Glen Mitchel is a long-time friend and trusted and admired business associate of the undersigned, Wesco's CEO. Indeed, because Wesco's CEO and his family owned more of New America Electric than Wesco, our whole transaction was approved by the Wesco board with the recommendation and participation of Warren Buffett, CEO and major shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Wesco's parent company. Mr. Buffett had no financial interest in New America Electric, and he, plus Messrs. Munger and Mitchel, all believed that $10,250,000 was a fair valuation for 100% of New America Electric at yearend 1988. New America Electric is a manufacturer of various electrical products including switchgear, circuit breakers, lighting ballasts and starters and electrical equipment for marinas and mobile home and recreational vehicle parks. Its facilities are in Orange County, California. New America Electric has a present book net worth of about $6,400,000, including over $2,500,000 in cash, and a long history of earning high returns on capital, but with current earnings reduced by conditions approaching those of severe price war. Fortunately, New America Electric is a very low-cost producer. Its size is not material (in accounting parlance) to Wesco; so we have not yet determined future reporting practice. At a minimum, essential information will be discussed each year in the Annual Report's Letter to Shareholders. This acquisition became available to Wesco because Glen Mitchel preferred minority (20%) ownership of a Berkshire Hathaway group subsidiary instead of dominant 30% ownership in New America Electric, with all other New America Electric stock pretty well scattered through a new public offering, which was the alternative offered. We will try to deserve Glen Mitchel's confidence. 18
合并资产负债表及相关讨论
西科金融的合并资产负债表(1)保持了与其合并净资产支撑大量对外承诺相匹配的稳健性,(2)反映了收购额外业务的步伐持续缓慢,因为尽管在不断搜寻,但能以西科金融股东认为合理价格收购的企业寥寥无几。
正如随附财务报表所示,截至 1988 年 12 月 31 日,西科金融有价权益证券的总市值比其总账面价值高出约 5400 万美元,较一年前的约 600 万美元大幅增加。所有有价证券(包括债券和其他固定收益证券)的合并总市值比总账面价值高出约 6200 万美元。如前所述,这约 5700 万美元的未实现增值中,约 4900 万美元来自储蓄和贷款子公司持有的房地美股票。
西科金融位于帕萨迪纳的房地产,包括一整片街区(包含(1)一栋现代化办公楼中约 12.5 万平方英尺的一流净可出租面积,包括共同储蓄公司自用空间;以及(2)老旧建筑中额外 3.4 万平方英尺的净可出租经济边缘空间,这些建筑需要昂贵的修缮),其市场价值远超账面价值,这体现在(1)针对该房地产的抵押债务(475.1 万美元,固定利率 9.25%)已超过其账面价值(293.7 万美元),以及(2)偿还抵押贷款后,西科金融每年可获得约 100 万美元的稳定的净现金流。尽管帕萨迪纳办公楼空置严重,但这栋现代化办公楼的出租率仍达 99%。我们收取略低于标准的租金,并将这栋楼打造成我们欣赏的租户的一流俱乐部。凭借这些做法、优越的地理位置和优越的停车设施,我们预计未来现金流将增长,但增长率不会超过通胀率。
西科金融的总债务与总股东权益和总流动资产相比,仍处于审慎位置。西科金融的一贯做法是在有具体需求之前就进行一定量的长期借款,以保持最大的财务灵活性来应对风险和机遇。
预计合并企业的资产负债表实力将在适当的时候用于一项或多项业务扩展。然而,扩展活动需要耐心,因为合适的机会很少出现。
如西科金融财务报表附表一所示,投资(无论是在储蓄和贷款及保险子公司中,还是暂时持有以待出售以资助业务扩展的)都倾向于高度集中在少数几家公司。通过这种集中投资的做法,我们力求对所做出的少数几个决策有更深入的理解。
西科金融年度报告的合并净利润与合并股东权益的比率,在 1986-88 年期间约为 10%,这在很大程度上依赖于证券收益,而证券收益本质上是非经常性的。
撰写此文时,西科金融合并财务状况的相当大(且高于期望)的流动性,并非源于我们预测经济状况即将恶化、利率即将上升或普通股价格即将下跌。相反,西科金融的现状源于我们根本找不到能让我们安心的、更积极使用资本的机遇。
西科金融继续更多地致力于通过始终牢记显而易见的事情,而不是通过掌握深奥难懂的东西来获利。这种方法虽然过去平均而言表现相当不错,并且长期未来也可能表现相当不错,但由于限制了行动,必然会经历一段平淡和不利的时期。此外,我们的方法仍然没有应用到大规模的资产上。
西科金融只有很小一部分总内在价值位于那些具有足够商业优势、能确保未来投入资本获得永久高回报的企业中。相比之下,西科金融的母公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司,其内在价值中则有更大比例位于持久的、高回报的企业中。
这里应该再次重复一些历史原因来解释当前状况。当西科金融的母公司获得控股权时,西科金融的活动几乎完全限于持有(1)一些多余现金,加上(2)一家拥有很多非常长期、固定利率抵押贷款的多分行储蓄和贷款协会,而负债是对这些存款支付利息的活期存款。收购这种本质上不利的处境是不明智的,在考虑过其他选择之后,因为收购方(包括本函的签署者)过分受到了一个被认为略低于清算价值的价格的影响。在这种情况下,平均而言,对于并非快速周转经营者的收购方来说,收购往往会导致低到中等的长期结果。这是因为起始的“便宜货”带来的任何优势都会被收购业务中抵制变革的平庸所带来的影响所淹没。在西科金融,尽管取得了一些成功的活动,包括 1985 年从通用食品的投资中获得巨大收益,但尚未完全避免这类正常的影响。
像西科金融这样,其内在价值中没有很大比例来自卓越业务的公司,仍然像龟兔赛跑中的乌龟。而且,正如我们已经清楚展示的那样,这只乌龟并不怎么敏捷。
1989 年 1 月 26 日,西科金融将其常规季度股息从每股 18.5 美分提高至每股 19.5 美分,于 1989 年 3 月 7 日支付给截至 1989 年 2 月 10 日营业结束时登记在册的股东。
这份年报包含提交给美国证券交易委员会的 10-K 表格,其中包含关于西科金融及其子公司的详细信息以及附有大量脚注的经审计财务报表。像往常一样,我们希望您仔细关注这些项目。
查理·芒格
董事会主席
1989 年 2 月 24 日
Consolidated Balance Sheet and Related Discussion Wesco's consolidated balance sheet (1) retains a strength befitting a company whose consolidated net worth supports large outstanding promises to others and (2) reflects a continuing slow pace of acquisition of additional businesses because few are found available, despite constant search, at prices deemed rational from the standpoint of Wesco shareholders. As indicated in the accompanying financial statements, the aggregate market value of Wesco's marketable equity securities was higher than their aggregate carrying value at December 31, 1988 by about $54 million, up significantly from about $6 million one year earlier. The consolidated aggregate market value of all marketable securities, including bonds and other fixed-income securities, exceeded aggregate carrying value by about $62 million. As earlier noted, about $57 million of this unrealized appreciation lies within the savings and loan subsidiary, and includes $49.5 million of appreciation in stock of Freddie Mac. Wesco's Pasadena real estate, a full block (containing (1) about 125,000 first- class net rentable square feet, including Mutual Savings' space, in a modern office building, plus (2) an additional net rentable 34,000 square feet of economically marginal space in old buildings requiring expensive improvement), has a market value substantially in excess of carrying value, demonstrated by (1) mortgage debt ($4,751,000 at 9.25% fixed) against this real estate now exceeding its depreciated carrying value ($2,937,000) in Wesco's balance sheet at December 31, 1988, and (2) substantial current net cash flow (about $1 million per year) to Wesco after debt service on the mortgage. The modern office building is 99% rented, despite a glut of vacant office space in Pasadena. We charge just-below-standard rents and run the building as a sort of first-class club for tenants we admire. With these practices, a prime location and superior parking facilities, we anticipate future increases in cash flow, but at no better rate than the rate of inflation. Wesco remains in a prudent position when total debt is compared to total shareholders' equity and total liquid assets. Wesco's practice has been to do a certain amount of long-term borrowing in advance of specific need, in order to have maximum financial flexibility to face both hazards and opportunities. It is expected that the balance sheet strength of the consolidated enterprise will in due course be used in one or more business extensions. The extension activity, however, requires patience, as suitable opportunities are seldom present. As indicated in Schedule I accompanying Wesco's financial statements, invest- ments, both those in the savings and loan and insurance subsidiaries and those held temporarily elsewhere pending sale to fund business extension, tend to be concen- trated in very few places. Through this practice of concentration of investments, better understanding is sought with respect to the few decisions made. The ratio of Wesco's annual reported consolidated net income to reported consolidated shareholders' equity, about 10% in 1986-88, was dependent to a significant extent on securities gains, irregular by nature. The considerable, and higher than desired, liquidity of Wesco's consolidated financial position as this is written does not result from our forecast that business 19 conditions are about to worsen, or that interest rates are about to rise, or that common stock prices are about to fall. Wesco's condition results, instead, from our simply not finding opportunities for more aggressive use of capital with which we are comfortable. Wesco continues to try more to profit from always remembering the obvious than from grasping the esoteric. Such an approach, while it has worked fairly well on average in the past and will probably work fairly well over the long-term future, is bound to encounter periods of dullness and disadvantage as it limits action. Moreover, our approach continues to be applied to no great base position. Wesco has only a tiny fraction of its total intrinsic value in businesses with enough commercial advantage in place to assure permanent high future returns on capital employed. In contrast, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Wesco's parent corporation, has a larger proportion of its intrinsic value in durable high-return businesses. Some historical explanation for the current situation should be repeated here. When Wesco's parent corporation acquired control, Wesco's activities were almost entirely limited to holding (1) some surplus cash, plus (2) a multi-branch savings and loan association which had many very long-term, fixed-rate mortgages, offset by interest-bearing demand deposits. The acquisition of this intrinsically disadvanta- geous position was unwisely made, alternative opportunities considered, because the acquirer (including the signer of this letter) was overly influenced by a price considered to be moderately below liquidating value. Under such circumstances, acquisitions have a way of producing, on average, for acquirers who are not quick- turn operators, low to moderate long-term results. This happens because any advantage from a starting "bargain" gets swamped by effects from change-resistant mediocrity in the purchased business. Such normal effects have not been completely avoided at Wesco, despite some successful activities, including a large gain in 1985 from an investment in General Foods. A corporation like Wesco, with no significant proportion of intrinsic value in great businesses, continues to be like a tortoise in a race of hares. And, as we have plainly demonstrated, this particular tortoise is not very sprightly. On January 26, 1989, Wesco increased its regular quarterly dividend from 18½ record as of the close of business on February 10, 1989. cents per share to 19/½ cents per share, payable March 7, 1989, to shareholders of This annual report contains Form 10-K, a report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and includes detailed information about Wesco and its subsidiaries as well as audited financial statements bearing extensive footnotes. As usual, your careful attention is sought with respect to these items. Charles + manger Charles T. Munger Chairman of the Board February 24, 1989