指望银行
这位作者——或许是有史以来最著名的选股人——讲述了他如何在长达 30 年战胜华尔街的职业生涯中,从自己见过的最佳机会之一里获利。
The author, perhaps the most famous stock picker ever, tells how to profit from one of the best opportunities he has witnessed during a 30- year career of beating Wall Street
由彼得·林奇撰写
By Peter Lynch
我在《价值》杂志上的第一篇专栏刊登在 1992 年 8/9 月号上,主题是几十家互助储蓄银行和储蓄机构(也就是正在上市的储贷协会)带来的巨大投资机会。你也许知道此后发生了什么:许多这类新上市公司的股票价格在首次公开发行后的时间里翻了一番、两番,甚至涨了三倍。在我 30 年的看股生涯中,很少见到哪个群体表现得像它这么好。
My first column for Worth appeared in the August/September 1992 issue. The subject was the great investment opportunities in the scores of mutual savings banks and thrifts (a.k.a. savings and loans that were going public). Perhaps you know what's happened since then: The share prices of many of these new public companies have doubled, tripled, and even quadrupled in the period following the initial offerings. In my 30 years of looking at stocks, I've rarely seen a group do as well as this one has.
在包装食品、保险或零售业的景气时期,并非每一家包装食品公司、保险公司或零售商都能分享到繁荣。投资者可能找对了行业,却选错了股票,最终亏钱。但在互助储蓄银行中,很难挑到一只错的股票。1991 年开始交易的 13 家此类公司中,表现最差的也上涨了 89%。(关于那年的转制详情,请参阅本页“1991 级”。)1992 年新上市的 46 只股票中,至今仅有一只亏损。而 1993 年首次公开发行的 57 只股票,到目前为止没有一只亏损;其中 30 只涨幅超过 30%。
During good times for packaged foods, insurance, or retailers, not every food packager, insurance company, or retailer is going to share in the prosperity. An investor may find the right sector but choose the wrong stock and lose money. But among the mutual savings banks, it's hard to find a wrong stock. Of the 13 that began trading in 1991, the worst performer is up 89 percent.(For more on that year's conversions, see "Class of 1991" on this page.) Out of 46 new issues in 1992, there's only one loser to date. And of the 57 initial offerings in 1993, there are no losers; 30 have gained more than 30 percent.
我讲这个老故事不是为了显摆后见之明——谁会在乎我们过去几年本可以做的那些绝妙投资呢?让我重提这个话题的原因,是还有 1231 家互助储蓄银行尚未转换为公众持股。除此之外,相当数量的先前已转换的银行正在市场上以低价交易。
I'm not telling this old story to exercise my hindsight--who cares about the wonderful investments we all might have made in years past? What causes me to revisit the topic is the 1,231 mutual savings banks that haven't yet converted to public ownership. On top of those, a sizable number of prior converts are trading in the market at bargain prices.
储蓄银行最近上了头条,但不是我乐见的那种。看来有少数高管和董事,利用自身的转制机会,给自己发放免费股票或打折购股权,中饱私囊。国会正在采取行动,要叫停内部人的牟利行为,而储蓄机构监理局(Office of Thrift Supervision)在研究此事期间,已对所有未来交易叫停。与此同时,财政部也暂停了储蓄银行向大型商业银行的直接出售。
The savings banks have recently made headlines, but not the kind I'd like to see. It seems that a small number of officers and directors have been enriching themselves on their own conversions by issuing themselves free shares or options to buy shares at a discount. There's a move afoot in Congress to put a stop to the insiders' profiteering, and the Office of Thrift Supervision has slapped a moratorium on all future deals while it studies the matter. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department has halted all direct sales of savings banks to larger commercial banks.
我向来不赞成内部人士拿得比应得的更多。如果是这种情况,就应该纠正。但在我看来,内部人士发财并非转换案例中最大的悲剧。最大的悲剧是,数百万储户——那些持有定期存单或储蓄账户的普通人——本来也能发财,却没有做到。在近期的数十次发行中,储户们本有机会参与,却只有 2% 的人抓住了机会。其余的人拒绝了一个可能是一生难遇的机遇。
I'm no fan of insiders getting more than they deserve. If that's the situation, it ought to be corrected. But to my mind, the prospering of insiders is not the biggest tragedy with conversions. The biggest tragedy is that millions of depositors, average people with CDs or savings accounts, also could have prospered but have not. When given the chance to participate in the scores of recent offerings, only 2 percent of the depositors have taken advantage. The rest have turned down what may be the opportunity of a lifetime.
我猜测,储蓄机构转制上市的暂停迟早会被解除。必须找到某种方式,让剩下的互助储蓄机构进入公共所有权体系,否则它们将无法与那些能进入公开资本市场融资的其他银行和储蓄机构竞争。而除非规则朝着错误的方向大幅修改,否则未来还会有更多好机会出现。我只希望更多个人投资者能从中受益。
My guess is that this moratorium on thrift conversions will be lifted sooner or later. Some way has to be found to bring the remaining mutuals into the system of public ownership, or else they'll be unable to compete with the other banks and thrifts that enjoy access to public capital. And unless the rules are drastically revised in the wrong direction, there will be more good deals to come. I only hope that more individuals will enjoy the benefits.
所以,我们清楚这里说的是什么——互助储蓄银行(mutual savings banks)、储贷协会(thrifts)和储蓄贷款机构(savings and loans)属于同一类别下的不同变种。有些由各州特许成立,另一些则由联邦政府特许。许多机构始于 19 世纪,最初是邻里协会,类似于电力合作社或食品合作社。它们并非由某个特定个体拥有,而是归全体储户所有。正是这种集体所有权,为新股东创造了意外之财,我将在下文更详细地解释这一点。
So we know what we're taking about here, mutual savings banks, thrifts, and savings and loans are varieties of the same species. Some are chartered by the states and others by the federal government. Many began in the 19th century as neighborhood associations, similar to electric co-ops or food co-ops. They aren't owned by anyone in particular, except the mass of depositors. This mass ownership is what creates a windfall for the new shareholders, as I'll explain in more detail below.
具有讽刺意味的是,互助储蓄银行改制在媒体上被标榜为对小户不公平。实际上,改制是罕见的例外——小户有机会按发行价买入股票。在几乎任何其他类型的首次公开发行中,华尔街的大鳄(机构、共同基金)都会抢走所有份额,而普通投资者则被排除在外。我常常纳闷,我们为什么还要把这些发行叫做“公开发行”;通常来说,公众跟它们一点关系都没有。
It's ironic that mutual-savings-bank conversions are branded in the press as unfair to the little guy. Actually, conversions are the rare exception where the little guy gets to buy shares at the initial offering price. In nearly any other kind of IPO, the Wall Street gorillas (institutions, mutual funds) grab all the shares, while the average person is shut out. I often wonder why we bother to call these events public offerings at all; generally, the public has nothing to do with them.
但互助储蓄银行的上市发行是真正的民主——寡妇、蓝领工人、甚至送报纸的小孩都有机会买到股份。虽然各银行对转股行权(即购买转股股份的资格)的实际要求不同,但在大多数情况下,只需 100 至 500 美元的存折余额,你就有权购买自己力所能及的股票,最多可达数十万美元。
But the offerings of savings banks are truly democratic. Widows, blue- collar workers, and kids with paper routes get a crack at the shares. Although the actual requirements for conversion vesting (that is, eligibility for buying shares at conversion) vary from bank to bank, in most cases a passbook balance of $100 to $500 will give you the right to purchase as much stock as you can afford, up to several hundred thousand dollars' worth.
当一家储蓄银行决定转型时,首先要做的第一件事就是给所有储户寄信,告知他们这些权利。这些信件以及后续的大多数公告,最终都跟垃圾邮件一起被扔进了垃圾桶。人们已经习惯了从银行收到烤面包机和日历——而不是股票认购邀请。他们觉得银行主动请他们提前掏钱买自己的股票,这事有蹊跷。毕竟人人都读过查尔斯·基廷的故事。
When a savings bank decides to convert, one of the first things it does is send out letters to all depositors informing them of these rights. Most of these letters, and most of the announcements that follow, end up in the trash along with the junk mail. People are used to getting toaster ovens and calendars from banks--not stock solicitations. They think there's something fishy about a bank's inviting them to put up money in advance to buy its own shares. They've all read the stories about Charles Keating.
被自己客户拒绝后,银行通常只能把发售范围扩大再扩大:先是本县居民,再扩大到邻县居民,最后甚至覆盖整个州。一部分股票最终会落到像我这样的专业投资者手里——我们在多家银行和储蓄机构开户,唯一目的就是碰上可能的转制机会。这是我的亲身经历。七年前,我妻子卡罗琳和我在附近好几家互助储蓄机构买了定期存单。
This rejection by its own customers usually forces the bank to extend its offer to an ever-widening group of outsiders: residents of the county, residents of neighboring counties, or even all residents of the state. Some of the shares will end up in the hands of professional investors like me who open accounts in a variety of banks and thrifts with the sole purpose of hitting upon a possible conversion. I know about this from personal experience. Seven years ago, my wife, Carolyn, and I bought CDs in several different mutuals in our vicinity.
成为连环存款人,并不是每个人都觉得有趣,而且跟踪那些文件处理也挺麻烦的。但从好的一面看,只要成功转换一家储蓄机构,你之前的所有麻烦就都值了。我们很幸运,撞上了四次这样的机会:三次发生在我们居住的大波士顿地区,一次发生在缅因州(全家去那里滑雪)。看看全国范围内那么多其他转换案例的惊人表现,我只希望我们在 80 年代后期曾经满美国跑,把钱投进那些储蓄机构里。
Becoming a serial depositor is not everybody's idea of an exciting time, and keeping track of the paperwork can be a minor hassle. On the plus side, it only takes one conversion to make all your troubles worthwhile. We have been fortunate enough to have stumbled into four: three in the area around greater Boston, where we live, and one in Maine, where the family goes skiing. Given the remarkable performance of so many other conversions around the country, I only wish we had spent the latter part of the 1980s traveling from coast to coast, sticking money into thrifts.
再想想,孩子们早就在后座造反了。总之,行权条件已经收紧,以阻止那些跨城套利的专业户。这也挺好。我完全支持把利润留在储蓄银行所在的地方,而眼下有 1231 家潜在大户等待转制,运气好的话,你住的城市或上班的镇上至少能找到一家。
On second thought, the kids would have mutinied in the back seat. Anyway, the vesting requirements have been tightened to discourage the long-distance carpetbaggers. That's just as well. I'm all for keeping the profits in the neighborhood where savings banks are located, and with 1,231 possible conversions waiting to happen, the odds are excellent that at least one candidate can be found in a city or town where you live or work.
不妨问问当地的银行家,你所在地区还有多少家未转制的互助储蓄机构。在每家都存一小笔存款或买一小笔定期存单,即便最终没有发生转制,你也能赚到利息收入。在《做好准备》一文中列举了 100 家最有可能、最具吸引力的转制候选机构,这份名单由 SNL Securities 提供,这是一家位于弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔、备受推崇的咨询服务机构。这些机会分布在 32 个不同的州。斜体标出的 29 家储蓄机构是 SNL 预测两年内最有可能完成转制的。当然,这不作任何保证。
It can't hurt to ask local bankers how many unconverted thrifts exist in your area. Leave a small deposit or purchase a small CD in each one, and even if nothing happens, you'll collect your interest payments. The 100 most likely and most attractive candidates for conversion are identified in "Get Ready," a list that comes courtesy of SNL Securities, a highly regarded advisory service in Charlottesville, Virginia. There are opportunities here in 32 different states. Shown in italics are the 29 thrifts that SNL predicts are most likely to convert within two years. No guarantees, of course.
手头的现金
CASH IN THE TILL
为什么转换股会是如此特别的投资?并非仅仅是牛市推高了这些股票。真正的原因是:互助储蓄银行没有正式的股东。一家正常的公司有创始人、早期投资者和风险投资人,当公司上市时,他们都要求分一杯羹。但互助储蓄银行只有储户,没有需要补偿的卖家。正如我们提到的,高管和董事可能免费获得股票,但发行募集到的所有现金,扣除承销费用后,全部回到公司的钱柜里。
What makes conversions such exceptional investments? It's not simply the bull market that has lifted these stocks. It's the fact that mutual savings banks have no formal owners. A normal company has founders, early investors, and venture capitalists, all of whom claim a share of the proceeds from a stock sale when the company goes public. But a mutual savings bank has only depositors. There are no sellers to compensate. Officers and directors may get free stock, as we've noted, but all the cash that's raised in the offering, minus the underwriting fee, is returned to the company till.
效果堪称神奇。假设精明共同储蓄银行(PennyWise Mutual Savings Bank)在转换前的净资产为 1000 万美元,宣布公开上市:以每股 10 美元发行 100 万股。承销商抽走一小笔费用,但为了便于说明,我们忽略这点。于是 1000 万美元的全部募集资金都归精明银行所有。这使公司价值翻倍,从 1000 万美元变成 2000 万美元。幸运的买家刚刚花了 1000 万美元就买到了价值 2000 万美元的资产。换个角度看,他们等于零成本买下了这家公司。
The effect is quite magical. Let's say PennyWise Mutual Savings Bank, which has a net worth of $10 million before conversion, announces a public offering: 1 million shares at $10 per share. The underwriters take their small cut, but for the sake of this exercise, we'll ignore that. So the entire proceeds of $10 million revert to PennyWise. This doubles the value of the company, from $10 million to $20 million. The lucky buyers have just paid $10 million for a $20 million property. Another way of looking at it is they've bought the company for zero.
很难想出还有哪笔交易,商品一换手价值就翻倍。换个角度想:你刚花 1 万美元现金买了一辆新车,开回家打开手套箱,发现里面放着你的 1 万美元,还有一张汽车经销商的纸条:“这钱我们不需要,您留着。”
It's hard to think of another transaction where the value of the merchandise doubles the minute it changes hands. Imagine it this way. You've just paid $10,000 in cash for a new car and driven it home, where you open the glove compartment and discover your $10,000 has been placed there, along with a note from the car dealer: "We don't need this. You keep it."
只要你把那些钱留在手套箱里,你那辆价值 1 万美元的汽车就比你买它之前值钱得多。那么,一家互助储蓄银行的股票一在公开市场交易就迅速上涨,还有什么好奇怪的呢?事实上,首日涨幅平均超过 30%。对那些习惯了定期存单 3% 利息的储户来说,这相当于一夜之间拿到了十年的利息。首轮价格飙升之后,通常还会有一轮更缓慢的上涨。在当今市场上,在主要交易所交易的 384 家储蓄机构平均能以账面价值的 104% 成交。通常,新转型的银行需要几个月甚至几年才能达到这一水平。那些错过了新股发行 30% 快钱的投资者,可以通过稍后买入股票,抓住接下来 50-70% 的上涨机会。
As long as you leave that money in the glove compartment, your $10,000 car is a lot more valuable than it was before you bought it. Is it any wonder then, that the stock price of a mutual savings bank rises quickly as soon as it starts trading on the open market? Indeed, first-day gains average more than 30 percent. For depositors who are used to getting 3 percent on their CDs, that's ten years' worth of interest, paid overnight. The initial price surge is usually followed by a second, more gradual increase. On average, the 384 thrifts that trade on the major exchanges sell for 104 percent of book value in today's market. Usually, it takes the newer conversions several months or even years to reach this plateau. Investors who miss out on the quick 30 percent profit from the offering can get in on the next 50-70 percent by purchasing shares later.
格林波特储蓄银行的案例很有启发。这家纽约银行(其母公司 GP Financial 公开上市)正是引发内部人士不公平优势争议的焦点。最初的计划是将格林波特出售给纽约共和银行,这笔交易未能实现后,董事们决定让银行上市。按照典型的模式,股票以 15 美元发行,迅速上涨到约 20 美元,在撰写本文时仍在此价位。其账面价值为 27 美元,如果之前的模式延续下去,股价最终会缓慢上涨到这个水平。
The example of Green Point Savings is instructive. This is the New York bank (publicly trading as its parent, GP Financial) that was at the center of the fuss about the insiders' unfair advantage. The original plan was to sell Green Point to Republic New York Corp., and when that deal didn't pan out, the directors decided to take their bank public. In typical fashion, the stock was offered at $15 and quickly rose to about $20, where as of this writing it now sits. The book value is $27, and if the earlier pattern holds, the price will creep up to that level eventually.
但我得重复一遍:没有保证。尽管有“抽屉里的现金”这种内在优势,但以为一家储蓄银行和另一家一样好,那就错了。有些银行利润很高,另一些则较差。有些银行的贷款组合“干净”;另一些则被违约和止赎所困扰。虽然大多数银行有偿付能力,但少数存在问题的银行会被政府强制进行转换,以便通过注入新资金来满足最低资本要求。这些所谓的监管转换对投资者来说可能很危险。在提出一些基本问题之前,我不会投资任何一家储蓄机构。
But let me repeat myself: no guarantees. In spite of the built-in advantage of cash in the drawer, it's a mistake to think that one savings bank is as good as another. Some are highly profitable, others less. Some have "clean" loan portfolios; others are plagued with defaults and foreclosures. While most are solvent, a few of the shaky ones are forced into conversion by the government so they can meet minimal capital requirements with the infusion of new money. These so- called supervisory conversions can be hazardous to investors. I wouldn't invest in any thrift without asking some basic questions.
——股本是否充足?股本很重要,有两个原因。如果一家银行缺乏足够的股本,它就会将自己置于监管机构的危险境地,并成为救助或清算的对象。20 世纪 80 年代储贷机构的受害者,就是因为没有足够的股本覆盖不良贷款造成的损失。
-- Is there enough equity? Equity is important for two reasons. If a bank lacks sufficient equity, it puts itself in a precarious situation with regulators and becomes a candidate for bailout or liquidation. The S&L; casualties of the 1980s didn't have enough equity to cover the losses from bad loans.
公开募股的收益被计入股本,这就是为什么转换后的储蓄银行在这一项上表现出色。股本与资产的比率是衡量财务实力的标准指标,5% 的股本率被认为是不错的。摩根大通是全国最强大的商业银行之一,其股本率为 7%,而 384 家公开交易的储贷机构的平均股本率为 9%。格林波特储蓄银行在加入来自转换的新资本后,股本与资产的比率达到 20%。
The proceeds from a public offering are counted as equity, which is why converted savings banks excel in this category. The equity-to-assets ratio is the standard measure of financial strength, and an e/a of 5 percent is considered good. J.P. Morgan, one of the nation's strongest commercial banks, has an e/a of 7, while the average e/a of the 384 publicly traded thrifts is 9 percent. Green Point Savings has 20 percent equity to assets after adding the new capital from the conversion.
一家现金充裕的银行可能会发生几件好事。它的股本越多,可以发放的贷款就越多;发放的贷款越多,收益就越高。
A couple good things can happen to a bank that's cash rich. The more equity it has, the more loans it can make; the more loans it makes, the more it increases its earnings.
或者,如果它不想放贷,可以把钱投资于国库券,赚取不错的回报。更好的是,它可以回购自己的股票。流通股减少意味着每股收益增加,每股账面价值增加,以及股价上涨。
Or if it doesn't want to make loans, it can invest the money in Treasury bills and earn a nice living. Better yet, it can buy back its own stock. Fewer shares outstanding means more earnings per share, more book value per share, and a higher stock price.
——贷款组合质量高吗?不良贷款,也就是所谓的不良资产,可以很快摧毁一家银行,因为它会把更多资金投入损失准备金和止赎财产的管理中。我寻找的不良贷款比例低的储贷机构。低于 0.5% 会让人安心。
-- Is there a high-quality portfolio of loans? Bad loans, a.k.a. nonperforming assets, can break a bank very quickly as it channels more money into its loss reserves and into the management of properties in foreclosure. I look for thrifts that have a low percentage of nonperformers. Less than 0.5 percent is comforting.
——这家储贷机构是否盈利?衡量银行盈利能力的常见指标是资产回报率。将银行的收入除以其给定时期内的资产,就得到 ROA。1% 的资产回报率是平均水平,这是一个不错的基准。超过这个数字就是加分项。另一个有用的指标是市盈率。我寻找市盈率低于 10 的储贷机构。我会警惕投资于任何在上市时亏损(盈利为零或负值)的储贷机构。
-- Is the thrift making money? The common measure of a bank's profitability is return on assets. You get the ROA by dividing the bank's income by its assets over a specified period. A 1 percent ROA is average, and that's a good benchmark to use. Anything above that is a plus. Another useful measure is the price- to-earnings ratio. I look for thrifts with p/e ratios below 10. I'd be wary of investing in any thrift that is losing money (zero or negative earnings) at the time it goes public.
——账面价值是多少?你可以从银行职员、投资者关系部门(如果有的话)、年报、标普报告或各种其他研究服务中获得这个数字。它的重要性已经谈到过了。
-- What's the book value? You can get this number from a bank officer, the investor-relations department (if there is one), an annual report, an S&P; report, or a variety of other research services. Its importance has already been noted.
如果银行官员已经开始转换过程,你的调查就很简单了:你需要知道的一切都可以在招股说明书中找到。在这里,你会找到股票的发行价格、盈利历史、贷款组合的构成、不良资产的百分比、股本与资产的比率、官员和董事的简历、他们购买的股票数量以及价格。这最后一个细节很重要。众所周知,公司内部人士不会自毁前程。他们不会购买公司股票,除非他们预期能从中赚钱。所以,当你支付和他们相同的价格时,你就和正确的人在一起了。
If bank officers have begun the conversion process, your investigation is a snap: Everything you need to know can be found in the prospectus. Here, you'll find the offering price of the stock, the earnings history, the makeup of the loan portfolio, the percentage of nonperforming assets, the equity-to-assets ratio, the resumes of officers and directors, the number of shares they are buying, and at what price. This last detail is an important one. Corporate insiders are not known to be self-destructive. They don't buy company stock unless they expect to make money on it. So when you pay the same price they do, you're in with the right crowd.
我还会寻找其他几件事。如果一家银行拥有自己的分行,那就是一个加分项。房地产以成本价计入账簿,可能是一项有价值的隐藏资产。另一个加分项是银行家所说的廉价存款。分行少、存款集中的银行比分行多、存款少的银行往往更具成本效益。
I also look for a couple of other things. If a bank owns its own branches, it's a plus. Real estate is carried on the books at cost and can be a valuable hidden asset. Another plus is what bankers call cheap deposits. A bank that has few branches and large concentrations of deposits tends to be more cost effective than one with many branches and smaller deposits.
阅读招股说明书后,你可以在与银行官员和其他知情人士的会面中提出所有你想问的问题,澄清任何遗留的困惑。每个有意向的投资者都会受邀参加这种会议。主办方可能会提供甜甜圈和咖啡,或者三明治和可口可乐,但仍然只有六七个人会到场。对普通人来说,这是另一个从权威人士口中学习知识的难得机会——令人惊讶的是,很少有人利用这一点。他们太忙于听经纪人的话,以及关注 CNBC 的最新热门提示。
After you've read the prospectus, you can ask all the questions you want and clear up any remaining confusion at a meeting with bank officers and others in the know, to which every would-be investor is invited. The hosts will probably serve donuts and coffee or sandwiches and Coke, and still only six or eight people will show up. This is another rare opportunity for the average person to learn from the horse's mouth--and it's astounding how few take advantage. They're too busy listening to their brokers and watching for the latest hot tip from CNBC.
赢家与输家
WINNERS AND LOSERS
从 1991 年以来转换的 116 家储蓄银行中,股价落后于其他银行的两家储蓄银行,我们能学到什么?最令人失望的是圣贝纳迪诺第一联邦储蓄贷款协会,目前来看,它是该群体中唯一的彻底输家。它的问题出在错误的时间出现在错误的地方:加州正经历现代史上最严重的衰退。另一个令人失望的,尽管目前还不是输家,是俄亥俄州东利物浦的波特储蓄贷款协会。波特储蓄的股票遵循了常见模式——1993 年以每股 10 美元发行,然后在公开市场上涨至 10.88 美元。但从此以后,它开始下跌,跌至约 9 美元的低点。然而,它反弹了,如今售价约为 11 美元。
What can we learn from 2 savings banks out of the 116 that converted since 1991 whose share prices have lagged behind the rest? The biggest disappointment is First Federal Savings & Loan Association of San Bernardino, which at this point is the only outright loser in the group. It has suffered from being in the wrong place at the wrong time: California in its worst recession in the modern era. The other disappointment, although not a loser at the moment, is < wam-co NASD:PTRS>Potters S&L; of East Liverpool, Ohio. Potters's stock followed the usual pattern--it was offered at $10 a share in 1993, then jumped to $10.88 on the open market. But from there, it drifted downward, reaching a low of about $9. However, it rebounded and today it sells for around $11.
也许波特储蓄被诅咒了,因为它的名字几乎和《美好人生》里那个恶毒的银行家一模一样。但根据我收集到的信息,基本问题是盈利能力。波特储蓄在转换时赚不了多少钱,现在也几乎没有盈利。考虑到 6% 的不良资产,不难想象利润都去哪了。
Maybe Potters is jinxed by having virtually the same name as the villainous banker in It's a Wonderful Life. But from what I can gather, the basic problem is earnings. Potters wasn't making much money when it converted, and it's barely profitable today. With 6 percent nonperforming assets, it's not hard to imagine where the profits have gone.
任何对波特储蓄提出关键问题的人都会避开这只股票。它在贷款质量测试中不及格。在你得到拖欠率正在下降的确凿证据之前,最好把钱投到别处。机会多得很。
Anyone who asked the key questions about Potters would have avoided the stock. It flunked the test on loan quality. Until you get hard evidence that the delinquency rate is in decline, you're better off putting your money elsewhere. There's plenty of opportunity.
在我 1992 年写的关于这个主题的专栏中,我列出了十家具有有利特征的储蓄银行。那组股票上涨了大约 58%(见“记分卡”)。一份新的优秀候选名单出现在“前景”中。我不是建议你赶紧去买这些股票,只是说它们似乎值得考虑。(我个人持有许多储贷机构,包括这份名单上的三家:Pamrapo、Fidelity New York 和 North Side Bank。)先调查,再投资。
In the column I wrote on this subject in 1992, I included a list of ten savings banks with favorable characteristics. That group is up some 58 percent (see "Scorecard"). A new list of good candidates appears in "Prospects." I'm not suggesting that you run out and buy these, only that they appear to be worth consideration. (I personally own many thrifts including three on this list: Pamrapo , Fidelity New York, and North Side Bank.) Investigate before you invest.
另一个警告:银行享受的完美环境不会永远持续下去。对银行家来说,这是一段非常愉快的时光,是他们可以讲给孙辈听的事情:利率下降、美联储宽松政策、经济改善以及形状完美的收益率曲线。在短期利率低、长期利率高的情况下,银行家可以以 6% 的利率放贷,以 3% 的利率借款,大赚利差。
Another word of warning: The perfect conditions banks have enjoyed for several years won't last forever. It's been an extremely happy time for bankers, something they can tell the grandchildren about: declining interest rates, an accommodating Federal Reserve, an improving economy, and a beautifully shaped yield curve. With short rates low and long rates high, a banker can lend money at 6 percent, borrow at 3 percent, and feast on the spread.
最终,我们还会迎来另一个资金紧张的时期。二月初美联储贷款利率首次小幅上调,导致银行股受挫。利率上升是利润杀手。平均每 10 年中,大约有 1.5 年会出现收益率曲线倒挂,即短期利率高、长期利率低。这对银行来说是一场灾难。
Eventually we will have another period of tight money. The first tiny increase in the Fed's lending rate in early February caused bank stocks to stumble. Rising interest rates are profit killers. During 1.5 years out of every 10, on average, we get an inverted yield curve, when short rates are high and long rates are low. This is a calamity for banks.
因此,银行股价格的稳步上涨迟早可能会被中断。但从长期来看,还有另一个看好的理由:整合。
So it may be that the steady upward rise in bank stock prices will be interrupted sooner or later. But long-term there's another reason to be bullish: consolidation.
在过去五年中,近 37% 的储贷机构和储蓄银行通过合并和收购被收购。当这种情况发生时,股价被推高到第三层次,远远超过账面价值。
In the past five years, nearly 37 percent of the thrifts and savings banks have been acquired through mergers and buyouts. When this happens, the stock prices are pushed to a third tier, far above book value.
即使收购暂时搁置,整合也是不可避免的,因为美国吸收存款的机构太多了。如果把信用合作社也算在内,我们有超过 20,000 个独立的机构可以存放我们的钱。每个都有自己的广告歌、董事会、审计师、软件系统和总部。我上次谈到这个问题时,提到我所在的 19,000 人的小镇有六家银行,而整个加拿大只有九家。我的小镇仍然有六家银行。
Even with the buyouts temporarily put on hold, consolidation is inevitable because we have too many deposit takers in this country. If you count credit unions there are more than 20,000 separate institutions where we can park our money. Each one has its own advertising jingle, board of directors, auditors, software system, and headquarters. The last time I wrote about this, I mentioned the six banks in my town of 19,000 people, as compared to nine in all of Canada. My little town still has six banks.
商业银行中积累的创纪录现金水平是并购的另一个刺激因素。今天的行业看起来就像二战后的情况——银行家拥有的现金比几十年来见过的都多,却没有地方可以放贷。通过收购较小的银行和储贷机构,它们可以扩大存款基础,最终提高收益。
The record levels of cash that has piled up in the commercial banks is another stimulus to mergers. The industry today looks like it did after World War II--bankers have more cash than they've seen in decades and no place to lend it. By acquiring smaller banks and thrifts, they can expand their deposit bases and eventually increase their earnings.
所以我们看到了一个双重趋势:许多互助储蓄银行和储贷机构正在上市,而另一些则被收购。许多被收购目标对大银行有吸引力,因为它们的现金也很充裕。在我们列出的优秀候选名单中,Queens County、Pamrapo 和 Sunrise Federal 可以归入现金充裕的类别,格林波特也在此列,其惊人的 20% 的股本与资产比率。
So we're seeing a double trend: Many mutual savings banks and thrifts are going public, while others are being bought out. Many of the takeover targets are attractive to larger institutions because they, too, are full of cash. On our list of good prospects, Queens County, Pamrapo, and Sunrise Federal can be put in the cash-rich category, along with Green Point, with its incredible 20 percent equity-to-assets ratio.
你可能已经注意到,推荐名单上的七家银行来自纽约,三家来自加州。在上一份名单中,有两家来自新英格兰。我总是在从衰退中复苏的地区找到储贷机构中最划算的买卖。但你必须小心购买那些贷款拖欠率在下降,而且银行和社区或地区的健康状况正在好转而不是恶化的股票。
You may have noticed that seven of the banks on the recommended list are from New York and three from California. On the last list, two were from New England. I've always found the biggest bargains in the thrift group in regions that are recovering from recession. But you have to be careful to buy the ones where loan delinquencies are in decline, and where the situation--the health of both the bank and the community or region--is getting better and not worse.
纽约银行尤其容易被收购,因为纽约的法规使外州银行容易进行收购。无论这些收购发生在哪里,被收购的目标都是以高于账面价值的溢价被买走的。
New York banks are especially ripe for takeover, because the regulations in New York make it easy for out-of-state banks to make acquisitions. Wherever these takeovers have occurred, the target has been bought out at a premium to book value.
SNL Securities(这些人忙得很)最近做了一项研究,统计了 1993 年被大型机构收购的 16 家储蓄机构。平均收购价格是账面价值的 1.5 倍,没有一家收购价低于首次公开发行价的 300%。
SNL Securities (these people keep themselves very busy) did a recent study of the 16 thrifts acquired by larger institutions in 1993. The average acquisition price was 1.5 times book. Not a single one was acquired at a price less than 300 percent of the initial offering price for the shares.
按这个标准衡量,我们虚构的 PennyWise 银行,如果以 10 美元上市、账面价值 20 美元,它在收购中就能值 30 美元。在互助储蓄银行或储蓄机构生命周期的三个阶投中,最后一个阶段最赚钱。
By this measure, our fictional PennyWise, which went public at $10 with a $20 book value, would be worth $30 in a takeover. Of the three phases in the life of a mutual savings bank or thrift, this last one is the most rewarding of all.
去问问密西西比州哈蒂斯堡、北卡罗来纳州威尔明顿、密苏里州贝城、科罗拉多州莱克伍德、佛罗里达州新斯米尔纳海滩、肯塔基州卡温顿,或者伊利诺伊州霍姆敦、拉格兰奇和廷利帕克的居民吧。他们通过在兑现工资支票的地方投资,已经赚了三倍的钱。这才是我说的那种内线优势。
Ask the residents of Hattiesburg, Mississippi; Wilmington, North Carolina; Bay City, Missouri; Lakewood, Colorado; New Smyrna Beach, Florida; Covington, Kentucky; or Hometown, La Grange, and Tinley Park, Illinois. They've already tripled their money by investing in the places where they cash their paychecks. That's my kind of insider's edge.
KEYWORDS银行业,股票投资策略
KEYWORDSBanking Industry, Stock Investing Strategies