持久耐用的热潮
彼得·林奇
By Peter Lynch
你看中了一家好公司。所有迹象都对你有利,但总有一种挥之不去的疑虑让你不敢碰这只股票。于是你手里攥着现金,眼睁睁看着这家公司继续蓬勃发展,股价也随之上涨。这就导致了"未买者懊悔症"——每当有人提起 CML 集团时,我就忍不住犯这种病。CML 销售 NordicTrack 健身器材,而我对客厅滑雪这个模式的前景一直心存疑虑,结果忽略了那些利好消息——从 1990 年底到 1992 年,股价翻了十倍。我整轮行情都没赶上。其实在那个过程中,投资者有很多次买入并赚钱的机会。
You've got your eye on a fine company. All the signs are favorable, but there's this nagging doubt that keeps you away from the stock. So you stand by with cash in you pocket as the company continues to thrive, and you watch the stock price rise accordingly. This leads to Unbuyer's Remorse, which I can't help feeling every time somebody mentions the CML Group. CML sells NordicTrack, and my nagging doubt about the future of living room skiing caused me to ignore the good news that has led to a tenfold gain in the stock price form late 1990 to 1992. I missed the entire move. But, in fact, there were many points along the way that an investor could have bought the stock and made money.
我与 CML(创始人查尔斯·M·莱顿的名字缩写)的关系可以追溯到 1980 年代初期,那时 CML 还没涉足男装、卡罗尔·里德女装和波士顿捕鲸船业务。公司的战略是瞄准 30 到 50 岁人群的工作和休闲场景。CML 发现,这个群体的人口增长速度是其他年龄段的四倍,而且他们手里有大把的钱可花。
My relationship with CML (the monogram of the founder, Charles M. Leighton) goes back to the early 1980s, before CML had anything to do with menswear, Caroll Reed women's wear, and Boston Whaler. The corporate strategy was to reach the 30 t0 50 age group at work and at play. CML had figured out that this group was growing four times faster than any other age group in the population, and that it had a lot of money to spend.
当时我还没有波士顿捕鲸船(Boston Whaler)——后来家人送了我一艘,总算弥补了这个缺憾——但这款船是海岸线上最常见的,我也多次乘坐过,对它的产品优势深信不疑。另一次,去巴尔的摩出差时,我需要一套西装,就在乔治城裤装店(Britches of Georgetowne)买了一件,穿着它上了路易斯·鲁凯瑟(Louis Rukeyser)主持的《华尔街一周》节目。
I didn't own a Boston Whaler at the time (my family has since corrected this error by giving me one), but this was the most frequently sighted boat along the coastline, and I'd ridden in enough Whalers to be fully convinced of the superiority of the product. Meanwhile, on a trip to Baltimore, I was in need of a suit and I bought one at Britches of Georgetowne and wore it on "Wall Street Week" with Louis Rukeyser.
尽管如此,穿过 CML 西装、坐过 CML 游艇,并没有让我在鲁凯泽的节目上推荐 CML 的股票——虽然 CML 是我为麦哲伦基金买进的几百只持仓之一,所以我确实还算喜欢它,以至于买了不少。
Still, wearing a CML suit and having ridden in CML boats did not cause me to recommend CML stock on Rukeyser's program, although CML was among the hundreds of holdings I'd acquired for the Magellan Fund, so I liked it well enough to have bought a sizeable chunk.
CML 曾经是那种遍地撒网的企业,一个部门成功了,另一个部门却亏了,两者相互抵消,所以总体上没什么起色。有那么一段时间,Britches 和 Boston Whaler 都做得不错,CML 还从 Sybervision 大赚了一笔——这家公司制作运动员的录像带,让我这样的周末业余球手能靠“潜移默化”提升球技。与此同时,Caroll Reed 拖累了盈利,Britches 则同时在太多方向扩张。此外,CML 还背了不少债。
CML was one of those scattershot enterprises in which success in one division was counteracted by failure in another, so on the whole it didn't get very far. There was a stretch when Britches and Boston Whaler both did well, and CML made a big profit from Sybervision, which produced videotapes of athletes so that weekend hackers like me could improve our games by osmosis. Meanwhile, Caroll Reed was a drag on earnings, and Britches was expanding in too many directions at once. CML also had a lot of debt.
我最喜欢的 CML 子公司是自然公司——还有哪里能给你的孩子们买一颗霸王龙牙齿呢?这些获奖门店报告的年销售额高达每平方英尺 600 美元,这项记录是任何规模大于热狗摊的零售企业都无法望其项背的。可惜,自然公司的门店数量不足以挽救 CML 的其他业务,尤其是在 1988 到 1989 年间,当时游艇销售开始下滑,布里奇斯开始走下坡,赛博视觉也不再风靡。到 80 年代末,CML 的财务状况仍未好转。多年来,这只股票一直在一个狭窄的区间内交易:3 到 8 美元。(我之所以说“狭窄”,是因为随后出现了一轮急涨,使股价在本篇文章撰写时达到了 33.50 美元。)
My favorite CML subsidiary was The Nature Company--where else can you buy your children a tyrannosaurus tooth? These award-winning stores reported a remarkable $600 per square foot in annual sales, a record that no other retail operation bigger than a hot dog stand could hope to match. Alas, there weren't enough Nature Company outlets to bail out the other CML businesses, especially during 1988-'89, when boat sales began to slump and Britches began to slip and Sybervision was no longer the rage. By the end of the decade, CML's financial condition had not improved. For several years, the stock had sold in a narrow range: $3 to $8. (I say narrow only because of the spurt that was about to occur, which carried the stock price to $33.50 as of this writing.)
这时候就需要持续关注了。为了减少债务并更专注于 NordicTrack,CML 卖掉了 Boston Whaler,也剥离了 Sybervision 和 Caroll Reed。自 CML 在 1986 年收购 NordicTrack 以来,该部门的势头迅速增强。第一年,NordicTrack 售出 3 万台健身器材;第三年,也是 3 万台;到第五年,销量达到了 14 万台。那些从未进行过越野滑雪、甚至从未跨过马路滑过雪的人,如今都在自家客厅里滑雪了。
This is where it pays to keep in touch. CML sold Boston Whaler and unloaded Sybervision and Caroll Reed in order to reduce debt and devote itself more fully to NordicTrack. The NordicTrack division had been rapidly gathering momentum since CML acquired it in 1986. In the first year, NordicTrack sold 30,000 exercise machines; in the third, 30,000; and, 140,000 by their fifth year. People who never skied cross country or even across the street were skiing in their living rooms.
家里有台 NordicTrack,我妻子卡罗琳一直坚持用它。我就远远欣赏它,像欣赏一件雕塑品,但我看得出它做工精良,而且比划船机轻便得多。
We had a NordicTrack at home, an my wife, Carolyn, continued to use it regularly. I admired it from a distance, as a piece of sculpture, but I could see that it was well-built, and much less bulky than a rowing machine.
1990 年底,我处于一个绝佳的位置,可以抓住这些积极的变化。我知道公司已经重组,NordicTrack 现在贡献了超过 90% 的盈利。我知道 NordicTrack 的销售额正以惊人的速度增长。我知道 NordicTrack 正在开设大量零售店和售货亭,人们可以在那里试用设备。
In late 1990 I was in a perfect position to take advantage of the positive developments. I knew that the company had restructured and that NordicTrack now accounted for over 90% of the earnings. I knew that NordicTrack sales were increasing at a phenomenal clip. I knew that NordicTrack was opening numerous retail outlets and kiosks where people could try out the equipment.
在此之前,你只能通过邮购或拨打电视广告上的 800 电话来购买 NordicTrack。成千上万的顾客未曾亲眼看到产品就买下了这个定价 600 美元的东西。但必然还有数百万人,他们永远不会通过电视推销购买昂贵的商品,却会对现场演示做出回应。
Prior to this, the only way you could buy a NordicTrack was by mail order or by calling an 800 number shown on the TV ads. Hundreds of thousands of customers had bought the $600 product sight unseen. There had to be millions more who would never purchase an expensive item from a TV offer but who would respond to a personal demonstration.
我还得到了两位专业人士的积极推荐,他们过去曾给过我很好的建议:一位是丹佛市成功的私人资金经理迪克·戈德斯坦;另一位是波士顿地区券商 Adams, Harkness & Hill 的分析师哈里·"斯基普"·韦尔斯三世。戈德斯坦告诉我,CML 已成为他仓位最大的持股。韦尔斯跟踪 CML 将近十年,尽管华尔街几乎不怎么关注他。在他的 CML 报告中,韦尔斯对健身的热情高涨得让你想放下报告,直接去做仰卧起坐。他对 CML 的前景同样兴奋不已,因为他认为我们正处于“健身养生大趋势”的起点,而 NordicTrack 设备的潜在市场极为庞大。
I was also getting positive recommendations from two professionals who had given me good advice in the past: Dick Goldstein, a successful private money manager based in Denver, Colorado; and Harry "Skip" Wells III, an analyst at Adams, Harkness & Hill, a regional brokerage firm in Boston. Goldstein told me CML had become his largest position. Wells had been following CML for almost a decade, even though he was getting little attention from Wall Street. In his CML reports, Wells gets so excited about fitness that he makes you want to stop reading and start doing sit-ups. He also gets very excited about the prospects for CML, since in his view we are at the beginning of a "fitness-wellness megatrend" and the potential market for NordicTrack equipment is huge.
这时候,我身边有两位专家在鼓动我,NordicTrack 的年销售额正以 15% 到 100% 的速度增长,公司还在降低债务,再加上那些售货亭和零售店的惊人新进展。然而,我连想都没想过要买入 CML 的股票,也没想过向我担任投资委员的那些慈善机构推荐它。
So here I had two experts egging me on, NordicTrack sales increasing at 15% to 100% a year, the company reducing its debt, plus the dramatic new developments of the kiosks and the retail stores. Yet I avoided even thinking about buying CML stock, or about recommending it to any of the charities on whose investment committees I serve.
我那个爱嘀咕的怀疑脑叶一直在告诉我,NordicTrack 只是一时风潮,不是什么大趋势,大多数对健身器材感兴趣的人早就买过一台了,而且不太可能再买一台备用。更何况,我猜想成千上万的“地板滑雪”爱好者早就厌倦了双腿前后滑动,重新翻出了简·方达的健身录像带。
My Nagging Doubt Lobe was telling me that NordicTrack was a fad and not a megatrend, that most people attracted to exercise machines already owned one, and that they weren't likely to purchase a spare. Moreover, I imagined that thousands of former floor skiers had gotten tired of sliding their legs back and forth and had returned to the Jane Fonda workout tapes.
许多公司让投资者有太多可担心的,但有些担心是实实在在的,有些则属于“衣橱里的妖怪”那种类型。这个妖怪还没露面,你也不确定他是不是真的在里面,但你也绝不会在黑暗中到处摸索,去证明他并不存在。
Many companies give investors a lot to worry about, but there are genuine worries and then there's the "bogeyman in the closet" variety. The bogeyman hasn't come out yet, and you're not sure he's in there, but you aren't about to poke around in the dark to prove that he isn't.
我经常提到一个事实——房地产市场的崩盘就像藏在壁橱里的那个“怪物”,把投资者都吓得不敢靠近房利美(Fannie Mae)。房利美本身是一家稳健的公司,仔细审视就会发现,它是一项极好的投资,风险比大多数公司都低。我一直在提醒人们,15 年来,那个“怪物”
I've often alluded to the fact that the collapse of the housing market was the bogeyman in the closet that scared investors away from Fannie Mae, a solid company that on close inspection was a great investment and less risky than most. I'm constantly reminding people that for 15 years, the bogeyman of
太多麦当劳餐厅让投资者不敢靠近这家优秀的企业,尽管自人们开始担忧致命性过剩以来,这只股票已经涨了十倍。可我呢,却在担心 NordicTrack 的过剩问题,而没有去做本该做的功课,没能消除这种恐惧。
too many McDonald's restaurants has been scaring investors away from that wonderful enterprise, even though the stock has gone up tenfold since people began to worry about a fatal glut. Yet here I was, worrying about the glut of NordicTracks and not doing the homework that might have put this fear to rest.
事后看来,我真希望自己当时能拖着身子去栗树山购物中心,实地看看诺迪克新开的零售店。那样我就能亲眼见到那一系列新产品——诺迪克健身椅、NordicFlexGold 全身训练机、NordicRow TBX 卧式健身车,以及固定式滑雪机上的各项改进。
In hindsight, I wish I had dragged myself out to the Chestnut HIll Mall to visit the new NordicTrack retail store. I would have seen firsthand the array of new products--the NordicFitness chair, the NordicFlexGold body building machine, NordicRow TBX, the recumbent bike exerciser, and the various advancements in stationary skiing.
如果我当初亲眼看着顾客试用那些器材,或许就能明白这些零售门店有多重要——到 1992 年,它们贡献了 NordicTrack 约 25% 的销售额。也许我会更认真对待斯基普·威尔斯对“大趋势”的预测:美国有 1000 万个“健身爱好者家庭”,目前拥有 NordicTrack 的还不到 4%;此外,还有 4500 万个“健身意识家庭”和 3100 万个“电视沙发家庭”,说不准哪天终于下定决心开始锻炼。
If I had watched the customers try out this equipment, perhaps i would have understood the importance of these retail outlets, which by 1992 accounted for about 25% of NordicTrack sales. Perhaps I would have taken Skip Wells's megatrend projections more seriously. Of the 10 million "fitness enthusiast households" in the United States, fewer than 4% currently own a NordicTrack, and on top of that, there are 45 million "fitness aware households" and 31 million "couch potato households" that might finally decide to start exercising.
逛一次零售门店的好处,就是能让数字活起来。你可以花一整天研究一家公司的盈利潜力,但只有在商场里亲眼看到证据之后,那些看涨的预测才会显得更加可信。可我从来没给自己看证据的机会。我待在家里,无视所有积极信号,结果 CML 的股价从 1990 年底 3.50 美元的低点,一路涨到 1992 年底的 33 美元。
One of the benefits of visiting a retail outlet is that it brings the numbers alive. You can study a company's earnings potential all day long, but bullish forecasts always seem more believable after you've seen the evidence in person at the mall. But I never gave myself a chance to view the evidence. I stayed at home and ignored all the positive signs, as CML's stock price rose from a low of $3.50 in late 1990 to $33 by the end of 1992.
当你对一家表现良好的公司心存挥之不去的疑虑时,人性使然,你会觉得只有自己才有这种不安,但事实是,其他每一个有意向的投资者也和你一样焦虑。那个让你忽略好消息的假想敌,对所有人都在施加同样的影响。疑虑本身的存在,恰恰为恐惧消除后股价大幅上涨创造了条件。诀窍在于,要在竞争对手之前,通过研究调查、核查事实来平息自己的恐惧。
Whenever you have a nagging doubt about a company that's doing well, it's human nature to think you're the only person who feels that way, but the truth is that every other would-be investor is as worried as you are. The bogeyman that causes you to ignore the good news is having the same effect on everybody else. The very existence of doubt creates the conditions for a big gain in the stock once the fears are put to rest. The trick is to put your fears to rest by doing the research and checking the facts-- before the competition does.
彼得·林奇于 1990 年从麦哲伦基金的管理岗位上退休,该基金在十五年期间是所有共同基金中业绩最佳的一只。他现在是富达基金集团的受托人,并写了一本新书《战胜华尔街》,由西蒙与舒斯特出版社出版。
Peter Lynch retired in 1990 from managing the Magellan Fund, the best- performing of all mutual funds over a fifteen-year period. He is currently a trustee of the Fidelity Group of funds and has written a new book, Beating the Street, published by Simon & Schuster.