史上最长的季度信
GMO 季度信函 2012 年 2 月 史上最长季度信函 来自波洛尼厄斯叔叔的投资建议 你的孙辈毫无价值(以及资本主义的其他缺陷) 市场回顾 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 第一部分:来自波洛尼厄斯叔叔的投资建议¹ 致踏上危险投资航程的个人投资者
GMO Quarterly Letter February 2012 The Longest Quarterly Letter Ever Investment Advice from Your Uncle Polonius Your Grandchildren Have No Value (And Other Deficiencies of Capitalism) Market Review Jeremy Grantham Part I: Investment Advice from Your Uncle Polonius1 For individual investors setting out on dangerous investment voyages.
1. 相信历史。在投资中,桑塔亚纳是正确的:历史一再重演,忘记它你将自食其果。所有泡沫终将破灭,所有投资狂热都会褪去。你绝对必须无视行业既得利益者和那些不可避免的啦啦队,他们会向你保证这次不同,这是个新的历史高点,或是生产力的永久性提升——即便这种观点来自美联储本身。不,不如说,尤其当它来自美联储时。市场是光辉地低效的,它常常远偏离公允价格,但最终,在伤透你的心、耗尽你的耐心(对专业人士而言,还包括他们客户的耐心)之后,它会回到公允价值。你的任务就是坚持到那一刻来临。方法如下。
1. Believe in history. In investing Santayana is right: history repeats and repeats, and forget it at your peril. All bubbles break, all investment frenzies pass away. You absolutely must ignore the vested interests of the industry and the inevitable cheerleaders who will assure you that this time it’s a new high plateau or a permanently higher level of productivity, even if that view comes from the Federal Reserve itself. No. Make that, especially if it comes from there. The market is gloriously inefficient and wanders far from fair price but eventually, after breaking your heart and your patience (and, for professionals, those of their clients too), it will go back to fair value. Your task is to survive until that happens. Here’s how.
2. “既不要做放债人,也不要做借债人。”如果你借钱投资,就会损害你的生存能力。没有杠杆的投资组合不会被强行平仓,而有杠杆的投资组合则可能。杠杆会削弱投资者最关键的资产:耐心。(扯开说一句,过度借贷已被证明是比波洛尼厄斯所能预见的更可怕的诅咒。它会助长财务上的激进、鲁莽和贪婪。它会一次次地放大你的收益,直到有一天突然将你毁灭。对个人而言,它能让你在今天拥有你本要到明天才真正付得起的东西。事实证明,它魅力如此之大,以至于大众会像吸毒一样无法抗拒。从中世纪开始,政府也同样——尤其在当下——显然也无力抵抗。任何理性的社会都必须认识到债务的诱惑,并据此制定法律。利息支出绝对不应享受税前抵扣或其他任何优待。政府显然必须像波洛尼厄斯的孩子一样被设限。通过法律,政府累计债务应设定一个合理的上限,比如 GDP 的 50%,对当前违规行为给予 10 或 20 年的纠正期。)但说回投资……3. 不要把全部家当放在一条船上。这条建议浅显得不能再浅显了。商人在几千年前就学会了。几种不同的投资,越多越好,会让你的投资组合具有韧性,也就是抵御冲击的能力。显然,你的投资越多,彼此差异越大,就越有可能在那些大赌注对你不利的危急时刻生存下来。4. 保持耐心,专注于长期。等待好牌。如果你一等再等,终于等到一个非常便宜的市场出现,这就是你的安全边际。现在你要做的就是挺过痛苦,看着这桩非常棒的投资变得出类拔萃。个股通常会恢复,整个市场则永远如此。如果你遵守了前面的规则,就能熬过坏消息。
2. “Neither a lender nor a borrower be.” If you borrow to invest, it will interfere with your survivability. Unleveraged portfolios cannot be stopped out, leveraged portfolios can. Leverage reduces the investor’s critical asset: patience. (To digress, excessive borrowing has turned out to be an even bigger curse than Polonius could have known. It encourages financial aggressiveness, recklessness, and greed. It increases your returns over and over until, suddenly, it ruins you. For individuals, it allows you to have today what you really can’t afford until tomorrow. It has proven to be so seductive that individuals en masse have shown themselves incapable of resisting it, as if it were a drug. Governments also, from the Middle Ages onwards and especially now, it seems, have proven themselves equally incapable of resistance. Any sane society must recognize the lure of debt and pass laws accordingly. Interest payments must absolutely not be tax deductible or preferred in any way. Governments must apparently be treated like Polonius’s children and given limits. By law, cumulative government debt should be given a sensible limit of, say, 50% of GDP, with current transgressions given 10 or 20 years to be corrected.) But, back to investing … 3. Don’t put all of your treasure in one boat. This is about as obvious as any investment advice could be. It was learned by merchants literally thousands of years ago. Several different investments, the more the merrier, will give your portfolio resilience, the ability to withstand shocks. Clearly, the more investments you have and the more different they are, the more likely you are to survive those critical periods when your big bets move against you. 4. Be patient and focus on the long term. Wait for the good cards. If you’ve waited and waited some more until finally a very cheap market appears, this will be your margin of safety. Now all you have to do is withstand the pain as the very good investment becomes exceptional. Individual stocks usually recover, entire markets always do. If you’ve followed the previous rules, you will outlast the bad news.
《哈姆雷特》中的角色波洛尼厄斯,是国王身边一位絮叨又自命不凡的顾问。莎士比亚塑造他的初衷显然是要刻画一个彻头彻尾的失败者,但奇怪的是,到了最后,莎士比亚却忍不住让他那些原本沉闷的劝诫变得既实用又令人难忘。他给儿子雷欧提斯(正要从丹麦踏上一趟前往法国的危险航程)那番著名的临别赠言,附在了文末供参考。(哈姆雷特阴差阳错地对波洛尼厄斯一家发动了近乎灭门的打击,干掉了雷欧提斯、他妹妹奥菲莉娅,还有可怜的波洛尼厄斯本人——真是一扫而光。)
1 Polonius, a character in Hamlet, a verbose, self-important advisor to the King, was clearly intended to be a real loser, but curiously in the end Shakespeare couldn’t resist making most of his ponderous advice actually useful and memorable. His famous speech to his son Laertes who is embarking on a dangerous sea voyage to France (from Denmark) is reproduced as an Appendix. (Hamlet makes genocidal if rather unintentional war on the Polonius family, account-ing for Laertes, his sister Ophelia, and poor Polonius himself: a clean sweep.)
5. 认识到你相对于专业人士的优势。对专业人士而言,投资中最大的问题远非市场本身,而是应对职业与业务风险:作为代理人保住自己的饭碗。专业投资的第二个诅咒,是因必须显得忙碌、证明自己配得上报酬而导致的过度管理。个人投资者在耐心等待合适击球机会方面占据绝对优势,可以完全不顾他人做什么,而这对于专业人士几乎是不可能做到的。
5. Recognize your advantages over the professionals. By far the biggest problem for professionals in investing is dealing with career and business risk: protecting your own job as an agent. The second curse of professional investing is over-management caused by the need to be seen to be busy, to be earning your keep. The individual is far better-positioned to wait patiently for the right pitch while paying no regard to what others are doing, which is almost impossible for professionals.
6\. 尽量克制天生的乐观情绪。乐观很可能是人类生存的有利特质。我们这个物种普遍乐观,成功人士往往比一般人更乐观。有些社会也比其他社会更乐观:要我说,美国人和澳大利亚人是典型代表。我确信(但我很高兴不必证明这一点)这与它们的经济成功有很大关系。美国尤其鼓励冒险:失败的企业家受到重视,而不是被排斥。如果说美国有 800 家互联网初创公司,而德国只有温和得多的 80 家,那么前者会亏掉更多的钱,但其中的少数公司最终长成了今天的亚马逊和 Facebook。你不需要比对手更强;大数定律会替你搞定。但乐观也有另一面,对投资者尤其如此:乐观的人不愿听到坏消息。如果你跟一个欧洲人说你觉得有房地产泡沫,你们会进行一次理性的讨论。如果你跟一个澳大利亚人这么说,那你就引爆了第三次世界大战。我有亲身体会!而在像 2000 年那样的真正股市泡沫中,看空的消息在美国会受到如同鼠疫般的待遇;看空的专业人士会被解雇,仅仅是为了避免听到空方观点带来的不协调感——这里有个例子,论证越充分,引发的反感就越强烈。在这方面,个人比那些整天被热新闻包围(有时还有愤怒的客户)的专业人士更容易保持冷静。不容易,但相对容易一些。
6. Try to contain natural optimism. Optimism has probably been a positive survival characteristic. Our species is optimistic, and successful people are probably more optimistic than average. Some societies are also more optimistic than others: the U.S. and Australia are my two picks. I’m sure (but I’m glad I don’t have to prove it) that it has a lot to do with their economic success. The U.S. in particular encourages risk-taking: failed entrepreneurs are valued, not shunned. While 800 internet start-ups in the U.S. rather than Germany’s more modest 80 are likely to lose a lot more money, a few of those 800 turn out to be today’s Amazons and Facebooks. You don’t have to be better; the laws of averages will look after it for you. But optimism comes with a downside, especially for investors: optimists don’t like to hear bad news. Tell a European you think there’s a housing bubble and you’ll have a reasonable discussion. Tell an Australian and you’ll have World War III. Been there, done that! And in a real stock bubble like that of 2000, bearish news in the U.S. will be greeted like news of the bubonic plague; bearish professionals will be fired just to avoid the dissonance of hearing the bear case, and this is an example where the better the case is made, the more unpleasantness it will elicit. Here again it is easier for an individual to stay cool than it is for a professional who is surrounded by hot news all day long (and sometimes irate clients too). Not easy, but easier.
7. 但在极少数情况下,要努力鼓起勇气。当极端机遇出现时,你可以比专业机构下更大的注——因为对它们而言,暂时的挫败会带来客户和业务大量流失的最大风险,而对你并不存在。所以,如果数据告诉你,这确实是一个市场定价严重错位的真正极端机会,那就咬紧牙关,全力出击。
7. But on rare occasions, try hard to be brave. You can make bigger bets than professionals can when extreme opportunities present themselves because, for them, the biggest risk that comes from temporary setbacks – extreme loss of clients and business – does not exist for you. So, if the numbers tell you it’s a real outlier of a mispriced market, grit your teeth and go for it.
8. 抵制从众:只崇拜数字。我们可以同意,在现实生活而非理论生活中,这是最难采纳的建议:人群的狂热难以抗拒。看着邻居在泡沫尾声发财,而你耐心地袖手旁观,那简直是纯粹的煎熬。抵制这种诱惑的最好方法,就是自己做简单的价值衡量,或者找一个可靠的信息源(并时不时查验他们的计算过程)。然后,像崇拜英雄一样崇拜数字,试图忽略其他一切。尤其要忽略短期新闻:经济和政局的起起落落无关紧要。股票的价值,是基于其未来几十年的全部股息和盈利总和决定的。较短期内的经济低迷,对单个公司几乎没有明显长期影响,更不用说你应该聚焦的广泛资产类别了。把这些复杂问题留给专业人士吧,他们平均而言会在试图解读这些信息的过程中赔钱。
8. Resist the crowd: cherish numbers only. We can agree that in real life as opposed to theoretical life, this is the hardest advice to take: the enthusiasm of a crowd is hard to resist. Watching neighbors get rich at the end of a bubble while you sit it out patiently is pure torture. The best way to resist is to do your own simple measurements of value, or find a reliable source (and check their calculations from time to time). Then hero-worship the numbers and try to ignore everything else. Ignore especially short-term news: the ebb and flow of economic and political news is irrelevant. Stock values are based on their entire future value of dividends and earnings going out many decades into the future. Shorter-term economic dips have no appreciable long-term effect on individual companies, let alone the broad asset classes that you should concentrate on. Leave those complexities to the professionals, who will on average lose money trying to decipher them.
也请记住,对于那些既能规避痛苦又能赚钱的绝佳机会——唯一真正重要的投资机会——数字几乎惊人地明显:相比长期平均 15 倍市盈率,1929 年市场顶峰时达到了 21 倍,而 2000 年标普 500 指数科技泡沫顶峰时竟高达 35 倍!反观 1982 年的低点,市盈率低于 8 倍。这与复杂的数学无关!
Remember too that for those great opportunities to avoid pain or make money – the only investment opportunities that really matter – the numbers are almost shockingly obvious: compared to a long-term average of 15 times earnings, the 1929 market peaked at 21 times, but the 2000 S&P 500 tech bubble peaked at 35 times! Conversely, the low in 1982 was under 8 times. This is not about complicated math!
最后,道理其实很简单,真的。我来给你们一些鼓舞人心的数据。GMO 预测资产类别回报的方法既简单又显然稳健:我们假设利润率与市盈率会在 7 年内,从当前不论什么水平,回归到长期均值。我们自 1994 年开始做这件事,至今已完成 40 次季度预测(起初是 10 年预测,近年才改为 7 年)。嗯,这 40 次我们全赢了——每一次预测都显著优于随机水平,有些还准确得令人惊讶。这些估算靠的不是细枝末节或博士学位,而是忽略群体、计算简单比率,并保持耐心。(但如果你是专业人士,它们还意味着巨大的商业风险。)现在,看看我们最近一次在去年 12 月 31 日结束的 10 年预测(图表 1),振作起来吧。这些预测用的是稳健但简单的方法。问题在于,虽说预测过程简单,专业人士却很难执行。不过,你们当中有些个人投资者,可能会发现做起来容易得多。
9. In the end it’s quite simple. Really. Let me give you some encouraging data. GMO predicts asset class returns in a simple and apparently robust way: we assume profit margins and price earnings ratios will move back to long-term average in 7 years from whatever level they are today. We have done this since 1994 and have completed 40 quarterly forecasts. (We started with 10-year forecasts and moved to 7 years more recently.) Well, we have won all 40 in that every one of them has been usefully above random and some have been, well, surprisingly accurate. These estimates are not about nuances or PhDs. They are about ignoring the crowd, working out simple ratios, and being patient. (But, if you are a professional, they would also be about colossal business risk.) For now, look at the latest of our 10-year forecasts that ended last December 31 (Exhibit 1). And take heart. These forecasts were done with a robust but simple methodology. The problem is that though they may be simple to produce, they are hard for professionals to implement. Some of you individual investors, however, may find it much easier.
GMO 第二季度信函——有史以来最长的季度信函——2012 年 2 月 GMO 预测:领会这项练习的精髓*
图表 1 2001 年 12 月 31 日的 10 年预测 vs. 2011 年 12 月 31 日的实际结果 2001 年 12 月 31 日的 10 年预测 vs. 2011 年 12 月 31 日的实际结果*
| 资产类别 | GMO 10 年期预测排序 2001 年 12 月 | 10 年预估实际年化回报率(%) | 实际回报率(%) | 实际排序 2011 年 12 月 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 新兴市场股票 | 1 | 9.4 | 11.4 | 1 |
| 美国 REITs | 2 | 9.1 | 6.8 | 3 |
| 新兴市场国家债券 | 3 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 2 |
| 国际小盘股 | 4 | 5.2 | 6.7 | 4 |
| 美国 TIPS | 5 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 6 |
| 巴克莱资本美国政府债务 | 6 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 8 |
| 外国债券 | 7 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 5 |
| 美国小盘股 | 8 | 2.2 | 4.0 | 7 |
| EAFE 指数 | 8(并列) | 2.2 | 2.6 | 9 |
| 美国短期国库券 | 10 | 2.1 | -0.6 | 11 |
| 标普 500 指数 | 11 | -1.0 | 0.4 | 10 |
排序相关性:94.5% 这些预测的准确性并不保证当前或未来的预测在那些资产类别未来 10 年期的排序、实际回报率的绝对水平、或更短时期的回报率上同样准确。资产类别预测中排序的准确性通常不同时期有所不同。* 平均误差 ±1.1% 来源:GMO 截至 2011 年 12 月 31 日 10. “最重要的是,要忠于自己。”我们大多数网球爱好者都曾从与不切实际的对手比赛中获益:那些人按照某种浪漫化的想象去打球——想象自己回到 20 年前那个辉煌的九月天,那时每次反手都击中角落,每个小球都完美得分——而不是面对他们如今可悲地萎缩的技能和下降的身体能力。谢天谢地有他们在。但在投资中这样做,代价极其高昂。作为个人要想在投资中有所成效,你绝对必须了解自己的局限,以及自己的优势和弱点。如果你能做到耐心、忽视人群,你很可能获胜。但要幻想自己能做到,然后采取一种有缺陷的方法,让你被群体引诱或吓到,从而追高买进或过早卖出,那注定是一场彻底的灾难。你必须精准地了解自己承受痛苦和保持耐心的底线,不要打超出自己水平的球。如果你无法抗拒诱惑,那就绝对不要自己管理钱财。这里没有“匿名投资者”聚会可以去参加。不过,有两个相当合理的替代选择:要么聘请一位具备这些技能的管理人——记住,专业人士同样很难不受群体影响——要么选择一个合理的、全球分散的股票和债券指数基金,把钱投进去,然后尽量在退休前再也不要看它。即使到了那时,也只是看看能稳妥取出多少钱。另一方面,如果你有耐心、有不错的痛苦承受能力、有抵抗从众心理的能力、大概学过一点大学数学、并且以常识著称,那就放手去做吧。在我看来,你手上的牌已经足够,会击败大多数专业人士(这是一个可悲但现实的、相对较低的障碍),甚至可能做得相当出色。
GMO 2 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 GMO Forecasts Catch the Spirit of the Exercise* Exhibit 1 10-year forecasts from December 31, 2001 vs. actual as of December 31, 2011 10-year forecasts from December 31, 2001 vs. actual as of December 31, 2011* GMO 10-Yr Forecast Dec-01 10-Yr Estimated (% Real Real Return* Actual Asset Class Rank Return/Yr) Dec-11 Rank Emerging Market Equities 1 9.4 11.4 1 U.S. REITs 2 9.1 6.8 3 +7.6 +8.3 Emerging Country Debt 3 6.8 8.3 2 International Small Cap 4 5.2 6.7 4 U.S. TIPS 5 3.5 5.0 6 Barclays Capital U.S. Gov't. Debt 6 2.9 +3.0 3.1 +4.6 8 Foreign Bonds 7 2.6 5.9 5 U.S. Small 8 2.2 4.0 7 EAFE 8 (tie) 2.2 2.6 9 +1.4 +1.6 U.S. T-Bills 10 2.1 -0.6 11 S&P 500 11 -1.0 0.4 10 Correlation of rank order: 94.5% The accuracy of these The accuracy of theseforecasts forecasts doesdoes not that not guarantee guarantee that current or future current predictions will or futureeither be accurate predictions with respect to will the ranking of those asset either be accurate with classes over respect a 10-year the ranking of toabsolute period, the levels of real return, or results over shorter periods. The accuracy of forecasted rankings in the asset class forecasts generally varies from period to period. those asset classes over a 10-year period, the absolute levels of real return, or results over shorter periods. The accuracy of forecasted *Average error ±1.1% Source: GMO 6 rankings in the asset class forecasts generally varies from period to period. * Average error ±1.1% Source: GMO As of 12/31/11 10. “This above all: to thine own self be true.” Most of us tennis players have benefited from playing against non-realists: those who play to some romanticized vision of that glorious September day 20 years earlier, when every backhand drive hit the corner and every drop shot worked, rather than to their currently sadly atrophied skills and diminished physical capabilities. And thank Heavens for them. But doing this in investing is brutally expensive. To be at all effective investing as an individual, it is utterly imperative that you know your limitations as well as your strengths and weaknesses. If you can be patient and ignore the crowd, you will likely win. But to imagine you can, and to then adopt a flawed approach that allows you to be seduced or intimidated by the crowd into jumping in late or getting out early is to guarantee a pure disaster. You must know your pain and patience thresholds accurately and not play over your head. If you cannot resist temptation, you absolutely MUST NOT manage your own money. There are no Investors Anonymous meetings to attend. There are, though, two perfectly reasonable alternatives: either hire a manager who has those skills – remembering that it’s even harder for professionals to stay aloof from the crowd – or pick a sensible, globally diversified index of stocks and bonds, put your money in, and try never to look at it again until you retire. Even then, look only to see how much money you can prudently take out. On the other hand, if you have patience, a decent pain threshold, an ability to withstand herd mentality, perhaps one credit of college level math, and a reputation for common sense, then go for it. In my opinion, you hold enough cards and will beat most professionals (which is sadly, but realistically, a relatively modest hurdle) and may even do very well indeed.
祝你好运。
波洛尼厄斯叔叔季报——史上最长季报——2012 年 2 月 3 GMO 第二部:你的孙辈毫无价值(以及资本主义的其他缺陷)《金融时报》近期刊发了大量文章,探讨资本主义可能存在的种种缺陷。普遍看法是,眼下并非资本主义最辉煌的时刻。金融危机暴露出主流经济学的长期弱点——它对资本市场效率的盲目信任推动了放松监管,最终将我们拖入当前的困境。海曼·明斯基的研究早已指出,周期性金融危机“几乎不可避免”,但这一观点却被彻底遗忘。在数百名资深经济学家和银行家中,只有寥寥数人似乎预见到了危机的到来。
Good luck. Uncle Polonius Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 3 GMO Part II: Your Grandchildren Have No Value (And Other Deficiencies of Capitalism) The Financial Times has had a plethora of recent articles examining possible deficiencies in capitalism. The general opinion is that this is not capitalism’s finest hour. The financial crash revealed a chronic weakness in establishment economic theory, whose trust in efficiency of capital markets encouraged deregulation and helped land us in our present trouble. Hyman Minsky’s work that suggested that recurrent financial crises were “well-nigh inevitable” could not have been more completely forgotten. Only a handful of the hundreds of senior economists and bankers seemed to see what was coming.
债务也被证明是麻烦的根源,政府和个人都任由债务比率上升到无法控制的程度,这给经济带来了巨大风险,而政府的政策特别是税收政策不仅没有加以控制,反而助长了这种下滑。
Debt has also proven troublesome, with both governments and individuals allowing debt ratios to become unmanageable at great risk to the economy, while government policies and taxes in particular encouraged the slide rather than moved to control it.
过去 20 年间,企业所有权开始变得怪异。名义上的所有者——股东——通常每隔几个月就交易一次,并且以机构身份行事,对公司事务几乎毫无兴趣。其结果是,企业高管看起来像是公司的所有者,他们的行为也与之相符。股票期权计划以巨量的形式将所有权从股东转移给管理层,且基于短期业绩授予。由此产生的一个后果是激励机制扭曲,鼓励杠杆操作以及用别人的钱孤注一掷的各种做法。董事会几乎从不及时干预,通常只在彻底灾难发生时为时已晚之际才亮出利爪。在美国,高管的总薪酬——在典型董事会的默许下——已从艾森豪威尔时代的普通工人工资的 40 倍,上升到今天的 600 倍以上,而没有任何迹象表明高管才能普遍提升了。很少有奖励与长期业绩紧密挂钩。大多数国家的税前收入不平等加剧,只有极少数国家通过税收调整加以抵消。在美国,奇怪的是,税收变化反而加剧了这一转变。这种不平等加剧,是由生产力大幅提升带来的所有好处都流向了少数人,而普通工人的平均时薪却 40 年停滞不前造成的!这使得经济进步既更缓慢也更颠簸,因为压力重重的普通工人只好举债度日,然后在危机中被迫收缩。
In the last 20 years, corporate ownership began to look odd. The nominal owners – stockholders – typically traded every few months and took on the part of institutions, with little or no interest in corporate affairs, with the result that corporate officers appeared to own the companies and behaved accordingly. Stock option programs transferred ownership from shareholders to managers in giant dollops and were awarded on short-term results. One consequence of this was a distorted incentive that encouraged leverage and other forms of going for broke with other people’s money. Boards of Directors demonstrated little timely intervention and typically only found their claws in situations of complete disaster, when it was too late. Total remuneration in the U.S. for senior officers, unopposed by typical boards, rose as a percentage of the average worker’s pay from 40 times in Eisenhower’s era to over 600 times today, with no indication of any general improvement in talent. Few rewards were carefully related to long-term results. Pretax income inequality rose in most countries and was offset by tax adjustments in very few. In the U.S., oddly, the tax changes accentuated the shift. Such an increase in inequality was caused by all of the benefits of the substantial productivity flowing to a few, while the average hour’s pay stayed unprecedentedly unchanged for 40 years! This risks making economic progress both slower and bumpier as the stressed average worker reaches for debt and then, in a crisis, is forced to retrench.
这份远非完整的清单仍然长得令人印象深刻,但在我看来,这基本上是照常运行,而且其中大部分问题在美国比其他资本主义国家更严重。例如,斯堪的纳维亚国家似乎能以相当令人满意的方式应对它们自己那套问题。可以想见,经济学家会慢慢消化过去几年的教训,并发展出切实可行且有用的理论。我们至少可以抱有希望。试错、改革和常识,最终似乎相当有可能应对所有这些问题。它们是当今令人烦恼且削弱活力的问题,但不会让我们一蹶不振。不过,有一些问题很少或从未在《金融时报》的讨论中出现过,却很可能带来大麻烦。在我看来,它们甚至威胁到我们的存亡,而我想重点讨论的正是这些问题。
This far from exhaustive list is still impressively long but it seems to me to be basically business as usual, and most of it worse in the U.S. than in other capitalist countries. Scandinavian countries, for example, seem to struggle with their set of problems reasonably satisfactorily. Presumably, economists will slowly digest the lessons of the last few years and will develop realistic and useful theories. We can at least hope. Trial and error, reform, and common sense seem reasonably likely to be a match for all of these problems eventually. They are irritating and debilitating problems today but they will not bring us to our knees. There are some problems, though, that have surfaced seldom or never in the Financial Times discussions that very well may. In my opinion, they threaten even our survival and it is these problems I would like to concentrate on.
资本主义经历了一系列达尔文式的试错,这个过程至今仍在继续。就目前而言,资本主义已将自身调适为一种几乎不惜一切代价追求高速增长的模式。碳氢化合物革命以及随之而来的人口爆炸等条件,既支撑了高增长,又提供了维持增长所需的高利润率。持续的高利润率反过来训练了资本家——如果你愿意,也可以叫企业高管——为所有投资设立高门槛。例如,20 世纪 90 年代末被视为最低标准的 14% 折现率门槛,意味着每 5 年就将未来 1 美元的价值砍掉一半,以至于 10 年后今天的 1 美元仅值 25 美分;20 年后值 6 美分;50 年后则只有 1 美分的十分之一!任何发生在那么遥远未来的事件被置之不理,就毫不奇怪了。
Capitalism has gone through a Darwinistic series of trials and errors, which still continues. For the time being, capitalism has tuned itself to rapid growth at almost any cost. Circumstances such as the hydrocarbon revolution and the ensuing population explosion have allowed for both high growth and high profit margins to sustain the growth. Sustained high margins have in turn trained capitalists – or corporate executives if you prefer – to set high hurdles for all investments. The 14% hurdle for discount rates that was considered a minimum in the late 1990s, for example, halves the future value of a dollar every 5 years, so that in 10 years today’s dollar is worth 25¢; in 20 years 6¢; and in 50 years one tenth of one cent! It is hardly surprising that any event out that far is ignored.
举个例子,假设一家公司当前的行为,将在 50 年后给整个社会带来价值 10 亿美元的损害。再进一步假设,所有成本都将由这家公司承担。那么,这家公司今天感受到的痛苦,换算成利润上的损失,仅仅相当于 100 万美元。他们凭什么要在乎呢?相比之下,普通个人的收入,大概率每年最多以 1.5% 的速度复利增长,其无风险投资(比如今天的 30 年期债券减去通胀)对应的隐含回报率为 0%,而股权投资,在扣除通胀和税收后,回报率或许在 4% 左右。取这三个利率中最高的 4% 作为折现率,那个 50 年后才需要面对 10 亿美元账单的普通公民,今天感受到的痛苦就不是 100 万美元,而是 1 亿美元。而且,站在某些社会目的的角度(如 GMO 2012 年 2 月《第四季度信函——史上最长信函》中所提),4% 的实际折现率实在是太高了。举个例子,难道一个儿童 50 年后生命的价值(进而其成本),不应该与今天完全相等吗?读者很容易就能看出,一家公司对未来潜在损害的看法,与普通个人乃至整个社会之间,可能会存在多么痛苦的错位。这种错位的后果不仅可能是灾难性的,几乎也注定如此。少数细心的读者或许还记得我去年 7 月讲的那个“农夫与恶魔”的故事。在那个故事里,我展示了一位优秀的资本主义农夫是如何不得不签署一份合同的:恶魔通过极其激进的耕作方式,保证让农夫的收入翻两番,而隐藏的代价是每年损失 1% 的土壤。农夫会因巨额利润而欣喜若狂,并热衷于在前几个 20 年的合同期后不断续约,结果只在大约 100 年后,落得没土、没粮、没人的下场。然而,每次农夫续约时,他都做出了一个在资本主义看来无比理智的选择。在这个案例中,亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”失灵了,而且是致命的失灵。对“公共领域”的损害,也就是所谓的“外部性”,几十年来一直被讨论,但其中最具威胁性的一种——因水土流失和肥力枯竭而导致我们集体失去养活自己的能力——却很少或根本没有得到关注。然而,对于如何共同制定明智、可持续、着眼于长期的公共领域问题政策,迄今没有提出任何有用的策略。指望通过资本主义追求短期利润最大化的方式,把我们从这困境中解救出来,既危险又天真,而且完全抓错了重点:资本主义和公司制度,从根本上就没有处理这些问题的机制,透过企业折现率这副镜片来看,我们的孙辈真的毫无价值。
For example, let us say that a firm’s current actions are going to cost society at large a billion dollars’ worth of harm in 50 years. Further, let us agree that all of the costs will definitely be imposed on the company. The company would feel that pain today as equivalent to only a mere $1 million hit to earnings. Why should they care? In contrast, the income of typical individuals is likely to compound at most at 1.5% a year, their risk-free investments at an imputed zero % (today’s 30-year bond minus inflation), and an equity investment at perhaps 4%, net of inflation and tax. To take the highest of these three rates, the billion dollar pain at a 4% discount rate is going to feel to the average citizen, who faces the bill in 50 years, not like $1 million, but like $100 million. And for some societal GMO 4 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 purposes, 4% real is far too high. Surely, for example, shouldn’t the value, and hence cost, of a child’s life in 50 years be identical to the value and cost today? The reader can easily see how a corporation’s outlook on potential future damage might be a painful mismatch with that of ordinary individuals and society at large. The consequences of this not only can be disastrous but probably will be. A few painstaking readers might remember my “Farmer and The Devil” story of last July. In it I showed how a good capitalist farmer had to sign a contract in which the Devil guaranteed a quadrupling of the farmer’s income through very aggressive farming practices at the hidden cost of 1% a year of his soil. The farmer would enormously profit and eagerly re-up through the first several 20-year contracts only to end up with no soil, no food, and no people at about 100 years out. Yet each time the farmer re-upped, he did the sensible capitalist thing. In this case, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” failed, and fatally so. Damage to the “commons,” known as “externalities” has been discussed for decades, although the most threatening one – loss of our collective ability to feed ourselves, through erosion and fertilizer depletion – has received little or no attention. There have been no useful tricks proposed, however, for how we will collectively impose sensible, survivable, long-term policies over problems of the “commons.” To leave it to capitalism to get us out of this fix by maximizing its short-term profits is dangerously naïve and misses the point: capitalism and corporations have absolutely no mechanism for dealing with these problems, and seen through a corporate discount rate lens, our grandchildren really do have no value.
从长周期问题转向短期公共利益,我们很快就能看清一个事实:资本主义作为一个整体,既没有道德感,也没有良心。无论美国最高法院怎么想,资本主义都不是一个人。如果法规不强制要求,或者看起来这笔钱在未来不会因为好形象有利于生意而带来利润回报,一家公司凭什么要为公共利益放弃一分钱?有道德的首席执行官可以带着公司走上一阵子,但这是一种不可靠且暂时的修补。有道德的个人也可以通过集体抵制或鼓励购买,将自己的意志强加给企业,而企业可以通过巧妙的品牌广告来预见甚至影响这一点——“清洁煤”是我最喜欢的一个例子。但这与企业利他主义完全是两码事。因此,我们可以肆意糟蹋地球,而公司可能会提供绝妙且有利可图的节能设备,但这只是为了今天的利润,而不是为了拯救明天的地球。情况还会更糟,因为资本主义一直拥有的是金钱,用来试图收买影响力。当今美国资本主义的版本在这个问题上已经死了,并且上了天堂。现在,一家公司可以自由地花钱来影响政治结果,并且无需告诉任何人,尤其是它的股东——那些名义上的所有者。于是,富有的行业可以施加如此大的政治影响力,以至于它们现在对国会拥有危险程度的控制力。而它们影响最大的议题,恰恰是最重要的那些,是对社会长期福祉乃至其存续最为关键的议题。因此,从自然中获取巨大利益却反过来破坏它,是完全免费的,而所有政府控制的尝试都会遭到花费高昂的游说和广告的抵制。在这场运动中,最早的受害者之一就是真相。如果科学证据表明,为了保护长期环境,应该对工业施加成本和限制,那么科学就会遭到巧妙的虚假信息攻击。这如今已经成了一个老生常谈且显而易见的故事,但由于他们的宣传手段高明,尽管数据确凿,仍然有半数的人认为问题在于政府失控,疯狂地想控制一切。于是,“工业复合体”(或其部分)奋力加剧资本主义的固有弱点。它们故意让达成那些将造福我们所有人的长期决策变得更加困难。烟草公司为了保护利润而故意模糊科学真相,给社会带来了巨大的健康成本和生命损失,这与那些努力混淆公众对健康和环境损害的科学衡量的能源行业之间,简直是一个完美的类比。然而,令人惊讶的是,这一点却被轻易地遗忘了。
To move from the problem of long time horizons to the short-term common good, it is quickly apparent that capitalism in general has no sense of ethics or conscience. Whatever the Supreme Court may think, it is not a person. Why would a company give up a penny for the common good if it is not required to by enforced regulation or unless it looked like that penny might be returned with profit in the future because having a good image might be good for business? Ethical CEOs can drag a company along for a while, but this is an undependable and temporary fix. Ethical humans can also impose their will on corporations singly or en masse by withholding purchases or bestowing them, and companies can anticipate this and even influence it through clever brand advertising, “clean coal” being my favorite. But that is quite different from corporate altruism. Thus, we can roast our planet and firms may offer marvelous and profitable energy-saving equipment, but it will be for profit today, not planet saving tomorrow. It gets worse, for what capitalism has always had is money with which to try to buy influence. Today’s version of U.S. capitalism has died and gone to heaven on this issue. A company is now free to spend money to influence political outcomes and need tell no one, least of all its own shareholders, the technical owners. So, rich industries can exert so much political influence that they now have a dangerous degree of influence over Congress. And the issues they most influence are precisely the ones that matter most, the ones that are most important to society’s long-term well-being, indeed its very existence. Thus, taking huge benefits from Nature and damaging it in return is completely free and all attempts at government control are fought with costly lobbying and advertising. And one of the first victims in this campaign has been the truth. If scientific evidence suggests costs and limits be imposed on industry to protect the long-term environment, then science will be opposed by clever disinformation. It’s now getting to be an old and obvious story, but because their propaganda is good and despite the solidness of the data, half of the people believe the problem is a government run wild, mad to control everything. So the “industrial complex” (or parts of it) fights to increase the inherent weaknesses of capitalism. They deliberately make it ever harder to reach the very long-term decisions that will serve us all. The influence of the Tobacco companies in deliberately obscuring the science to protect profits at a huge cost to society in health costs and lives is a perfect analogy to the energy industries that work hard to confuse the public on scientific measures of damage to health and the environment. Yet it is one that is surprisingly forgotten.
在资本主义所有的技术性弱点中,当下最危险的或许是它完全没有能力处理资源的有限性,以及在物质产出上维持高速增长在数学上的不可能性。你可以持续提高商品和服务的质量,我希望还有生活质量,但你无法在物质产出上实现可持续的增长。你要么选择“增长”——短期内——要么选择“可持续”——永远,但不能两者兼得。这是复利法则和自然法则带给你的信息。不过,你可以尝试两者兼得。但很多人,当面临选择时,会选“增长,去他妈的后果。” 或者,他们采取一种“不听坏消息”的生活态度,只专注于听好消息。对于这类人来说,好消息是,总有一些专家缺乏长远眼光、缺乏简单常识,或者他们的合作已经被“租用”了——就像谋杀案审判中的“专家”证人——随时可以被拉出来信誓旦旦地说,一切总会好起来的。(一位著名的教授无缝地从一个声称吸烟无害的立场,转向了声称持续排放温室气体也不会带来任何后果。)这些乐观主义者提供的证据是,我们永远活在最好的世界里——他们引用的不是我们这个物种历经百万年艰辛尝试和痛苦错误的证据,而仅仅是过去 200 年,当碳氢化合物和其他资源给了我们一个暂时的喘息机会。这个喘息机会并不会让有限变成神奇地无限,但这 250 年的碳氢化合物中场休息感觉像是永远。资本主义显然表现得好像它相信物质财富的高速增长可以永远持续下去。它似乎对高增长上瘾了,并且回避任何关于增长可能因资源限制而放缓的暗示。因此,它对人口下降的想法(以及偶尔的现实)表现出恐惧,而实际上,为了我们能够以一种优雅而非痛苦的方式,最终达到一个完全可持续的世界经济,人口下降是绝对必要的。同样地,对于自然资源,资本主义想要以加速的速率消耗这些珍贵的、有限的资源,其潜台词是,地球上的每个人都有权像今天浪费且污染的发达国家一样生活。你不需要成为数学博士也能算出,如果普通的中国人和印度人要赶上(理论上也在不断移动的)普通美国人,那我们这个地球就完蛋了,连同大多数其他东西一起。事实上,科学家们计算过,如果他们追赶上来,我们将需要至少三个地球才能完全可持续。但如今,很少有人听科学家的。那么,你知道有多少经济理论把资源当作有限的一样来对待吗?嗯,经济合作与发展组织的研究人员说“没有”——不存在这样的理论。经济理论要么忽略这个小问题,要么假设你可以通过正常的供需机制获取所需的资源,并且可以无限期地这样做。这简直是与“理性预期”同一级别的常识缺失——那种鼓励了对放松管制的荒谬信仰和对自由市场智慧的盲目崇拜的优雅理论,正是它给我们带来了最近的金融灾难。但经济理论上的这种失败——忽视自然极限——风险远比暂时的金融危机更危险。
Of all the technical weaknesses in capitalism, though, probably the most immediately dangerous is its absolute inability to process the finiteness of resources and the mathematical impossibility of maintaining rapid growth in physical output. You can have steady increases in the quality of goods and services and, I hope, the quality of life, but you can’t have sustainable growth in physical output. You can have “growth” – for now – or you can have “sustainable” forever, but not both. This is a message brought to you by the laws of compound interest and the laws of nature. However, you can try to have both. But many, when given the choice, select “Growth, and to hell with Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 5 GMO the consequences.” Alternatively they adopt a hear-no-evil approach to life and listen exclusively to good news. The good news for such people is that there are always a few experts lacking in long-horizon vision, simple common sense, or whose co-operation has been rented, like “expert” witnesses at a murder trial, who can be dragged out to reliably say that everything will always work out fine. (One famous professor went seamlessly from saying tobacco smoking was just fine to saying continuously pumping out greenhouse gases would also be without consequences). The optimists offer as evidence that we will always be in the best of all possible worlds, not our species’ tough million or so years of trial and painful error, but only the last 200 years, when hydrocarbon and other resources have given us a temporary reprieve. This reprieve does not make the finite magically infinite, but the 250 years of the hydrocarbon intermission can feel like forever. Capitalism certainly acts as if it believes that rapid growth in physical wealth can go on forever. It appears to be hooked on high growth and avoids any suggestion that it might be slowed down by limits. Thus, it exhibits horror at the thought (and occasional reality) of declining population when in fact such a decline is an absolute necessity in order for us to end up gracefully, rather than painfully, at a fully sustainable world economy. Similarly with natural resources, capitalism wants to eat into these precious, limited resources at an accelerating rate with the subtext that everyone on the planet has the right to live like the wasteful polluting developed countries do today. You don’t have to be a PhD mathematician to work out that if the average Chinese and Indian were to catch up with (the theoretically moving target of) the average American, then our planet’s goose is cooked, along with most other things. Indeed, scientists calculate that if they caught up, we would need at least three planets to be fully sustainable. But few listen to scientists these days. So, do you know how many economic theories treat resources as if they are finite? Well, the researchers at the O.E.C.D say “none” – that no such theory exists. Economic theory either ignores this little problem or assumes you reach out and take the needed resources given the normal workings of supply and demand and you can do it indefinitely. This is a lack of common sense on a par with “rational expectations,” that elegant theory that encouraged the ludicrous faith in deregulation and the wisdom of free markets, which brought us our recent financial fiascos. But this failure in economic theory – ignoring natural limits – risks far more dangerous outcomes than temporary financial crashes.
让我问一个简单的问题。如果除了我们今天拥有的、成本混杂的 40 年石油储量之外,还有额外的 1000 年石油供应——比如陆上传统石油——以每桶 200 美元的生产成本可得,那么对今天的价格会有什么影响?引人注目的是,答案是“没有。” 今天的价格只关心当前每桶石油的当前成本和当前需求的中期运作。然而,每一位理性的读者都知道,这不应该是这样:巨大储量的存在(或缺乏)确实应该在一个关注其长期福祉的世界里影响今天的价格。除了忽略高品质材料的日益枯竭之外,对于目前我们那种具有毁灭性侵蚀能力且资源密集型的全球农业实践,也完全没有任何关注。
Let me pose a simple question. If there were an extra thousand years of oil supply – of onshore traditional oil – available at, say, a production cost of $200 a barrel in addition to the actual 40 years of mixed-cost reserves that we have today, what difference would it make in today’s price? Remarkably, the answer is “none.” Today’s price is concerned only with the intermediate-term workings of current costs of current barrels and current demand. Yet every rational reader knows that this should not be the case: that the existence of huge reserves (or the lack thereof) should indeed influence today’s price in a world concerned about its very long-term well-being. In addition to ignoring the depleting supplies of high quality materials, no concern at all is shown for our current devastatingly erosive and resource-intensive global farming practices.
如上所述,当前美国资本主义体系似乎包含了一些潜在的致命缺陷。因此,我们应当问一问,需要什么条件才能使我们的体系及时进化,才能拯救我们自己。显然,与监管之间达成更好的平衡会有帮助。这需要相当开明的法规,而这一点在巨额政治献金对国会,尤其是在选举中的影响力减弱之前,不大可能实现。这需要法律层面的变革,一路改到美国最高法院。这是一条漫长的路,但北欧其他几个民主国家已经取得了成功,而鉴于赌注如此之高,我们几乎没有其他选择,只能改变我们的做法。如果普通大众,尤其是科学素养更高,那肯定会有帮助。不幸的是,对国会本身也是如此。该机构极其缺乏科学家以及对科学事物的基本熟悉。我们关键的问题需要由非常熟悉并通晓科学的人来应对。据说,中国政府的九位最高领导人中有八位是科学家。而在我们这边如此高的层级上,我们 535 名国会议员加上总统和副总统,能通过这个测试的屈指可数——大概只有两三位。(我想,如果你愿意的话,可以把最高法院的大法官也算进去。)另一方面,据说大约有 100 名国会议员不相信进化论。没有对科学的尊重,加上普通大众对科学的兴趣在下降,一些痛苦的新的议题将难以应对。(如今在美国,获得科学学位的学生占全体毕业生比例,按国家排名是第 60 位!)这种对科学熟悉程度的缺乏,又因为每个人都喜欢听好消息——美国人比大多数国家的人更喜欢——而变得更加糟糕。
As described above, the current U.S. capitalist system appears to contain some potentially fatal flaws. Therefore, we should ask what it would take for our system to evolve in time to save our bacon. Clearly, a better balance with regulations would be a help. This requires reasonably enlightened regulations, which are unlikely to be produced until big money’s influence in Congress, and particularly in elections, decreases. This would necessitate legal changes all the way up to the Supreme Court. It’s a long haul, but a handful of other democratic countries in northern Europe have been successful, and with the stakes so high we have little alternative but to change our ways. It would certainly help if the general public were better educated, especially in science. The same applies, unfortunately, to Congress itself. This body is desperately short of scientists and basic familiarity with things scientific. Our key problems need to be addressed by people very familiar and comfortable with science. It is said that eight of the nine senior leaders in China’s government are scientists. At that high a level, of our 535 Congressmen and the President and Vice President, less than a handful – arguably only two or three – would pass the test. (I suppose you could throw in the Supreme Court Justices if you wanted to.) It is said, on the other hand, that about 100 Congressmen do not believe in evolution. Without a respect for science in Congress and with science in the general public declining as an interest, some of the painful new issues are going to be hard to address. (The percentage of students graduating with degrees in science as a proportion of total U.S. graduates is the 60th highest by country these days!) This lack of scientific familiarity is made worse by the fact that everyone loves to hear good news, Americans more than most.
我们必须尽早掌握的坏消息,被那些担心利润受到威胁的强大行业所资助的、熟练且充满活力的否认行为变得更为棘手。自由意志主义者似乎觉得,即使坏消息是真的,所需的监管也会如此令人反感,以至于他们宁愿科学结论是不同的,并且他们也就这样认定了,将理想化的政治理论置于科学之上。
GMO 6 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 The tough news we must sooner or later grasp is made tougher by the skilled, energetic denials, well-funded by powerful industries that fear their profits would be threatened. Libertarians seem to feel that even if the bad news were true, the necessary regulations would be so distasteful that they would really prefer that the science were different, and they deem it so, putting desired political theory over science.
与此同时,中国正在按部就班地行动,科学再次被接纳,而这正是我们在一二十年前习以为常的方式。我认为他们拥有一些不公平的优势,比如领导层具备科学背景,公众的科学成绩更高,而且他们还有一个奢侈的条件——领导层无需面对选举。真羡慕他们。关键的后果是,他们在应对气候问题时毫不拖延(印度也是如此),更重要的是,他们开始真正担忧,甚至近乎恐慌地关注长期关键资源的获取。与我们的政治僵局和无法直面长期问题形成对比的是,他们迅速行动,开发新的可持续能源,锁定资源交易,并提高资源利用效率。美国和加拿大拥有无与伦比的自然优势(至少如果你把安全因素算在内,在一个资源紧张、气候变暖的绝望世界里,这可能会对新西兰不利,否则新西兰看起来很难被击败)。然而,当今美国相对不受控制的资本主义形态,可能会削弱我们的许多优势。解决这些问题——远比任何其他问题都重要——需要一个微妙的组合,即资本主义与明智的、民主控制的政府监管的结合。对太多人来说,这听起来可能像一个矛盾的说法。如果我们不能在接下来的几十年里让它听起来合理、可信且可接受,那么我们将陷入深深的困境,因为世界真的、真的需要美国在这些关键问题上发挥领导作用。
Meanwhile, China gets on with it and science is accepted in what used to be our normal way until the last decade or two. And I suppose they have some unfair advantages, among them leaders with scientific backgrounds and higher science scores for the general public, but they also have the luxury of a leadership that does not face election campaigns. Lucky them. The critical consequences are that they waste no time in challenging climate problems (the same is true of India) and, even more importantly perhaps, they begin to really worry, almost panic, about their long-term access to crucial resources. In contrast to our political log jam and failure to face long-term issues, they have moved rapidly to exploit new sustainable energy sources, to tie down resource deals, and to promote improved resource efficiency. The U.S. and Canada are blessed with natural advantages that are unrivalled (at least if you include security, which, in a desperate, resource-constrained, warming world might hurt New Zealand, that otherwise would look hard to beat). Yet the relatively uncontrolled variety of capitalism that exists in the U.S. today may negate many of our advantages. Solutions to these issues – far more important than any others – need a delicate mix of capitalism and wise, democratically-controlled government regulation. That might sound like an oxymoron to far too many people. If we can’t make it sound, plausible, and acceptable in the next few decades, then we are in deep trouble for the world really, really needs U.S. leadership on these critical issues.
卡尔·马克思反复强调,资本主义倾向于如此执着于增长,以至于最终会忘记需要为社会展现友善的一面,并过于清楚和残酷地凸显其对劳动的优势。具有讽刺意味的是,在某种程度上,他和恩格斯曾期待全球化和跨国公司的出现,因为他们认为这会让资本主义更强大、更越界,并最终变得鲁莽。他们声称,这会为资本家提供更多的绳子去上吊——或者更准确地说,在工人革命中被吊死。他们用黑色幽默建议,干这活的绳子将从激烈竞争的资本家那里购买,这些资本家直到最后一刻都急于做成这笔好交易。好吧,时间在前进,要在一个没有工人的情况下发动工人革命将很困难。组织机器人工具可不容易。然而,马克思和恩格斯关于全球化和跨国公司会以牺牲劳动力为代价增强资本权力的那部分,绝对说对了。为了干预马克思的末日预言,我们需要一些开明的政府来缓和新的全球化巨兽(哪怕稍微开明一点就值得鼓励),以防资本主义变得过于自大,引发严重的社会反弹。但对我来说,马克思所专注的资本主义不惜一切代价追求增长的完全执着,远不如这里讨论的其他问题重要。资本主义,通过忽视资源的有限性和忽视地球的长期福祉及其潜在的关键生物多样性,威胁着我们的生存。50 年和 100 年的视野是重要的,尽管存在利率的专制”,而孙辈也有价值。我的结论是,资本主义确实在一千件事上比其他系统做得更好:它目前只在两三件事上失败了。对我们所有人来说不幸的是,即使其中任何一个失败,都可能拖垮资本主义,并连带着我们。
Karl Marx went on and on about the tendency of capitalism to so fixate on growth that in time it would forget the need to put on a friendly face for society and would drive home too clearly and brutally its advantage over labor. Ironically, in some way he and Engels looked forward to globalization and the supranational company because they argued it would make capitalism even more powerful, over reaching, and eventually reckless. It would, they claimed, offer the capitalists more rope to hang themselves with or, rather, to be hung with, in the workers’ revolution. The rope for the job, they suggested with black humor, would be bought from briskly competing capitalists, eager till the end for a good deal. Well, time marches on and it’s going to be hard to have a workers’ revolution with no workers. Organizing robotic machine tools will not be easy. However, Marx and Engels certainly got the part right about globalization and the supranational company increasing the power of capital at the expense of labor. To interfere with Marx’s apocalyptic vision, we need some enlightened governmental moderation of the new globalized Juggernaut (even slightly enlightened would be encouraging) before capitalism gets so cocky that we have some serious social reaction. But for me capitalism’s complete fixation on growth at all cost that Marx concentrated on is not as important as the other issues discussed here. Capitalism, by ignoring the finite nature of resources and by neglecting the long-term well-being of the planet and its potentially crucial biodiversity, threatens our existence. Fifty and one-hundred-year horizons are important despite the “tyranny of the discount rate,” and grandchildren do have value. My conclusion is that capitalism does admittedly do a thousand things better than other systems: it only currently fails in two or three. Unfortunately for us all, even a single one of these failings may bring capitalism down and us with it.
季度信函——最长的季度信函——2012 年 2 月——GMO——第三部分:新年投资观察——回顾与展望(2011 年和 2012 年)——在经历了狂风骤雨般的一年之后——对各种重要问题做出强烈反应,并充满无休止的紧迫感——大多数市场并未有多大变化。货币剧烈波动,但最终却奇怪地接近起点。即便是欧元,全年也仅下跌了 3.5%。美国市场是完美的例子,反复震荡却毫无进展。某天所有股票上涨,第二天又全部下跌,仿佛营地主管用扩音器在喊“所有人进来!”“所有人出去!”“风险开启!”“风险关闭!”所有兴奋过后,竟无净变化!无聊的是,即使是我们当前的投资建议,也与去年几乎相同。
Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 7 GMO Part III: Investment Observations for the New Year Looking Backwards and Forwards (2011 and 2012) After a year of Sturm und Drang – powerful responses to important problems and a non-stop sense of urgency – most markets did not cover that much ground. Currencies bounded around viciously but ended strangely close to where they started. Even the euro was down only 3.5% for the year. The U.S. market was the perfect example, bouncing around but going nowhere. One day all stocks were up and the next they were all down as if the Camp Director was calling on the bullhorn “Everyone in!” “Everyone out!” “Risk on!” “Risk off!” All that excitement and no net change! Boringly, even our current investment advice is pretty much what it was last year.
对于资产配置者来说,在一个所有资产都被严重错误定价的世界里工作总是令人兴奋。遗憾的是,现在根本不是这种情况。全球大部分股票距离公允价值都只有唾手可得(一个技术术语)的距离。只有标普 500 指数被明显高估,根据我们的 7 年预测,其隐含实际回报率约为 1%。由于标普 500 指数中高质量的四分之一股票定价为提供 5.5% 的实际回报(大约是一个公平回报),其余 75% 的股票则带来略为负的回报。世界其他地区的股票(我在 1 月份写下这些时)平均略为便宜,接近 7% 的实际回报,因此非美国股票加上美国优质股票提供的平均回报略高于正常水平(正常组合约为 6.1% 实际回报)。(今天,在一轮令人眼花缭乱的上涨之后,对同一全球股票组合的预测下降了 1.1%,变得略为昂贵。)这并非值得欢呼雀跃的时刻,但与过去 20 年典型的定价过高相比,这并不算糟糕。
It is always exciting for an asset allocator to work in a world where all assets are badly mispriced. Regrettably, this is not now the case at all. The majority of global equities are within spitting distance (a technical term) of fair value. Only the S&P 500 is materially overpriced, with an imputed return on our 7-year forecast of about 1% real, and because the high quality quarter of the S&P is priced to deliver 5.5% real (about a fair return), the 75% balance of the S&P has a slightly negative return. The rest of the world’s equities were (when I sat down to write this in January) on average slightly cheap at close to 7% real, so that non U.S. equities plus U.S. quality stocks offered a slightly higher average return than normal (a normal mix is about 6.1% real). (Today, after a dazzling rally, the forecast for the same global equity mix has dropped by 1.1%, to very slightly expensive.) This is not exactly whoopee time, but compared to the typical overpricing of the last 20 years, it’s not bad at all.
全球市场上存在有趣的高估值是在债务市场——那些被视为风险低于其他市场的债务(例如,除希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利这些常见嫌疑国之外的大多数发达国家政府债券)。在像美国和英国这样的市场上,长期债券可能会被通胀严重侵蚀,以至于持有者最终应该担心本金的回报,而忘记为风险获得补偿。从好的方面看,如果经济崩溃,具有一定久期的债券可能在短期内保护你的资金。这是短期可能的安全与可能的长期风险和负回报之间的权衡。
The interesting overpricing that exists in global markets is in debt markets – those that are seen to be lower risk than the rest (e.g., most developed market government bonds ex the usual suspects: Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy). In some markets like the U.S. and the U.K., the long bonds can be so murdered by inflation that holders should end up concerned about return of capital and forget about being paid for the risk. On the plus side, if economies collapse, the bonds with some duration may protect your money in the short term. This is a trade-off between possible short-term safety against probable long-term risk and negative return.
因此,在资产配置上,有一个巨大的机会——避免固定收益的久期——和一个不错的机会——减持大部分美国市场。这其实并不是一个糟糕的机会集合。
So in asset allocation there is one great opportunity – avoiding duration in fixed income – and one pretty good opportunity – down weighting most of the U.S. market. Not such a bad opportunity set, really.
通胀对冲——房间里的大象(这只喜欢债券持有人胜于竹子)尚未现身,但你能听到它在山上捶胸顿足。它最终会到来,在此之前,你应该记住,股票是被低估的通胀对冲工具。基础公司拥有实物资产,雇佣真实的人,有时甚至制造真实的东西,尽管嵌入小物件(如 iPad)或服务中的一个好主意也同样有效。股票在不同地方和不同年代经受了反复检验,一直被证明是非常有效的对冲工具。重要的资源——地下的石油和铜、林业和农田——几乎肯定也会表现良好,而且在短期内很可能会远超广义股票。黄金也可能表现不错。谁知道呢?但要使股票成为可靠的通胀对冲工具,需要有数年的时间跨度:在短期内,通胀上升可能会严重损害股票,因为正如上一季度提到的,通胀通常是一个强大的负面行为输入因素。投资者厌恶通胀飙升,因为它会急剧提高不确定性水平。不过,利润很快总会赶上,经过多年的通胀飙升(如 80 年代的巴西),我们最终会看到总市值占 GDP 的比例回到正常范围,而常规债券如果还存在的话,将被摧毁。图表 2 显示了美国自 1919 年以来,股票、债券和黄金分别与 CPI 的 5 年同期回报率关系。随着通胀攀升,黄金的实际价格上涨,债券的实际价格大幅下跌,股票也下跌,但幅度明显较小。图表 3 针对完全相同的通胀数据,但增加了这三个资产随后的 5 年实际回报。现在,在 10 年跨度内,黄金或股票的回报与最初的 5 年 CPI 变化之间只有非常微弱的关系。然而,对于债券来说,债券继续走弱的强烈趋势依然存在。从这一时期的结论是,通胀飙升对股票(和黄金)持有者来说,在 10 年基础上是一个非常轻微的问题,但对债券持有者来说则是一个非常严重的问题——GMO——季度信函——最长的季度信函——2012 年 2 月——图表 1a:图表 2——通胀与实际股票、债券和黄金回报——年化 5 年通胀率与年化 5 年回报率——来源:Global Financial Data,GMO——截至 2012 年 1 月 31 日——来源:Global Financial Data,GMO——截至 2012 年 1 月 31 日——图表 3——图表 1b:通胀与实际股票、债券和黄金回报——年化 5 年通胀率与年化 10 年回报率(同期+随后 5 年)——来源:Global Financial Data,GMO——截至 2012 年 1 月 31 日——来源:Global Financial Data,GMO——截至 2012 年 1 月 31 日——季度信函——最长的季度信函——2012 年 2 月——GMO——债券持有者。我们还必须记住,美国之前的通胀时期大多遵循一种模式:先上升数年达到一个峰值,然后下降。下一次可能有所不同。它可能会上升然后回落几次,形成更多的一系列丘陵,而不是像 1981 年那样的单一喜马拉雅山峰。在这样的颠簸旅程中,股票可能每次调整得更快,而长期债券的价值将稳步缩水。过去股票与通胀之间的短期相关性相当高,但短期相关性适用于交易者,而非投资者。我建议不要过分沉迷于此。总的来说,在长期投资方法中,我也更倾向于持有股票和其他实物资产,而不是复杂的对冲和期权。复杂性的墨菲定律很强大:如果可能出错,它就会出错,而且是在你最不需要的时候;但复杂的东西会首先出错,而且只要有半分机会就会错得最惨,就像几年前我们在抵押贷款市场上看到的那样。尽可能保持简单。而持有股票确实非常简单。
Inflation Hedges The 800-pound gorilla (the one that prefers bond holders to bamboo) is not in the room yet, but you can hear him thumping his chest up in the hills. He will come eventually, and before he does, you should remember that stocks are underrated inflation hedges. The underlying corporations have real assets, employ real people, and sometime even make real things, although a good idea embedded in a small thing (like an iPad) or a service is just as good. Equities have been tested over and over again in different places and in different decades and they have always been found to be very effective hedges. Serious resources – oil and copper in the ground and forestry and farmland – will almost certainly also be good and very probably much better than broad stocks in the short run. Gold may be good too. Who knows? But for stocks to work dependably as inflation hedges one has to have a several-year time horizon: in the short term, rising inflation can hurt stocks badly, for as mentioned last quarter, inflation is usually a powerful negative behavioral input. Investors hate jumps in inflation because they sharply raise the levels of uncertainty. Fairly quickly, though, earnings always catch up, and after multi-year surges in inflation (as in Brazil in the ’80s) we end up with the total market value in its normal range as a percentage of GDP while regular bonds if they exist, get destroyed. Exhibit 2 shows the co-incident 5-year relationship between the return for stocks, bonds, and gold, respectively, against the CPI since 1919 in the U.S. As inflation picks up, the real price of gold goes up, the real price of bonds declines a lot, and equities decline also, but significantly less. Exhibit 3 looks at exactly the same inflation data but adds the next 5 years of real returns for the three assets. Now, over 10 years, there is only a very slight relationship between either gold or equities with the original 5 years of change in the CPI. In the case of bonds however, there is still a strong tendency for bonds to continue to lose ground. The conclusion from that time period is that surges in inflation have been a very slight issue for holders of equities (and gold) on a 10-year basis, but a very serious one for GMO 8 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 Exhibit 1a: Exhibit 2Inflation against Real Stock, Bond, and Gold Returns Inflation against Real Stock, Bond, and Gold Returns Annualized 5-Year Inflation against Annualized 5-Year Returns Source: Global Financial Data, GMO As of 1/31/12 Source: Global Financial Data, GMO As of 1/31/12 1 Exhibit 3Exhibit 1b: Inflation Inflation against against Real Stock, Real Bond, Stock, and Gold Bond, and Gold Returns Returns Annualized 5-Year Inflation against Annualized 10-Year Returns (Contemporaneous + Subsequent 5-Year) Source: Global Financial Data, GMO As of 1/31/12 Source: Global Financial Data, GMO As of 1/31/12 2 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 9 GMO bond holders. We must also remember that previous inflationary periods in the U.S have mostly followed a pattern of rising several years to a single peak and then falling. The next one may be different. It may move up and then fall back several times, creating more of a range of hills than a single Himalayan peak like 1981. In such a bumpy ride, stocks are likely to adjust more quickly each time while long bonds will see their values steadily eroded. The short-term correlations between stocks and inflation in the past have been quite high, but short-term correlations are for traders, not investors. I’d advise not getting too carried away with them. In general, I also much prefer to have stocks and other real assets in a longer-term approach than to have complicated hedges and options. Murphy’s Law of complexity is powerful: things will go badly if they can and when you least need them to, but complex things will go bad first, and worst given half a chance, as we saw in the mortgage market a few years ago. Keep it simple when you can. And owning stocks is very simple indeed.
资源 我们现在有了投资“地里的东西”的能力。正如我去年 4 月所说,资源价格曾大幅且迅速地飙升。几乎每一种范式转换,按定义都会吸引动量投资者和投机成分,这次也不例外。产量对高价格的反应很快——农产品方面尤其迅速,而基础设施相关的煤炭和矿业则相对较慢。我此前写道,农民们尤其正在开垦从未种过玉米或谷物的土地,以抓住这一机会。如果天气不那么糟糕,我此前认为,价格可能大幅下跌。自去年春季以来,泰国(世界上最大的大米出口国)、美国南部和阿根廷部分地区确实遭遇了恶劣天气。但总体而言,天气确实比前一年有所好转,全球谷物产量很可能大幅上升。因此,价格自初夏峰值(在近期反弹之前)平均下跌了 25% 以上,未来可能还会进一步下滑。不过,我比以往任何时候都更确信,我们面临的几个重大难题中,最大的一个是如何养活未来可能存在的 90 亿或 100 亿人口,而土地有限、土壤有限,或许最重要的是,可开采的肥料有限。更别忘了,大多数政府及资本主义本身的长远眼光也极为有限。GMO 长期在木材投资领域占据重要地位,我认为可以公允地说,它已建立了一个成功的林业投资团队。最近,我们花了大量时间扩展其能力,以应对全球农田投资。尽管美国的部分农田价格快速上涨,或许已涨得过高,但无论在美国还是全球,农田都是一个极其多样且复杂的市场,定价效率低下。凭借谨慎和经验,可以做出合理的投资,当然,如果出现抛售,则会带来更具吸引力的机会。我很高兴 GMO 在这方面正在培养日益增长的(哎哟!)能力。在与创纪录价格的爱荷华州农田相对的资源光谱另一端,是天然气。对于大多数用途,比如家庭供暖和发电厂,天然气是一种比石油或煤炭更好、更清洁的燃料,但由于技术原因,它正陷入困境:过去几十年里,天然气的热当量价格(BTU equivalent price)至少曾短暂地与石油持平。但现在,它仅为热当量价格的 14%,是近 50 年来的最低水平。每个有头脑的人都应该思考如何从中长期获利。图 4 显示了这一比率。金属生产商的股价从高点下跌了近三分之一,直到近期快速反弹。它们目前(2 月 9 日)大约下跌了 20% 到 25%。有些可能仍很脆弱。然而,黄金生产商在去年表现远逊于黄金本身之后,看起来比黄金本身更便宜,达到了一个时期以来较为疲弱的比率之一。不过,我去年 4 月的旧建议仍然有效:这些都是极好的长期投资,但短期风险很高。有两种投资方法有效。我的选择是分批买入(这也是我个人一直在做的)。另一种方法是比市场更了解短期市场,这很难;虽然可能少数专家能做到。第三种方法,我绝对不推荐,就是简单地随大流涨跌(当然,也有少数人也能做好这一点)。
Resources We now have a capability to invest in “stuff in the ground.” As I argued last April, resources had gone up a lot and in a hurry. Every paradigm shift must, almost by definition, attract momentum players and a speculative component, and this was no exception. Production has responded to the higher prices very quickly for agricultural output and more slowly for infrastructure-related coal and mining. Farmers in particular, I wrote, were planting acres that had never seen corn or grain in order to capitalize on the opportunity. Given less bad weather I argued, prices could fall a lot. Since last spring, there has been some terrible weather in Thailand (the world’s largest exporter of rice), in the Southern U.S., and in parts of Argentina. But, on average, the weather has indeed been less bad than the previous year and world grain output is likely to be up quite a lot. As a consequence, prices, which had weakened an average 25% plus since the early summer peak (before the recent rally), will likely come down some more. I am, though, more convinced than ever that the biggest of several substantial problems we face is that of feeding the 9 or 10 billion people that are likely to exist one day, with finite land, finite soil, and, perhaps above all, finite mined fertilizer. And, not to forget, the very, very finite long-term vision on the part of most governments and capitalism itself. GMO has long had a significant presence in timber investing and, I think it’s fair to say, has built a successful forestry investing group. Recently, we have spent some considerable time expanding their capability in order to deal with global farmland. While some farmland in the U.S. has appreciated rapidly and perhaps by too much, farmland is an extremely varied and complicated market both in the U.S. and globally, and one that is inefficiently priced. With care and experience, reasonable investments can be made, although a sell-off would of course make for even more attractive opportunities. I am happy that GMO is developing a growing (ouch!) competence in this area. At the opposite end of the resource spectrum to record-priced Iowa farmland is natural gas. Natural gas is, for most purposes like home heating and electric utility plants, a better and cleaner fuel than oil or coal, but is for technical reasons in distress: there have been several recent decades in which the BTU equivalent price for natural gas did, at least for a second, reach parity with oil. But now it is at just 14% of BTU equivalency, the lowest in almost 50 years. Everyone who has a brain should be thinking of how to make money on this in the longer term. Exhibit 4 shows the ratio. Metals producers were down almost a third from their high until the recent rapid rally. They are now (February 9) down about 20% to 25%. Some may still be vulnerable. Gold producers, though, look cheaper than the metal itself after badly underperforming the metal last year, reaching one of their weaker ratios for a while. Still, my old recommendation from April holds: these are all great long-term investments that are dangerous short term. There are two investment approaches that work. My choice is to average in. (It is what I personally have been doing.) An alternative is to know the markets short term better than the market does, which is tough; although probably a few experts can do it. The third approach, which I definitely don’t recommend, is to just follow the herd up and down (although of course some small numbers do this well, too).
欧洲的复杂性——一个哲学注脚。GMO 的各投资团队各有其不同的优势。在资产配置领域,我们的优势在于研究和理解资产类别泡沫。这让我们更容易洞察 2000 年和 2008 年即将到来的问题。2000 年的问题源于美国科技股与成长股泡沫的形成与破裂。
European Complexity A philosophical note. Each investment group at GMO has its different strengths. In Asset Allocation, ours is in the study and understanding of asset class bubbles. That made it so much easier for us to spot the coming problems in 2000 and 2008. The 2000 problem originated from the forming and breaking of the U.S. tech and growth stock bubble.
GMO 十季度信 – 有史以来最长的季度信 – 2012 年 2 月 展示图 4 天然气 / 原油 能源等价价格比率 数据来源:Global Financial Data,GMO 截至 2012 年 2 月 8 日 2008 年的问题是由美国房地产泡沫破裂引发的。相比之下,欧洲债务问题的核心并没有资产泡沫(尽管房地产崩盘加剧了爱尔兰和西班牙的问题)。这个问题似乎源于欧元货币本身的设计缺陷,以及缺乏必要的监管来确保各国采取有益行为。它还因政治领导人广泛而持续的无能和拖延而愈演愈烈,不过考虑到政治复杂性,我对此有几分同情。这种主权债务-监管-政治-货币的混乱局面,绝对不在我们的能力范围之内。当我在《金融时报》上读到 120 条相互矛盾的建议时,我不禁自问:谁是专家?如果说有人曾在这种问题上有过盈利的专业操作,我猜那人是乔治·索罗斯。依我看,还有一两家投资管理集团似乎言之有理(出于懦弱的竞争原因,这些集团的名字不便透露)。问题在于:这些可能的专家比整个市场要担忧得多。这一事实催生了一个新的、试探性的、但绝对令人不安的理论:或许,面对无知或缺乏信心与技能时,默认的假设就是一切都会勉强撑过去。当然,在 2000 年和 2008 年泡沫酝酿期间,我们对世界(以及大多数竞争对手)普遍表现出的这种态度感到震惊。如今,我们 GMO 的人正冷静地坐着,按数字玩股票——这些数字并不太糟——而整个市场看起来相当放松,但那些看上去像这场危机专家的人却吓得直揪头发。正如我所说,这只是一个理论。但确实吓人。
GMO 10 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 Exhibit 4 Natural Gas / Crude Oil Energy Equivalent Price Ratio Source: Global Financial Data, GMO As of 2/8/12 The 2008 problems were precipitated by a deflating U.S. housing bubble. In contrast, the European debt problem has no asset bubble at its heart (although housing busts have added to problems in Ireland and Spain). This problem seems to stem from original design flaws in the euro currency and the lack of necessary regulations to guarantee helpful behavior by individual countries. It has also gathered steam due to broad and persistent incompetence and delay on the part of political leaders, although given the political complexities I am a little sympathetic. This type of sovereign debt-regulation-political-monetary mess is absolutely not our forte. When I read the 120 contradictory bits of advice in the Financial Times alone, I find myself asking the question: who is an expert? To the extent that anyone has profitably specialized in this type of problem, I suppose it is George Soros. There are also, in my opinion, one or two investment management groups that seem to talk sense (which groups will go nameless for weasely competitive reasons). This is the problem: these probable experts are much more worried than the general market. This fact is giving rise to a new, tentative but definitely uncomfortable theory: perhaps the default assumption when dealing with ignorance or lack of confidence and skill is to assume everything will muddle through okay. Certainly we were amazed by this attitude generally displayed by the world (and most competitors) in the build-up to the 2000 and 2008 bubbles. Now we at GMO are calmly sitting around playing equities by the numbers, which are not too bad, and the market in general seems quite relaxed, while those few who look like experts on this crisis are pulling out their hair in fright. As I said, this is just a theory. But it is scary.
GMO 在 2011 年的表现相当不错。在资产配置方面,超配新兴市场给我们带来了损失,久期不足和低配美国也是如此。但大规模超配全球优质股票——其中 80% 集中在美国——贡献巨大。这些股票跑赢美国市场约 10%(跑赢非优质股近 14%),因为 2011 年最终确实是一个避险之年。在这一年里,这些优质股相对于其他股票,始终是“前进三步、后退两步半”的节奏。我们还在许多小细节上做对了,因此,尽管有些事情本可以做得更聪明或运气更好,最终成绩还算不错。在资产配置方面(我承认,主要是受优质股的带动),我们的大部分配置季度通讯——最长季度通讯——2012 年 2 月 第 11 页 策略都战胜了基准,旗舰产品全球平衡资产配置策略在扣除费用后实现相对收益 3.9%。我们的股票策略中,跑赢基准的远多于跑输的。和往常一样,我们在较艰难的年份往往表现更好,这也是我们喜欢的方式。这一点在夏季的急剧下跌中尤其明显。总之,这是有趣的一年。我期待新的一年。
GMO Performance in 2011 Was Quite Good In Asset Allocation, being overweight in emerging hurt us, as did lack of duration and underweighting the U.S. But a massive overweight in global quality stocks, 80% of which are in the U.S., was huge. They outperformed the U.S. market by about 10% (and the non-quality component by almost 14%), for in the end it was indeed a risk-off year. During the year, it was steadily three steps forward, two and a half steps back for these quality stocks relative to the rest. We also got a lot of little things right so in the end, despite a cluster of things where we could have been smarter or luckier, we did decently enough. In asset allocation (dragged along mostly, I admit, by quality) most of our allocation Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 11 GMO strategies won against their benchmarks, with our flagship Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy adding 3.9% relative, net of fees. Far more of our equity strategies outperformed their benchmarks than underperformed. As usual, we tend to do better in tougher years, which is the way we like it. This was especially noticeable in the sharp summer decline. It was in all an interesting year. I look forward to this one.
建议汇总(对缺乏变动表示抱歉)
n 严重低配美国股票,但优质股除外——这类股票价格近乎合理。相比之下,非优质股在截至 2 月中旬的过去 3 个月内大幅上涨后,其隐含的 7 年回报率为负值。
n 略微超配其他全球股票——这些股票价格近乎合理,较年底时略微偏低的情况有所回落。
n 总体上,对全球股票保持中性配置。是的,潜在负面因素比我们通常认为的合理比例更多,但根据我们的数据:a) 大多数负面因素已反映在股价中;b) 所有固定收益类久期产品均被危险地高估。最后这种情况,当然是由美联储策划的,它希望驱使我们承担更多风险,尤其是通过增持股票。我不愿配合,但在当前股价水平下,按他们的意愿行事确实合情合理。如前所述,股票也是良好的长期通胀对冲工具。
n 尽可能低配长期债券,尤其是高等级主权债券。
n 从长期看,地下资源、林业和农业用地具有吸引力,但需要警惕短期定价过高的风险,因此应采取分批建仓的方式。
Summary of Recommendations (with apologies for the lack of changes) n Heavily underweight U.S equities, but not the high quality quartile, which is almost fair price. Non-quality equities, in contrast, have a negative imputed 7-year return after their handsome rally in the last 3 months through to mid-February. n Slightly overweight other global equities, which are almost fair price, down from a little cheap at year end. n In total, be about neutral in global equities. Yes, there is more than our normal fair share of potential negatives lurking around, but on our data: a) most of the negatives are reflected in stock prices; and b) all fixed income duration is dangerously overpriced. This last situation is, of course, engineered by the Fed, which hopes to drive us all into taking more risk, notably by buying more equities. I hate to oblige, but at current equity prices it just makes sense to do what they want. As mentioned earlier, equities are also good long-term hedges against inflation. n Underweight as much as you dare long-term bonds, especially higher-grade sovereign bonds. n In the long term, resources in the ground, forestry, and agricultural land are attractive, but come with the usual caveats of the risk of short-term over pricing, so average in.
“拥有它,就炫耀它。” GMO 截至 2011 年 12 月 31 日的 10 年预测
GMO 去年 12 月 31 日截止的 10 年预测展示在第 3 页。正如零·莫斯特在《制作人》中低头看着窗外一辆黄色劳斯莱斯时所说:“宝贝,就是这样。当你拥有它,就炫耀它!”如你所见,上一个 10 年预测的秩相关系数,怎么说呢,高得离谱。现在我们要是能猜准短期国债就好了。10 年前,预测未来 10 年实际收益为负 2%,听起来像是疯了。但格林斯潘-伯南克组合就是有这个本事,专毁我们的预测。不幸的是,那负 2% 的收益——它点燃了美国历史上第一次房地产泡沫——一路走来,也毁掉了其他不少东西。
“When You’ve Got it, Flaunt it.” GMO’s 10-year Forecast to December 31, 2011 The GMO 10-year forecast ending on December 31 last year is shown on page 3. As Zero Mostel says in “The Producers” as he looks down at a yellow Rolls Royce outside his window, “That’s the way baby. When you’ve got it, flaunt it!” As you can see, the rank correlation number for the last 10-year forecast was, well, ridiculously high. Now if we could only get the T-Bill right. Ten years ago, minus 2% real for 10 years would have seemed crazy. But the Greenspan-Bernanke team had this plot to ruin our forecasts. Unfortunately, the negative 2% – which stirred up the first U.S. housing bubble in history – ruined a few other things along the way.
我们当时对标普 500 指数的预测是最低的,这或许并不意外。但我们对新兴市场股票的预测却是最高的。这两类资产的年化预测差距为 10.4%,这意味着投入标普 500 指数的 100 美元将变为新兴市场的 270 美元。实际结果是 280 美元!两类资产的短期相关性起初就很高,达到 0.5,随后进一步升至 0.6。然而这种相关性并未阻止业绩的巨大差异。这说明短期相关性的参考价值很有限。其实我们想表达的很简单:标普 500 指数异常高的市盈率(约 30 倍)将回归正常的 15 倍,而估值偏低的 13 倍新兴市场则会回升。
We had by far the lowest estimates back then for the S&P 500, perhaps no surprise. But we also had the highest estimate for emerging market equities. The forecast gap between these two was 10.4% a year, which would turn $100 in the S&P into $270 in Emerging. The actual result was $280! These two asset classes had short-term correlation that started out high, at .5, and rose to the even higher level of .6. This correlation did not, however, prevent a huge gap in performance. This is an indicator of the limited usefulness of short-term correlations. Yet, all we were saying was that the abnormally high P/E on the S&P (about 30 times) would decline to a normal 15 times, and the depressed emerging markets at 13 times would rise.
我们最近发布的 10 年预测,也能拿来对付某位记者最近扣给我的“著名空头”标签。老兄,饶了我吧!过去 10 年美国市场表现糟糕透顶,经通胀调整后,就算加上股息,每年也仅微增 0.5%。如果不算股息,从 1997 年中到 2011 年底这 14 年半里,指数实际上一分钱都没涨。这可真是够久的了!难道我们该出于爱国主义而看多吗?考虑到过去 10 年(还是 100 年?)乐观言论泛滥成灾,你或许会这么想。这个行业实在太偏爱乐观了。这对生意好得多,好得没法比。大体上,媒体也一样,我确实理解——乐观情绪确实能让文章读起来更引人入胜。我跟你说吧,不如拿那些在 1999 年和 2007 年大吹法螺、把所有人都忽悠进血淋淋的缺口里的知名多头们出出气?(你知道吗,中世纪时号手因角色有害而被随手处决?等下次泡沫破裂时,这算不算个好先例?)此外,正如你所见,我们对新兴市场股票确实非常看好,已经持续了 15 年,偶尔痛苦万分。不过,这种对新兴市场的乐观情绪,在平衡我们公司(尤其是我个人)作为空头的名声方面,基本上没起什么作用,因为在新兴市场股票被视为相对于主流——美国股市——微不足道的事情,至少在这个国家是这样。
Our recent 10-year forecast is also ammunition to use against the “notorious bear” label that a journalist gave me recently. Dude, give me a break! The U.S. market was terrible for the last 10 years, gaining a pathetic 0.5% per year overall, after inflation adjustments and even including dividends. Without dividends, the index itself has not gone up a penny in real terms from mid-1997 to end-2011, or 14½ years. This is getting to be a long time! Are we expected to be bullish out of patriotism? You might think so given the flood of optimistic views for the last 10 years (or is it 100?). The industry so much prefers bullishness. It is much, much better for business. So, in general, does the press, and I do sympathize – optimism really does make for more compelling reading. I’ll tell you what. Try taking it out on the army of well-known bulls who blew the trumpets in 1999 and 2007 and waved everyone into the rather bloody breach. (Did you know that trumpeters were killed out of hand in the Middle Ages because of their pernicious role? How about that for a precedent when we get to the next burst bubble?) Also, we were, as you can see, very bullish indeed on emerging market equities and have been for 15 years, occasionally quite painfully. This optimism on emerging, though, has generally carried little weight in counter balancing our firm’s reputation (mine in particular) as bears because emerging equities are considered to be a very minor affair relative to the main event – the U.S. equity market – at least in this country.
GMO 第 12 期季度信函——最长季度信函——2012 年 2 月顺便说一句,我们使用最初的 10 年预测而不是 7 年预测,理由是一个非常复杂的数学原因:10 年预测表现更好。(尽管 7 年预测的秩相关系数也相当不错,达到 0.42。)事实上,在相当长的检验期内,10 年预测似乎比 7 年预测稍微准确一些。这部分是因为更长的时间段给了均值回归更长的发挥作用时间。为了说明这一点,我们 1 年期的结果看起来就像随机数生成器,而 1 天期的结果当然也会一样。价值是一种非常温和但非常坚定的力量。它最终会带你抵达目的地,但沿途可能让你和你的客户心碎。表 5 展示了一些我们做的新研究,表明通过数据挖掘,过去几十年里 9 年期似乎是最佳的,至少对某个(显然非常重要的)资产类别——标普 500 指数——来说是这样。
GMO 12 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 By the way, I used our original 10-year forecast rather than our 7-year forecast for a very complicated mathematical reason: it did better. (Although the 7-year forecast had a perfectly respectable rank correlation of .42.) In fact, 10-year forecasts, on a reasonably long test seem to work a little better than 7 years. This is partly because longer time periods give mean reversion longer to work. By way of illustrating this point, our 1-year results tend to look like a random number generator, and our 1-day would, of course, look the same. Value is a very mild but very determined influence. It gets you there in the end but can break you and your clients’ hearts along the way. Exhibit 5 shows some new research we have done that suggests that 9 years would, data mined, have been the best in the last few decades, at least for one (obviously very important) asset class, the S&P 500.
表 5 标普 500 指数预测准确度按时间周期划分
来源:GMO
截至 2012 年 1 月 31 日
Exhibit 5 S&P 500 Forecast Accuracy by Time Horizon Source: GMO As of 1/31/12 P.S. Defending Last Quarter’s Letter Due to the shortage of time, I clutched at material from our conference in November and managed, by breaking up the thesis into bullet points, to confuse my point and many readers: some thought I was a crazy bear, some bullish, and some in between. Ironically, the point in a nutshell was precisely that: stock market opinions must be read with a careful understanding of the time period being used. Apparently contradictory opinions are often wholly or partially the result of using different times periods. As an extreme example I gave three very different views of the market, all of which I find useful, that draw their differences from their time horizons. Here are the three: 1) Financial historians interested in the very long term would notice that all of the great bull markets before Greenspan ended by going below their trend line for several years. In the Greenspan-Bernanke era, declines were aggressively curtailed as policy. We should all be aware that the possibility exists of an old fashioned bear market overcorrection. Few have experienced a 1970’s type bear market and therefore it would be found particularly difficult to deal with. The usual expectations of long rallies would be serially disappointed.
附言:为上一季度的信函辩护
由于时间有限,我匆忙从我们 11 月的会议上抓来一些材料,并试图通过把论点拆解成要点,结果反而把论点和很多读者都搞糊涂了:有些人以为我是个疯狂的空头,有些人以为我是多头,还有些人觉得介于两者之间。讽刺的是,论点的核心恰恰就是:对股市的看法必须结合所使用的时间段来仔细理解。表面上相互矛盾的观点,往往完全是或部分是由于采用了不同的时间段所致。作为一个极端的例子,我给出了三种截然不同的市场观点,我觉得它们都有用,其差异源于不同的时间跨度。以下是这三种观点:1) 关注超长周期的金融历史学家会注意到,在格林斯潘之前,所有的大牛市都是以跌破趋势线数年告终。在格林斯潘-伯南克时代,作为政策,下跌被激进地遏制。我们都应该意识到存在出现一场老式熊市过度修正的可能性。经历过 1970 年代那种熊市的人很少,因此人们会发现它特别难以应对。对长期反弹的惯常预期会一再落空。
2) In the very short term, the Inker-Grantham “comfort” model for explaining P/E points out that the “normal” response (over response would be better) both to current high profit margins and to current low inflation would call for a substantially higher market than existed three months ago (the gap has been half closed in the intervening Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 13 GMO months). To me this suggests that just like last year, the U.S. market will fight bad news and try to go up and that it is unlikely to go down much until either the current, extremely high profit margins decline or some very big wheels fall off: Europe, China, or the U.S. That is to say, in the near term, periodic moderate bad news of any kind, except about profit margins and inflation, is unlikely to keep the market down.
2) 在极短期内,Inker-Grantham 用来解释市盈率的“舒适度”模型指出,无论是对于当前的高利润率还是低通胀的“正常”反应(最好是说过度反应),都会要求市场比三个月前(在过去的几个月里,差距已经收窄了一半)的水平高出不少。在我看来,这意味着就像去年一样,美国市场会对抗坏消息并试图上涨,而且在当前极高的利润率下降,或者欧洲、中国或美国这些非常大的轮子掉下来之前,它不太可能大幅下跌。也就是说,短期内,任何类型的周期性的温和坏消息(除非是关于利润率和通胀的)都不太可能让市场持续下跌。
3) In the intermediate term – seven years – the GMO forecast suggests that global equity prices on December 31 were, boringly, about normal, if you avoid lower quality companies in the U.S. (today they are modestly overpriced). Our GMO forecasts do not allow for overruns (point 1) or behavioral inputs (point 2) but have had a good record. So, you see, we had something for everyone: bullish, bearish, or fair value. You just had to pick your time frame.
3) 在中期内——7 年——GMO 的预测表明,如果你避开美国低质量公司(目前它们价格略高),12 月 31 日的全球股价无聊地处于正常水平。我们的 GMO 预测不考虑过冲(观点 1)或行为输入(观点 2),但记录良好。所以你看,我们为各种人都提供了内容:多头、空头或公允价值的拥趸。你只需要选择你的时间框架。
Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are presented after the deduction of management fees and incentive fees if applicable. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compli-ant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The performance information for the Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011.
所示业绩数据代表过往业绩,并非对未来业绩的预测。回报率已扣除管理费,以及(如适用)业绩报酬。净回报率包括交易成本、佣金、对外国收入和资本利得的预扣税,并且(如适用)包括股息和其他收入的再投资。在过去 12 个月内,一份符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩陈述已在本陈述之前提供,或随附于本陈述,也可在 www.gmo.com 上获取。实际费用在 GMO 的 ADV 表格 Part II 中披露,也可在各策略的合规陈述中获取。全球平衡资产配置策略的业绩信息补充了 2011 年 4 月在 GMO 网站上发布的符合 GIPS 标准的陈述。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending February 24, 2012, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
免责声明:本文所表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2012 年 2 月 24 日的观点,并可能随时根据市场和其他情况发生变化。本文并非购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被解释为此类要约或招揽。对特定证券和发行人的引用仅供说明之用,不应被视为或解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Copyright © 2012 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
版权所有 © 2012 GMO LLC。保留所有权利。
GMO 14 Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 Appendix Hamlet, Act 1, Scene III Polonius: Yet here, Laertes? Aboard, aboard, for shame! The wind sits in the shoulder of your sail, And you are stay'd for. There, my blessing with thee. And these few precepts in thy memory See thou character. Give thy thoughts no tongue, Nor any unproportion'd thought his act.
GMO 第 14 期季度信函——最长季度信函——2012 年 2 月
附录
哈姆雷特,第一幕,第三场
波洛涅斯:你还在这儿,雷欧提斯?上船,上船,真不害臊!
风已经吹在你的帆肩上了,
人家在等你呢。好,我为你祝福。
还有这几句箴言,你要铭刻在记忆里。
不要想到什么就说什么,
凡事三思而行,不要随心所欲。
对人要和气,但不要过分狎昵。
对于那些经过考验的知心朋友,
要紧紧抓住他们,用钢铁般的箍环拴住你的灵魂;
但不要对每一个新交的、羽毛未丰的伙伴
都滥施你的交情。
留心避免与人争吵;但万一争端已起,
就要让对方知道你不是好惹的。
倾听每一个人的意见,但只对极少数人发表你的意见;
接受每一个人的批评,但保留你自己的判断。
你的穿着要量力而行,
但不要奇装异服;要华贵,但不浮夸;
因为衣着往往代表一个人,
法国那些地位最高、最有身份的人
在这方面是特别讲究、大方的。
不要向人告贷,也不要借钱给人;
因为债款放出去往往丢了本钱,也失了朋友,
而借钱则会让你养成挥霍的习惯。
尤其要紧的是:你必须对自己忠实,
正像有了白昼才有黑夜一样,
这样你才不会对任何人欺诈。
再会。愿我的祝福使你这番话牢牢印在你的心里!
Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar. Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel; But do not dull thy palm with entertainment Of each new-hatch'd, unfledged comrade. Beware Of entrance to a quarrel; but being in, Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee. Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice; Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment. Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy, But not express'd in fancy; rich, not gaudy; For the apparel oft proclaims the man, And they in France of the best rank and station Are of a most select and generous, chief in that. Neither a borrower nor a lender be; For loan oft loses both itself and friend, And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry. This above all: to thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man. Farewell. My blessing season this in thee!
季度信函——最长季度信函——2012 年 2 月
GMO 第 15 期
Quarterly Letter – Longest Quarterly Letter – February 2012 15 GMO